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An elementary course of  
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# AN ELEMENTARY COURSE

OF

# THEOLOGICAL LECTURES,

IN THREE PARTS.

## PART I.

ON THE EVIDENCES OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED.

## PART II.

ON THE CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE.

## PART III.

ON THE PECULIAR DOCTRINES OF CHRISTIANITY.

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DELIVERED IN BRISTOL COLLEGE, 1831, 1832, 1833,

BY THE

✓  
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CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, &c. &c.

VISITOR OF THE COLLEGE.

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TO THE CRITICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL PART IS APPENDED

## An Essay

ON THE GENERAL GRAMMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE  
SEMITIC LANGUAGES.

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Ἐμπρεπὲς γὰρ τοῖς ἑταιρίαν πρὸς Ἐπιστήμην θεμένοις ἐφίεσθαι μὲν τὸ ὄν  
ἰδεῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναιντο, τὴν γοῦν Εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ τὸν ἱερώτατον Λόγον, μεθ' ὃν καὶ  
τὸ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τελειότατον ἔργον τόνδε τὸν κόσμον.

*Philo-Judæus*, Ed. Mangeii, tom. i. p. 419.

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1836.



## P R E F A C E.

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To the members of the Collegiate Class, for whom these Lectures were originally composed, and to other young students who may be similarly situated, the present publication is offered, only in the unpretending, but, I am persuaded, far from useless light of a convenient manual and manuduction. As a manual, it is trusted that it will be found to contain, in a portable form, a full and faithful summary of the general heads of argument by which our Church defends the doctrines which she has embraced from a conscientious conviction that they constitute the faith once delivered to the saints. As a manuduction, according to the plain import of that expression, it is hoped that this little introduction may, as it were, *lead the student by the hand* to consult for himself the more elaborate treatises to which he will here find himself perpetually referred. On such a subject the pretension to originality would be ridiculous ; the

utmost which is here aimed at is judiciously to select, to combine in a clear arrangement, and to exhibit in what appears the most striking light, arguments of which the author has ever been desirous to indicate the original sources; and most deeply would he regret were the purposes of a *summary* so far misunderstood, as to be considered to supersede the necessity of, rather than to lead to, a fuller consultation of larger authorities. The author would especially thus recommend an attentive perusal of the admirable Treatise of Dr. Pye Smith on the Scripture Testimony to the Messiah; and this he the more readily does, from the circumstance that that writer, though agreeing in every essential of doctrine, is yet in discipline unconnected with the Establishment, and may therefore by many be considered to exercise a freer and more unbiassed judgment.

But at the same time that the author is thus ready to disclaim every pretension to originality, he trusts that this very avowal may also exonerate him from what would involve an employment to him most painful,—the probability that in consequence of the office of Theological Lecturer, which he has thus endeavoured to discharge, he might become engaged in any personal controversy; but this he trusts he shall assuredly escape, inasmuch as it must be obvious that any who may conscientiously dissent from the arguments here adduced, would far better



employ their time in the endeavour to refute those arguments in the works where they are most fully developed, than by attacking them as briefly produced in a short summary like the present, where they may often, perhaps, be stripped of much which constitutes an essential part of their force, so that apparent success against the weaker outworks would still leave the main strength of the position unassailed. At all events, this conviction may fairly exempt the author from the task of engaging in rejoinder under any circumstances.

With reference to the more immediate occasion of the course of Theological Lectures, of which a new edition is now submitted to the public, it is only necessary to premise the following short notice. It having been considered desirable to found at Bristol a Collegiate Institution for superior education, it was determined to place that establishment on the most extensively useful and liberal basis; and, therefore, impartial admission to all the advantages it offers was conceded, without distinction, to the members of different religious communities. At the same time, a large portion of the Council (being members of the Established Church) felt it their duty in no manner to neglect the providing sufficient means for the religious instruction of the Pupils belonging to the same in the tenets of that Church. To this effect the Seventh Article of the general constitution of the College declares "That the Institution shall be open to Students of all religious denominations with-

out preference or distinction ; but that it shall be competent to a committee, consisting of those members of the Council who are also members of the Church of England, to institute lectures and provide instruction in Theology, under such regulations as they shall determine on." To carry the latter part of this Article into effect, a special committee has been accordingly organized, and has adopted the following Resolutions.

"That the Course of Theological Instruction be conducted according to the following outline:—

"1.—The evidence and doctrine and natural religion, as deduced by inference from the works of nature, from the phenomena of the human mind, and from the circumstances of mankind. The text-books of this part of the course may be the works of Derham and Paley on Natural Theology, and the Analogy of Bishop Butler.

"2.—The evidences of Christianity ; taking as text-books the works of Paley, Chalmers, and Less, on this subject.

"3.—A brief survey of biblical criticism, upon the basis of the lectures and translations of Bishop Marsh, or at least the second volume of the Introduction to the Critical Study of the Scriptures by the Rev. Hartwell Horne.

"4.—Scriptural Archæology, with sacred and Ecclesiastical History.

"5.—The doctrines of the Church of England.

"6.—The most important principles relative to Church Discipline.

"The course, or any of the sections, will be open to all Students who may feel disposed to attend ; and examinations on the subject of each section will take place periodically."

It must be unnecessary to remind the members of the College, (and the statement may probably be uninteresting to all besides,) that the author, in the

infancy of the establishment which had honoured him with the title of its Visitor, merely volunteered to supply *pro tempore*, and of course gratuitously, the office of Theological Lecturer, until arrangements could be made for placing that appointment on a permanent footing.

It is scarcely necessary to make any remarks on the order of the topics discussed in the course of Lectures comprised in this and my former publication. That order must be in a great measure the same in any elementary system of Theological instruction. And in the present case the individual topics, and method of their arrangement, were officially recommended to me by the outline laid down in the resolutions of the Committee which founded these Lectures. It has been already seen to comprise,—1. The Evidence and Doctrine of Natural Religion, as deduced from the works of nature, &c. I have endeavoured to sketch the great outlines of this branch in the second Lecture of Part I.; the first having been devoted to a preliminary introduction on the connection between General and Theological education, illustrated by remarks on such an application of classical literature.

2. The Evidences of Christianity. These, after a connecting survey of Butler's argument from the analogy between the truths disclosed by natural and revealed religion, are recapitulated in the third Lecture of Part I.

3. A brief survey of Biblical Criticism, on the basis of the Lectures and Translations of Bishop Marsh, &c. This suggestion I have endeavoured to fulfil in the second part of this course, in the Lectures on the Inspiration of the Holy Scripture, the Determination of the Genuine Text, and on the Means and Rules of Scriptural Interpretation, or Hermeneutics.

I have next, neglecting the 4th branch, Ecclesiastical History, as rather suited to private reading and instruction than to the object of general lectures like the present, proceeded at once to

5. The Doctrines of the Church of England,—a subject which engrosses the remaining six lectures, constituting the third part of the course. And here, after an introductory essay on the Mysteriousness of certain Doctrines of the Christian Religion (Lecture I. Part III.), I have considered the views entertained by our Church concerning the nature of Christianity as a remedial dispensation, as the foundation of the whole doctrinal system. I have therefore examined the necessity of that remedy as arising from the alienation of man's moral condition (Lecture II.) and the nature of that remedy itself, or the scheme of the Christian Atonement (Lecture III.) The Scriptural Evidence on which our Church holds herself bound to confide in and adore her Redeemer as her Lord and her God, is comprehensively detailed in Lectures IV. and V., and the



subject of the Personality and Influences of the Holy Spirit, has afforded the materials for the concluding lecture. If I shall be found to have elucidated these great doctrines in a satisfactory manner, I apprehend every member of our Church will agree that I have accurately selected those cardinal points of her system which she has ever regarded as primarily essential.

In the course of these Lectures I have ever endeavoured to keep in mind that my auditory consisted principally of adult youth engaged in cultivating the higher branches of education. I well remember, from my own experience, the eager spirit of inquiry which characterizes the mind at such a season of life under such circumstances, and the tone and spirit of the discussion which it then requires for its satisfaction; and to meet the demands thus imposed has been my great aim. For the same reasons, in the hope of exciting in such minds a more lively interest, I have, throughout the Course, entered somewhat more freely into the scientific, literary, and critical disquisitions which bore in any manner on the subjects treated of, than might have otherwise been expected in a work so merely elementary. This will account for the introduction of such discussions as have been thrown together in the Appendices subjoined to each part. Convinced also that the minds of youth were often keenly and painfully sensible of the difficulties op-

posed to commonly received opinions, and must, from the wide diffusion of information, be generally acquainted with the objections popularly urged against those opinions, I have never intentionally shrunk from openly and fairly canvassing those difficulties and objections. I have often felt the want of a work addressed in such a tone to the feelings of the youthful inquirer. I dare not, indeed, flatter myself that the present feeble attempt can be considered as having materially supplied that deficiency ; but if in any degree it may be regarded as having contributed to do so, I shall most assuredly never have reason to regret any labour which its composition may have cost me.

I would wish to add a few words concerning one digression, which might otherwise be considered as a somewhat irrelevant interpolation in a course of Theological Lectures ; I mean the insertion, as an Appendix to the philological and critical part of the Course, of a detailed Essay on the Grammatical Principles of the Hebrew and kindred Oriental Tongues. Deeply impressed with the importance of an acquaintance with those tongues, and earnestly desirous to see this considered as an essential branch of theological instruction, I felt it desirable, in presenting this volume to my collegiate class, to accompany it with some contribution tending to facilitate their acquisition of an attainment which I had so warmly recommended to their attention. I felt con-

vinced also that much light might be thrown on a subject often regarded as obscure, and much interest excited in a pursuit too commonly neglected as dry, by applying the general grammatical principles elicited by that careful examination of the mechanism of different languages which constitutes the true science of Comparative Philology. This science, which involves the whole philosophy of language, has been warmly and successfully cultivated by the Germans, undoubtedly the most learned of nations, but has been unaccountably neglected in this island, where, with the exception of the late universal Dr. Young, and my almost equally active friend Dr. Pritchard, I have scarcely known any persons who have devoted to this most important subject the attention it deserves<sup>1</sup>.

As I have endeavoured to introduce as many of the general principles and most striking results of this science as possible in a condensed form, it seems probable that these parts of my essay may present views perfectly novel to the greater part of my

<sup>1</sup> It will be remembered that I am here speaking of systematic writers on *comparative* Philology ;—for in the more particular branches of Philology, especially in the oriental tongues, England has just reason to be proud of the most distinguished names—*e. g.* In Sanscrit, Wilkins, Colebroke, Wilson, Naughton ; in Hinduwee, Marshman and Carey ; in Hebrew, Arabic and Persian, Lee and Lumsden ; in Chinese, Morrison ; in Pali, Hough ; in Malay, Marsden ; and a host of other labourers, who have done much, though they may not have attained the eminent standard of the above.

readers ; and if I may judge of other minds from my own, those views can scarcely fail to open a new and rich source of interest. The plan pursued in the concluding portion of this essay is, I believe, perfectly original ; I mean the application of the mathematical doctrine of probabilities to the investigation of the question to what extent the coincidences detected between different languages can be fairly attributed to casual resemblance, and to what point they become satisfactory evidence of original connexion. I need not add, that whenever such mathematical reasoning can be applied, it affords the only means of rendering doubt absurd and dissent ridiculous.



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ON  
THE EVIDENCES  
OF  
NATURAL & REVEALED RELIGION.

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LECTURE I.

ON THE RIGHT APPLICATION OF CLASSICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION TO THE PURPOSES OF THEOLOGICAL INSTRUCTION.

IT is altogether impossible that I should for the first time address the members and friends of such an Institution as that before me, on such an occasion as the present, without feelings of the highest gratification: every patriotic sentiment must lead me to rejoice generally in the rise of Institutions calculated to promote the best interests of society by the diffusion of the superior branches of useful knowledge, and the extension of the opportunities of a well regulated education. Of these Institutions, indeed, we may confidently anticipate the success, inasmuch as they are not the feeble creations of any visionary projects, but called into existence as absolutely required by the necessities and demands arising from the actual state of society; and thus originate from circumstances of demand precisely similar to those



which, in that marked though partial outburst of literary aspiration which distinguished the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (an era which may justly dispute with the fifteenth the honourable title of that of the revival of learning), crowded with eager pupils the popular lectures of Abelard at Paris, of the Croyland monks at Cambridge, and of Vacarius<sup>1</sup> at Oxford,—and thus appear to have laid the foundations of those celebrated Universities, if we endeavour to disentangle their authentic history from the mass of fabulous matter beneath which it hath been obscured. Far from us be any pretensions of rivalry with those venerable and illustrious establishments: but we may surely, without presumption, draw from the analogy I have pointed out, the hope that our Institution also will be found among those which, to borrow the words of a philosophical historian, “Society by a sort of elective attraction seems to

<sup>1</sup> It has been indeed often asserted, that Alfred restored the schools of Oxford, which according to this account had an earlier Britannic celebrity. A passage in Parker's edition of the contemporary biography of Alfred, by Asser, affords the foundation of this assertion: but the most recent critical examinations have left no doubt of the interpolation of the passage in question, as will be rendered fully evident whenever the anxiously expected critical edition of the early monuments of our history, now preparing under the superintendence of Mr. Petrie, shall see the light. The archæology of our Universities at one period particularly engaged my attention; and I have never found any claim to an antiquity earlier than the close of the twelfth century, which would bear the test of critical examination. The Chronicle of Ingulph of Croyland, indeed, appears to allude to the schools of Oxford in the time of Edward the Confessor; but an able writer in the Quarterly Review for June 1826, has sufficiently exposed the spuriousness of this composition.

select from among the many objects presented to it, as having an affinity with it, and easily combining with it, in its state at the time<sup>1</sup>."

But if such considerations lead me generally to rejoice in the rise of similar Institutions,—in that established in *this City* I cannot but feel peculiar interest. The memory of many gratifying friendships here formed, of much cordial kindness here experienced, during the years of my residence in the neighbourhood,—must engage all my warmest feelings in favour of objects which appear so well calculated to advance the intellectual character of this important city.

But above all, I have (as I have said) peculiar gratification in addressing you on the present occasion; because the purpose for which we are now assembled proves, that while we are properly engaged in cultivating the noblest faculties which the Father of all Lights has bestowed on the creatures whom his all-wise and all-bountiful Providence hath made partakers of the most excellent gift of reason,—no culpable neglect has been suffered to render our designs imperfect in that which, properly considered, ought to form their great final aim. The very object indeed which has now brought us together, is to direct that reason towards its highest pursuit, the knowledge of its Divine Author; the object for which, as the great apostle forcibly reminded the most intellectual people of antiquity, "God created of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth,—determining the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, that they should

<sup>1</sup> Mackintosh's History of England, vol. i. p. 246.

seek the Lord if haply they might feel after him and find him." As connected with your classical studies I may indeed remind you, that the most illustrious philosopher of the people thus addressed, while under the light of natural reason alone, and even when most warmly urging the necessity of separating the great principles of religion, (which He, who hath never left himself entirely without a witness in the minds of his creatures, hath implanted in that reason,) from the absurd and impure mixture of mythological fable :—I may, I say, remind you, that this leading philosopher most earnestly inculcated the necessity of making these religious principles the very basis of every sound system of education, which could qualify its pupils for properly discharging any of the political obligations of civil society. And I may cite an interesting example of the manner in which these dictates of a sound philosophy became heightened by the influence of Revelation, from a distinguished writer of Alexandria, who, to an intimate acquaintance with the speculations of the philosopher just quoted, added the faith which he inherited from Abraham, to whose race he belonged : I mean Philo Judæus, a contemporary of our Blessed Lord, from the pure source of whose doctrines I cannot resist the persuasion (so obviously suggested by his language) that he had also drunk. This writer has the following passage, of which the very words seem expressly and remarkably applicable to Institutions like the present.

“ It is proper for persons who form themselves into a Society for the advancement of knowledge, to long to behold the Supreme Being ; and, since he

cannot be discerned, to study his image the most sacred Word [by whom he has revealed himself to us], and, in due subordination to him, the most perfect work among the objects of sense, this universe.”—*Philo Judæus*, lib. ix.

And thus may our endeavours to advance the noble cause of intellectual instruction, and to afford the rational powers of our pupils a scientific and literary cultivation adequate for their full development, be exalted, and, if I may so speak, sanctified, by our including in our aims, the acquisition of that higher and heavenly knowledge to which, assuredly, every rightly understood system of the education of immortal beings ought to be rendered subservient. There is, indeed, a natural analogy between the state of moral and preparatory discipline under which mortals are placed in this probationary scene as introductory to a future stage of being, and the *education* which prepares the youth for the purposes of the man. Ought we then ever to suffer this, our preliminary stage of instruction, to be destitute of all direction to the great ultimate end of our being? This surely must, to right reason, ever appear its highest as well as holiest object.

There is a strict accordancy also between the most important subjects of instruction to which our establishment can be devoted, and their application to the great truths of religion: for if we turn to Natural Science, or Classical Literature,—who can read aright the great volume of Nature, without pausing at every page to admire, with the full devotion of every faculty, the splendid and countless proofs of design; the myriad combinations, each

regulated by consummate wisdom and directed by infinite benevolence, which they everywhere exhibit? Insensible must that mind be, and incapable of every high and expansive thought, which can intelligently survey these works of creation, and not be led to adore Him, "whose goodness beyond thought and power divine" all these proclaim. But I have advisedly used the phrase, "intelligently survey;" for although these glorious works speak plainly to all, even to the uneducated; though there be no tongue nor language whither their voice hath not gone forth,—yet undoubtedly much of the irresistible force of the inferences to be derived from them, must be comparatively lost to minds which have not been opened by Scientific Instruction. Again, as to Classical Literature; what more interesting field of inquiry does it present to us, than that important chapter in the history of the human mind—the philosophical speculations of the various schools of antiquity? But where, also, can we better discover the natural aspirations and requisitions of that mind, its wants and its weakness, and the hopeless obscurity, on the most important points, of the best reason unassisted by revelation, than where we see the most splendid examples of that reason,—thus finding no end, "in wandering mazes lost." For even when we find them laying down as the very fundamental principle of their systems, the existence of a Divine Mind, and justly reprobating the fictions of the vulgar and poetical mythology as palpably false and unworthy of the gods,—and cannot therefore suppose for a moment that they placed any faith in these gross absurdities; still less will the accurate observer



find any proofs that they entertained those pure and just conceptions of the Deity, or of that hope full of immortality, so earnestly sought after by the soul, which (however the enemies of Christianity may pretend that they, in common with ourselves, derived from the light of nature), it is certain that Revelation alone has developed to the understanding of man. Those scholars who have most critically and minutely examined the various doctrines of these philosophical sects, are the most fully aware of this deficiency<sup>1</sup>. It may be reckoned, indeed, as one of the most striking instances of the insufficiency of mere human reason, that often, when they appear in the writings they have left us to come the nearest to that knowledge, then the light which has guided them to the confines of truth suddenly quits them, and they are again lost in darkness, a darkness which could only be illumined by the bright sun of that Revelation.

The necessity of such a revelation, indeed, the ablest among them seem clearly to have admitted; candidly acknowledging their consciousness of the infirmity and insufficiency of human reason. There is a remarkable passage to this effect in Plato's report of the interesting discourse of Socrates on the Immortality of the Soul. One of the interlocutors is made to observe,—that since on a subject of such

<sup>1</sup> On the subject of the imperfect views concerning the Deity, entertained by the ancient philosophical sects, I would especially refer to that most able and elaborate investigation of them, Meiner's very interesting tract "*De Vero Deo.*" A full account of their real tenets, as to a future state, may be found in Warburton's *Divine Legation of Moses*.

moment so much doubt prevailed, our utmost efforts should be directed to the investigation and discovery of truth; but that since success in this seemed impossible, we could only select the most plausible of human opinions, and embarking in these as in a vessel, thus navigate amid the perils of life—"Unless, indeed," (mark this especially,) "any one might be enabled to proceed with less liability to failure and danger, as in a more secure vehicle, *by means of some divine communication.*" (Platonis Phædo. ed. Serr. i. p. 85.) Perhaps a still more striking instance of the same kind occurs at the conclusion of the Dialogue on Prayer. In the course of this, Socrates has been introduced expatiating, with much justice of sentiment, on the truth afterwards briefly enounced by an Apostle, "that we know not what to pray for as we ought;" and he winds up his statement in such a manner as to show how strongly he felt the necessity of what the same authority was commissioned to proclaim, the gift of a heavenly Spirit to help our infirmities in this respect: "Seeing then," says he, "that it cannot be safe for thee to come to God in prayer, lest, listening to thy service as a vain profanation, he should refuse to receive such a sacrifice, and additional injury alone should result,—it seems to me most advisable to continue in silence till we may clearly learn what disposition towards God and man are most fitting." "But when (it is asked,) when shall that time arrive? and who is he that shall so instruct us? for most gladly would we behold who that man may be." "He it is," is the answer, "who regardeth thee with tender care: but it seemeth to me that, as Homer represents Minerva to have removed from

the eyes of Diomedes their mortal mist, and thus to have enabled him

‘ With piercing glance the varied field to scan,  
And view with clear discernment God and man,’—

even so must this Instructor remove the darkness from thy soul, that it may be directed to really beneficial objects, and enabled rightly to discern between good and evil, which is beyond its present power.” “O may he,” rejoins the Disciple, “may he, if he be willing, remove this darkness, and every other hindrance, for I am fully persuaded to evade none of his ordinances, whosoever this instructor may be, provided only I may be rendered more virtuous by his influence.”—“Yea, wonderful indeed,” concludes Socrates, “is the loving regard which he beareth towards thee.”—(Alcibiades II. Plat. ed. Serr. ii. p. 150.)

Thus far could a keen sense of the wants, weakness, and ignorance of our nature, open the eyes of those in whom the greatest powers of that nature were most fully developed, to some foresight, as it would seem, of the only means by which those wants could be supplied, that weakness strengthened, that ignorance enlightened. Must we not feel, then, when we look back on the earnest aspirations of such minds impressed, with a grateful sense of our superior advantages; “for, verily, many of the most illustrious of our race have desired to see those things which we see, and have not seen them : and to hear those things which we hear, and have not heard them <sup>1</sup>.”

<sup>1</sup> A passage from the beginning of the 2nd Book of Plato's Republic, which contains a striking picture of a just man ex-

Under the influence of the views which I have endeavoured to lay before you, many of the friends of this establishment have judged it right to provide for the Course of Theological instruction which I am thus called upon to open ; and from the principles of the Special Committee, whose delegate I am, this provision is made with an especial reference to the members of that particular religious communion, into whose ministry I have myself entered,—with feeble powers indeed ; but I trust with the fullest and sincerest conviction of my best judgment.

In this Preliminary Address, then, I will generally state the order of the Course, and incorporate a

posed to calumny, persecution, and death, has sometimes been inconsiderately quoted, and without proper attention to the context in which it stands, in terms which almost seem to represent it as directly prophetic of the great fundamental fact of our religion, or at least as implying an intimate acquaintance with the 53rd of Isaiah. But judiciously considered, the passage will, I think, appear only a natural illustration of his argument.—Having laid down Justice as the foundation of his Republic, it becomes necessary accurately to investigate the essential nature and properties of that virtue ; it must therefore be distinguished from the hypocritical pretences of those whose aim is *to seem*, rather than *to be*, virtuous ; the superiority of the sincerely and abstractedly just man is strongly insisted on, who of course must, to illustrate his essential character, be considered stripped of all external advantages, and even reputation (which might otherwise seem his real objects.) An objector is supposed to inquire, What if your abstractedly just man should be calumniated, scourged, tortured, bound, have his eyes burnt out, and be impaled,—would you not admit, amidst his calamities, that he would have acted more reasonably in preferring the *videri* to the *esse* ? Of course such an objection requires only to be stated to be refuted.

few introductory observations on its several leading topics.

We necessarily commence with the Evidences of Natural Religion;—thence we proceed to the striking analogy between the truths thus learnt concerning the natural government of the universe by the Deity, and those which Revelation hath made known concerning his moral and spiritual government of his reasonable creatures. We shall then enter on the more particular evidences of that Revelation,—both external, as derived from the historical certainty of the miracles wrought for its confirmation, and the fulfilment of the prophecies which it comprises; and internal, as derived from the doctrine which it inculcates. This last subject will naturally lead us to the exposition of the view of those doctrines embraced by our Church:—*our* Church, I say; for it must be remembered that none are now *necessarily* present who are not members of that communion; and whom those to whose authority Providence hath delegated the guardianship of their youth, do not wish to train up in its principles. Should any others accidentally hear me, they will, I trust, hear me in the spirit of charity, as it will be my own earnest endeavour and prayer to speak in that spirit: they will allow, I hope, that we,—being deeply convinced that in these principles our Church is built on the foundation of the apostles and the prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone,—could not, without a gross dereliction of our duty, fail to inculcate them on you, our Christian brethren; in order that ye also may, as the apostle adds, “be builded together in him, for an habitation of God through the



Spirit.” As to the temper in which I would, on my part, endeavour to discharge this solemn duty, may I always be enabled to keep in mind the admirable cautions of one, who is himself far the ablest champion in the present day of the doctrines I would advocate, although being separated by some minor questions of discipline comparatively immaterial, he walketh not entirely with us,—I mean that most accomplished scholar and acute reasoner, Dr. Pye Smith.

This writer represents the want of just respect to the persons of opponents, and of fair and honest representation of their sentiments and arguments, as the great fault in theological controversy; and reprobates it with severe abhorrence. “This delinquency,” says he, “is of no light guilt before man, and in the sight of the righteous God. It is at least the offspring of ignorance and prejudice, and it never fails to inflict deep injury on the cause which has the misfortune to be so defended. ‘A servant of the Lord ought not to strive’ in angry contention, ‘but to be gentle to all; apt to teach, patient of wrong, in meekness instructing the opposers.’ Nothing can justify the misrepresentation of a doctrine or an argument, or an inference, charged upon those whose opinions we controvert, nor ought we to allow a moment’s countenance to calumnies against character. In acknowledging what is excellent and praiseworthy in an adversary, an honourable and Christian mind will feel a pleasure the greater because he is an adversary. The love of truth, as to Christian doctrine, cannot be genuine and consistent, if not conjoined with the practice of truth in our sentiments and feelings towards our fellow-

creatures. If, with regard to any religious errors, it be our serious persuasion that they subvert the very foundations of holiness and hope, and that the unhappy persons who embrace them are placed under grave spiritual disadvantages; the proper concomitant of this distressing conviction will be, a tender care that we do nothing tending to fortify their prejudices, or to put an additional stumbling-block in their way. If, by any want of equity and Christian dispositions, we repel and alienate them from the truth which must be received that men be saved, we sin most awfully against God; and have we not reason to expect, that ‘their blood will be required at our hands’?”—(Smith’s Scrip. Test. to Messiah, i. 62.)

But to proceed. I have stated that our Course will of necessity commence with the Evidences of Natural Theology. Incomplete as it is in itself, and introductory only to the fuller light of Revelation, still it is in one sense prior in *order*. As the apostle argues, “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him,” a general apprehension of those great primary truths, the existence of a Deity and of his moral government of the universe, constitutes what may be called an elementary faith, lying at the very root of all further faith; a point obvious as it is, yet, I am persuaded, often practically overlooked by those who, with the best intentions, are vainly labouring at the superstructure, when they ought to be laying the first foundations, and inculcating the higher and peculiar points of Christian faith, when this previous and elementary faith yet requires to be formed, or at

least to be firmly established. Now the great advantage, as I take it, of having acquired the habit of looking “through Nature up to Nature’s God,” is, that He is there as it were presented to us at every turn; the conviction of His being forces itself upon us from every surrounding object; and this is especially the case when the mind is otherwise employed on the most engaging and elevating objects of its knowledge. When Science unfolds to it the great system of the universe, the admirable adaptation of all its parts, the multiplicity of ends which all its general laws fulfil, and the exquisite artifice of all the living frames that move and have their being therein; and while one great conclusion irresistibly flows from all,—must not an habitual feeling of devotion in every well constituted mind be thus associated, and as it were identified, with the most gratifying exercise of its highest faculties? How well has a writer (who stands at present first in the ranks of science, to which he is alike endeared by his paternal name and his own) remarked, that although “No doubt the testimony of natural reason on whatever exercised, must of necessity stop short of those truths which it is the object of Revelation to make known; still it places the existence and personal attributes of the Deity on such grounds, as to render doubts absurd, and atheism ridiculous.”—(Herschel’s Discourse on Nat. Phil.)

Reserving then for its more appropriate station in the prosecution of the argument which I have now commenced, our introductory survey of the peculiar evidences and doctrinal character of the Christian Revelation, I shall devote the next division to the

general development of the argument suggested by the proofs of design and intelligence evinced in the works of creation.

Now that this argument is in any way inappropriate to our present theological course, can be considered only by those who forget that an inspired apostle hath expressly appealed to it, when he declares, "that the invisible things of the Deity from the creation of the world are clearly understood from the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." On this subject I would only add a short quotation from a Father of the Church, whose warm devotional feelings and deep experience of the vital influence of religion have ever given a peculiar weight to his authority with those of congenial sentiments; I mean Saint Augustin.

"Far is it from vain and idle," saith he, "to contemplate the beauty of the heavens, the order of the stars, the lustre of light, the vicissitudes of day and night, the monthly course of the moon, the temperature of the seasons, the immense abundance of seeds reproducing species and individuals, each preserving its proper generic nature and condition. For in this contemplation a vain and perishable curiosity is not to be exercised, but an advance is to be made towards objects immortal and perpetually enduring. For it is not the authority of the divine books alone which proclaims a God; but every argument from things surrounding us, and to which we ourselves bear relation, attests it likewise; since Universal Nature declares itself to have proceeded from a supremely excellent Creator, whose Eternity is under-

stood from its perpetuity ; his Omnipotence from its greatness ; his Wisdom from its order and disposition ; and his Goodness from its government<sup>1</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> August. de Verâ Relig. cap. 28 : de Trinitate, l. 15, c. 3 ; et super Ioan.

## LECTURE II.

ON THE NATURAL EVIDENCES OF THEOLOGY AS DEDUCED  
FROM THE SEVERAL BRANCHES OF SCIENCE.

IN continuing the subject opened in my last Address, it becomes my present duty to enter upon an introductory survey of the general nature of those evidences of religion to which it will be the business of the present Course to direct your attention. And first, as preliminary in point of order and method, we have to examine those countless attestations which the universal design pervading the whole frame of nature bears to the existence of a great intelligent First Cause. The short outline indeed which I can now offer, will I doubt not be much more ably filled up by those whom I am most happy to have as my colleagues in this duty, who will no doubt direct your attention to the larger and more elaborate treatises of Ray, Derham, and Paley, on this most interesting subject<sup>1</sup>. Some general and preliminary notice however seems to me to constitute the most natural and proper introduction to our present Theo-

<sup>1</sup> Had the very valuable series of Bridgewater treatises which have appeared at various intervals (all however subsequently to the original publication of the first edition of these Lectures), existed at the time, I should have especially referred to these. In perusing them I have been very generally gratified by finding the views taken of the several topics very similar to those which I have here submitted, although, of course, far more elaborately developed: I shall have frequent occasion to refer in the notes of this edition to the extension of our arguments thus afforded.



logical Course ; and the opportunity of casting a general glance, however slight, over subjects so calculated to draw out all our highest faculties to their utmost stretch in admiration and adoration, is so gratifying to every feeling of my mind, as to lead me irresistibly forward.

I have to begin, then, with pointing out the general line of argument to be drawn from our scientific examination of the works and laws of Nature as they are usually called ; but which, as we shall see in every place and at every moment, proclaim in terms not to be overlooked or misunderstood, the great Author of Nature. When we see all around, myriads and myriads of combinations which it would be utterly ridiculous, and against every principle of reason and philosophy, to ascribe to chance, continually presenting themselves ; all directed by the most exquisite skill to ends the most extensively beneficial ; it is absolutely impossible for any sane mind to doubt of the Intelligence which has arranged, and which perpetually governs those combinations ; and the whole doctrine of final causes stands forth in its full lustre. Narrow and very ill-informed views may sometimes indeed have led to the overlooking these causes, as if less directly connected with science ; but in truth, the *final causes* are generally much more strictly and fully within our cognisance than the *efficient or material causes* of nature. What may be the material essence of light, or in what manner it can affect our senses through the medium of our nerves, we are, and must probably ever remain, ignorant : but the useful ends for which it was necessary that we should thus become acquainted with the

external objects of nature, we know full well. In proceeding, I shall at present attempt only to take the briefest general survey of the abundant illustrations of these final causes, which every branch of science you can pursue presents.

#### DYNAMICS.

At the first portal of Science is placed the mathematical investigation of the primary laws of matter and motion, or what are called Dynamics. Now here we have to observe the universal application of these laws, and the infinite multiplicity of ends attained by the efficiency of a few simple principles; to the action of which, therefore, the whole frame of nature, throughout all its parts, must be nicely adjusted; the physical constitution of all its masses, and the mechanical structure of every living frame it contains, requiring to be regulated in exact accordance with them. One of our poets has observed, not more beautifully than philosophically, that—

“ The very law that moulds a tear,  
And bids it trickle from its source,  
That law maintains the world a sphere,  
And guides the planets in their course.”

The wing of the meanest and minutest insect which the passing breeze wafts by us, even those which man requires the aid of the microscope to enable him to discern, must have its muscular powers, and the mechanism by which they act, as exquisitely adjusted to the operation of those laws in the medium in which it lives and moves and has its being, as the grand mass of Jupiter majestically sailing, surrounded

by its attendant moons, through the vast plains of æther.

#### ASTRONOMY.

Astronomy, however, undoubtedly affords the most sublime exemplification of these laws, and that which has in every age been considered as affording the noblest illustration of the wisdom and power of the great First Cause. To this the inspired Psalmist repeatedly alludes in his loftiest and warmest devotional strains. He informs us that, “the words of these heavenly bodies had gone out to the ends of the world, and there was no tongue or language where their voice was not heard ;” and even so shall we find that it was from hence that those unblest with Revelation were enabled to approximate most nearly to some just conceptions of the Divine attributes. Classical antiquity has bequeathed to us no finer address to the Deity than the Hymn of Cleanthes the Stoic, in which we read,—

Σοι μὲν πας ὁδε κόσμος ἐλίσσόμενος περὶ γαίαν  
Πειθεται ἢ κεν ἀγῆς, καὶ ἔκων ὑπὸ Σειο κρατεῖται.

“This circling universe, its willing way  
Bends where thou biddst, and worlds thy Word obey.”

Here the first remarkable instance of design and contrivance is the exactly adjusting the projectile force which impels every planet in its course, to the attractive power which draws it towards the central sun, in that single proportion which enables these forces by their composition to produce orbits very nearly circular : as we know that the one of these forces (gravitation) varies in each planet, the other

(the projectile force) must of course vary also. In each instance, out of the infinite possible number of combinations of these forces, but one would produce the ellipses of small eccentricity which are actually described, and of the great advantages of which, in regulating the seasons, we are well aware in our own case, and may extend our inferences as far as analogy warrants our believing that the beings inhabiting the planetary system generally are at all of similar nature. Now, that the frequent recurrence of this particular combination is by no means the result of any physical necessity of the case, is evident, from the orbits which have been ascertained to belong to the comets, which occasionally in one part of their path approach so nearly to the sun as to be heated two thousand times more than red-hot iron: and in another become so remote, as to view the sun only as we do a fixed star, and to derive scarcely more of light or heat from his beams.

Now assuredly it were too hasty to conclude that even such conditions preclude every modification of life. Undoubtedly it were more agreeable to all that we know of the dispensations of Him who filleth all space with things living, and all things living with his goodness, to believe that the infinite treasures of his wisdom may also have provided creatures calculated to endure even these extreme circumstances; or have (as we see done in many known instances) allayed and mitigated them by some secret compensations, so as to have rendered them tolerable<sup>1</sup>. Still

<sup>1</sup> Thus we know the heat imparted by the solar beams to vary with the rarefaction or condensation of the surrounding atmosphere: rarefied air (as we experience on the summits of moun-

we here see, at any rate, how nicely the constitution of the creatures inhabiting our own planet is adjusted to its path, a path evidently impressed upon it by design; for, as I have said, it is one only out of millions of possible combinations, which could have impressed on our own globe the course which bringeth the regular return of its seasons, crowning the year with the goodness of Him who ordained this orbit, which might else by very many equally possible chances have deviated even into a comet's course, at once destructive of every creature that moves and every plant that blossoms, as they now exist.

Another instance of the adjustment of forces, though by no means confined within such narrow

tain chains) having its capacity for heat so increased as to absorb and render latent large supplies of it, which in a condensed state it readily emits and imparts to surrounding objects. Now we may infer from the phænomena of their tails, that the atmospheres of comets are greatly rarefied at their perihelion; so that they may perhaps there absorb and conceal much of the heat, which, being equally condensed in the aphelion, may be thus given out when most required. But it is little safe to speculate on a subject, concerning which, in the present state of our knowledge, all our conclusions remain so purely hypothetical, as is the case with regard to the nature and constitution of those singular appendages; which occasionally (as in the Comet of 1680) have been known to expand to the enormous length of twenty millions of leagues, within the short space of two days. As recent observations have demonstrated that even the nuclei of most comets have no real solidity, but are in truth mere vapours in an extreme state of attenuation, we are indeed little able to conceive any forms of animal life capable of subsisting in such an habitation; but still it is admitted by Herschel, that in some a very minute stellar point has been seen, indicating the existence of a solid body.

limits as the former, may I think be observed in the so regulating the velocity of the rotation of each planet on its own axis, that the centrifugal force thence resulting, can never exceed such a proportion as leaves it still easily controlled by the gravitation arising from the mass of the same planet. For instance, in our own planet, the velocity of rotation is such as carries with it any body situated at the equator 1042 miles every hour, or rather more than a quarter of a mile in a second. But had this velocity been increased about twenty times, so as to produce a motion of five miles in a second, (the mass of the earth, and consequently its attraction of gravitation remaining the same,) we know that the centrifugal force thence resulting would be sufficient to detach any bodies which might be loosened, causing them to revolve like satellites;—a gale of wind might, under such circumstances, carry off the roofs of our mansions and every thing which could be torn loose.

But the most beautiful extension of the doctrine of final causes has been disclosed by those extraordinary and elaborate researches, through which our theory of Physical Astronomy has received its full development and perfection, and the mechanism of the heavens, as it has been appropriately termed, laid open to our admiring inspection. Now if we consider it, and consider it justly to be the grand triumph and noblest boast of man's reasoning powers, thus to have unravelled a portion of that universal mechanism,—how must we conceive of that intellect which planned, executed, and sustains the whole! of which the specimen visible and cognisable by us,



forms probably but an infinitesimal fraction!—But to return. That great inventive mind which firmly laid the whole foundations of this sublime science, and in every respect pointed out to his successors the true methods of investigation to be pursued, still left his grand system in parts incomplete. It is truly wonderful indeed, that the transient life of one man (especially when it is remembered that from the probable exhaustion of an overworn mind he was compelled to suspend his researches at an age by no means advanced); it is wonderful, I say, that his span of intellectual energy should have sufficed to have accomplished one-half of what Newton did perform, rather than surprising that he should have left it to others to complete a portion of the superstructure which has given its full dimensions and compact solidity to that magnificent Temple of Nature (or rather let me again say of the God of Nature) which his mind conceived and his hands mostly erected. Newton in his investigations had become completely aware of the perturbing forces arising from the interfering attractions of the planets on each other, which affect and appear to threaten the permanent stability of the system. He was, indeed, inclined to believe, that these perturbations were such as to render it necessary that the Deity should from time to time, directly, and as it were miraculously, interfere (without the intervention of those general and ordinary laws of secondary means which his wisdom at first appointed) in order to rectify these disturbances, and to prevent the system from being hurried by them into disorder and destruction. But far more sublime, and more worthy of the great Creator,

seem to me the views opened by the more recent discoveries of science, which, in pursuing to its full results, and perfecting in all its details the Newtonian theory, have established that He has from the beginning secured by a most exquisite and never to be shaken arrangement, the permanent stability of all the parts of the system : that when at the first he spoke the word and they were made ; when he originally commanded, and they were created ; by that same word he made them fast for ever and ever, and gave them a law which never shall be broken. For by fully tracing out the universal power of gravitation through all its abstruse combinations, it has at length been completely demonstrated, that all the anomalies in our system are what are called secular variations, that is, periodical inequalities, oscillating only within fixed and narrow limits ; and destined, after running through a certain course, to return by a fixed appointment of nature into the same order. And that the great points of the mean distances (from the sun) and mean motions (or revolutions) of the planets being constantly invariable, all permanent and destructive effects from the disturbing causes are thus overruled, and even in the midst of seeming danger, stability is established on the securest basis. Now, as an able exponent of these discoveries has excellently observed <sup>1</sup>, “ When we consider the provision thus made by Nature for the stability and permanence of the planetary system, an important question arises, Whether is this stability necessary or contingent ? the effect of an unavoidable or an arbitrary arrange-

<sup>1</sup> Playfair.

ment? for if it were the necessary consequence of conditions themselves, we could not infer from them the existence of design, but must content ourselves with admiring them as simple and beautiful truths, having a necessary and independent existence. But if, on the other hand, the conditions from which this stability arises necessarily, are not necessary themselves, but the consequences of an arrangement which might have been different, we are then assuredly entitled to conclude, that it is the effect of *wise design exercised in the construction of the universe.*

“ Now the investigations of La Place enable us to give a very satisfactory reply to these questions, viz. —That the conditions essential to the stability of a system of bodies gravitating mutually to one another are by no means necessary, insomuch that systems can easily be supposed in which no such stability exists. The conditions essential to it, are, the movement of the bodies all in one direction, their having orbits of small eccentricity, or not far different from circles, and having periods of revolution not commensurable with one another. Now these conditions are not necessary; they may be easily supposed different; any of them might be changed, while the others remained the same. The appointment of such conditions, therefore, as would necessarily give a permanent and stable character to the system is not the work of necessity, and no one will be so absurd as to argue that it is the work of chance. *It is therefore the work of design or of intention, conducted by wisdom and foresight of the most perfect kind.*” (Ed. Review, vol. xi.)

Before I quit the subject of Astronomy, I cannot

fail to point out the nice adjustment by which the physical constitution and power of the animal inhabitants and vegetable products of our own planet are so exactly adapted to the condition of that planet, as influenced by its distance from the sun, and other circumstances; that all things here conspire together for their well-being: although the same constitution would be often inconsistent with the comfortable and vigorous existence of races similarly organized on some of the other planets. We need not indeed doubt that those other planets are equally inhabited and occupied; analogy would on the contrary rather lead us to conclude that they are all likewise fully tenanted by beings equally adjusted to their respective situations. But this nice adjustment, by which every thing is rendered exactly suitable to the physical circumstances of its particular situation, most clearly implies design and intelligence. To illustrate this, let us consider how animals and vegetables like those with which we are acquainted would fare if they had been called into existence on the face of Jupiter instead of the Earth,—which is certainly a *chance* equally supposable, if *chance* had exerted any influence in their disposition. Now since by the wonderful resources which the powers of mathematical calculation have opened to our reason, we become able to weigh as it were the planetary masses in the intellectual balance so supplied, we thus ascertain that Jupiter contains 320 times the quantity of matter belonging to our own earth, and we may therefore determine the relative forces of gravity at the surface of either planet (according to the law that these forces vary inversely as the squares

of distance from the centre) by dividing the mass of each planet by the square of its radius,—the result will acquaint us that a body at the surface of Jupiter will weigh between two and three times as much as on our earth<sup>1</sup>:—the muscular powers of the terrestrial animals, exactly calculated to their proper situation, would, if transferred to the larger planet,

<sup>1</sup> Since the original publication of these lectures, I find the argument of this paragraph much more strongly stated in the admirable Bridgewater Treatise of my friend Mr. Whewell. This author takes the supposition (which if chance had had anything to do with the matter, would have been equally probable) of a planet having the same density as our earth and the same size as Jupiter. "In this case," he observes, "gravity would have been eleven times what it is;" and all the inconveniences suggested in the text would have been proportionally increased. —Page 49.

I cannot close my reference to this portion of one of the ablest publications of the day, without adverting to the very beautiful illustration it contains of that universal harmony of adjustment, by which the most minute objects which exist on the surface of our planet, are made dependent by direct relations, upon the great laws of its general condition. The author instances the case of those flowers which having the pistil longer than the stamens require that they should "hang the pensive head," to permit their impregnation by the dust falling from the anthers upon the stigma; he proceeds thus:

"The positions in all these cases depend upon the length and flexibility of the stalk which supports the flower, or in the case of the Euphorbia, the germen. It is clear that a very slight alteration in the force of gravity, or in the stiffness of the stalk, would entirely alter the position of the flower cup, and thus make the continuation of the species impossible. We have therefore here a little mechanical contrivance, which would have been frustrated if the proper intensity of gravity had not been assumed in the reckoning. An earth greater or smaller, denser or rarer than the one on which we live, would require a change

scarcely suffice to drag their wearied limbs along under the oppression of this nearly threefold augmentation of their gravity. If the planet has an atmosphere constituted like ours, it must of course exist in a degree of condensation vastly greater, in consequence of the superior gravitation. Now it is well known how great is the inconvenience experienced, even in an atmosphere slightly condensed, by those who have ever descended in diving-bells: but how much greater must the labours of respiration become, were our atmosphere condensed by a gravitation equal to that of Jupiter? The birds also, which here wing their light way through the thin breeze, would there have to struggle through a medium greatly more dense. We know not indeed certainly, whether Jupiter has an atmosphere, or what are its circumstances; the appearance however of the variable belts surrounding its surface, seem to indicate zones of clouds, arranged by aerial currents analogous to our trade winds; and there is another ground which may lead us to believe that the planet has an atmosphere highly condensed, because this in fact would form a compensation in one important point admirably adjusted to its particular circumstances. The solar beams there received, and the consequent influences of light and heat thence derived, are only in the proportion of one twenty-

in the structure and strength of the footstalks of all the little flowers that hang their heads under our hedges. There is something curious in thus considering the whole mass of the earth from pole to pole, and from circumference to centre, as employed in keeping a snowdrop in the position most suited to the promotion of its vegetable health."



eighth to those which fall on the earth. But we well know that the actual heat given out is altogether dependent on the state of rarefaction or condensation of the atmosphere, since in the former state its capacity for heat being increased, it absorbs the caloric, and renders it latent, but readily gives it out in the latter state. The superior condensation of Jupiter's atmosphere, therefore may materially compensate the less quantity of heat incident from the sun.

I have not yet spoken of our vegetables: but as Jupiter, having its axis of rotation at right angles to the plane of the ecliptic, can have no change of season, it may be doubted whether our vegetables, adapted for an alternation of excitement and repose in the vicissitudes of summer and winter, could endure the perpetual stimulus of a *ver assiduum*.

But not only do the organized beings of our planet exhibit these proofs of due adjustment to their place, but we may further extend the observation to its inorganic masses. It has been calculated, for instance, that the amount of the possible disturbances affecting our ocean, mainly depend on the density of its waters, as compared with the density of the earth supporting them: if the densities of both were equal, the ocean would be liable to tremendous oscillations, which might often carry its waves in deluges of destruction over the face of our continents. Now, as the density of the matter composing Jupiter scarcely exceeds that of water; if it possessed an ocean constituted like ours, this must be always threatening it: but as the density of the solid materials of our earth exceeds five times that of water, no such catastrophe

can be here apprehended. Thus has the great Arranger of Nature given to the floods a limit which they shall not pass, neither turn again to cover the earth<sup>1</sup>.

Arguments similar to the above may be applied to almost all the other planets. We have already con-

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Whewell, in his Bridgewater Treatise, before referred to, has succeeded in rendering the somewhat difficult problem of the stability of the ocean perfectly intelligible by the following familiar illustration :—"What is meant by the stability of the ocean may perhaps be explained by means of the following illustration. If we suppose the whole globe of the Earth to be composed of water, a sphere of cork, immersed in any part of it, would come to the surface of the water, except it were placed exactly at the centre of the earth; and even if it were so placed, the slightest displacement of the cork sphere would end in its rising and floating. This would be the case whatever were the size of the cork sphere, and even if it were so large as to leave comparatively little room for the water; and the result would be nearly the same, if the cork sphere, when in its central position, had on its surface prominences which projected above the surface of the water. Now this brings us to the case in which we have a globe resembling our present earth, composed like it of water and of a solid centre, with islands and continents, but having these solid parts all made of cork. And it appears by the preceding reasoning, that in this case, if there were to be any disturbance either of the solid or fluid parts, the solid parts would rise from the centre of the watery sphere as far as they could: that is, all the water would run to one side and leave the land on the other. Such an ocean would be in *unstable* equilibrium."

These observations are then applied to the case of Saturn, whose specific gravity scarcely doubles that of cork, and is not more than half that of many other floating woods, and concludes that "if an ocean of water like ours, were poured into the cavities upon the surface of Saturn, its equilibrium would not be stable. It would leave its bed on one side of the globe, and the planet would finally be composed of one hemisphere of water and one of land."

sidered the excess of gravity in Jupiter as compared with our earth; in other planetary bodies we shall have to notice a deficiency of the same power to an amount often much more considerable. At the surface of Mars, for instance, the gravity is only one third that at our own surface, at the moon one-sixth, and in the singular little planetules grouped between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, probably not more than one-twentieth. We may easily figure to ourselves the reeling and staggering motions of an animal constructed like a man, if placed on one of these. Considerable, however, as the variations in these respects are, we may observe that they would have been far more so, had not the more bulky planets been generally of less density, or specific gravity. This is indeed not an universal rule, for Saturn, though rather smaller in bulk than Jupiter, has not half its density, and Mars, though little more than one eighth the bulk of our Earth, has at the same time a less specific gravity, the proportions being as three to five nearly<sup>1</sup>; but still this compensation, as it may be considered, so far prevails, as to keep within much smaller limits the variations to which we have alluded; and in the extreme case of the planetules, where this point has not yet been ascertained, an increase of specific gravity may possibly take place, greatly reducing the amount of the deficiency, as above stated.

Still more important should seem to be the dif-

<sup>1</sup> The specific gravities of the planets very generally decrease as their distance from the sun increases. There is only a single exception to this rule, namely, Uranus, which has nearly twice the specific gravity of its predecessor Saturn.

ference of circumstances arising from the various supplies of light and heat imparted to the several planets from their great central source the sun, the intensity of whose rays is on Mercury nearly *seven times greater*, and on Uranus 330 times less than on our earth. If, therefore, the atmospherical circumstances, &c. affecting the distribution of heat were at all similar in the various planets—the extremes of temperature must be obviously fatal to any animal of constitutions at all analogous to those with which we are acquainted; for, on the preceding supposition it has been very strikingly remarked, “that if we consider that even in the very next planet above our own, that of Mars, water would not remain fluid at any part of his surface, not even at his equator, and that in the temperate zones of the same planet even alcohol and quicksilver would freeze, we may form some idea of the cold that must reign in Uranus.” (*Mrs. Somerville’s Connexion of Sciences.*)

We must allow, however, that the very greatest modifications as to temperature may easily be understood to result from varieties in the constitution of the planetary atmospheres, on the supposition that they possess atmospheres; but this very important problem has scarcely yet received the careful examination which it appears to merit, and authorities accordingly are considerably at variance on the subject; some maintaining, for example, with Dr. Wollaston, that Jupiter has scarcely any atmosphere, others that it possesses one much more considerable than that of our earth: even in the case of the moon, where the existence of an atmosphere is most generally and peremptorily denied, it may be doubted whether all

even of the optical conditions which the problem involves, have been subjected to a rigorous and precise examination <sup>1</sup>.

Another possible cause of compensation as to temperature may be conceived to exist in some internal source of heat, such as geologists, reasoning from the increasing temperature found at successive levels in descending deep mines, &c., very generally attribute to our earth. But however these things may be, if we suppose the planets to be subject to the general law, which, as far as our observation extends, seems universal, that every space shall be made to teem with appropriate forms of life, we must necessarily conclude either that the conditions of animal life are almost infinitely varied to accommodate them to such extreme variations of the most essential circumstances; or that provisions of compensation exist rendering that variation less intolerable to beings similarly constituted. In either case, an adjustment

<sup>1</sup> Even the question how far the atmosphere which envelopes our earth in strata, rapidly diminishing in density, can be considered as absolutely finite, can scarcely be said to have received any thing like a demonstrative solution; although most philosophers agree with Dr. Wollaston in regarding the affirmative as far the more probable conclusion. We must remember that Newton has shown, that supposing our atmosphere to extend under the same laws of increasing rarity, to a distance from our surface equal to the earth's radius, it would then become so greatly attenuated, that a single cubic inch (taken as it exists at our surface) would be expanded so as to fill all the planetary regions to the orbit of Saturn and beyond. Still less are we competent to enter into the properties of the etherial medium filling all space, from whose undulations light itself appears to result; nor can we conjecture the relations which this æther may possess to planetary atmospheres variously constituted.

of relations must exist equally admirable and equally a proof of design.

But not longer to speculate on these *vast unfathomed depths*—these unknown and unexplorable regions of planetary space; we require no surer evidence of adjustment and design—no more satisfactory affirmation to the question of the old logical schools, “an locus conveniat locatis,” than the certain universal relations which we know to exist between the physical constitution and general laws of our own planet and the various organic forms which occupy its surface, and even the inorganic masses which enter into its constitution—and even of the whole planetary system we know enough to enable us fully to join in the irresistible truth of the conclusion of the great Newton—“*Elegantissima hæc compages non nisi consilio et dominio entis intelligentis et potentis oriri potuit.*”

#### GEOLOGY.

As a kindred branch of cosmical science, Geology may be ranked next in order to Astronomy (though undoubtedly at a vast interval, if the powers of mind by which the two have been cultivated be taken into account). Here, in the alternation of strata, pervious to water, and those which are impenetrable by that fluid, we find, as evinced by wells and springs, the most admirable contrivance for collecting and distributing the rains that fall from the clouds for the purpose of forming the general irrigation of the earth,—a system quite perfect in its kind. The proportion of the surfaces of our oceans and continents also enters into this account: for the former, the



surface of the seas, evidently afford the first grand source of this supply by evaporation, which thence rising in clouds through the air, is precipitated in showers, percolates through the porous strata, thence oozes in a thousand rills through valleys seemingly excavated on purpose for its conveyance, which inosculate successively into the larger courses of rivers, in a manner very similar to the inosculation of the smaller ramifications into the greater trunks of the venous system in animals, to which it has been aptly compared; and by these channels the streams return to their original parent, the sea, to be thence again raised by fresh evaporation—a complete circulation being thus established. Now had the proportion of the seas to the continents been greater, the supply would probably have been superabundant: if less, deficient: as it is, it is suitably adjusted to the wants of nature. Now in Geology I would particularly observe, that the inferences as to the intervention of a Deity are rendered far more cogent than in almost any other branch of science; because Geological phænomena clearly prove that the present face of things has been preceded, and indeed has resulted from, scenes marked by the most violent convulsions and disturbances. Now how can we possibly conceive that the admirable order we behold has been educed out of, and indeed in many cases has been effected by, catastrophes of ruin and confusion, unless we believe that a Being of infinite power and wisdom, “rode in the whirlwind and controlled the storm!” For instance, we observe the most indisputable proofs that the whole of our continents were formed originally beneath the bosom of the ocean, and have been

thence elevated by forces probably analogous to volcanic agency, of which ineffaceable traces remain in the dislocations and disturbances of the strata; the valleys which afford such an admirable system for performing the part we have seen assigned to them in that revolution of the waters which we have described, appear partly to have originated in these dislocations of the surface, and partly to have been excavated by grand diluvial currents sweeping over that surface with the most tremendous and destructive energy. Of these there may have been more than one epoch: the earliest may have been occasioned by the great change of the relative level of sea and land which occurred when the continents emerged, and the oceans assumed their present relative situation, which a late writer (very justly I think) supposes to have been alluded to in the Mosaic narrative, where it is said that the command was given, "Let the waters be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear." The latest diluvial convulsion, I need not add, is distinctly recorded in the sacred page. But Geology is, I think, most important, as showing by the irrefutable evidence of these convulsions, and of an order of things in which the globe must have been untenable by the present races of animals, that the actual order of things has not been constant and invariable, but must necessarily have had a beginning;—"For it has ever been the refuge of scepticism, to believe that the laws of Nature, being fixed, permanent and invariable, this frame of things is eternal; that the earth and all the apparatus of bodies in this and other systems were ever in the state they now are,

and will ever continue the same. In this their scheme they think no God needful<sup>1</sup>.”—Now all these atheistical assumptions are most decidedly and unanswerably negatived in every page of Geology. But the most important point in this argument has been most convincingly stated by an author equally distinguished for the great extent of his attainments, and the strength and soundness of the ratiocination which he has applied to the multifarious subjects which he has cultivated, not superficially, but to the very bottom—an authority also especially endeared to us as one of the principal founders and warmest friends of this Institution. I cannot therefore do better than quote from Dr. Prichard’s admirable Essay on the physical history of Mankind the following passage<sup>2</sup>. “It is well known that all the strata of

<sup>1</sup> See an admirable passage in Dr. Woodward’s *Natural History of the Earth*, p. 9, to which I am happy to acknowledge myself indebted for suggesting this argument, although of course I have been obliged to rectify his statements according to our present state of knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Prichard’s *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*, vol. ii. p. 594.

This great point of the recent origin of man is admitted by all Geologists, however various and even discordant their theoretical views. I am most happy to be able to quote on this subject the consentaneous testimony of that singularly able work, “*Lyell’s Principles of Geology*,” although it must be well known to all interested in the science, that I widely dissent from the author in many of his speculative ideas; but on this very account it is the more gratifying to me to show, that our differences, whatever they may be, do not in any manner affect the important application of the science which I have endeavoured to enforce and illustrate in the text. “We need not,” says this writer, “dwell on the proofs of the low antiquity of

which our continents are composed were once a part of the ocean's bed. There is no land in existence which was not formed beneath the sea, or that has not risen from beneath the water. Mankind had a beginning, since we can now look back to the period when the surface on which they live began to exist. We have only to go back in imagination to that age, to represent to ourselves that at a certain time there existed nothing in this globe but unformed elements, and that in the next period there had begun to breathe and move, in a particular spot, a human creature; and we shall already have admitted perhaps the most astonishing miracle recorded in Scripture. After contemplating this phænomenon, we shall find no difficulty in allowing, that events which would now be so extraordinary that they might be termed almost incredible, (our confidence in the present order of things having been established by the uniform experience of so many ages,) would at one time have given no just cause for wonder or scepticism. In the first ages of the world, events were conducted by operative causes of a different kind from those

our species, for it is not controverted by any Geologist, &c. The establishment by Geological evidence of the first intervention of such a peculiar and unprecedented agency long after other parts of the animate and inanimate world existed, affords ground for concluding, that the experience, during thousands of ages, of all the events which may happen on this globe, would not enable a philosopher to speculate with confidence concerning future contingencies.....had he previously presumed to dogmatize respecting the absolute uniformity of the order of nature, he would undoubtedly be checked by witnessing this new and unexpected event."—(Principles of Geology, vol. i. pp. 153—164.)

which are now in action ; and there is nothing contrary to common sense or to probability in the supposition, that this sort of agency continued to operate from time to time as long as it was required,—that is, until the physical and moral constitution of things now existing was completed, and the design of Providence attained<sup>1</sup>.”

Since the above paragraphs were first written, an Address, delivered to the Geological Society of London by its very able President, Professor Sedgwick,

<sup>1</sup> Hume has objected to the argument from design, that if we consider the perfect system of nature as inferring a designer, then, by parity of reasoning, that perfect designing being must infer a prior designer, and so on *ad infinitum*. Now it seems clear that this objection, if pressed, must immediately resolve itself into a mode of Pantheism ; for our answer will of course be, “That the only conclusion in which our reason can repose, is the idea of a first cause eternal necessary and self-existent ; and that the idea of any thing prior, therefore, involves a contradiction in terms.” And if the opponent would still urge his objection, he must, I conceive, remodel it thus : “Why may not the natural universe itself be that eternal necessary and self-existent perfect being ?” which in effect is Pantheism. Now the arguments in the text appear to me to be the most conclusive against all these sophisms : for they show that the present frame of nature has not possessed this eternal and necessary existence : they palpably demonstrate that many of the most important parts of the design of nature have had a beginning, and were altogether foreign to all the parts of the fabric of nature which preceded. Thus the conclusion of a first cause and original designer altogether extraneous to the material universe appears inevitable.—The argument from design has always seemed to me to require the demonstration of the non-eternity of the present state of nature (that state in which the design is evinced) to complete its cogency ; and geological evidence may perhaps be considered as most clearly supplying this demonstration.

has just appeared, which contains some remarks on this application of geological science, which I am much gratified in being able to subjoin, as an appropriate conclusion to the present branch of our argument.

“Geology lends a great and unexpected aid to the doctrine of final causes; for it has not merely added to the cumulative argument, by the supply of new and striking instances, of mechanical structure adjusted to a purpose and that purpose accomplished; but it has also proved that the same pervading active principle, manifesting its power in our times, has also manifested its power in times long anterior to the records of our existence.

“But after all, some men seeing nothing but uniformity and continuity in the works of nature, have still contended (with what I think a mistaken zeal for the honour of sacred truth), that the argument from final causes proves nothing more than a quiescent intelligence. I feel not the force of this objection. In geology, however, we can meet it by another direct argument; for we not only find in our formations organs mechanically constructed—but at different epochs in the history of the earth we have great changes of external conditions, and corresponding changes of organic structure; and all this without the shadow of a proof that one system of things graduates into, or is the necessary and efficient cause of, the other. Yet in all these instances of change, the organs, as far as we can comprehend their use, are exactly those which are best suited to the functions of the being. Hence we not only show intelligence contriving means adapted to an end, but at



successive times and periods contriving a change of mechanism adapted to a change in external conditions. If this be not the operation of a prospective and active intelligence, where are we to look for it?"

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The sciences which relate to the material constituents of nature, their properties and reciprocal action, next present themselves; such as the history of light, of heat, and of electricity, and that investigation of the composition of bodies, and of the character and relation of their elements, usually included under the term of Chemical Philosophy.

#### LIGHT.

In this division of my argument, I shall first have to direct your attention to the first great element to which the voice of Deity gave birth, when God said, "Let there be light." Light is the grand medium of our knowledge of external nature; the voice as it were with which the God of Nature has endowed its material objects, to place them in relation and communication with its intellectual agents. This great end it could not accomplish, were not all its optical laws, the properties of the media through which it passes, of the objects on which it falls, and of every humour of the eyes which it traverses, nicely regulated in reciprocal relations. We have here thousands of instances of mutual adaptation and adjustment, all implying intelligence and design, fully to elucidate which would require a complete treatise on physical optics—a science undoubtedly next to physical astronomy in importance, interest, and extent, and one

which has received the largest additions from the persevering progress of recent discovery. Our present limits will of course prevent our doing more than very briefly alluding to the more prominent and obvious of the topics thus pressing upon our notice, and directing you to sources from which you may obtain more detailed and precise information<sup>1</sup>. In prosecuting such inquiries, our minds, before overwhelmed by the vast magnitude of the quantities of space and time involved in all the speculations of astronomical science, find their limited faculties equally transcended by the almost inconceivable minuteness of the quantities to which attention is now demanded. The great and the small in nature seem alike to baffle the narrow span of our intellectual grasp; and it fills us with astonishment when, as in the case of Newton, we see the same mind at one time comprehending in its expansive survey the laws that bind worlds together and impel them in their mighty course; and at another contracting and concentrating its powers for what may be well called the microscopic task of detecting the momentary changes

<sup>1</sup> I would especially refer to Mrs. Somerville's "Connexion of the Sciences," from section 18 to 23, for a very satisfactory account of the present state of physical optics, and the undulatory theory of light, so drawn up as to require little more than a general acquaintance with the great principles of mathematical reasoning to render it perfectly intelligible. I would also wish to refer the reader to the 16th and 17th chapters of the first book of Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise.

The more scientific reader (should this little work obtain the notice of any of that class) may be referred to Professor Airy's excellent tracts on this subject, or Sir John Herschel's article on Light, in the *Encyclopedia Metropolitana*.

of affection undergone by the atomic molecules of light in their passage through intervals so extremely small as scarcely to admit expression in millionth parts of inches. We hardly know whether most to admire the gigantic grasp evinced in the *Principia*, or the piercing keenness of minute investigation which characterises the *Optics* of Newton. But if we bow with such deep and just homage before the extension of the powers of human intellect to what may well appear their extreme limits, must not every feeling of admiration be proportionally raised with regard to that creative intellect for which nothing is too great—nothing too small—whose works, we are assured by every analogy afforded by the narrow sphere of observation permitted to our faculties, when pursued to its utmost boundary, extend infinitely on either hand beyond that boundary?

With regard to those optical properties of light which render it, as we have said, the language which communicates to us the existence of external nature, the laws of reflection and refraction are obviously the prime conditions which enable it to discharge this office, from their adjusted relations to all the substances on which they act. We need not embarrass ourselves with the inquiry whether other combinations of relations could not be conceived equally competent for this purpose; it is quite sufficient that those which have been adopted so perfectly fulfil it. Any derangement in any of these would obviously require new and corresponding changes in the rest, and our argument mainly relies on the general harmony of design evinced. If, for instance, every ordinary ray of light were in the extraordinary con-

dition of polarized rays, while yet the properties of the media on which they acted remained the same, we may easily judge of the confusion which would result as to vision; and it is quite immaterial as to our argument, whether we adopt the undulatory or corpuscular theory of light, since it depends not on controverted hypotheses, but certain and known phænomena.

Among the relations of light to the media which it traverses, we may notice as one of the most general and obvious, that which it bears to the atmosphere surrounding us. It is in consequence of the general dispersion and diffusion of the rays of light, owing to their reflection from the particles of vapour floating in the atmosphere, and perhaps from the gaseous molecules themselves, that our vision is at all what it is, and presents us with the scenes of universal beauty in which we delight. Without the reflective and dispersive powers of the atmosphere, the gradual mellowed transitions and lovely hues of the morning and evening twilight would cease to be, and in their stead we should witness an abrupt and painful change from midnight darkness to the broad light of day—of that day it could no longer be said, “*Diffuso lumine ridet* ;” the glowing sun would seem to be cheerlessly rolling through a gloomy abyss of darkness, wherein its rays would meet with nothing to reflect or scatter them around; and the very stars would become visible in the absence of that general radiance which characterises the day, and spreads abroad a flood of glory over the brightened azure expanse of the heavens, colouring the whole horizon, and thus unveiling the face of nature in the most

lovely and harmonious tints<sup>1</sup>. Instead of this, those surfaces of the objects around us which directly reflected light to our eyes, would be alone visible in a glaring light, abruptly and painfully contrasted with total darkness; and the landscape now brought so vividly forth by its relief against a transparent and enlightened atmospherical back-screen, would have been, as it were, stretched upon a black curtain, with which its shadows would have been indistinguishably mingled; while apartments, the windows of which had a northern aspect, admitting no direct rays from the sun, must have remained wrapt in total gloom.

With reference to the relations between the optical properties of light, and the structure of the organs of vision, Paley, whose work will be the text-book of this collegiate class, has so fully described the exquisite structure of the eye as a regular optical instrument, that I need only observe, that he who believes a telescope or microscope to be the work of design, and doubts this of an eye, must believe that a perfect instrument exhibits less proof of contrivance than an imperfect one of the very same kind.

The mechanism of vision so admirable in man is far from being a solitary example. The argument as to design becomes still more cogent if we follow the great Cuvier in his "*Leçons d'Anatomie comparée*"

<sup>1</sup> After referring to so many more grave and learned works, it may be pardoned to the recollections of my boyish years to cite an old-fashioned popular work placed at that period in my hands, a translation of the "*Spectacle de la Nature*," by an ancestral connexion of my own. At that period of my life it made a very deep impression on my memory, and from this source the observations in my text are, I believe, very faithfully derived.

and examine the comparative structure of the organs of vision in the other classes of animals. The Author of nature, in transferring the same general provision to these various races, has in the most perfect manner modified the details in perfect accordance to the varying circumstances, wants, and habits of each, sometimes suppressing parts which become useless under these new conditions, sometimes introducing new details appropriately accommodated to them, or even, as in the case of insects, adopting an entirely new system, based on perfectly distinct optical principles, yet conducing to exactly the same great end. In this latter case, indeed, we cannot be said fully to comprehend the final motives for the deviation of plan; but if our knowledge were more extended, we cannot doubt we should trace such motives no less satisfactorily than when we find in quadrupeds and birds destined to remain abroad and search their prey by night, a provision for a much greater variation in the dimensions of the iris and pupil, than in man, enabling them, by the more considerable enlargement of the latter, to concentrate a proportionally greater quantity of luminous rays, and consequently to distinguish objects in a degree of obscurity which would shroud them from our vision. In birds and fishes, we find the structure of the eyes varied with a constant relation to the different density of the media in which they live: these provisions the present state of our knowledge only enables us partially to understand; but as the relations are constant, they are evidently designed, and they often suggest enquiries well calculated for the advancement of optical science. We may instance especially the power of accommo-

dation to distinct vision at different distances, so remarkably evinced in the case of birds of prey, who, from the vast elevation at which they soar in the air, are able to mark the little victims on which they are about to plunge<sup>1</sup>.

These brief allusions to a field of observation so vast and interesting, must strongly impress our minds with the great conclusion, that Light, evolved as it is from the great luminary of our system, and acting on an insect's eye, forms the most striking example of the universal relations which pervade that system from its greatest bodies to its meanest tenants. The exquisite adaptation of colours to produce agreeable impressions on our own senses, and those, as we may justly conclude, of other animals, may be mentioned not only as a proof of design, but of benevolent design, consulting not only the physical wants, but even the pleasures of its creatures ; and the mechanism employed to produce these results, is often singularly curious and admirable ; for instance, how exquisitely complicated, and how nicely adjusted must not that mechanism be, to produce the beautiful images which adorn the peacock's tail ? Here, the whole pattern, though justly symmetrical, is made up of a very great number of independent laminæ, constituting the vane of the feather ; each of these separate laminæ must have the structure and constitution of the fibrils fringing it varied, so as to

<sup>1</sup> I would refer the English reader to Dr. Roget's admirable Bridgewater Essay on Physiology, for a masterly summing up of all that is known as to the structure of the organs of Vision in man, and the other orders of the animal kingdom : the part which relates to the eyes of insects will perhaps have the greatest novelty for the general reader.



reflect different colours at definite intervals, those intervals being in each lamina regulated in dependence on its particular situation in the whole groupe, so as to produce by their juxta-position, not a confused spectrum, but the symmetrical curves we so much admire. What a lavish profusion of elaborate art we here find employed for a purpose which we must regard, if compared with the greater provisions of nature, as quite trivial; yet as it is a purpose of pure benevolence, it may well illustrate the affluent riches of the universal bounty whence it proceeds. I have more particularly dwelt on this instance, because I do not remember to have seen it elsewhere noticed.

We may conclude this article on the subject of Light, by observing what a striking illustration is here afforded of the great multiplicity of useful ends, seemingly quite unconnected, accomplished by an individual principle, since Light is known to be important as a chemical agent.

#### HEAT.

Heat is equally conducive to the support of animal and vegetable life; it is moreover an indispensable agent in many of the most important chemical operations which we see carrying on around us; nor is its influence less essentially necessary to sustain both the atmosphere and the waters of the earth in the condition which enables them to fulfil their important purposes in the œconomy of nature. What a number and variety of nicely-adjusted relations are implied in this short statement!

The laws by which heat is evolved in combustion

especially demand our notice, as these seem to have an especial reference to the comforts of man and to the arts of human life, and therefore may perhaps be regarded as implying a foresight of those wants, and the arts which supply them. I have sometimes been led, further, from this fact to inquire whether we might not, in the suitableness of natural agents to afford materials for the arts invented by man's reason, discover a *prophetic anticipation* and *prospective provision* for those arts; whether, for instance, admitting the laws of the evolution of heat in combustion to have been designed with reference to our artificial comforts, we may not in like manner conclude, its agency in the production of the immense power arising from the elasticity of steam, to have been equally an intentional provision for our use as science advanced?—an opinion which would identify that advance with the designs of the Author of our reason. But I propose this only as a query, and with diffidence<sup>1</sup>.

To confine our attention, therefore, to that which is matter of absolute and certain knowledge, the influence of heat in evaporation is undoubtedly a most splendid instance of beneficial contrivance; for had not water and heat been related in such a manner, that this effect must necessarily result from their reciprocal action, the clouds of heaven could never have dropped fatness, and all vegetable and animal

<sup>1</sup> On this very interesting speculation I have some further observations to offer, which in the former edition formed the substance of a note—but in the present, being considerably enlarged, they are referred to the Appendix to this part of the work, No. I.

life had quickly perished in intolerable drought<sup>1</sup>. For this end it was equally necessary that the constitution and relations of the atmosphere should be adjusted so as to co-operate: and we have before seen how the geological structure of the earth has been regulated in subserviency to the same end, by the distribution and circulation of these waters. What multitudes of relations must be thus made to conspire together to work out a single end! The mind is almost lost in the contemplation; and can

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Prout, in his Bridgewater Treatise, has some very just and striking remarks on this subject—"Thus water, *within very narrow limits of temperature*, is a solid, or a liquid, or a gas; and yet these *very narrow limits of temperature*, neither more nor less, are precisely those, which exist upon the surface of our globe; where they are the natural, and the necessary results of its situation in the universe; and of the general laws, which govern the distribution of light and heat. Had the properties of this body been other than what they are; or had the general temperature of our globe been different; water would have existed altogether in the solid, or in the gaseous state; and its most important properties would have been unknown. Hence, it seems almost impossible to arrive at any other conclusion, than that the temperature of the earth, and the properties of the water on its surface, have been mutually adjusted to each other. And further, since the temperature of the earth, as just stated, is the natural result of the general laws which govern the distribution of heat and of light; the inference must be, that the properties of the water, as the subordinate and later principle, have, at an after period, been adjusted to the prior temperature of the earth." For a complete view of the argument I would especially refer the reader, with regard to the subject of this article, to the admirable general observations which have since been published in Whewell's Bridgewater essay "on the laws of heat with respect to earth, water and air." Book I. c. viii. ix. x., and the more detailed arguments on Climate, &c. in the second Book of Dr. Prout's Essay.

only exclaim, "O Lord, how manifold are thy works, in wisdom thou hast made them all!"

#### ELECTRICITY.

Of Electricity, the infancy of the science forbids my speaking at any length. We have, however, grounds for believing that all the attractions of chemistry depend on this principle; and the recent discoveries of electro-magnetism exhibiting remarkable analogies to the planetary motions, in the production of gyrations which in like manner necessarily revolve in one and the same direction, may induce us to suspect,—as we certainly know one of those planets, our own, to be endowed with magnetical polarity,—that this agency is of far more importance in the system of the universe than we are yet aware of.

It seems also highly probable that the electrical power under some of its modifications may be the principal agent in the mysterious propagation of the nervous influence, and consequent excitement of muscular action through the animal frame; an opinion forcibly suggested by the phenomena of the actual development of this principle by animal mechanism in the cases of the gymnotus and torpedo, and by the powerful effect which well-known experiments demonstrate that galvanism is capable of producing on the nervous and muscular system, re-exciting almost the appearance of vitality in bodies after the flame of life had fled. The researches also of Dr. W. Philip, and other English physiologists,—in the prosecution of which it was found that when a nerve was divided so as entirely to intercept the

transmission of its action, the place of the nerve might be supplied by a galvanic apparatus,—assuredly impart much of additional probability to the hypothesis of the connection of nervous influence with the electrical principle.

When another Newton shall arise to investigate, methodize, and generalize the laws of the polar forces, his harvest of important truths may perhaps be as abundant as was that of the first<sup>1</sup>: and we

<sup>1</sup> Does not the language of *the* Newton, in alluding, I believe, to his supposed ætherial fluid, seem almost prophetic of such a regular theory of polar forces?—"Adjicere jam liceret nonnulla de spiritu quodam subtilissimo corpora crassa pervadente, et in iisdem latente, cujus vi et actionibus particulæ corporum ad minimas distantias se mutuo attrahunt, et contiguæ factæ cohærent. et corpora electrica agunt ad distantias majores tam repellendo quam attrahendo corpuscula vicina,—et lux reflectitur, refringitur, inflectitur, et corpora calefacit; et sensatio omnis excitatur, et membra animalium ad voluntatem moventur, vibrationibus scilicet hujus spiritus per solida nervorum capillamenta ab externis sensuum organis ad cerebrum et a cerebro in musculos propagatis.—Sed hæc paucis exponi non possunt, neque adest sufficiens copia experimentorum quibus leges actionum hujus spiritus accurate determinari et monstrari debent." (*Scholium generale* at the end of the *Principia*.)—Here we see the attraction of coherence, corpuscular attraction, of which chemical affinity may perhaps be only a modification, electrical, which of course involves magnetical attraction, optical phænomena (now extended by the discoveries of polarised light), and nervous influence, considered as probable modifications of a single principle; a generalisation bold indeed, (in the time of the author so bold that only the *αγχινοια* of true genius could suggest or sanction it,) but as beautiful as it is bold, and to which every subsequent discovery of science appears constantly to bring some accession of probability. Since the above article and note were originally published, the author has been much gratified

cannot doubt that if so, it will be equally pregnant with proofs of design. For the argument from final causes is of a cumulative nature, it ever "grows with the growth, and strengthens with the strength" of science, continually unfolding fresh pages to the admiration of succeeding generations as they advance in intellectual progress.

#### CHEMISTRY.

Chemistry, as it develops the elementary composition of bodies and the laws regulating the combinations of those elements, illustrates in almost every instance the admirable adjustment of their relations to each other and to the governing laws<sup>1</sup>.

by perusing the very able development in detail of views similar to those thus briefly indicated in the Bridgewater essay of Dr. Prout; where the intimate constitution of bodies, and the mutual agencies and chemical relations of their molecules, is altogether referred to the operation of polar forces analogous to those of electro-magnetism—and a very ingenious theory, of what may be termed Molecular Dynamics, is based on this principle.

<sup>1</sup> For a full and satisfactory investigation of the arguments connected with the doctrine of final causes, as deduced from the science of Chemistry, I would particularly refer the reader to the 4th chapter of the 1st Book of Dr. Prout's Bridgewater essay "on chemical elementary principles, and on the laws of their combinations." He reasons in the most conclusive manner on the manner in which the adaptation of all the bodies we meet with to fulfil the great purposes which they accomplish in the economy of nature, is made to depend on the due adjustment to each other of the qualities and quantities of their constituent elements; and he most justly concludes, that the double adjustment both of quality and quantity which is involved in the chemical doctrine of definite proportions, "adds almost infinitely

Our limits, however, must now oblige me to select from this rich abundance very sparingly. It may suffice to point out only a single example : How indispensable is the atmosphere to the support of animal and vegetable life ! yet it is composed of two elements, oxygen and azote, which being blended in another mode and in different proportions, furnish only acid poisons alike destructive of both,—nitrous and nitric acid, &c. Here, again, we see a striking instance of the multiplicity of beneficial ends, unconnected and sometimes seemingly opposed, effected by a single agent. The atmospheric air supports animal life by renewing the vigour of the blood, carrying off its carbonized impurities in the form of the acid produced by their union with its oxygen. It supports vegetable life, on the contrary, by transferring to it the materials thus abstracted from animal frames ; occasionally indeed (during the absence of light that is) its oxygen is also partially abstracted, which uniting with the carbon already lodged in the pores of the vegetables (as derived from the vegetable soil in which they grow, &c.), thus forms carbonic acid ; through which state this nutriment of vegetables, for such carbon principally is, must pass, before it can be assimilated into their system. Under the influence of light, however, the vegetable becomes capable of decomposing the carbonic acid, appropriating solely the carbon ; and not only thus repays the oxygen it had previously borrowed,

to the weight of evidence ; and indeed furnishes a proof in favour of design, and of its consequences, which amounts to all but actual demonstration.”—I would further refer to the third book of the same essay on the Chemistry of organization.



but also by decomposing those other portions of carbonic acid which the air had derived from animal respiration and wafted over to the vegetable, gives forth an independent and, as it were, gratuitous supply of the aëriform principle emphatically termed vital air. Thus the purity of the atmosphere is restored, and it becomes again fitted for animal respiration, to which it would be unsuitable if overloaded with the carbonic acid from which the vegetables thus free it. So exactly does animal respiration fit the air to support vegetable life, and vegetable respiration (if we may so speak) renew its fitness for that of animals. What an admirably adjusted balance! and how nicely do these antagonist causes play into each other!

The atmosphere also supports combustion by parting with its oxygen.

#### ACOUSTICS.

Another most important and beneficial use of the atmosphere, and one totally unconnected with the former, is, that it is so constituted as to afford a medium suitable to propagate by its vibrations the impressions of sound to the animal senses. Were its properties<sup>1</sup> other than such as to fit it for receiv-

<sup>1</sup> Had the atmosphere been composed entirely of oxygen, the sounds would have been painfully intense. Had it consisted exclusively of hydrogen, they would have been faintly distinguishable, and at small distances totally inaudible. I cannot, without a fresh expression of admiration, conclude this final reference to the vast variety of independent purposes accomplished by the instrumentality of a single natural agent—our atmosphere, which we have before seen to be essentially connected with the diffusion of light and of heat, with the system for the supply and distribution of water, and with the support both of literal flame

ing and transmitting these undulating vibrations, or were there not such an adjustment and adaptation of the things to be acted upon to the medium of action, as to qualify the ears of animals to be suitably affected by the impressions thus communicated, all nature would be buried in the silence of death. The audible signs by which every beast of the field, and every bird of the air, expresses its wants and affections would be cut off; the great means of communication from mind to mind of rational creatures would be annihilated; the sweet strains of harmony, which yield the purest and, if I may so speak, the most intellectual of sensual gratifications, would be hushed; and the unbroken and gloomy stillness of the grave replace the busy and happy hum of life!

The structures of the organs of speech and hearing, as related to the aerial vibrations which constitute sound, by their respective adaptations to produce and to be affected by those vibrations, complete the

and the figurative flame of life. I remember to have seen it very justly remarked, how far superior were the views thus presented of the real riches of design manifested in the works of nature by the progress of science, to those falsely entertained at an earlier period, even by an intellect no less powerful than that of Aristotle, who maintains that nature never acts in what he esteemed a poverty-struck manner, *πενυχρως*, by employing the same agent to accomplish different ends, as the Delphic dirk was employed—now for a knife, now for a dagger—but has always recourse to new instruments. How completely do we not here discover the real poverty, not in the economy of nature, but in the imagination of the philosopher. I would especially refer, for a very striking description of the various purposes to which our atmosphere is rendered subservient, to the article on that subject in Whewell's Bridgewater Essay, Book I. c. xv.

argument as to the design evinced in this respect. The very curious experiments of Mr. Willis, as to the mechanical adjustment of pipes so as to fit them for the imitation of articulate sounds, led him to investigate very minutely, with the assistance of his friend Dr. Clarke, of Cambridge, the muscular arrangements of the human larynx, which by its peculiar powers entitles our species to the epithet *μεροπες ανθρωποι*, and provides appropriate utterance to all the various dictates of human reason, “*effert animi motus interprete lingua* ;”—the result of this examination was, in more than one instance, the detection of mechanical provisions required under the circumstances, but unsuspected before the attempt artificially to imitate these results had led to the examination of the natural means employed. The whole investigation presented as beautiful and complete a proof of extensive design, and contrivance in the organs of our speech, as Paley has demonstrated in those of our sight<sup>1</sup>.

#### ANIMAL PHYSIOLOGY<sup>2</sup>.

The physiology of the organised beings, the races endowed with animal and vegetable life, finally claim our attention. We will first consider the former

<sup>1</sup> An excellent description of the mechanism of the organs of hearing, in the various orders of animals, will be found in Dr. Roget's Bridgewater essay. In that of Sir Charles Bell, is a very valuable article on the structure of the human larynx.

<sup>2</sup> On this subject generally, I would refer the reader for details to Dr. Roget's very interesting Bridgewater essay, which is peculiarly dedicated to physiological science; and for that division of it which is connected with Chemistry, I would again refer to the third book of Dr. Prout's essay before cited.

class. Now the frames of these beings present us partly with chemical laboratories adapted to all the purposes of

“—— Nature’s chemistry, by Man’s  
Weak art inimitable,—”

partly they form machines constructed on the most perfect mechanical principles. We have already had frequent occasion to remark on their nice adjustment and exact adaptation to the general laws of Nature, and to their particular place in the system, and the circumstances under which they are placed; an adaptation at once precluding every possibility of ascribing their disposition to chance. The proofs of design resulting from the exquisite structure of the animal frame have been selected by Paley<sup>1</sup> as the most

<sup>1</sup> In that very interesting work, Ellis’s *Polynesian Researches*, to which I may apply Johnson’s well-known sentence, with a slight accommodation, and say that the philosopher ought to read it for its valuable information on natural history, statistics, and national manners, and the Christian for its details of the causes and effects of the great religious change effected in the insular population to which it relates,—I have met with a striking instance of the manner in which the argument, from the *mechanical* structure of the animal frame (so admirably illustrated by Paley), suggested itself to a mind previously scarce elevated above the savage state, when that mind began to be opened and expanded by the civilizing influence of Christianity. It affords an interesting exemplification of the natural train of thought of one who may be well called the *Polynesian Paley*.

Mr. Ellis informs us that, “On a public occasion, in the Island of Raiatea, during the year 1825, a number of the inhabitants were conversing on the wisdom of God, which, it was observed, though so long unperceived by them, was strikingly exhibited in every object they beheld. In confirmation of this, a venerable and grey-headed man, who had formerly been a sorcerer, or priest of the evil spirit, stretched forth his hand, and looking at

cogent topic of his argument, and so admirably illustrated by him, that it were superfluous now to detain you with any detail on this subject. I will only add a brief statement of the very important observations made since his time by the Newton of comparative anatomy, the great Cuvier, concerning the harmony and necessary relations which subsist between the different members in each class of animals.

“Every organized individual,” says this distinguished philosopher, “forms an entire system of its own, all the parts of which mutually correspond and concur to produce a certain definite purpose by reciprocal action, or by combining towards the same end. Hence none of those separate parts can change their forms, without a corresponding change in the other parts of the same animal; and consequently each of these parts taken separately indicates all the other parts to which it has belonged. Thus, if the viscera of an animal are so organized as only to be fitted for the digestion of recent flesh, it is also requisite that the jaws should be so constructed as to fit them for devouring prey: the claws must be con-

the limbs of his body, said, ‘Here the wisdom of God is displayed!—I have *hinges* from my toes to my fingers’ ends. This finger has its *hinges*, and bends at my desire;—this arm, on its *hinge*, is extended at my will;—by means of these *hinges* my legs bear me where I wish;—and my mouth, by its *hinge*, masticates my food.—Does not all this display the wisdom of God?’ ”

How closely parallel is this to the argument in Paley, 8th chapter, on the Mechanical Arrangement of the Human Frame,—where he expatiates at length on the *hinge*-joint of the neck, on the *hinge*-joint at the elbow, on the *hinge*-joint at the knee, on that of the ankle, &c.—to these the term *ginglymus* is technically applied.

structed for seizing and tearing it to pieces ; the teeth for cutting and dividing the flesh ; the entire system of the limbs or organs of motion, for pursuing and overtaking it ; and the organs of sense, for discovering it at a distance. Nature also must have endowed the brain of the animal with instinct sufficient for concealing itself, and for laying plans to catch its necessary victims."

Did the time permit me to proceed with the detail of the examples which he subjoins, in these and the other classes, all would be found most striking.

Another most beautiful point in the organization of the various animal frames, is one which is almost suggested by the name *comparative* Anatomy, and which imparts to that science all its exactness ; viz. the uniformity of the general type, according to which those animal frames are constructed, subject as that type yet is to a thousand different subordinate modifications, calculated to adapt each individual form for the peculiar circumstances under which its living occupant is placed. This uniformity in its greatest degree is of course to be found only in the different congenerous species of the same great orders of the animal kingdom,—in the several species of vertebrated animals, for instance : yet in these how great a diversity (in each case regulated by the specific wants of the animal) is found to coexist with a perfect identity in the general type of the structure. If we take, for instance, a man and a whale,—what can seem more diversified than the external forms of each ; and how admirably do those diversities fit each for its place, for the element in which it moves, and for the pursuits in which it is engaged ? Yet if we

compare the skeletons of each, the uniformity is such that a person previously acquainted with human anatomy, would at once be able to point out, bone for bone, analogous divisions in the structure of the whale, with the exception indeed of the hinder extremities, which being in the whale unnecessary, are here left out of the design. But in the anterior extremities, though nothing can at first, and outwardly, seem more different than a man's arm and hand and the fin of a whale, both in figure and use, yet the anatomist will at once recognise in the skeleton of both, the same type, and the same subordinate parts; the same humerus, though much shortened in the whale; the same radius and ulna, although the cetaceous forms are compressed and anchylosed to the neighbouring parts; and the same carpus and metacarpus, though with similar modifications, terminating in the same phalanges. Yet how admirably is each so diversified as to fit it for its intended purpose! How admirably does the human hand and arm co-operate with man's reason, with which in one sense this form seems co-ordinate, in all the arts which distinguish his mode of being<sup>1</sup>! And how well suited is the whale's fin, as an organ of impulse and

<sup>1</sup> The arguments briefly alluded to in the text, have been fully stated by Galen, in his chapters on the use of the various parts of the body, with a power of intellectual comprehension, and justness of philosophical discernment, which have seldom been rivalled, and which may well demonstrate how little the nineteenth century can claim any material advantage over the second, in these essential points. Extended extracts, which will richly reward the reader who will turn to them, are given in the very interesting third chapter of my esteemed friend Professor Kidd's Bridgewater Essay; from these I will only select a single



direction in its motion through the waves! This surprising uniformity has always seemed to me valuable, as inferring the unity of the designing intelligence; just as the adaptation of the diversities de-passage, which contains an admirable summary of the whole argument.

“Man being naturally destitute of corporeal weapons, as also of any instinctive art, has received a compensation, first in the gift of that peculiar instrument the hand, secondly in the gift of reason; by the employment of which two gifts, he arms and protects his body in every mode, and adorns his mind with the knowledge of every art. For since, had he been furnished with any natural weapon, he would have possessed the use of this alone on all occasions, or had he been gifted with any instinctive art, he would never have attained to the exercise of other arts; hence he was created destitute of those insulated and individual means and arts, which characterize other animals; inasmuch as it is manifestly preferable to have the power of making use of various means and various arts. Rightly, therefore, has Aristotle defined the hand to be the instrument antecedent to, or productive of, all other instruments: and rightly might we, in imitation of Aristotle, define reason, as opposed to instinct, to be the art antecedent to, or productive of, all other arts. For as the hand, though itself no particular organ, is yet capable of being adapted to all other organs, and is consequently antecedent to them; so reason, though itself no particular art, is yet capable of comprehending and applying all; and may therefore be considered as an art antecedent to all others. Thus man alone, of all animals, possessing in his soul this general and original capacity, is justly endued in his body with this general and original instrument.” (Galen, lib i. cap. 4.)

One of the Bridgewater essays has been, in compliance with the will of the donor, expressly dedicated to this argument, which has been most ably handled by Sir Charles Bell; yet in truth very little can be added to the statements of old Galen, who, in addition to the passage I have quoted, proceeds to describe, in a very masterly manner, the anatomical circumstances on which the great superiority of the human hand depends.

monstrate his intelligence. An Italian anatomist has beautifully expressed this varied uniformity in a Latin sentence, well worthy one of the descendants of Cicero's compatriots. "Usque adeo Natura una eadem semper atque multiplex, disparibus etiam formis effectus pares, admirabili quadam varietatum simplicitate conciliat." (*Scarpa de Audit.*)

But the most astonishing provision in the animal economy is perhaps the system of nervous influence, the great and sole channel of communication by which the impressions excited by external objects on the organs of sense are transmitted to the central seat of sensation, and by which inversely the energies of volition, stimulated by the ideas so presented, are propagated, and excite corresponding motions in every part of the muscular frame. While engaged in drawing up this article, my eye is caught by a statement on this subject by a most intelligent medical writer, so luminous and so concise that I cannot, I am sure, present that subject to you more clearly than by quoting his words.—Speaking of the nervous system, he thus proceeds to describe it as—

“A medium of communication every where distributed with the minutest care, and in the richest profusion; while its various parts and subordinate systems are so closely, so carefully, and so astonishingly connected with each other, as to indicate most clearly the perfection of divine wisdom displayed in preserving its uninterrupted and harmonious intercourse, and securing the most general impression. Not the minutest sensation occurs at the extremity of the system, but is instantaneously propagated to its centre. Not a desire is excited in the mind, but

a corresponding action is produced in the organ destined for its gratification; and the endless variety of communication with its several regions, through the medium of plexus, ganglion, interlacing and decussation of fibres, separate twigs of intercourse, and the one agency of the great sympathetic nerve, is such as to overwhelm the mind with astonishment<sup>1</sup>.”—*Newnham on the Influence of the Mind on the Body*, &c. *Christian Observer*, March 1831, p. 142.

## ENTOMOLOGY.

Even in the minutest, I will not say meanest races, (for which of the Creator's works can be called mean!)—in the history of the insect tribes, we often find some of the most astonishing proofs of that Creator's universal providence. A treatise on Entomology is trifling only in the size of its objects. When we examine the wonderful fabrics which many of them construct, and their admirable provisions for the care and sustenance of their young progeny, which the parents themselves are often destined never to behold,—we look with astonishment on a power of instinct which even reason is unable to fathom; and feel that in one sense at least it is philosophically true, that “*Deus est animus brutorum.*”

I know not, indeed, any subject which more conspicuously displays the amazing riches of that creating

<sup>1</sup> On the subject of Zoology some very interesting remarks occur in the introductory treatise to the Library of Useful Knowledge, which I have been obligingly permitted to extract.—See Appendix, No. II. I would also particularly wish to refer to the excellent treatise on Animal Mechanics, published by Sir Charles Bell, in the same series. The Animal Physiology of the same collection is likewise especially valuable.

and presiding Intelligence, the Author and Governor of nature, than the history of these minute tribes. The very fact of the small size of the objects, only renders more admirable the very signal instances of contrivance and design which all the phænomena of their organization, their instincts, their arts, and their social order exhibit. We feel more, I think, the infinite extent of that care which is over all the great Creator's works,—which knows no distinction of great and small,—when we see it thus lavished on beings which to a superficial view appear so utterly insignificant ; and in one instance perhaps we are warranted in carrying our inferences from design a step further in this case, than we are able to do in a mode of reasoning equally direct with regard to the higher orders of animals,—I mean with reference to the arts, such for instance as architecture, and the like, of these insects, which we see obviously as much provided for in the original design which has regulated their organization, as the primary physical wants of their nature ; for we find peculiarities of organic structure as decidedly adapted to the one as to the other. I have before endeavoured to avail myself of this analogy, in pointing out the probability that a similar provision may have been made, though by a prospective anticipation, for the progressive advances of the arts developed by human reason. And indeed in the organic structure of man,—in the admirable and universally applicable instrument with which he is furnished in the human hand, we find a provision strictly co-ordinate with the mental powers which direct the application of that instrument. But to return to our insects. In the admirably disci-

plined societies of the ant and the bee, in the regular division of labour, we see, as it were, a beautiful model of the best organized republics of civilized men;—not only in the devotion of the community to the necessary safety of the queen and universal mother of the tribe, but in the divisions of the worker from the nurse bee;—divisions obviously the express appointment of the Author of Nature, because they are accompanied with corresponding varieties in the organic structure of the different classes. Then, how admirably is that organic structure adapted to all their wants; not only their physical wants, for that provision we equally see in all animal races: and though the intestinal sacs for carrying honey in the bee, and the curious ovipositors of many insects are peculiar and beautiful examples, yet they belong to an universal class of animal provisions. But the provisions made for the uses of what may well be called the arts of insects, seem to me strictly *sui generis*;—such, to take the most obvious instance, are the spinnerets with which the spider constructs its geometrical webs.—But the arts of bees are decidedly the most striking. In these wonderful little insects, instinct has taught them rules of construction of which man's reason examines and confirms the propriety, by the most refined mathematical calculus. If we inquire by a problem in *maxima et minima* what figure will afford the greatest capacity in the least space and with the least expenditure of materials, we have as our result the precise hexagonal cells employed by these little geometricians. If we inquire what ought to be the form of the pyramidal terminations of such cells where the bases of the double row

of cells fronting the opposite faces of the comb are in contact in the middle, the infinitesimal calculus directs us to certain angles which should be employed in the formation of a three-sided pyramidal base, in order that the least possible quantity of matter may be expended, and these angles will be found the same within two seconds with those actually employed. To supply and use the materials for these admirable structures, we find them furnished with an organic apparatus by which wax is secreted from their vegetable nutriment, and deposited between the scales of the wax-workers. We find also their legs provided with a little triangular basket for the express purpose of carrying the propolis or vegetable gum, which they employ as a sort of cement and varnish. The hairy bristles of their legs fit them for brushing off and carrying heaps of the pollen of flowers, which in the form of bee-bread constitutes an essential part of their nutriment. The claws of their extremities, and their flexible mandibles supply all the purposes of a man's hand and fingers, and in a manner equally efficient: and their tongue, also capable of assuming the most varied shapes, and executing the most complicated operations, being sometimes flattened like a trowel, and at others pointed like a pencil, is a most useful aid in their architecture <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> On this subject, Kirby and Spence on Entomology is the most complete treatise: but the cheaper and more condensed publications on the subject, in Murray's Family Library, and The Library of Entertaining Knowledge, contain every thing at all essential, and are most ably executed.

Since this note was first published, the Bridgewater Essay of Messrs. Kirby and Spence on Entomology, has fully sustained their previous reputation.

## VEGETABLE PHYSIOLOGY.

It may be regretted that Paley has not entered more largely on the physiology of vegetables, which would have afforded him many illustrations of his argument scarcely less interesting than those of the animal œconomy. The time will now only permit me to adduce one of these, which is particularly suggested by the present vernal season<sup>1</sup>. Who can now pass through the fields without admiring the curious manner in which the tender petals are enfolded, and defended from the still frosty breezes in the cases of their yet unexpanded buds. All of you must frequently have admired the exquisite specimens of this presented by the horse-chestnut; —the external scaly cases of its bud covered with a thick gum, forming so complete a shelter for the inclosed leaflets from the action of cold. But few of you are probably aware, that these external scales present a most beautiful instance of one of those prospective provisions, affording by anticipation an adaptation of organization, varying with the varying circumstances to which the subject may be exposed. These scales are derived from the same origin as the ordinary leaves; and in the warm climates of which the tree is a native, are fully developed under their form, as common additional leaves: but when transferred to our colder regions, these outer leaves are chilled, checked in their growth, and instead of expanding in the natural form, they contract, harden, curve inwards, and degenerate into scales, beneath

<sup>1</sup> This lecture was originally delivered in the spring of 1831.



whose friendly covering the protected interior leaflets vegetate freely. Thus is the very cold made by its influence to produce an effectual defence against the injuries it might itself otherwise occasion <sup>1</sup>.

#### CONCLUSION.

Thus feebly have I endeavoured to set forth and illustrate the most striking and convincing argument which the great Creator has addressed to his rational creatures, in thus plainly inscribing the fundamental truth of his existence on all his works. But the force of the argument may be perhaps best exemplified, by observing the concessions which it extorts from those unhappy men who would fain endeavour to persuade themselves in their hearts, that there is no God. One of the ablest of these, Diderot, frankly admits, that it was necessary, in consistency with his view of the argument, to maintain that it was possible that the most elaborate Epic, an Iliad for instance, might be reproduced by rattling together a number of types like dice, and throwing them a sufficient number of times; and this absurdity he does consequently seriously maintain. "Whatever," says he, "were the finite sum of types with which it should be proposed to me to reproduce the

<sup>1</sup> I would especially recommend the admirable and compendious work of Mrs. Marcet on Vegetable Physiology. I may also refer to my friend Mr. Duncan's interesting essay, entitled Botano-Theology. It is greatly to be regretted that this comparatively unexhausted topic was not selected for the exclusive subject of a Bridgewater Essay expressly dedicated to it—Had such a task been committed to the Botanical Professor of Cambridge, Mr. Henslow, what an interesting work might we not have expected.

Iliad, there would be an appreciable finite sum of throws, which would render the proposal advantageous for me. And if the number of throws allowed me were infinite, my advantage also would be infinite." Surely we may safely enough take the philosopher at his own words, and admit the probability that the universe could come into existence without an intelligent Creator, and that an Iliad could be thus constructed, to be exactly equal. But even Diderot himself seems, as an amiable writer has observed, "to have had some lucid intervals in which he thought and felt very differently." In one of these happier moments he has exclaimed, not more eloquently than justly, "Is not the existence of a God as clearly impressed on the eye of a moth, or the wing of an insect, as the faculty of thought in the writings of the great Newton? What! Does the formation of the universe evince less of intelligence than the explanation of the universe? What an assertion! Is not the intelligence of the First Cause more forcibly demonstrated by his works, than the faculty of thought in a philosopher by his writings? Let the Atheist, too, remember that I have objected to him only the wing of a butterfly, whereas I might have crushed him with the weight of the universe." How forcibly does not the great father of inductive reasoning express the deep conviction of his powerful intellect, "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend and the Talmud, than that this universal frame is without mind. And therefore God never wrought miracles to convince Atheism, because his ordinary works convince it." *Bacon*, Essay xvii.

May the applications of science which I have thus endeavoured to inculcate, become habitually familiar to your minds, and heighten and sanctify the intellectual gratification such intellectual pursuits are calculated to yield. Without such an application, indeed, what can they ultimately profit? Horace, in his most beautiful Ode on the Death of the Philosopher Archytas, gives a melancholy answer to this question.

“ . . . . Nec quidquam tibi prodest  
Aërias tentasse domos, animoque rotundum  
Percurrisse polum, *mòrituro*.”

But with such an application, when these pursuits are cultivated with a constant reference to the great Creator, and when through them we endeavour to habituate our minds to the contemplation of his power and goodness,—may we not trust, with a better hope, that such a study may be productive of advantages, which shall not thus desert us at the hour of death?

I will now conclude with the words in which the great Newton sums up his celebrated *Scholium generale* at the end of his immortal *Principia*. “Atque hæc de Deo, de quo utique ex Phænomenis disserere ad Philosophiam Naturalem pertinet.”

## LECTURE III.

ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY, AND ON THE PECULIAR EVIDENCES AND DOCTRINAL CHARACTER OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

THE preliminary consideration of the natural evidences to the existence of an intelligent Creator of the universe, as deducible from the innumerable marks of design impressed on the works of creation, has been properly followed up in the plan sketched for your lectures, by the examination of the argument drawn from the analogy of religion, natural and revealed, to the constitution and course of nature. This subject, as is well known, is identified, as it were, with the name of that distinguished author who first handled it fully and satisfactorily; a name which, in this place, should, I think, be peculiarly cherished, as that of the ablest Prelate who has presided over the See of Bristol. In the progress of the course, this work will be regularly perused by the present class.

A slight sketch will be sufficient to show the general tenor of Butler's reasoning. He first prepares his ground by pointing out, in the general constitution of the circumstances amid which we are placed, the traces and indications of a natural government of his creatures by the Deity. The further marks of a moral character belonging to his government; the presumptions hence arising of a future state, in which that moral government shall be extended and perfected; and the suitableness of

our present state, as a stage of probation, to educate and discipline and prepare our souls for another and advanced scale of being,—are then exhibited. Having thus laid the foundation, he proceeds to the necessity and importance of Revelation, as a clear and authoritative republication of the truths of Natural Religion, which before were obscured by doubt, and destitute of any adequate sanction ; and still more as an original communication of truths not discoverable by natural reason ; such as the alienation of our state by nature ; and the dispensation for the recovery of lost man, through the atonement effected by the Son of God, and through the renewing influences of the Divine Spirit,—he shows that we cannot doubt but that the doctrines of such a Revelation (if there be sufficient evidence that such has been vouchsafed) must impose upon us duties no less obligatory than those most clearly pointed out by the light of nature. He then proceeds to argue, that the difficulties which Christianity presents,—such as arise from its partial and limited diffusion<sup>1</sup>, and

<sup>4</sup> Butler's answer to the objection against Revelation, drawn from its want of universality, is deduced from the analogous cases in God's natural government of the world, in which we often see his gifts bestowed with the same apparent partiality. And this answer will, I think, derive a peculiarly appropriate additional illustration, if we compare the manner in which the Deity has been pleased to impart the knowledge of the remedies which are curative of the physical disorders to which our corporeal frames are subject, with the manner in which he has regulated his communication of the religious remedial dispensations applicable to the spiritual disorders of our moral constitutions ; in each case (and I do not think we can select any two cases more properly analogous) such knowledge has

the supposed deficiency of its proof,—are objections which might be urged with equal force against all that we are most clearly assured of in God's natural government of the universe; that the page of Nature is a page of mystery, no less than that of Revelation, and that the presumptions from analogy are, throughout, rather favourable than hostile to the Christian scheme, whether considered in its doctrines, or its evidences. Especially he argues, that what he justly considers as the fundamental truth of the particular system of Christianity, the appointment of a Mediator, and the redemption of the

been imparted gradually, progressively and partially. How long and widely had fevers afflicted the human race, while yet one remote nation alone possessed the invaluable specific contained in the bark of the Peruvian Cinchona, which was hid from the far greater portion of mankind till less than four centuries ago; and even when at length made known, how imperfect and inefficient was its application until very recently chemistry has taught us how to extract in a separate state the specific constituent in which the febrifuge principle resides,—a discovery which has already so far mitigated the symptoms of disease, that districts before almost uninhabitable from the effects of malaria, are acquiring the happy character of a new salubriousness. How long had the inhabitants of the lovely Alpine valleys suffered from one of the most cruel deformities, before the efficacy of iodine was discovered? How many children fell premature victims to variolar disease before inoculation mitigated, and subsequently vaccination almost promises to expel this pest of infancy? Now, in all these cases, it must either be contended on the one hand, that neither the remedial or preventive virtues of these specifics, nor the faculties which enabled men to discover them, were the gift of a moral Governor of the world, because they have been thus partially distributed; or on the other, it must be allowed that similar objections against Christianity as a divine revelation have no validity.

world by him ; far as they transcend the discoveries of natural reason, are yet in no manner inconsistent with them. To abridge these arguments exhibited in the original with remarkable condensation of reasoning, would now be alike superfluous and injurious, as I trust you will shortly examine for yourselves the details of that admirable original. I can only hope that my own views, when my present survey shall conduct our glance over any of the particular topics thus alluded to, may be found imbued with some portion of the spirit derived from this source. And it shall, in the first place, be my endeavour in this spirit (although without servile plagiarism) to point out the just line of connecting argument by which we may advance from the Natural Evidences of Theology, which it was the business of my former Address to exhibit to you, to the consideration of the peculiar evidences and doctrinal character of the Christian Revelation,—the subject to which I have next to call your attention.

We have already seen that all nature implies design, that the constitution of every thing which the universe contains is exactly adjusted and adapted to its situation, and to the relations which intervene between itself and surrounding objects. We have seen, I say, that this physical adjustment of things is universal and complete ; but are we not bound on every principle of analogy to extend this argument from design still further ? for surely we cannot reasonably limit it to a partial application. If, for example, there should be in existence any beings of a mixed nature, possessing intellectual and moral, as well as physical constitutions ; on what possible



ground of reason can we persuade ourselves that the principle of adjustment and adaptation which we find universally manifested in their physical properties, is wanting in their moral properties? Now such a mixed being is man: and how can we for a moment suppose that all the circumstances belonging to the inferior part of his nature being thus strictly regulated and exquisitely adjusted by final causes, those of the superior part of his nature are not so regulated<sup>1</sup>? Let us look for a moment at the analogies presented by the instincts of the lower races of animals; let us contemplate the singular and admirably organized societies of many insect tribes of the bee and of the ant: in these the physical preservation of the species is evidently as much dependent on instincts, which it can hardly be considered as any abuse of language to term moral instincts, as on any purely physical circumstances. Here then we see a physical end requiring for its attainment intellectual and moral, no less than physical qualities; and we perceive both conditions equally fitted to attain that end. How then can we here suppose that one half, and that the lowest half, of the provision has been regulated by a design emanating from the great Creator's mind; while we refuse to acknowledge this of the other, and certainly higher half of the very same provision? But

<sup>1</sup> It has afforded me much gratification to find the same line of argument as that in the text, similarly enforced in Whewell's *Bridgewater Treatise*, p. 261, as supplying an important connecting link in deducing the moral government of the Deity from his natural works. At the period when I first published these views, I believed them to be original.

if we admit this as to the instinct of insects, how can we doubt of it with regard to the reason of man? The intellectual qualities on which the social relations of man depend, are indeed more varied and complicated than the instincts which regulate insect societies: but it may, I think, fairly be presumed that they differ rather in degree than in kind. And can it be said that this difference in degree renders it probable that the lower objects are regulated by the Divine Mind, but that the higher objects are not so regulated<sup>1</sup>?

The general prevalence, I had almost said the *universality*, of these moral feelings,—for their liability to perversion under circumstances unfavourable to their development, is surely not a more urgent exception than the diseased perversions of our vision, our taste, and our other physical senses,—the universality then, I will say, of these moral feelings surely imparts to them an instinctive character. I am well indeed aware of the objections sometimes alleged against the possibility of such moral instincts, because it is urged that they involve the exploded doctrine of innate ideas: but I will venture to confess that I have never been able to perceive the relevancy of this objection. Surely the supposition, that the mind possesses instinctively a moral *constitution*, disposing it to regard certain objects with approbation, and others with disapprobation, no more involves the

<sup>1</sup> In the Appendix to this part No. III. will be found some observations connected with the above arguments, being an attempt to deduce the constitution of human society from the necessary physical conditions, and primary instincts of our species. I shall thus illustrate my views of the application of Natural Theology to Political Philosophy.

assumption that the mind possesses innate ideas of those objects, than the certain fact that the physical senses are so constituted as to be affected pleasantly or painfully by different objects, involves the assumption that those senses must possess innate ideas of the sounds, colours, and flavours, &c. which so affect them<sup>1</sup>. Are not then, I would ask, these uni-

<sup>1</sup> I am delighted in being able to adduce as a powerful support to the views advocated in the text, the forcible and eloquent arguments of my friend, Professor Sedgwick, in his very nervous Discourse on Academic Studies:—"Another great fault in the Essay of Locke, (involved I think in his very system, which looking only to the functions of the soul forgets its innate capacities,) is its omission of the faculties of moral judgment. That such faculties exist, is proved by the sense of shame in a child, by the natural feelings of manhood, by the language of every country, and the code of every nation: and lastly, by the word of God, which speaks of conscience not as a word of convention—a mere creation of the social system—but as implanted in our bosoms by the hand of our Maker, to preside there, and pass judgment on our actions. We read of men *convicted in their own conscience—living in all good conscience—we are told of the law written in the hearts (of the Gentiles), and of their conscience also bearing witness—we read of a conscience void of offence—of the answer of a good conscience towards God—of holding faith and a good conscience—and of a conscience seared with a hot iron through long familiarity with sin. What meaning have words like these, if we may at our own will strip conscience of its sanction, and think of it no longer as a heaven-born rule of action?*

\* \* \* \* \*

If the mind be without innate knowledge, is it also to be considered as without innate feelings and capacities—a piece of blank paper, the mere passive recipient of impressions from without? The whole history of man shows this hypothesis to be an outrage on his moral nature. Naked he comes from his mother's womb; endowed with limbs and senses indeed, well fitted to the material world, yet powerless from want of use:

versal, and, as I believe, instinctive feelings, of a strictly moral character? Are they not such as, being implanted in our breasts by the great Governor of Nature, prove that his government is of a moral character ; and in effect assist in carrying that government into execution by the rewards which they minister to the virtuous bosom, and the punishments which they inflict on the guilty, as it were, by a necessity of nature<sup>1</sup>? Does not universal sympathy agree with the poet when he exclaims—

“ What nothing earthly gives or can destroy,  
The soul's calm sunshine and the heartfelt joy,  
Is Virtue's prize.”

And again, when the opposite picture is drawn by the classical satirist,

“ Nec tamen hos tu  
Evasisse putes, diri quos conscia facti  
Mens habet attonitos, et surdo verbere cædit,  
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.”

Do not then these indications of an actual moral go-

and as for knowledge, his soul is one unvaried blank ; yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident but design, and comes forth covered with a glorious pattern.”

<sup>1</sup> Butler has powerfully pursued this line of argument both in his *Analogy* and *Sermons on Human Nature*, and Dr. Chalmers has very eloquently illustrated it in the early chapters of his *Bridgewater Essay on the Supremacy of Conscience*, and on the inherent Pleasure of the virtuous and Misery of the vicious Affections. The concluding chapter of that treatise also excellently illustrates the true office of Natural Theology as an introductory discipline, opening our minds to the necessity of revelation.

vernment, and of a system of moral retribution carried even at present, however partially, into effect, afford some ground of presumption, that there may be a yet fuller development of this moral government, a yet stricter system of retribution in some future and more advanced stage of being, if indeed such a future state be itself probable? To what conclusion then, on this latter head, does analogical reasoning conduct us? Is not every presumption it affords favourable to the notion of successive and advanced stages of being? Is not the life of the fœtus<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This argument has been most forcibly stated by Dr. Ferguson, in a passage extracted in Dr. Chalmers's *Bridgewater Treatise*. "If the human fœtus were qualified to reason of his prospects in the womb of his parent, as he may afterwards do in his range on this terrestrial globe, he might no doubt apprehend in the breach of his umbilical cord, and in his separation from the womb a total extinction of life, for how could he conceive it to continue after his only supply of nourishment from the vital stock of his parent had ceased? He might indeed observe many parts of his organization and frame which should seem to have no relation to his state in the womb. For what purpose, he might say, this duct which leads from the mouth to the intestines? Why these bones that each apart become hard and stiff, while they are separated from one another by so many flexures or joints? Why these joints in particular made to move upon hinges, and these germs of teeth, which are pushing to be felt above the surface of the gums? Why the stomach through which nothing is made to pass? And these spongy lungs, so well fitted to drink up the fluids, but into which the blood that passes every where else is scarcely permitted to enter?"

"To these queries, which the fœtus was neither qualified to make nor to answer, we are now well apprized the proper answer would be—the life which you now enjoy is but temporary; and those particulars which now seem to you so preposterous are a provision which nature has made for a future course of

introductory to that of the infant, and that of the infant to that of the man? and why may there not remain yet one other stage? The beautiful classical emblem of the soul, the butterfly of Psyche, is surely not less philosophical than poetical: for would it not *à priori*, be at least as improbable that the caterpillar should survive its apparent dissolution and give birth to a being so essentially different, as that the soul of man should so survive, and when divested of its present corporeal investiture, assume some new form adapted to a higher mode of existence?

If then there should exist any degree of *probable presumption* that these things *may* be so; if it be at all a *reasonable conjecture*, that interests so all-important to man *may* possibly be depending, as must be presented by the prospects of a future state of existence, and by the inquiry whether any mode of preparation in this life may be practicable or requisite to qualify the soul for that future state; if, I say, points so awfully momentous be depending, can we hesitate to perceive the importance of a divine revelation to clear them up? Can we hesitate to agree with the philosopher of old, in the wish, which I have already quoted in my first address, for some divine communication on this great subject, upon which we might confidently embark our all, as in the only vessel fitted to convey us in safety through the

life which you have to run, and in which their use and propriety will appear sufficiently evident.

“Such are the prognostics of a future destination that might be collected from the state of the fœtus; and similar prognostics of a destination still future might be collected from present appearances in the life and condition of man.”

perils of our course? For while the general apprehension of man, what Cicero calls the "*omnium consensus, naturæ vox*," always testifies that the soul is permanent, and that something still remains beyond the grave<sup>1</sup>, nevertheless impenetrable clouds and thick darkness hang over the subject: thus we find the same Cicero, after enumerating the many absurd and contradictory opinions of the philosophical schools as to the nature of the soul, subjoining, "*harum sententiarum quæ vera sit Deus aliquis viderit, quæ verisimillima magna quæstio*." Aristotle peremptorily denies immortality: "Death," saith he, "is the limit, and it seemeth that nothing either of good or evil can affect the dead." (*Ethic. lib. 3.*) And even those who were most inclined to entertain the hope that death was not thus final, could advance no further than Seneca: "*Juvabat de æternitate animarum quærere, immo mehercule credere. Credebam enim sane opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium*." Is not such a state of things then truly a *dignus vindice nodus*? Is it not a crisis which might naturally be supposed to claim the interference of the great Author of our natures, who hath constituted them susceptible of such earnest aspirations, of such anxious apprehensions? Was not a Revelation needed to bring life and immortality to light? Nor was it less necessary on almost every other subject of natural theology and moral obligation. Those who are most intimately acquainted with all the bearings of the previous speculations of unassisted reason, will ever be the first to assent to the convincing reasoning of

<sup>1</sup> *Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. §. 15.*



one of the earliest apologists of the Christian Revelation. "Your systems of virtue," says Tertullian<sup>1</sup>, "are but the conjectures of human philosophy, and the power which commands obedience merely human : so that neither the rule nor the power is indisputable, and hence the one is too imperfect to instruct us fully, and the other too weak to command us effectually : but both these are abundantly provided for by a Revelation from God. Where is the philosopher who can so clearly demonstrate the true good, as to fix the notion beyond dispute ? and what human power is able to reach the conscience, and bring down that notion into practice ? Human wisdom is as liable to error as human power is to contempt<sup>2</sup>."

So that even if we were to consider Revelation only as an authoritative republication of the truths of Natural Religion, substituting the indisputable sanction of a Divine Teacher for the doubtful specula-

<sup>1</sup> Tertullian. Apol. c. 45.

<sup>2</sup> The conclusion of Cicero's Dialogue De Natura Deorum, well illustrates the entire uncertainty that must necessarily prevail on doctrines professing to rest on no higher authority than the arguments of conflicting philosophical schools. In this dialogue, Balbus the Stoic has been introduced as alleging the usual philosophical arguments in proof of the existence of the gods : and Cotta, the new Academic, while, himself bearing the rank of Pontifex, he professes an implicit submission to the rules of the priestly college, (obviously only, as is allowed in a following dialogue De Divinatione, *ne communi jure migrare videatur*), yet refutes all these arguments most elaborately, so that *studio contra Stoicos disserendi deos videtur funditus tollere*, and attacks with all his force the *whole doctrine of Providence* ; and what is the conclusion ? "Hæc cum essent dicta, ita discessimus, ut Velleio Cottæ disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior."

tions of conflicting human schools, it would still be a communication of the first necessity and importance ; and should any probable pretension to such a Revelation be made, the evidence adduced in its support must undoubtedly challenge our deepest and most serious attention. But still further, if such an asserted revelation should be found to contain, not only this republication of natural truth, but also many doctrines purporting to be of the greatest importance, totally undiscoverable by natural reason, though by no means contradictory to it,—then, since, if such Revelation be established as true, these, its *peculiar* doctrines, must necessarily impose obligations upon us, no less binding than those resulting from any natural truths ; and since Revelation affords to us the *only* channel of ascertaining these, the duty incumbent on us to examine into the evidence on which it rests, clearly forms the first and most indispensable of all duties, inasmuch as it is necessary to elucidate the very foundation upon which the obligation of every other duty relies.

What then are the peculiar evidences of the Christian Revelation ?

The appropriate evidence of Revelation must ever ultimately resolve itself into miraculous agency. If it be asserted that the Deity hath spoken, we require proofs that the intervention hath been really his ; but what proof of his intervention can be given save the performance of some action of which he alone is capable ? But all actions of this nature are in effect miracles. Our primary notion of the Deity being that of the Author of Nature and its laws, we necessarily believe that he, and he only, is competent to

suspend or modify those laws. Prophecy may indeed be added as another class of appropriate evidence ; but it must, I think, be esteemed subsidiary to miracle, its application being far more difficult and complicated. Christianity however purports to be confirmed by both these classes of evidence ; and we shall presently examine how far that pretension can be satisfactorily maintained. What is called the internal evidence, arising from the excellency of the doctrines, and their adaptation to the wants of human nature, must be considered, I think, rather as affording a favourable presumption (often indeed a very strong one) that they have truly proceeded from that all-wise Being who alone knoweth what is in man, than as constituting direct evidence. To this point, however, we shall return. But first, as to miraculous evidence. Some sceptical writers have endeavoured to argue against every ground of believing in such. We believe human testimony, say they, only on the analogy of experience, and that analogy of experience is much stronger against any deviation from the laws of nature than it is in favour of such testimony. To this objection it has been well answered, that the same analogy of experience would equally justify a king of Siam in rejecting as incredible the testimony of any traveller, who should inform him of the congelation of water into ice. On the same principle the scepticism of Herodotus must be perfectly philosophical, when, after relating the observation of the Phœnician mariners, who circumnavigated the southern extremity of Africa, that in this operation they had the meridian sun on the north, he adds, “ Any body else may believe this,

but to me it is perfectly incredible." Still Nature, as we have formerly seen, attests that all her laws were originally imposed by an intelligent cause; and can we doubt that he who imposed has power to suspend or modify them? One branch of natural science moreover—Geology, affords us proofs, as we saw in our last lecture, that he has subsequently interfered with those laws, by an event no less striking than the calling the race of man into existence, to inhabit the face of a planet at first uniformly covered by the deep. A late writer in a popular journal has well remarked on the application of the argument hence resulting:—"This discovery imposes a still further degree of unreasonableness on the supporters of the uniformity of causation in its ill-extended sense and application: the circumstances of the remarkable evidence thus wonderfully brought to light seem to leave the recusants only this alternative; either out of compliment to a refinement of metaphysical ingenuity, they must, in spite of the concurrent testimony of philosophers, disbelieve the fact that the prior state of nature was broken in upon to make room for man; or, in case an interruption, that is a miracle, be admitted to have taken place in this instance, they must take for granted (and this without any satisfactory distinction being suggested) that it cannot be repeated, or, if repeated, must not be believed<sup>1</sup>."

Miracles then being the appropriate evidence of Revelation, and the objections made against the reception of human testimony to establish these miracles being removed, our next step must be to inquire

<sup>1</sup> Edinburgh Review, No. 114.

what circumstances render testimony competent to such an application, and whether these circumstances be present in the evidence of Christianity.

Now, the competency of testimony to establish miraculous facts must evidently depend on exactly the same circumstances as its competency to establish any other facts, though undoubtedly in this case the evidence may reasonably be subjected to a scrutiny of more than ordinary severity. These circumstances resolve themselves into the inquiry, 1st, Whether the witnesses could possibly have been deceived themselves as to the facts of which they give evidence. 2dly, Whether they lay under any conceivable temptation or inducement to falsify their testimony so as to deceive others.

How then stands the evidence adduced in support of the Christian miracles in these respects?

That evidence purports to consist of the testimony of witnesses, themselves, in part at least, the associates of the Founder of that religion, and the spectators of the miracles which he wrought in proof of his divine mission—miracles, such as the raising the dead, the giving sight to those known to have been born blind, the cure of organic diseases, and the like,—concerning which no deception could be practicable, the only alternative being that the narrative must be false, or the miracle true. Deceived themselves, therefore, the witnesses could not possibly be; more especially as they speak of the power of working miracles as imparted to, and continuing with, themselves and their companions, as the apostles and authoritative teachers of the new faith. Our next inquiry then must be, What temptation then

can we suppose could have existed to induce them to attempt deceiving others? What interested motives appear to have actuated them? Now they profess themselves to have been exposed to the bitterest persecutions, to imprisonments, scourges, and death, as the inevitable consequences of persisting in their testimony. They profess that "if in this life only they had hope, then were they of all men most miserable." What inducement then could have tempted them to fabricate such a testimony? Every worldly interest must have been most vehemently opposed to their ever having uttered it; and the interests of another world can assuredly afford no encouragement to falsehood. But it will be observed that I have hitherto carefully said the witnesses *purport* to be such parties, and *profess* to have been under such circumstances; and here a distinction presents itself between living and documentary evidence. Had we lived at the time and received this evidence orally, and had we been ourselves cognisant of the circumstances under which the witnesses who saw it were placed, this had been fully sufficient; but in documentary evidence, it must be first necessary that we establish the genuineness of the documents, i. e. that they really did proceed from the witnesses whose testimony they purport to record, before we can advance to the examination of their authenticity, i. e. the truth of the facts recorded. We must also learn from extraneous and collateral sources, and such as we cannot conceive to have been implicated in any conspiracy of fraud, the circumstances under which the witnesses were placed. Let us examine then whether there be any deficiency of this extraneous

and collateral evidence in support of the Christian documents.—First, with regard to the genuineness of these documents, it must of course require for its support the same critical evidence as the genuineness of any other writings. Now this critical evidence must be partly external, afforded by a regular series of successive reference to, and quotations from, them, given in independent authors, from the age when they purport to have been first published. And we shall find that this evidence is far more complete with regard to the Christian writings than with regard to any others, as might have naturally been anticipated from the more general interest belonging to them, and their consequently more extensive circulation. Thus we find the whole canon, as it is called, of the New Testament cited before the close of the second century of our æra<sup>1</sup>: and early in that century, in the writings of Justin Martyr, we find the Memorials of the Apostles repeatedly and familiarly cited, which, if they were not identically the same with the present Gospels, but as it has been sometimes imagined (though I think without any sufficient grounds), were some earlier document previous to the compilation of our separate Gospels in their exact present form, yet,

<sup>1</sup> In 1740 a MS. of the second century was discovered by Muratori in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, apparently a fragment of a dialogue of one Caius, cited by Eusebius and Jerome. This MS. contains a regular list of the books of the New Testament as they at present stand, with the omission only of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and of one of those of John, to whom only two are ascribed: the one passed over is probably the second. This MS. has been published, with full critical remarks, in the beginning of the 4th volume of Routh's *Reliquiæ Sacræ*.



however this may have been, the citations exhibit throughout the most close agreement with those Gospels, and sufficiently prove that the narrative cannot have been materially altered since that period.

What may be called the internal critical evidence (a phrase which I employ for the sake of distinction from the internal doctrinal evidence, which belongs to quite another part of the subject), consists in the agreement of the narrative with the known historical circumstances of the time in which it purports to have been written; and if there be more narrations than one, as in the case of the Four Gospels—in what has been called their undesigned coincidences, that is, their agreement in minute circumstances, of a nature never likely to have attracted the notice of a forger, and which can scarcely be accounted for otherwise than by ascribing it to the harmony which truth must ever impress on all its records. Now the application of such an inquiry is in effect subjecting the documents to which it relates to the strictest cross-examination; and to such a cross-examination the evidence of Christianity has been subjected, and the result has been most satisfactory. There does not perhaps exist a more acute specimen of this kind of examination than the *Horæ Paulinæ* of the celebrated Paley, the object of which is the investigation of the undesigned coincidences in the personal allusions, contained in the different Pauline epistles, and in the narrative of the Acts, a treatise to which I would most earnestly call your deepest attention. It is I think quite impossible for any candid mind to arise from its perusal without a full conviction of the genuineness of this most important

part of the Christian writings. A similar scrutiny has been more recently extended to the Gospels<sup>1</sup> and the result, though perhaps less striking, has yet been most satisfactory. Of the genuineness of these writings then, and that they were really put forth, as they profess to have been, by the early disciples of Christianity, within the first century after the promulgation of that faith, we have the fullest evidence which the nature of the case admits, much fuller, probably, than can be brought to bear on the genuineness of any other class of writings.

It remains to be seen what we can ascertain as to the circumstances under which the witnesses, whose record is thus preserved, delivered their testimony, and how far those circumstances were calculated to shake or to confirm our reliance upon it. For this purpose we must of course endeavour to ascertain these circumstances from the independent evidence of other writers in no wise connected with them, and therefore entirely free from all suspicion of collusion or possible union with them in any confederate conspiracy. Now we have exactly such collateral evidence as we require, in the classical historians and other writers of the period, who looked upon this new and foreign sect, if not with hostility, yet with the indifference of supercilious contempt. From these sources we derive repeated and unsuspected corroborations of the fact that the early Christians

<sup>1</sup> See an admirable article in the Quarterly Review for February 1831. As I am most anxious to place this very able investigation of the above subject in the hands of the present Class, I have (with permission) subjoined the most material extracts in the Appendix, No. IV.

attested with inflexible constancy a narrative of a miraculous character concerning the author of their faith, and that this attestation actually did draw down upon them all the extremities of persecution which we have before collected from their own account, which is thus far therefore unexceptionably confirmed. We have such collateral evidence in Suetonius, who flourished about 70 years after the Crucifixion, who informs us that Claudius, who died within 20 years of that event, banished from Rome the Christians, whom the historian ignorantly describes as a Jewish sect raising continual tumults, "impulsore Christo."—Again, Tacitus, a contemporary of Suetonius, speaking of the fire which occurred at Rome in the time of Nero, about 10 years later than the time to which the former extract relates, informs us, that in order to avert from himself the suspicion of having caused the conflagration, he laid the guilt, and inflicted the most cruel punishments upon the Christians, a sect abhorred by the people as criminals, and deriving their name from Christ, who suffered death in the reign of Tiberius, under his procurator Pontius Pilate. "Their sufferings," he adds, "at their execution were aggravated by insult and mockery; for some were disguised in the skins of wild beasts and worried to death by dogs,—some were crucified,—and others were wrapped in pitched shirts and set on fire when the day closed, that they might serve as lights to illuminate the night." We have further evidence from another writer of the same age, whose account, however, carries us still lower down than the preceding, as it relates not to former reigns, but to his own

time. Pliny, who was pro-consul of Asia Minor under Trajan, has left a letter, written by him to that Emperor, requesting his advice how he should act in repressing the Christians, whom he describes as amounting, in Bithynia and Pontus, to a great multitude of all ages and of both sexes, spread not only through cities but over villages and the whole country. "Many," he says, "had been apprehended, of whom some boldly avowed their profession and died in the cause, while others recanted." Several other passages to the same effect, from other heathen testimonies, may be found in Lardner and Paley.

On the evidence from Prophecy I can offer but few remarks in so general and cursory a survey, as my present Address—introductory be it remembered only—will admit. This subject is far less susceptible of any general statement, as it immediately resolves itself into the detail of the application and fulfilment of each particular prophecy. Since also these prophecies were not intended so far to interfere with the course of events, as to enable others to foretell them beforehand, they were often necessarily, at first, delivered under the veil of figure and allegory, and awaited their explanation until their fulfilment, and until History, their interpreter, assisted the investigation with its torch. The complication thus introduced into the subject must be obvious. I will only then briefly observe, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament present us with many distinct prophecies of the long expected Messiah. The time of his advent, the place of his birth; his miracles, his ministry, and his course of life; his character, and the manner and object of his atoning

sacrifice, are all foretold. I need only particularise that most affecting prediction in the fifty-third of Isaiah, of the unmerited sufferings of him “who was wounded for our transgressions, and upon whom was the chastisement of our peace;”—a passage, as is well known, mainly instrumental in the conversion of the unhappy infidel, Rochester. We also find in the sacred volume many other striking prophecies of the successive monarchies of the ancient world, of the destruction of Jerusalem, of the dispersion of the Jews, and of the fate of the land of Judea and the circumjacent countries. But on all these points, and more especially on the last, I would refer you to the excellent little volume of Keith on the Evidence of Prophecy. He has often gleaned from the pages of travellers of indifferent or even sceptical principles, an unwitting, and, we may almost say, reluctant testimony, to the exact fulfilment of those Scriptures which they hesitated to admit, in the actual condition of the countries through which they passed. I would more especially call your attention to the accounts extracted from Volney of the districts of Edom or Idumæa.

The evidence arising from the consideration of the Christian doctrines, their excellency, originality, and suitableness to all the moral wants of our nature, or the internal doctrinal evidence, will be best illustrated while we are engaged in surveying these doctrines; and I shall now, therefore, offer a few concluding remarks on the peculiar doctrinal character of Christianity, introductory to the detailed examination of this most important subject, which it is proposed should engage our attention at my future visit to close the present Course.

Christianity, I would first observe, offers itself to us as a remedial dispensation for the recovery of man, who is uniformly represented to us, in its sacred writings, as in a state of natural corruption, and alienation from God. The remedial means held out, are, 1st, The atonement of a *divine* Mediator; and, 2dly, The renewing and sanctifying influences of a *divine* Spirit on the soul.

I feel that I naturally glide as it were into this subject from that of Prophecy, which has immediately preceded it; for such is the uniformity of the divine scheme, that whether it is foretold, announced as present, or recorded as accomplished, it is invariably described in terms strictly equivalent. Doth Isaiah in the passage I was even now quoting foresee the day of Christ? His exclamation is, "All we like sheep have gone astray, and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." Doth his Baptist messenger proclaim his advent? "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world!" Or is the most active apostle of his faith proclaiming its glad tidings to the Gentiles? What are his words? "God commendeth his love towards us, in that *while we were yet sinners Christ died for us*; much more then being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if *when we were enemies* we were reconciled to God, *by the death of his Son*, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by his life." Can language be more explicit? To its simple and grammatical interpretation the Church of which I am an unworthy member has ever fondly clung as to the rock on which she is built. In this interpretation we would

most anxiously seek peace to our own souls, and this, as the great secret of hope and restoration, would we most earnestly impress on all that will listen to our voice.

But who is the great Mediator thus proposed to us? Who is he that hath wrought out for us this great salvation? This inquiry must evidently be one of the greatest moment; for what can be more important for us than to ascertain what are the relations in which the Author of that salvation stands to those to whom it is offered? and what the duties which in virtue of those relations he claims from us? For an answer we can refer alone to the word and to the testimony which he hath bequeathed to his Church. It only appertains to us simply to record the express declarations of that testimony. In this then we find him described as the Son of God, emphatically, and with every epithet which can mark the application of that title in a special sense as the only begotten, and well-beloved. We learn that earth was not his original place, but that he descended thither from an heavenly seat, that when he took upon himself the servile form of man he emptied himself (*εκενωσε εαυτον*) of his proper and previous dignity. Therefore that human condition can never have been his essential nature. We read that this his pre-existing state was one of glory with the Father before the world was, or, as it is yet more explicitly spoken, that he was in the beginning with God and was God; that all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made; for by him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible. All



things were created by him and for him, and he is before all things, and by him all things consist. He upholdeth all things by the word of his power<sup>1</sup>. Hence an Apostle scruples not to address him as his Lord and his God; and the first martyr who sealed with his blood the confession of his faith, while on the eve of falling asleep in him, offers up to him the most solemn prayer which man can possibly address to Deity, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit."

These doctrines cannot be even glanced at without its being at once perceived that they are perfectly original. So little are they discoverable by natural reason, that at first sight they might rather appear repugnant, although on more careful investigation we shall I trust be led to the conclusion that no real opposition exists: that on the contrary these doctrines explain appearances which are and always have been universal throughout the world; that they are exquisitely adapted to the moral circumstances under which our nature is placed; and afford the only adequate supply to the moral necessities of that nature; and can alone hold out to the earnest aspirations of our souls the soothing promise that in embracing them they shall find satisfaction and repose. Yet so truly original are these doctrines, that that originality has been ably urged<sup>2</sup> as affording an argument (and a very powerful argument it is) that impostors could never have devised with the smallest probability of success, doctrines so unlikely to meet with acceptance amongst any whom they addressed,

<sup>1</sup> Compare the 1st chapter of St. John's Gospel and the 1st chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians.

<sup>2</sup> See particularly Sumner on the Evidence of Christianity.

—doctrines which to the prejudiced Jew were a stumbling block, and to the philosophical Greek, foolishness. Such a system, it is forcibly argued, could never have triumphed as it did, had not the power of God indeed worked with it.

Fully to unfold to the class now for a time entrusted to my care these most important doctrines, will hereafter be my gratifying task; and my earnest prayer will be, that, however feebly, it may yet not altogether unprofitably be discharged. May I be enabled to give a reason of the hope and the faith which we place in them, in the spirit so solemnly inculcated of meekness and fear; fear of unnecessary offence, fear of unfaithful compromise by suppressing any portion of essential truth committed to our charge, and fear of injuring its simplicity by the intermixture of any presumptuous explanations of our own beyond that which is written! I will now only observe on this subject, that the single question before us must ever be “What is written?”—the only reasonable place for objection must be while inquiring into the evidence of Revelation. If this evidence be satisfactory, no objection can possibly lie against any of the contents of that Revelation; these must be implicitly and submissively received. We may not dare to pursue a partial course,—to embrace the portions we approve, and reject those we disapprove. We may not dare to modify and pare down the doctrines of a credited Revelation to make them suit any preconceived hypothesis of human reason. The only question, I repeat, must ever be, “Hath God indeed spoken?”

If he hath, shall he not say to every whisper of doubt—

Be still, and know that I am God!

Is this then contrary to reason?—far, my friends, far from it; it will ever be my endeavour to place in its just light the real union of Reason and Faith. Faith hath indeed sometimes been contrasted with Reason, as if these two principles (both the gifts of the Author of all light) were or could be, when rightly understood, in opposition the one to the other; but they are in truth inseparably combined,—Reason is the handmaid of Faith, and Faith is the perfection of Reason. Them hath God joined together, and let no man presume to put them asunder, either by exalting unassisted Reason, or by stripping Religion of her aid and attendance. If we examine the objects of religious truth, we shall find that the faculty which gives them admission into our souls, is Reason. Sense and Reason are the two eyes of the mind; and while material objects appeal to Sense, spiritual objects appeal to Reason; she is the portress, as it were, sitting at the gate of the soul to receive and usher them in. I do not mean that she first suggests them; to do so is the higher office of that great Power, the primary source of all illumination, who created her for this among other purposes. But I assert, that she does and must first entertain them; the leading idea of the existence of a Deity is in the first place recognized and received by her; and the other elementary truths of religion follow in their order. These truths are indeed so impressed by her Maker on

her essence, that even when his more direct voice is silent, she still repeats them, faintly and feebly indeed, and languishing as cut off from the source and cause of her knowledge;—but still she does repeat them, and she loves to trace them in the beauty, order, and harmony of the universe. When his more direct voice is heard,—when Revelation speaks, it is indeed her place and office to sit silent and listen, and with all other creatures to keep peace before her Creator, receiving humbly truth from him who is the one great Eternal Truth. But this her submission is not forced or constrained; her prostration is a voluntary prostration; it is a duty which she teaches and enforces on herself. There is indeed a proud and rebellious principle, a miscalled and spurious reason, more justly termed—as being often mistaken for her heavenly prototype—the wisdom of this world, which acts otherwise: but to confound the two, even in name, is alike injurious to the cause of true religion and true reason. Submitting herself thus readily and entirely to revelation, it is therefore to true reason that revelation appeals, calling on her to reject every false pretension to that title, and to admit, approve, and attest the true. When the beautiful feet of them that preach the Gospel of Peace wander afar amidst the nations that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death,—is not their mighty errand, the mission of reason, as well as of religion? Does not reason furnish them from her armoury with the keen weapons which must expose the abominations of Juggernaut, the follies of Brahminical superstition, and the fallacies of Mahometan imposture? and must not these weapons be

first successfully employed to clear the way for the more appropriate use of the sword of the Spirit, the Word of God? Are not the disciples of Christianity, from the beginning, instructed to be ever ready to give a *reason* for the hope that is in them? I have said, that as Reason is thus the handmaid of Faith, so is Faith the perfection of Reason. The object of reason is truth; the highest and noblest truths are those which religion supplies, and the reception of these by reason constitutes faith. Religion is indeed that first philosophy, else vainly sought, in which alone the eternal form of truth subsists. The triumph of reason is to give to the objects of intellect the victory over those of sense; and to make the distant and the future gain ascendancy over the present: but this triumph, in its most exalted degree, is that of faith,—it is by faith, the evidence of things not seen, that objects spiritually discerned overbalance the objects of sight. It is by faith, the substance of things hoped for, that eternity triumphs over time;—this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith; it is faith that giveth to reason the wing and the eye of the eagle, enabling her to soar towards the heavens, and to look upwards to the Sun of Righteousness.

## APPENDIX.

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No. I.—Page 37.

*Enquiry whether we are not justified in concluding many natural provisions to have a designed reference to the development of human arts.*

THE idea, that in many instances such anticipative provisions have a designed reference to the future and progressive developments of human arts, and discoveries of human science, is one on which I could willingly dilate, did I not fear the charge of running into fanciful speculation. I am aware, indeed, that the Lucretian argument,

“ Nil adeo quoniam natum est in rebus ut uti  
Possemus, sed quod natum est id procreat usum—”

may seem more plausibly applicable against this view than on the subject to which he directed it:—to me, however, every analogy seems strongly favourable to such a supposition. If, for example, we consider the case of the insect societies,—since we often see tribes of insects hatched at the very season when the vegetables forming their appropriate nutriment are developed; the relations in this case are such, that we cannot doubt the one to have been intentionally provided for the other. But to those tribes which construct regular habitations for themselves, and receptacles for their young and their food, the mate-

rials whence these are fabricated are obviously no less essential to their animal economy than is their nutriment; and we find both equally provided by the same bountiful hand of nature;—Can we then believe that the provision is in the one instance intentional, but in the other accidental? Shall we say that the nectarine juices of flowers and their pollen afford sustenance to bees by design, but that the vegetable materials whence (by an adapted animal organization) they secrete their wax, and the resinous gums found in certain trees (such as the birch, willow, and poplar), which constitute their propolis, are made subservient to their use in the construction of their cells only through mere chance? But surely the architecture and arts of bees differ from those of men in degree rather than in nature; and if it be said that the one are the necessary consequences of immutable instincts, and the other the contingent discoveries of progressive reason; still there seems nothing in this distinction which can render it probable that the Universal Cause should in his designs so fully provide for every thing necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes suggested by the former mental principle, and have left the other in the hands of chance.

In man, indeed, unprovided as he is in his native and universally naked and destitute state with the most indispensable necessities, and left to make provision for himself by his reason and the arts to which it gives birth, that reason and its exercise are as indissolubly connected with the preservation of the species, as any physical requisite can possibly be. If, therefore, we recognize as demonstrated a designed



provision for the preservation of the species in physical adaptations, we cannot consistently doubt that a similar designed provision has been made for those arts at least which are strictly indispensable for the maintenance of life, without which the former provision would remain incomplete and its design be frustrated. The very nutriment of man is in fact left to depend on the arts suggested by his reason,—small and inadequate indeed were the portion of food which the untilled earth would afford him; in the sweat of his brow must he eat his bread. Nor is his supply of animal food less dependant on his arts than the produce of agriculture: he wants entirely the natural weapons and means of all other carnivorous animals,—he has not their untired speed in the chase, their force of spring, their powerful claws,—but he has the artificial means and weapons for which he is indebted to his reason—the javelin, the bow, the net. In most climates the shelter of a roof and the warmth of clothing are equally indispensable with food itself for the preservation of his existence. Now the primary and universal material of human edifices, from the rude hut of the savage, is the wood of the forest; hence the very words which signify any material, are in most languages borrowed from timber. Our own Saxon forefathers had no other verb for “to build,” than “to *timber*.” If we examine the structure and character of this great and almost universally abundant material, uniting, from the disposition of its fibres, great tenacity of cohesion with great lightness, easily cut into any required shape by the most simple tools, and having exactly those limits of firmness and flexibility

which best fit it for our purposes, I know not on what ground of analogical reasoning we can doubt that these purposes were contemplated and provided for, if we believe the supply of appropriate nourishment to have been so. In what do the two cases differ?

The designed adaptation of the metals to the purposes of the human arts being less indispensable, and not as in the last instance universal, may, perhaps, seem a more questionable point; yet, if we believe the being of our species provided for, why should we suppose its well-being to have been neglected—a more savage state of existence so richly cared for, and civilization, the perfection of human society, forgotten? but without the use of the metals, civilization could never have taken place. My friend, Dr. Kidd, in his Bridgewater Essay, has some excellent observations on the manner in which the properties of malleability, ductility, and fusibility, are so combined in different metals, as to render them exactly adapted to subserve the purposes which our wants require, and to bear every mark of a designed adjustment. “Thus, iron,” he observes, “has at once a degree of malleability sufficient to allow of its being easily fashioned into every description of instrument, while it is yet capable of being hardened so as to form the sharpest of tools; in ductility it exceeds every other metal, and as it is the most useful of all metals, so is it the most abundant.” Dr. Kidd proceeds to remark on the very useful art of protecting metallic vessels of copper and iron from corrosion by covering them with a superficial coating of tin in a state of fusion: he observes that each metal employed in this process

has exactly the most advantageous qualities. "Thus, of the three metals now under consideration, iron and copper, from the degree of their malleability, are easily formed into those various vessels which are of daily use for culinary and other purposes; while tin possesses the property of malleability in comparatively a slight degree: and, correspondently with the extent of their use, iron and copper are found in great abundance and in almost every part of the world; while tin is of very rare occurrence. Again, the two former metals are easily rusted; and, from the poisonous quality of the rust of copper, fatal effects on human health and life would be frequently occurring, used so extensively as that metal is for the construction of vessels in which our food is prepared, were it not defended by that superficial coating of tin, which is commonly applied to the inner surface of such vessels; tin being neither easily rusted, nor capable of communicating any poisonous quality to substances brought into contact with it. Let us then suppose that the respective degree of malleability, or of fusibility, were reversed in these metals; and observe the inconvenience that would ensue. Let the tin have that degree of malleability, for instance, which would render it capable of supplying the place of the iron, or the copper, in the construction of various economical vessels and instruments; yet, from the small quantity in which it occurs in the world, the supply of it would soon be either exhausted, or its price would be so enhanced that it could not be purchased except by the rich. And, even if the supply were inexhaustible, yet, from the softness of the metal, the vessels made of it

would be comparatively of little use; and from the low temperature at which it melts, it could not be readily used for the generality of those purposes to which copper and iron are commonly applied. On the other hand, let the copper or the iron be as fusible as tin; and let the tin be as refractory under the action of heat as iron and copper are: in that case, how could the tin be applied with any degree of economy to the surface of either of the other two; while they themselves would be unfit, from their easy fusibility, to withstand that degree of heat to which they are necessarily exposed in many of the economical uses to which they are applied?"

The medical properties of so many natural substances seem to afford a strong confirmation of this argument. Can we suppose the febrifuge qualities of the bark of the *Cinchona* less the effect of intentional design, than the nutritive properties of every green herb given for food to animal nature? Yet the general application of this remedial principle was dependent on the progress of navigation, and the discovery of the continent to which the *Cinchona* is limited: and we see many of the most important medical substances latent for ages, until, as in the case of Iodine, the most recent chemical discoveries have introduced them to common use.

The application of the polarity of the magnet to the purposes of navigation affords another example of this class of cases; concerning which I would inquire, whether we may not consider such an application to have been an object of design in the original constitution of things. It is true, indeed, that this is only one result of the general principle of

polarity, which probably answers many much higher and more important purposes than those of human navigation: but this is surely no objection; for in the economy of nature, one of the most admirable circumstances is the great multiplicity of useful purposes answered by some single and simple provision, often in addition to that which seems its most obvious and principal end. Thus in the case of the bees before alluded to, no one can believe that it is the principal end of the inflorescence, so necessary to the perpetuation of the vegetables themselves, to furnish these insects with honey or pollen; yet no one can, I think, deny that this, though a subordinate purpose, was yet one of those contemplated in the design of the creating intelligence. Thus we do not, I think, feel any inconsistency when we read that God set the luminaries in the firmament of heaven to rule the day and the night, and to be for signs and for seasons, and for days and for years; though we assuredly know that this can be only a secondary and subordinate design answered by these great bodies in the system of the universe.

I am almost afraid of appearing to argue fancifully, should I venture to pursue this inquiry with reference to the circumstances which have favoured the development of human sciences; yet in attending to their history, I have often been struck by the occurrence of critical periods in which every requisite subsidiary aid calculated to give a rapid advance to those sciences was brought together unexpectedly, and from the most unconnected quarters, in a manner so exactly adapted to this great end as to bear every mark of designed provision. Surely, then, it

is far less philosophical to attribute such remarkable combinations of circumstances to chance, than to the great Father of all Lights guiding his children by his own hand, as it were, in the noble task his providence has assigned to them—the improvement of his high gift of reason. Thus, if we advert to the history of astronomy at the commencement of the seventeenth century, the invention of the telescope opened powers of investigation unknown to former ages; and in the acuteness of a Galileo and exactness of a Tycho Brahe, we have commensurate mental powers supplied to profit by these novel instrumental means; and, above all, in Kepler, we have the very mind required at that particular era—devoted as it were by a natural instinct to try with an unwearied zeal, unchecked by repeated failure, every conceivable geometrical and arithmetical combination, till he finally arrived at the establishment of those three great laws which have immortalised his name. Now, had he lived an age earlier, he would have been destitute of the requisite data on which to found his calculations; had he not lived when he did, we might long and vainly have waited for the subsequent sublime generalisations of Newton, which are entirely dependent on these laws. For powerful as the mind of Newton was (and it was undoubtedly of a far higher order than that of Kepler), it will hardly appear that it had the very peculiar qualities which so signally fitted Kepler for his especial task,—a determination almost amounting to insanity, and much more like the result of instinctive appetite than any conclusion of sober reason, to try every possible numerical experiment which

could be brought to bear on his subject, often indeed with very little just appreciation either of the true foundations or results of the great principles which nevertheless he so successfully detected. This remark will especially apply to his third great law, (the proportionality of the squares of the periodic times of the planets to the cubes of their own distances,) of which we shall find him pursuing the investigation through a grotesque labyrinth of analogies the most far-fetched, unfounded, and absurd. His two first laws indeed, (the motion of the planets in ellipses having the sun in one focus, and their equable description of Areas) he deduced from his investigation of the orbit of Mars, by processes more just and natural, but still very remarkable for an unrivalled ardour of perseverance, which could be deterred by no difficulties and baffled by no discouragement. I do not speak lightly, when I express the persuasion which has strongly impressed me while considering these things, that the mind of Kepler was in truth a machine purposely constructed for the discovery of the Keplerian laws.

If we look at general history, even amidst all the clouds which so often darken the scene, do we not yet often discern combinations and critical periods bearing the same strong stamp of providential arrangement,—as when a general frenzy of emigration appeared to prompt the most remote, barbarous and heathen nations to fall on the *effete* empire of Rome, yet not until it had become the centre of Christianity,—and thus ultimately to derive arts and religion from the conquered people; and so to diffuse civilization, and, above all, Christianity in distant regions



where the power of Rome had been unfelt and almost its very name unknown.

To conclude, if there be any weight in the arguments now adduced, although they do not indeed afford a stronger proof of providential arrangement and design than the physical adjustments of the great Author of Nature, yet I think they come far more sensibly home to our business and our bosoms; they more strikingly illustrate the prophetic anticipations, by which His providence has beforehand appointed a supply for demands only gradually arising from the successive development of our faculties, and teach us to regard that Providence as acting not merely by a single act of creative energy impressing from the beginning constant laws on matter, but as exerting a perpetual supervision over all His creatures.

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No. II.—Page 50.

[*Extracted by permission, from the Preliminary Treatise of the Library of Useful Knowledge: On the Objects, Advantages, and Pleasures of Science.*]

THE illustrations of the argument which it is the object of this part of the author's Address to exhibit, which may be deduced from the consideration of the organic structures and habits of animals, &c. have been so concisely and excellently stated in the very useful treatise above cited, that I am truly gratified in having obtained permission to enrich my Address with the following extract; being fully persuaded that thereby I shall greatly increase its utility to the

collegiate class to which it is essentially and principally dedicated<sup>1</sup>.

“For the purpose of further illustrating the advantages of Philosophy, its tendency to enlarge the mind, as well as to interest it agreeably, and afford pure and solid gratification, a few instances may be given of the singular truths brought to light by the application of mathematical, mechanical, and chemical knowledge to the habits of animals and plants; and some examples may be added of the more ordinary and easy, but scarcely less interesting observations, made upon those habits, without the aid of the profounder sciences.

“If we have a certain quantity of any substance, a pound of wood for example, and would fashion it in the shape to take the least room, we must make a globe of it, it will in this figure have the smallest surface. But suppose we want to form the pound of wood, so that in moving through the air or water it shall meet with the least possible resistance, then we must lengthen it out for ever, till it becomes not only like a long-pointed pin, but thinner and thinner, longer and longer, till it is quite a straight line, and has no perceptible breadth or thickness at all. If we would dispose of the given quantity of matter so that it shall have a certain length only, say a foot, and a certain breadth at the thickest part, say three inches, and move through the air or water with the smallest possible resistance which a body of those

<sup>1</sup> On the same subject I would particularly recommend to the attention of the class the very interesting Treatise on Animal Mechanics by Sir Charles Bell, which forms a part of the series of publications by the same Society.

dimensions can meet, then we must form it into a figure of a peculiar kind, called the *Solid of least resistance*, because of all the shapes that can be given to the body, its length and breadth remaining the same, this is the one which will make it move with the least resistance through the air, or water, or other fluid. A very difficult chain of mathematical reasoning, by means of the highest branches of algebra, leads to a knowledge of the curve, which by revolving on its axis, makes a solid of this shape, in the same way that a circle by so revolving makes a sphere or globe; and the curve certainly resembles closely the face or head part of a fish. Nature, therefore, (by which we always mean the Divine Author of nature), has fashioned these fishes so, that, according to mathematical principles, they swim the most easily through the element they live and move in.

“Suppose upon the face part of one of these fishes a small insect were bred, endowed with faculties sufficient to reason upon its condition, and upon the motion of the fish it belonged to, but never to have discovered the whole size and shape of the face part, it would certainly complain of the form as clumsy, and fancy that it could have made the fish so as to move with less resistance. Yet if the whole shape were disclosed to it, and it could discover the principle on which that shape was preferred, it would at once perceive, not only that what had seemed clumsy was skilfully contrived, but that if any other shape whatever had been taken, there would have been an error committed; nay, *that there must of necessity* have been an error; and that the very best possible

arrangement had been adopted. So it may be with man in the Universe, where, seeing only a part of the great system, he fancies there is evil; and yet, if he were permitted to survey the whole, what had seemed imperfect might appear to be necessary for the general perfection, insomuch that any other arrangement, even of that seemingly imperfect part, must needs have rendered the whole less perfect. The common objection is, that what seems evil might have been avoided; but in the case of the fish's shape it *could not* have been avoided.

“It is found by optical inquiries, that the rays or particles of light, in passing through transparent substances of a certain form, are bent to a point where they make an image or picture of the shining bodies they come from, or of the dark bodies they are reflected from. Thus, if a pair of spectacles be held between the candle and the wall, they make two images of the candle upon it; and if they be held between the window and a sheet of paper when the sun is shining, they will make a picture on the paper of the houses, trees, fields, sky, and clouds. The eye is found to be composed of several natural magnifiers which make a picture on a membrane at the back of it, and from this membrane there goes a nerve to the brain, conveying the impression of the picture, by means of which we see it. Now, white light was discovered by Newton to consist of different-coloured parts, which are differently bent in passing through transparent substances, so that the lights of different colours come to a point at different distances, and thus create an indistinct image. This was long found

to make our telescopes imperfect, insomuch that it became necessary to make them of reflectors or mirrors, and not of magnifying glasses—the same difference not being observed to affect their reflection. But another discovery was about fifty years afterwards made by Mr. Dollond, that by combining different kinds of glass in a compound magnifier, the difference may be greatly corrected; and on this principle, he constructed his telescopes. It is found, too, that the different natural magnifiers of the eye are combined upon a principle of the same kind. Thirty years later, a third discovery was made by Mr. Blair, of the greatly superior effect which combinations of different liquids have in correcting the imperfection; and, most wonderful to think, when the eye is examined, we find it consists of different liquids, acting naturally upon the same principle which was thus recently found out in Optics by many ingenious mechanical and chemical experiments.

“Again, the point to which any magnifier collects the light is more or less distant as the magnifier is smaller or rounder, so that a small globe of glass or any transparent substance makes a microscope. And this property of light depends upon the nature of lines, and is purely of a mathematical nature, after we have once ascertained by experiment, that light is bent in a certain way when it passes through transparent bodies. Now birds flying in the air, and meeting with many obstacles, as branches and leaves of trees, require to have their eyes sometimes as flat as possible for protection; but sometimes as round as possible, that they may see the small objects, flies and other insects

which they are chasing through the air, and which they pursue with the most unerring certainty. This could only be accomplished by giving them a power of suddenly changing the form of their eyes. Accordingly, there is a set of hard scales placed on the outer coat of their eye, round the place where the light enters; and over these scales are drawn the muscles or fibres by which motion is communicated; so that, by acting with these muscles, the bird can press the scales, and squeeze the natural magnifier of the eye into a round shape when it wishes to follow an insect through the air, and can relax the scales, in order to flatten the eye again, when it would see a distant object, or move safely through leaves and twigs. This power of altering the shape of the eye is possessed by birds of prey in a very remarkable degree. They can see the smallest objects close to them, and can yet discern larger bodies at vast distances, as a carcass stretched upon the plain, or a dying fish afloat on the water.

“ A singular provision is made for keeping the surface of the bird’s eye clean, for wiping the glass of the instrument, as it were, and also for protecting it, while rapidly flying through the air, and through thickets, without hindering the sight. Birds are, for these purposes, furnished with a third eyelid, a fine membrane or skin, which is constantly moved very rapidly over the eyeball by two muscles placed in the back of the eye. One of the muscles ends in a loop, the other in a string which goes through the loop, and is fixed in the corner of the membrane, to pull it backward and forward. If you wish to draw a thing towards any place with the least force, you

must pull directly in the line between the thing and the place ; but if you wish to draw it as quickly as possible, and do not regard the loss of force, you must pull it obliquely, by drawing it in two directions at once. Tie a string to a stone, and draw it straight towards you with one hand ; then, make a loop on another string, and running the first through it, draw one string in each hand, not towards you, but side-ways, till both strings are stretched in a straight line : you will see how much swifter the stone moves than it did before when pulled straight forward. Now this is proved, by mathematical reasoning, to be the necessary consequence of forces applied obliquely ; there is a loss of power, but a great increase of velocity. The velocity is the thing required to be gained in the third eyelid, and the contrivance is exactly that of a string and a loop, moved each by a muscle, as the two strings are by the hands in the case we have been supposing.

“ A third eyelid of the same kind is found in the horse, and called the *haw* ; it is moistened with a pulpy substance (or mucilage) to take hold of the dust on the eyeball, and wipe it clean off, so that the eye is hardly ever seen with anything upon it, though greatly exposed from its size and posture. The swift motion of the haw is given to it by a gristly elastic substance, placed between the eyeball and the socket, and striking obliquely, so as to drive out the haw with great velocity over the eye, and then let it come back as quickly. Ignorant persons, when this haw is inflamed from cold, and swells so as to appear, which it never does in a healthy state, often mistake it for an imperfection, and cut it off, so nearly does



ignorance produce the same mischief as cruelty ! They might as well cut off the pupil of the eye, taking it for a black spot.

“ If any quantity of matter, as a pound of wood or iron, is fashioned into a rod of a certain length, say one foot, the rod will be strong in proportion to its thickness ; and, if the figure is the same, that thickness can only be increased by making it hollow. Therefore, hollow rods or tubes, of the same length and quantity of matter, have more strength than solid ones. This is a principle so well understood now, that engineers make their axles and other parts of machinery hollow, and therefore stronger with the same weight than they would be if thinner and solid. Now the bones of animals are all more or less hollow ; and are therefore stronger with the same weight and quantity of matter than they otherwise would be. But birds have the largest bones in proportion to their weight ; their bones are more hollow than those of animals which do not fly ; and therefore they have strength without having to carry more weight than is absolutely necessary. Their quills derive strength from the same construction. They have another peculiarity to help their flight. No other animals have any communication between the air-vessels of their lungs and the hollow parts of their bodies ; but birds have ; and by this means they can blow out their bodies as we do a bladder, and thus make themselves lighter, when they would either make their flight towards the ground slower, or rise more swiftly, or float more easily in the air. Fishes possess a power of the same kind, though not by the same means. They have air-bladders in their bodies, and

can puff them out, or press them closer, at pleasure : when they want to rise in the water, they fill out the bladder, and this lightens them. If the bladder breaks, the fish remains at the bottom, and can only be held up by the most laborious exertions of the fins and tail. Accordingly, flat-fish, as skaits and flounders which have no air-bladders, seldom rise from the bottom, but are found lying on banks in the sea, or at the bottom of sea rivers.

“ If you have a certain space, as a room, to build up with closets or little cells, all of the same size and shape, there are only three figures which will answer, and enable you to fill the room without losing any space between the cells ; they must either be squares, or figures of three equal sides, or figures of six equal sides. With any other figures whatever, space would be lost between the cells. This is evidently true upon considering the matter ; and it is proved by mathematical reasoning. The six-sided figure is by far the most convenient of these three shapes, because its corners are flatter, and any round body placed in it has therefore more space, there being less room lost in the corners. Likewise, this figure is the strongest of the three ; any pressure either from without or from within will hurt it less, as it has something of the strength of an arch. A round figure would be still stronger, but then room would be lost between the circles, whereas none at all is lost with the six-sided figure. Now, it is a most remarkable fact, that *Bees* build their cells exactly in this shape, and thereby save both room and materials beyond what they could save if they built in any other shape whatever. They build in the very

best possible shape for their purpose, which is to save all the room and all the wax they can. So far as to the shape of the walls of each cell ; but the roof and floor, or top and bottom, are built on equally true principles. It is proved by mathematicians, that to give the greatest strength, and save the most room, the roof and floor must be made of three square planes meeting in a point ; and they have further proved by a demonstration belonging to the higher parts of Algebra, that there is one particular angle or inclination of those planes to each other where they meet, which makes a greater saving of materials and of work than any other inclination whatever could possibly do. Now, the bees actually make the tops and bottoms of their cells of three planes meeting in a point, and the inclination or angle at which they meet is precisely the one found out by the mathematicians to be the best possible for saving wax and work. Who would dream for an instant of the bee knowing the highest branches of Mathematics—the fruits of Newton's most wonderful discovery—a result, too, of which he was himself ignorant, one of his most celebrated followers having found it out? This little insect works with a truth and correctness which are quite perfect, and according to the principles at which man has only arrived after ages of slow improvement in the most difficult branch of the most difficult science. But the mighty and all-wise Creator, who made the insect and the philosopher, bestowing reason on the latter, and giving the former to work without it—to Him all truths are known from all eternity, with an intuition that mocks even the conceptions of the sagest of human kind.

“It may be recollected, that when the air is exhausted or sucked out of any vessel, there is no longer the force necessary to resist the pressure of the air on the outside; and the sides of the vessel are therefore pressed inwards with violence: a flat glass would thus be broken, unless it were very thick; a round one, having the strength of an arch, would resist better; but any soft substance, as leather or skin, would be crushed or squeezed together at once. If the air was only sucked out slowly, the squeezing would be gradual, or, if it were only half sucked out, the skin would only be partly squeezed together. This is the very process by which *Bees* reach the fine dust and juices of hollow flowers, like the honey-suckle, and some kinds of long fox-glove, which are too narrow for them to enter. They fill up the mouth of the flower with their bodies, and suck out the air, or at least a large part of it; this makes the soft sides of the flower close, and squeezes the dust and juice towards the insect as well as a hand could do, if applied to the outside.

“We may remember this pressure or weight of the atmosphere as shown by the barometer, the sucking-pump, and the air-pump. Its weight is near fifteen pounds on every square inch, so that if we could entirely squeeze out the air between our two hands, they would cling together with a force equal to the pressure of double this weight, because the air would press upon both hands; and if we could contrive to suck or squeeze out the air between one hand and the wall, the hand would stick fast to the wall, being pressed on it with the weight of above two hundred weight, that is, near fifteen pounds on

every square inch of the hand. Now, by a late most curious discovery of Sir Everard Home, the distinguished anatomist, it is found that this is the very process by which *Flies* and other insects of a similar description are enabled to walk up perpendicular surfaces, however smooth, as the sides of walls and panes of glass in windows, and to walk as easily along the ceiling of a room with their bodies downwards and their feet over head. Their feet, when examined by a microscope, are found to have flat skins or flaps, like the feet of web-footed animals, as ducks and geese; and they have towards the back part or heel, but inside the skin or flap, two very small toes so connected with the flap as to draw it close down upon the glass or wall the fly walks on, and to squeeze out the air completely, so that there is vacuum made between the foot and the glass or wall. The consequence of this is, that the air presses the foot on the wall with a very considerable force compared to the weight of the fly; for if its feet are to its body in the same proportion as ours are to our bodies, since we could support by a single hand on the ceiling of the room (provided it made a vacuum) more than our whole weight, namely, a weight of fifteen stone, the fly can easily move on four feet in the same manner by help of the vacuum made under its feet. It has likewise been found that some of the larger sea animals are by the same construction, only upon a greater scale, enabled to climb the perpendicular and smooth surfaces of the ice hills among which they live. Some kinds of lizard have the same power of climbing, and of creeping with their bodies

downwards along the ceiling of a room ; and the means by which they are enabled to do so are the same. In the large feet of these animals, the contrivance is easily observed, of the two toes or tighteners, by which the skin of the foot is pinned down, and the air excluded in the act of walking or climbing ; but it is the very same, only on a larger scale, with the mechanism of a fly's or a butterfly's foot ; and both operations, the climbing of the sea-horse on the ice, and the creeping of the fly on the window or the ceiling, are performed exactly by the same power, the weight of the atmosphere, which causes the quicksilver to stand in the weather-glass, the wind to whistle through a key-hole, and the piston to descend in a steam-engine.

“ Although philosophers are not agreed as to the peculiar action which light exerts upon vegetation, and there is even some doubt respecting the decomposition of air and water during that process, one thing is undeniable, the necessity of light to the growth and health of plants; and accordingly they are for the most part so formed as to receive it at all times when it shines on them. Their cups, and the little assemblages of their leaves before they sprout, are found to be more or less affected by the light, so as to open and receive it. In several kinds of plants this is more evident than in others; their flowers close entirely at night, and open in the day. Some, as the Sun-flower, and a tribe of the like description, constantly turn round towards the light, following the sun, as it were, while he makes or seems to make his revolution, so that they receive the greatest quan-

tity possible of his rays. Plants of this kind require more light than others for their growth, and this is the provision made for supplying them.

“The lightness of inflammable gas is well known. When bladders, of any size, are filled with it, they rise upwards, and float in the air. Now, it is a most curious fact, that the fine dust, by means of which plants are impregnated one by the other, is composed of very small globules, filled with this gas—in a word, of small air balloons. These globules thus float from the male plant through the air, and striking against the females, are detained by a glue prepared on purpose to stop them, which no sooner moistens the globules than they explode, and their substance remains, the gas flying off which enabled them to float. A provision of a very simple kind is also made to prevent the male and female blossoms of the same plant from breeding together, this being found to hurt the breed of vegetables, just as breeding in and in does the breed of animals. It is contrived that the dust shall be shed by the male blossom before the female is ready to be affected by it, so that the impregnation must be performed by the dust of some other plant, and in this way the breed be crossed. The light gas with which the globules are filled is most essential to this operation, as it conveys them to great distances. A plantation of yew trees has been known, in this way, to impregnate another several hundred yards off.

“The contrivance by which some creeper plants are enabled to climb walls, and fix themselves, deserves attention. The *Virginia Creeper* has a small tendril, ending in a claw, each toe of which has a



knob, thickly set with extremely small bristles; they grow into the invisible pores of the wall, and swelling stick there as long as the plant grows, and prevent the branch from falling; but when the plant dies, they become thin again, and drop out, so that the branch falls down. The *Vanilla* plant of the West Indies climbs round trees likewise by means of tendrils; but when it has fixed itself, the tendrils drop off, and their place is supplied by leaves.

“It is found by chemical experiments, that the juice which is in the stomachs of animals (called the *gastric* juice, from a Greek word signifying *the belly*), has very peculiar properties. Though it is for the most part a tasteless, clear, and seemingly a very simple liquor, it nevertheless possesses extraordinary powers of dissolving substances which it touches or mixes with; and it varies in different classes of animals. In one particular it is the same in all animals: it will not attack living matter, but only dead; the consequence of which is, that its powers of eating away and dissolving are perfectly safe to the animals themselves, in whose stomachs it remains without ever hurting them. This juice differs in different animals, according to the food on which they subsist: thus, in birds of prey, as kites, hawks, owls, it only acts upon animal matter, and does not dissolve vegetables. In other birds, and in all animals feeding on grass, as oxen, sheep, hares, it dissolves vegetable matter, as grass, but will not touch flesh of any kind. This has been ascertained by making them swallow balls with meat in them, and several holes drilled through, to let the gastric juice reach the meat: no effect was produced upon it. We may

further observe, that there is a most curious and beautiful correspondence between this juice in the stomach of different animals and the other parts of their bodies, connected with the important operations of eating and digesting their food. The use of the juice is plainly to convert what they eat into a fluid, from which, by various other processes, all their parts, blood, bones, muscles, &c. are afterwards formed. But the food is first of all to be obtained, and then prepared by bruising, for the action of the juice. Now birds of prey have instruments, their claws and beak, for tearing and devouring their food (that is animals of different kinds), but those instruments are useless for picking up and crushing seeds: accordingly, they have a gastric juice which dissolves the animals they eat; while birds which have only a beak fit for pecking, drinking, and eating seeds, have a juice that dissolves seeds, and not flesh. Nay more, it is found that the seeds must be bruised before the juice will dissolve them: this you find by trying the experiment in a vessel with the juice; and accordingly the birds have a gizzard, and animals which graze have flat teeth, which grind and bruise their food before the gastric juice is to act upon it.

“ We have seen how wonderfully the *Bee* works, according to rules discovered by man thousands of years after the insect had followed them with perfect accuracy. The same little animal seems to be acquainted with principles of which we are still ignorant. We can, by crossing, vary the forms of cattle with astonishing nicety; but we have no means of altering the nature of an animal once born, by means

of treatment and feeding. This power, however, is undeniably possessed by the bees. When the queen bee is lost, by death or otherwise, they choose a grub from among those which are born for workers; they make three cells into one, and placing the grub there, they build a tube round it; they afterwards build another cell of a pyramidal form, into which the grub grows; they feed it with peculiar food, and tend it with extreme care. It becomes, when transformed from the worm to the fly, not a worker, but a queen bee.

“These singular insects resemble our own species in one of our worst propensities, the disposition to war; but their attention to their sovereign is equally extraordinary, though of a somewhat capricious kind. In a few hours after their queen is lost, the whole hive is in a state of confusion. A singular humming is heard, and the bees are seen moving all over the surface of the combs with great rapidity. The news spread quickly, and when the queen is restored, quiet immediately succeeds. But if another queen is put upon them, they instantly discover the trick, and surrounding her, they either suffocate or starve her to death. This happens if the false queen is introduced within a few hours after the first is lost or removed; but if twenty-four hours have elapsed, they will receive any queen, and obey her.

“The labours and the policy of the *Ants* are, when closely examined, still more wonderful, perhaps, than those of the *Bee*. Their nest is a city consisting of dwelling-places, halls, streets, and squares into which the streets open. The food they principally like is the honey which comes from another insect

found in their neighbourhood, and which they, generally speaking, bring home from day to day, as they want it. Later discoveries have shown that they do not eat grain, but live almost entirely on animal food and this honey. Some kinds of ant have the foresight to bring home the insects on whose honey they feed, and keep them in particular cells, where they guard them to prevent their escaping, and feed them with proper vegetable matter which they do not eat themselves. Nay, they obtain the eggs of those insects, and superintend their hatching, and then rear the young insect until he becomes capable of supplying the desired honey. They sometimes remove them to the strongest parts of their nest, where there are cells apparently fortified for protecting them from invasion. In those cells the insects are kept to supply the wants of the whole ants which compose the population of the city. It is a most singular circumstance in the economy of nature, that the degree of cold at which the ant becomes torpid is also that at which this insect falls into the same state. It is considerably below the freezing point; so that they require food the greater part of the winter, and if the insects on which they depend for food were not kept alive during the cold in which the ants can move about, the latter would be without the means of subsistence.

“How trifling soever this little animal may appear in our climate, there are few more formidable creatures than the ant of some tropical countries. A traveller who lately filled a high station in the French Government, Mr. Malouet, has described one of their cities, and, were not the account confirmed by various

testimonies, it might seem exaggerated. He observed at a great distance what seemed a lofty structure, and was informed by his guide that it consisted of an ant hill, which could not be approached without danger of being devoured. Its height was from fifteen to twenty feet, and its base thirty or forty feet square. Its sides inclined like the lower part of a pyramid, the point being cut off. He was informed that it became necessary to destroy these nests, by raising a sufficient force to dig a trench all round, and fill it with fagots, which were afterwards set on fire; and then battering with cannon from a distance, to drive the insects out, and make them run into the flames. This was in South America; and African travellers have met with them in the same formidable numbers and strength.

“The older writers of books upon the habits of some animals abound with stories which may be of doubtful credit; but the facts now stated respecting the Ant and Bee may be relied on as authentic. They are the result of very late observations and experiments made with great accuracy by several most worthy and intelligent men, and the greater part of them have the confirmation arising from more than one observer having assisted in the inquiries. The habits of *Beavers* are equally well authenticated, and, being more easily observed, are vouched by a greater number of witnesses. These animals, as if to enable them to live and move either on land or water, have two web feet like those of ducks or water dogs, and two like those of land animals. When they wish to construct a dwelling-place, or rather city, for it serves the whole body,

they choose a level place, with a stream running through it; they dam up the stream so as to make a pond, and perform the operation as skilfully as we could ourselves. They drive into the ground stakes of five or six feet long in rows, wattling each row with twigs, and puddling or filling the interstices with clay, which they ram close in, so as to make the whole solid and water-tight. This dam is likewise shaped on the truest principles<sup>1</sup>; for the upper side next the water slopes, and the side below is perpendicular; the base of the dam is ten or twelve feet thick; the top or narrow part two or three; and it is sometimes as long as a hundred feet. The pond being thus formed and secured, they make their houses round the edge of it: they are cells, with vaulted roofs, and upon piles; they are made of stones, earth, and sticks; the walls are two feet thick, and plastered as neatly as if the trowel had

<sup>1</sup> If the base is twelve, and the top three feet thick, and the height six feet, the face must be the side of a right-angled triangle, whose height is eight feet. This would be the exact proportion which there ought to be, upon mathematical principles, to give the greatest resistance possible to the water in its tendency to turn the dam round, provided the materials of which it is made were lighter than water in the proportion of forty-four to a hundred. But the materials are probably more than twice as heavy as water, and the form of so flat a dike is taken, in all likelihood, in order to guard against a more imminent danger,—that of the dam being carried away by being shoved forwards. We cannot calculate what the proportions are which give the greatest possible resistance to this tendency, without knowing the tenacity of the materials, as well as their specific gravity. It may very probably be found that the construction is such as to secure the most completely against the two pressures at the same time.

been used. Sometimes they have two or three stories for retreating to in case of floods, and they always have two doors, one towards the water, and one towards the land. They keep their winter provisions in stores, and bring them out to use; they make their beds of moss; they live on the bark of trees, gums, and crawfish. Each house holds from twenty to thirty, and there may be from ten to twenty-five houses in all. Some of their communities are therefore larger than others, but there are seldom fewer than two or three hundred inhabitants. In working, they all bear their shares: some gnaw the trees and branches with their teeth to form stakes and beams; others roll the pieces to the water; others diving make holes with their teeth to place the piles in; others collect and carry stones and clay; others beat and mix the mortar; and others carry it on their broad tails, and with these beat it and plaster it. Some superintend the rest, and make signals by sharp strokes with the tail, which are carefully attended to; the beavers hastening to the place where they are wanted to work, or to repair any hole made by the water, or to defend themselves, or make their escape when attacked by an enemy.

“The fitness of different animals, by their bodily structure, to the circumstances in which they are found, presents an endless subject of curious inquiry and pleasing contemplation. Thus, the *Camel*, which lives in sandy deserts, has broad spreading hoofs to support him on the loose soil, and an apparatus in his body by which water is kept for many days, to be used when no moisture can be had. As this



would be useless in the neighbourhood of streams or wells, and as it would be equally so in the desert, where no water is to be found, there can be no doubt that it is intended to assist in journeying across the sands from one watered spot to another. There is a singular and beautiful provision made in this animal's foot, for enabling it to sustain the fatigues of journeys under the pressure of its great weight. Beside the yielding of the bones and ligaments, or bindings, which gives elasticity to the foot of the deer and other animals, there is in the camel's foot, between the horny sole and the bones, a cushion, like a ball, of soft matter, almost fluid, but in which there is a mass of threads extremely elastic, interwoven with the pulpy substance. The cushion thus easily changes its shape when pressed, yet it has such an elastic spring, that the bones of the foot press on it uninjured by the heavy body which they support, and this huge animal steps as softly as a cat.

“Nor need we flee to the desert in order to witness an example of skilful structure in the foot: the *Horse's* limbs display it strikingly. The bones of the foot are not placed directly under the weight; if they were in an upright position, they would make a firm pillar, and every motion would cause a shock. They are placed slanting or oblique, and tied together by an elastic binding on their lower surfaces, so as to form springs as exact as those which we make of leather or steel for carriages. Then the flatness of the hoof which stretches out on each side, and the frog coming down in the middle between the quarters, adds greatly to the elasticity of

the machine. Ignorant of this, ill-informed farriers nail the shoe too far back, fixing the quarters, and causing permanent contraction—so that the contracted hoof loses its elasticity; every step is a shock; inflammation and lameness ensue.

“The *Rein-deer* inhabits a country covered with snow the greater part of the year. Observe how admirably its hoof is formed for going over that cold and light substance, without sinking in it, or being frozen. The under side is covered entirely with hair, of a warm and close texture; and the hoof, altogether, is very broad, acting exactly like the snow-shoes which men have constructed for giving them a larger space to stand on than their feet, and thus to avoid sinking. Moreover, the deer spreads the hoof as wide as possible when it touches the ground; but, as this breadth would be inconvenient in the air, by occasioning a greater resistance while he is moving along, no sooner does he lift the hoof than the two parts into which it is cloven fall together, and so lessen the surface exposed to the air, just as we may recollect the birds doing with their bodies and wings. The shape and structure of the hoof is also well adapted to scrape away the snow, and enable the animal to get at the particular kind of moss (or *lichen*) on which he feeds. This plant, unlike others, is in its full growth during the winter season; and the rein-deer accordingly thrives from its abundance, notwithstanding the unfavourable effects of extreme cold upon the animal system.

“There are some insects, of which the males have wings, and the females are grubs or worms. Of these, the *Glow-worm* is the most remarkable: it is

the female, and the male is a fly, which would be unable to find her out, creeping, as she does, in the dark lanes, but for the shining light which she gives to attract him.

“There is a singular fish found in the Mediterranean, called the *Nautilus*, from its skill in navigation. The back of its shell resembles the hulk of a ship; on this it throws itself, with two of its feet raised in the air, and over these two spreads a thin membrane to serve for a sail, paddling itself on with the other two feet as oars.

“The *Ostrich* lays and hatches her eggs in the sands: her form being ill adapted to that process, she has a natural oven furnished by the sand and the strong heat of the sun. The *Cuckoo* is known to build no nest for herself, but to lay in the nests of other birds; but late observations show that she does not lay indiscriminately in the nests of all birds; she only chooses the nests of those which have bills of the same kind with herself, and therefore feed on the same kind of food. The *Duck*, and other birds breeding in muddy places, have a peculiar formation of the bill: it is both made so as to act like a strainer, separating the finer from the grosser parts of the liquid, and it is more furnished with nerves near the point than the bills of birds which feed on substances exposed to the light; so that it serves better to grope in the dark stream for food, being more sensitive. The bill of the *Snipe* is covered with a curious net-work of nerves for the same purpose; but a bird (the *Toucan* or *Egg-sucker*) which chiefly feeds on the eggs found in birds' nests, and in countries where these are very deep and dark,

has the most singular provision of this kind. Its bill is very broad and long; when examined, it is completely covered with branches of nerves in all directions; so that, by groping in a deep and dark nest, it can feel its way as accurately as the finest and most delicate finger could. Almost all kinds of birds build their nests of materials found where they inhabit, or use the nests of other birds; but the *Swallow of Java* lives in rocky caverns on the sea, where there are no materials at all for the purpose of building. It is therefore so formed as to secrete in its body a kind of slime, with which it makes a nest, much prized as a delicate food in eastern countries.

“Plants, in many remarkable instances, are provided for by equally wonderful and skilful contrivances. There is one, the *Muscipula*, *Fly-trap*, or *Fly-catcher*, which has small prickles in the inside of two leaves, or half leaves, joined by a hinge; a juice or syrup is provided on their inner surface, and acts as a bait to allure flies. There are three small spines or prickles standing upright in this syrup, and upon the only part of this leaf which is sensitive to the touch. When the fly, therefore, settles upon this part, its touching, as it were, the spring of the trap occasions the leaves to shut and kill and squeeze the insect; so that its juices and the air arising from their rotting serve as food to the plant.

“In the West Indies, and other hot countries, where rain sometimes does not fall for a great length of time, a kind of plant, called the *Wild-pine*, grows upon the branches of the trees, and also on the bark of the trunk. It has hollow or bag-like

THE NAUTILUS.—p. 135.



With its feelers shooting out from, and over the shell, and its sails A, raised to the wind.

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THE MUSCIPULA, OR FLY TRAP.—p. 136.



The lowest part shows one of the pods open, with the spine on which the flies are entangled, so as to make the two leaves close and catch the fly.



leaves, so formed as to make little reservoirs of water, the rain falling into them through channels which close at the top when full, to prevent it from evaporating. The seed of this useful plant has long threads, by which, when carried through the air, it catches any tree in the way, and falls on it and grows. Wherever it takes root, though on the under side of a bough, it grows straight upwards, otherwise the leaves would not hold water. It holds in one leaf from a pint to a quart; and although it must be of great use to the tree it grows on, to birds and other animals its use is even greater. Another tree, called the *Water-with*, in Jamaica, has similar uses; it is like a vine in size and shape, but growing in very parched districts, is yet so full of clear sap or water, that on cutting a piece two or three yards long, and merely holding it to the mouth, a plentiful draught is obtained. In the East there is a plant somewhat of the same kind, called the *Bejuco*, which grows near other trees, and twines round them, with its end hanging downwards, but so full of juice, that on cutting it, a plentiful stream of water spouts from it; and this, not only by its touching the tree so closely must refresh it, but is a supply to animals, and to the weary herdsman on the mountains."



## No. III.—Page 84.

*On the Origin and Constitution of Human Society, considered as the necessary result of the physical and moral conditions impressed on our nature by the Creator, illustrative of the application of Natural Theology to Political Philosophy*<sup>1</sup>.

IN pursuing in the text the inferences of natural theology, from the physical arrangements of the universe, and of animal organizations to the indications which we observe of analogous mental and moral provisions, often equally indispensable for the accomplishment of that great physical end, the preservation of the species<sup>2</sup>, I have especially adverted

<sup>1</sup> Much of the present article originally formed the substance of an Assize Sermon, which the author was required to preach, and afterwards printed; but it was always his intention to incorporate the materials in the present Lectures, should a second edition be called for.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Chalmers has very beautifully expressed the sum of this argument in the following passage in the fifth chapter of his Bridgewater Treatise “On the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man:”—“And here we might observe, that, in studying that balance of powers and of preserving influences, which obtains even in a commonwealth of brutes, the uses of a mental are just as palpable as those of a material collocation. The anger which prompts to the resistance of aggression is as obviously inserted by the hand of a contriver, as are the horns or the bristles or any other defensive weapons wherewith the body of the animal is furnished. The fear which wings the flight of a pursued animal is as obviously intended for its safety, as is its muscular conformation or capacity for speed. The affection of a mother for her young points as intelligibly to a designer’s care for the preservation of the species, as does that apparatus of nourishment wherewith nature hath endowed her. The mother’s

to the societies of insects, evidently constructed with a view to this leading object. I then briefly stated that the conditions on which the social relations of man depended, though far more complicated and varied, differed rather in degree than in kind. It will be the object of the present article to examine this argument rather more in detail, and thus to illustrate what has ever appeared to me a very important branch of natural theology—its application, namely, to the fundamental principles of human society.

To trace from God the order and harmony of civil society, and the laws necessary for its preservation and regulation, it cannot be necessary to begin, as has sometimes been done, by considering the laws of nature, as they are called, or the order of physical causation and effect impressed by the great First Cause on the material elements, and which those material agents must observe by a natural necessity. To call this *order*, indeed, by the name of *laws*, is only to express *a loose analogy*; and in any way to confound this *physical constraint* with the rules of action delivered for the guidance of *moral, rational, and voluntary agents*, seems little better than an

fondness supplies as distinct and powerful an argument as the mother's milk—or, in other words, a mental constitution might, as well as a physical constitution, be pregnant with the indications of a God." The whole of the sixth and seventh chapters of that eloquent Treatise "On the Special Affections to the Civil, Political, and Economical Well-being of Society," may be referred to as containing very striking illustrations of the great principles I have endeavoured to maintain; but it will be observed that I have carefully avoided borrowing from these valuable stores.

abuse of figurative language. Yet is there a juster sense in which the social compact may be derived, from the very physical constitution impressed by the Creator on our race. Our strength is throughout derived from, and as it were cradled in, our very weakness. Unprovided, like other animals, with ready-formed instincts, man has a mind gifted with the principle of reason, at first, indeed, an unfurnished blank, but capable by its universal application of storing up the richest treasures of varied knowledge. Unarmed, like other animals, by any natural weapon of offence or defence, man has yet, as co-ordinate with and subservient to his reason, that wonderful organ of universal application, the human hand, which has well been defined as "*the instrument effective of all other instruments.*" But the reason of man, and every other faculty which depends upon it, require for their development a long process of education. He who sees the future lord of creation at his first entrance into the scene of his destined dominion, sees a helpless babe, the very image of weakness, not of power, attesting its feebleness by its cries; by far the most inefficient of all the animal tribes, and dependent *to a degree*, and for *a length of time*, of which we see an example in the young of no other race, on the nurture, assistance, and painful instructions of others. Were it not, then, for the permanent union of human families, and the more enduring and endeared connection of their members, a race thus constituted in infancy must have become extinct in a single generation.

In the Bridgewater Essay of Professor Kidd this argument will be found beautifully illustrated. After

explaining anatomically the different conditions of that main prop of our whole frame, the spinal column in infancy, and in more advanced age, by which, while in the earlier period the annular portions protecting the spinal canal, and therefore essential to the security of the life of the individual, are already completely ossified, those portions in which the conditions of strength and flexibility are so remarkably developed in the adult state are not yet formed, or not completed; the author, with truly philosophical views, thus proceeds :

“ Nor need we spend much time in ascertaining the final cause of this remarkable difference. Is it not, indeed, obvious, on a moment's reflection, that the very helplessness and imperfect state of the physical powers in infancy, so ill understood and appreciated, though so beautifully described by Lucretius, contribute to the fuller development of the moral character, not only of the individual, but of his parents also, and of all his immediate connections? The mutual affection, for instance, that takes place and is cemented between the infant and its mother, during the lengthened period in which the latter nurses her offspring; the stimulus, which is given to the exertions of the other parent in supplying the increasing wants of those who depend on him for support; and the general feeling and expression of good-will and attachment, which bind together the numerous individuals of the same family; all coincide to increase the sum of human happiness and virtue. Whereas, were the infant born with all its powers complete, and capable of exerting those powers as soon as born, independently of the assist-

ance of parent, or sister, or brother, what would then remain of those endearing relations, but the empty name?

“How incorrect, then, is the conclusion of the poet in that otherwise most beautiful passage of his poem, ‘The new-born babe, which, like the ship-wrecked mariner, lies prostrate on the ground, naked and destitute of every assistance required for the support of life, pierces the surrounding air with its incessant cries, as if foreseeing the long train of miseries which it must hereafter encounter. And yet the tender foal and lamb not only begin to crop the grass, but play about the mother almost as soon as born. The nurse’s soothing lullaby is not wanted by them, nor the excitement of the rattle or of any other toy: nor do they require a change of dress accommodated to the changing temperature of the surrounding atmosphere; nor arms for their defence, nor walled cities for their protection; kind nature supplying to them in bountiful profusion whatever is necessary to satisfy their wants<sup>1</sup>. As if it might

<sup>1</sup> Tum porro Puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis  
 Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni  
 Vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras  
 Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit;  
 Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum ’st,  
 Cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum.  
 At variæ crescunt Pecudes, Armenta, Feræque;  
 Nec crepitacula eis opu’ sunt, nec cuiquam adhibenda ’st  
 Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela:  
 Nec varias quærun’t Vesteis pro tempore Cœli.  
 Denique non Armis opus est, non Mœnibus altis,  
 Queis sua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia large  
 Tellus ipsa parit, naturaque dædala rerum.

not have been reasonably and safely concluded, that that same power, (call it 'nature,' or by any other name,) which provided so amply for the early wants of the lower species of animals, had some good and special reason for leaving the human infant in a temporary state of helpless weakness."

Pope has well traced the origin of human society to this cause, in the third epistle of his *Essay on Man*.

Thus beast and bird their common charge attend,  
The mothers nurse it, and the sires defend ;  
The young dismiss'd to wander earth or air,  
There stops the instinct, and there ends the care.

A longer care man's helpless kind demands ;  
That longer care contracts more lasting bands :  
Reflection, Reason, still the ties improve,  
At once extend the interest and the love :

And still new needs, new helps, new habits rise,  
That graft benevolence on charities.

While pleasure, gratitude, and hope, combin'd,  
Still spread the interest, and preserve the kind.

Hence, then, the lovely cycle of domestic charities, the first element and pregnant germ naturally and necessarily expanding itself into a more extended civil society, which, according to the indisputable testimony of revelation, and the concurrent traditions and practices of all tribes of simple and primitive habits, is in its origin referred to unions of kindred families, still preserving their ancient alliance, and combined beneath the patriarchal rule of the *chief of their blood*.

As society thus owes its origin to the circumstances of the *natural constitution* impressed on our race by the all-wise Creator, so the order which it assumes in its progress and development is equally the natural and necessary result of the condition of our intellectual and moral faculties<sup>1</sup>. From the varieties of these faculties results the different advancement of different individuals in wealth, power, and influence; and hence the various ranks and orders of the political body: but these results, though seemingly accidental in the individual steps, are still, as a whole, evidently overruled by a superintending Providence, equally wise and beneficent, to the production of the greatest good to all the members. He who looks *superficially* at the fabric of civil society, is often struck with its *apparent inequalities*; he who examines it with a more steady view, and more philosophical eye, cannot fail to discover the regulated workings of a wonderfully and wisely constituted machine, of which the several wheels are nicely adjusted, to the production of a combined effect, itself the most useful and admirable. Thus the *seeming inequalities* will vanish, when we perceive that the poverty of the poor is not caused by the wealth of the wealthy, but in reality alle-

<sup>1</sup> In that splendid Chorus in the *Antigone*, combining such a striking enumeration of the various faculties and achievements of man, Sophocles has justly reckoned the disposition to civil polity, as forming the climax of our natural endowments.

καὶ φθέγμα, καὶ ἀνεμόεν  
φρόνημα, καὶ ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΟΥΣ  
ΟΡΓΑΣ ἐλιῶάζατο.



viated by it ; when we find these seemingly favoured classes, favoured, *not for themselves*, but *for the good of the whole*, acting as *reservoirs* that collect the waters only, that they may be distributed in the channels best calculated to diffuse an universal fruitfulness over the whole spacious plain ; and thus accumulating *capital*, not idly to hoard it, but as the invigorating stimulus and just reward of industry, and diffusing the streams of wealth over the whole mass exactly in the manner calculated to produce the most beneficial effects to the whole : when we see that the wealthy, whether *intentionally* or *unintentionally*, yet *necessarily* even *when they seem bent only on pursuing their own individual gratification*, are obliged by their expenditure to contribute to this beneficial result : when we see, I say, these effects *necessarily* and *invariably* resulting quite *independently of the intention of the agents* themselves, can we doubt for a moment that these things are ordered and appointed by the intention and design of an higher and overruling intellect ?

This subject has been most clearly stated by Archbishop Whately, in his sixth Lecture on Political Economy.

“ But I am so far from attributing to Man, as a merit, the benefits which, in an advanced stage of society, he confers on the community, that, on the contrary, the very point I am especially dwelling on is, the bountiful wisdom of Providence in directing towards the public good the conduct of those who, even when not basely selfish, are yet not impelled to the course they pursue by patriotic motives.

“ A man, for instance, who has accumulated

wealth, as in the progress of society naturally takes place, more and more, may be so selfishly disposed, that he would willingly consume his whole revenue himself, without a thought of benefiting others. But though there are various modes of expenditure, some more and some less beneficial to the public, in which he may employ it, it is hardly possible for him to keep it entirely to himself. Directly or indirectly, he will always be feeding labourers with it. He may employ them in producing something which will add to the stock of national wealth, in which case he will be enriching the community; but if he employ them in making lace, or diving for pearls, to add to the splendour of his dress, or in pulling down his house, and rebuilding it after some fancy of his own, or in waiting at his table, still he maintains them. And though it is a mistake (a very common one, by the way, and which hereafter it will be necessary to treat of,) to suppose, that, in all this, he is a benefactor to the community, by furnishing employment, still he is at least no more consuming his revenue himself, than if he had thought fit to give it away to the same number of persons;—to bestow on those, who are now employed in labouring for him, the bread they eat, leaving them to sit idle. The only difference is, that they are at work instead of doing nothing, and that they feel that they earn their own bread, instead of being fed by charity. It is only when a rich man lays down in forest, like William the Conqueror, a quantity of fertile land, or in some such way diminishes human subsistence, that his wealth is detrimental to the community.”

“ And this is one of the points connected with our present subject, which is at once so simple, as to be easily explained to the labouring classes, and of high importance for them to understand. For, at the first glance, they are apt to imagine, when they see a rich man whose income is a hundred times as much as suffices to maintain a poor man’s family, that if he were stripped of all, and his wealth divided, a hundred poor families additional might thus obtain subsistence ; which, it is plain, would not be the case, even when the income was spent in such ostentatious and selfish vanity as I have been alluding to.”

I would also refer to the same author’s admirable remarks on the connection of Political Economy and Natural Theology, or the contemplation of the Divine Wisdom, as displayed in provisions for the existence, well-being, and progress of society, in the fourth chapter, as *fully developing* views concerning the origin of civil society, from the constitution impressed on our nature by the Divine Designer for this end, similar to those which it has been the object of this article to establish, but which, of necessity, can only be very briefly and generally stated in a mere manual like the present ; but here to quote satisfactorily, would be to reprint the whole chapter ; I must, therefore, confine myself to an extract of a few lines, comprising the great result of his argument.

“ Various parts of man’s conduct as a member of society are often attributed to human forethought and design, which might, with greater truth, be referred to a kind of instinct, or something analogous

to it, which leads him, while pursuing some immediate personal gratification, to further an object not contemplated by him. In many cases, we are liable to mistake for the wisdom of Man what is in truth the wisdom of God."

Nor are the higher orders the reservoirs and distributing channels of wealth alone; they have a still higher calling: privileged with an exemption from bodily labour, intellectual labour and the cultivation of reason is theirs: they are therefore likewise the great *reservoirs* of the nobler wealth of knowledge. Nor is this (great though the blessing to themselves undoubtedly is) a benefit at all conferred on them for themselves alone. No: it is again as in the first instance, because this is the only effectual method of diffusing the wholesome streams of knowledge and civilization through the whole social frame. Since under the necessity of our universal condition, the majority are, and must be, born to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow, it is clear, that by persons thus situated no original discoveries could be made, no fresh accessions of knowledge could be obtained; it was necessary, then, that a privileged class should be exempted from the common lot of bodily labour for this intellectual work, who may from these advantages become enabled to communicate to the rest the great results of the knowledge thus acquired, at least in all its most useful and practical consequences. The influences of intellectual cultivation, thus (as has been well said) flowing down from high sources, pervade the lowest levels of the public mind.

Looking at the social frame, then, we see through-

out that it is admirably adjusted and compacted by a prudence far higher than that of man, into a system of mutual relations, dependence, and benefits.

The apostle hath very forcibly and comprehensively expressed this great truth in that noble verse, as judicious as it is eloquent, and as philosophical as it is pious: "From Christ the whole body fitly joined (or adjusted, *συναρμολογούμενον*,) together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, (or rather, through each joint so combined into a tributary system, *διὰ πάσης ἀφ᾽ ἧς τῆς ἐπιχορηγίας*,) according to the effectual working, or proper energy, (*ἐνέργεια*,) in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love. That it may grow up unto him in all things, which is the head, even Christ<sup>1</sup>."

We see, then, that the view which would represent civil society as less agreeable to nature than a savage independence like that of the Homeric Cy-

<sup>1</sup> Eph. iv. 16. The particular expression employed in this place, *ἐπιχορηγία*, containing a metaphorical allusion to the system adopted in the Grecian cities for providing the funds necessary for the support of their choral exhibitions, must have spoken to the inhabitants of one of those cities with a force which any translation accommodated to modern ideas and habits can scarcely convey. Perhaps "a system of purveyance" would afford the nearest approximation. Altogether this remarkable passage has ever appeared to me in all its clauses to convey a description of the functions of the animal frame as precise and philosophical as even the language of a Galen or a Cuvier, the ablest anatomical physiologists of ancient or modern times. It seems almost to contain the germ and anticipation of the splendid discoveries of the latter, with regard to the harmony and necessary relations subsisting between the different members of the animal frame.

clops, is as unphilosophical in its argument as it is injurious in its tendency. Civil society is, in truth, the consummation and perfection of the moral nature of our species.

But then to give all these beneficial tendencies their perfect work, a spirit of religion must be the presiding principle of their operation. To return to the forcible language of St. Paul, in order "*that the social body may make increase unto the edifying of itself in love,*" it must have such a religious character impressed upon it "*that it may grow up unto him in all things which is the head, even Christ.*" A very little reflection may suffice to convince us how impossible it is that any member should properly discharge its functions, unless a spirit of religion animates and pervades the whole. Without religion, the *inferior orders* will regard their own condition with *murmuring discontent*, and look with envy and hatred on the higher as their imagined oppressors. Without religion, the *higher* will disregard the *claims* of the lower, live *selfishly* for themselves alone, and forget that they are only stewards, who will shortly be called to an account. And although, as we have seen, they can never fail beneficially to distribute their *pecuniary wealth*, yet with regard to the *higher wealth of intellect and knowledge* it is not so : this, or at least any sound and true wisdom, they will not even acquire themselves, and far less distribute to the mass, unless a principle of religion rules in their souls, and has subdued the principle of sensuality. Their influence must doubtless affect that mass, and impart to it its general colour and character; but how differently will it affect it with and without a spirit

of religion, shedding forth in the one case streams of healing, in the other streams of poison, to the people !

Education is, in the present age, commonly regarded—and, if the term *education* be rightly understood, very justly regarded—as the great instrument of social amelioration : but then it should never be forgotten, that a real moral and efficient *education* is a very different thing indeed from what is sometimes mistaken for it—a mere system of literary instruction. I cannot better illustrate the difference, than by translating the remarks of the intelligent author of a work, equally interesting and instructive, on the Moral Statistics of France—a country, alas ! where simple instruction alone prevails, and where, consequently, the most instructed are very generally also the most criminal districts. The author cited having stated this discouraging fact, thus proceeds : “<sup>1</sup> We might hence, perhaps, be tempted to conclude, that intellectual cultivation tends rather to fortify than to subdue the criminal passions ; but this would be, without doubt, a new error. *Instruction* is an instrument of which a good or bad use may be made. That which can be derived from our elementary schools (and which consists only in learning very imperfectly reading, writing, and accounts) cannot possibly supply the deficiency of *education*, properly so called ; nor can it be expected to exercise any considerable moral influence ; for it is difficult to comprehend how the training a man to certain

<sup>1</sup> Essai sur la Statistique Morale de la France, par le M. Guerry, 1833.



merely mechanical operations can suffice to implant at the same time regulated morals, or to develop sentiments of honour and probity. Without *education*, simple *instruction* indeed may only be an instrument of ruin. Morals spring from education. *Education* alone creates and perpetuates them, for that alone instructs us in the knowledge of duty, with a constant practical application."

This true and efficient education, as Christianity will teach us, and as experience will confirm, is a *religious education*; this alone can instruct us in our duty and relations to man and to God; and in making us faithful servants to Him, make us at the same time profitable members of society.

As this volume is especially addressed to youth completing their course of education, the author especially wishes to impress on their minds the truth, that it is not merely the humble circle of instruction described by the French essayist which is unworthy of such an honourable name, but that even the very highest sphere of merely intellectual acquirements, if weighed in the balance of effective moral and social improvement, will be found equally wanting, if unassociated with and unsanctified by higher principles. May He, whose approbation can prosper even the humblest means, render this little volume, in some degree, instrumental in promoting so desirable a combination!

## No. IV.—Page 91.

[*Extracted, by permission, from the Article on Dr. Townson's Practical Discourses, Quarterly Review, No. lxxxviii.*] <sup>1</sup>

THE author's wish to incorporate with this address such materials as, being scattered in different publications, might have been otherwise overlooked by the class, although they appeared to him very important in the prosecution of the theological course thus opened, has further been materially assisted by the permission which he has obtained, to extract from one of our leading literary journals the following very satisfactory remarks on the probable history of the successive production of the several evangelical narratives, on the origin and explanation of the phænomena of their *resemblances* and variations, and on the undesigned coincidences which they exhibit.

“ ‘The Discourses on the Gospels,’ by Dr. Townson, may be regarded as at once offering a body of internal evidence for the truth of the Gospels, and a probable explanation of the agreements and differences which they severally present. Now, a principle which at one and the same time yields testimony to the authenticity of Scripture, and a solution of the difficulties which encumber it, has a double claim upon our confidence : just as we may be sup-

<sup>1</sup> The author of this article, the Rev. I. J. Blunt, has since extended and published his materials in a separate volume ; but this masterly abstract of the argument from the author's hands must still form a very desirable addition to the little manual in which he kindly sanctioned its appearance.

posed to have a right key when it both fastens and opens the lock. Dr. Townson's theory is this—that

“ ‘The progress in planting the Christian faith was from a church purely of the circumcision, Samaritans included, to a mixed community, and from thence to distinct churches of the Gentiles. And there is a strong presumption (he thinks) that the Gospels were published successively, as they were wanted by the churches to whose use they were immediately adapted: that St. Matthew wrote for the first; St. Mark for the second; and St. Luke for the third settlement of the faith; and that this view of things presents us with the order in which the Gospels have all along been disposed.’

“ Here, then, Dr. Townson takes up his position; the four Evangelists have been almost invariably placed, from the earliest times, in the order in which they now stand; the presumption, therefore, is, that such was the order in which they were originally published. Again, the progress of Christianity was this: (the history of it, as given in the Acts of the Apostles, were there no other, testifies as much :) it began with the *Jews*, who were the first Christian congregation; it proceeded to a mixed society, consisting both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, who were the next; and it ended with a body composed of *Gentiles* chiefly or altogether. Let us, then, observe whether the historical order of the Gospels does not tally with the historical progress of the cause which the Gospels advocate, deducing our argument from internal evidence only. Now, St. Matthew, as compared with St. Mark, writes as though he was living in Judea—amongst people who knew all the Jewish

customs as well as himself; who had the Temple before their eyes, and the offerings made in it; to whom the phraseology, the geography, the local peculiarities of the Holy Land were perfectly familiar: above all, who partook of the Jewish expectations of a Messiah, and understood the numerous prophecies which were thought to relate to him; for to these St. Matthew points far more frequently than the other Evangelists, and, indeed, makes it a very primary object to develop the prophetic Christ in Jesus of Nazareth. St. Mark makes much more limited demands upon his readers for knowledge of this kind; he explains where St. Matthew is silent; and accommodates (as it would seem) the narrative of the latter, in very many instances, to a different audience.

“ Examples are every thing: thus, in Matt. iii. 6, we read, ‘And were baptised of him in Jordan;’ whereas, St. Mark, i. 5, has it, ‘And were baptised of him in *the river* of Jordan.’ The general identity of phrase here, and in the context of the two passages, argues the one Evangelist to have consulted the other, whilst the insertion of the word *river* by the one, argues that his congregation had members in it to whom the geography of Judea was less perfectly known than to those of his colleague. In Matthew, ix. 14, we find, ‘Then came the disciples of John, saying, Why do we and the pharisees fast oft, but thy disciples fast not?’ The thing was notorious: but St. Mark, ii. 18, speaks to the uninitiated; he therefore supplies a preface, ‘*And the disciples of John and of the pharisees used to fast,—*And they come and say unto him, Why do the disciples

of John, and of the pharisees, fast, but thy disciples fast not?’ The introduction added, the rest is the same. In the fifteenth chapter of Matthew, as compared with the seventh of Mark, there is a very remarkable instance to the same effect,—‘Then came to Jesus scribes and pharisees which were of Jerusalem, saying, Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders, for they wash not their hands when they eat bread?’ Now, look at the commentary with which St. Mark, who adopts the narrative in the main, interpolates it,—‘Then came together unto him the pharisees and certain of the scribes which came from Jerusalem,—And when they saw some of his disciples eat bread with defiled (*that is to say, with unwashen*) hands, they found fault.—*For the pharisees, and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders.—And when they come from the market, except they wash, they eat not. And many other things there be, which they have received to hold, as the washing of cups, and pots, brazen vessels, and of tables.—*Then the pharisees and scribes asked him, Why walk not thy disciples according to the tradition of the elders?’ Here we see St. Matthew’s text transferred, with little alteration, into St. Mark’s, and a note of explanation let into it. In St. Matthew, xxi. 19, we are told, ‘Jesus saw a fig-tree in the way, and he came to it, and found nothing thereon but leaves only.’ St. Mark, xi. 13, adds, for the purpose of completing an expression which he thought elliptical and obscure, more especially to persons who might not know that at the passover (which was the date of this transaction) the figs in

Judea were not ripe for gathering, ‘*for the time of figs was not yet.*’ St. Matthew, viii. 8, 9, uses the word Gehenna, a word purely Jewish. St. Mark, ix. 43, 48, uses the same in the corresponding passage of his Gospel, but he annexes a paraphrastical explanation of it. St. Matthew, xv. 22, speaks of a ‘*Canaanitish* woman.’ St. Mark, vii. 2, calls the same person a *Syro-phœnician*;—the former a term perfectly intelligible to the readers of the ancient Scriptures, though a term now nearly obsolete, for it occurs in only two other places in the New Testament (Acts vii. 11, and xiii. 19); and, accordingly, one who wrote at a distance from Canaan, and addressed himself to persons who might or might not be acquainted with the language of the Old Testament, substitutes for it the more popular word Syro-phœnician. Nay, sometimes even a slight grammatical emendation may be thought to betray the order in which the two Evangelists wrote, and the ἡγέρθη ἀπὸ τῶν νεκρῶν of St. Matthew, xiv. 2, is written by St. Mark ἐκ νεκρῶν ἡγέρθη, vi. 14: the preposition in the latter case being less ambiguous in its meaning. And again, St. Matthew’s sentence, ‘but are as the Angels of God in heaven,’ xxii. 30, is expressed, with a similar regard to precision, by St. Mark, xii. 25, ‘but are as the Angels *who are* in heaven.’

“ By these and other instances of the same kind, we seem justified in the conclusion that St. Mark wrote after St. Matthew, seeing that he often completes, explains, and develops the narrative of St. Matthew; but if after him, then is it probable that the congregation which required this new Gospel

would not be made up of Jews only, for the Christian faith soon extended to Gentiles too; and accordingly, with the internal evidence of its being posterior in time to the Gospel of St. Matthew, comes also the internal evidence that it was addressed to Gentiles as well as to Jews. The parallel which has been already run between certain passages in St. Matthew and St. Mark, whilst it establishes one of these points, establishes the other also; for the changes to which texts in St. Matthew are subjected, when they re-appear in St. Mark, are of a kind to show no less that he made them in accommodation to the Gentiles, than that he wrote after St. Matthew. But if more proof of the *mixed* character of the converts for whom St. Mark wrote were demanded, more might be supplied. For instance, that a portion of those whom he addressed were *Jews*, may be argued from his recording at so much length the reproofs which our Lord directed against the characteristic vices of the pharisees—vii. 3—13; the nature of the marriage union, and the manner in which the Mosaical law of divorce had been abused—x. 2, 12; the decision of the question touching the comparative importance of the commandments, which was the greatest, the doubt being altogether judaical—some Jews holding sacrifice, others circumcision, a third party the observance of the Sabbath, to be the greatest—xi. 12, 14; the caution against false Christs, a caution of which the Jews stood chiefly in need, they being in expectation of a temporal Messiah, and of which events proved that they stood in need—xiii. 6, 21, 23;—not so, perhaps, the Gentiles.



“ On the other hand, that amongst those for whom St. Mark wrote there were *heathens*, nay, more, heathens who did not live in Judea, and to whom the Jewish customs and language were imperfectly known (heathens of *Rome*, as it should seem, and as ecclesiastical authority asserts), is no less plain from other passages:—‘ *Go not into the way of the Gentiles*, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not; but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel,’ is a part of the charge which our Lord gives to his disciples, as reported by St. Matthew, x. 5, 6. St. Mark, vi. 7, 11, who relates many of the particulars of this address, omits this one; and so does St. Luke, ix. 3, 5; both probably for the same reason—a desire not to give needless offence to the Gentiles, by recording a clause in the instructions affecting them which had been since withdrawn. Interpretations, annexed by St. Mark to words of common occurrence amongst Jews, are evidently intended for strangers:—‘ *Boanerges, which is, The sons of thunder*,’ iii. 17; ‘ *Corban, that is to say, a gift*,’ vii. 11; ‘ *Ephphatha, that is, Be opened*,’ vii. 34; ‘ *two lepta (mites), which make a quadrans (farthing)*,’ xii. 42: here it is further remarkable that a Greek coin is explained by a *Latin* equivalent—‘ the soldiers led him away into the hall, *that is* (ὅ ἐστι), the *prætorium*,’ xv. 16, where again the Greek word is turned by the *Latin*: ‘ *The centurion*’ (ὁ κεντυρίων), xv. 39,—again a *Latin* word; in the parallel passage of St. Matthew, xxvii. 54, and of St. Luke, xxiii. 47, the same officer is expressed by a Greek term (ἐκατόνταρχος); ‘ *The preparation, that is, the day before the Sabbath*,’ xv. 42; though the

preparation was a common name amongst the Jews for Friday. Moreover, St. Mark speaks of Simon as the father of Alexander and *Rufus*, xv. 21, as though this hint was sufficient to designate the individual to those for whom he wrote. Now, Rufus was a distinguished *Roman* convert, of whom St. Paul speaks (Rom. xvi. 13); and if this be the same Rufus, the circumstance still points to Romans as members of St. Mark's congregation.

“ Thus there is reason to think, from internal evidence, that St. Mark wrote at a period *later* than St. Matthew, and, from the same evidence, there is again reason to think that he wrote for a *mixed* assembly, consisting both of Jews and Gentiles. Now, these two inductions are remarkably consistent, the later date of the Gospel agreeing with the greater diffusion of Christianity; either conclusion corroborates the other, and both minister to the credibility of the Scriptures.

“ A similar comparison of St. Mark with St. Luke affords similar ground for arguing the priority in point of time of the former Evangelist. Thus, St. Mark tells us that, ‘as Jesus sat at meat in *his* house, many publicans and sinners sat also together with Jesus, and his disciples,’ ii. 15. As this occurs immediately after the call of Levi, it is reasonable to suppose that the house of Levi was here meant; the passage, however, is not so worded as to determine this with certainty; accordingly, St. Luke comes after St. Mark, and puts the matter out of all doubt—‘and Levi made him a great feast in *his own* house,’ v. 29. Sometimes, when the sentence is on the whole all but identical in these two writers, there

is an improved collocation of some member in it, which indicates St. Luke's hand to have been the later of the two. Thus, St. Mark, ii. 25, 26, 'And he said unto them, Have ye never read what David did when he had need, and was an hungered, he and they that were with him? How he went into the house of God, in the days of Abiathar the high priest, and did eat the shew-bread (which is not lawful to eat but for the priest), and gave also to them that were with him.' St. Luke vi. 3, 4, inverts the last two clauses, and avoids the parenthesis, reading, 'how he went into the house of God, and did take and eat, and gave also to them that were with him, the shew-bread, which is not lawful to eat but for the priests alone.' In the two accounts of the miracle performed on the daughter of Jairus, that of St. Luke, though agreeing in great part to the letter with that of St. Mark, is still the more complete: 'As soon as Jesus heard the word that was spoken, he saith unto the ruler of the synagogue, Fear not, only believe. *And he suffered no man to follow him save Peter, James, and John the brother of James.* And he cometh to the house of the ruler of the synagogue.' So speaks St. Mark, v. 36, 38. But the multitude had 'thronged' Jesus just before;—did he disengage himself from them in the high road, and gather to him his three attendants without an effort? 'But when Jesus heard it, he answered him, saying, Fear not, only believe, and she shall be made whole. *And when he came into the house he suffered no man to go in, save Peter, and James, and John, and the father and the mother of the maiden.*' So speaks St. Luke, viii. 50, 51, who

clears the case up by informing us that the throng was escaped at the house-door, which was closed against the ingress of all but those whom Jesus selected. In the scene of the widow at the treasury, St. Mark writes, 'for all they have cast in of their abundance, but she of her want hath cast in all that she had, her whole living,' xii. 44; St. Luke, nearly in the same words, but with one small supplement, 'for all these have cast in of their abundance unto the *offerings of God*, but she of her want hath cast in all the living that she had,' xxi. 4: the addition is not an idle one, especially, when Gentiles were to be readers, and as St. Mark had such amongst those for whom he wrote, such an addition would not have been ill bestowed even by him. Whilst, therefore, the general similarity of the two passages indicates that the one Evangelist must have seen the other, the addition of a word of explanation by St. Luke, which would have been equally in its place in the text of either party, argues St. Luke to have been the later writer of the two. St. Luke might have added the clause, but St. Mark would scarcely have expunged it. The details of the mockery of our Lord, immediately before his crucifixion, present another argument for the priority of St. Mark's Gospel. St. Matthew had represented the scoffers as saying, 'Prophecy unto us, thou Christ, who is he that smote thee,' xxvi. 68; but he makes no mention of the blindfolding. St. Mark says, that 'they covered his face and bade him prophecy,' xiv. 65; but he fails to tell what was to be the subject of his prophecy. Accordingly St. Luke profits by the example of both, and with St. Mark

tells of the blindfolding, and with St. Matthew, of the prophecy and its objects: 'And the men that held Jesus mocked him and smote him. And when they had covered him, they struck him on the face, and asked him, saying, *Prophecy* who is he that smote thee,'—xxii. 63, 64. The other arguments we shall mention for the priority of St. Mark's Gospel, are such as turn upon points of grammar and construction. The force of these (which is considerable) can only be perceived in the original, and we are sorry for it, it being our object to treat this question in a manner rather popular than scholastic.

## MARK XII. 38—40.

Βλέπετε ἀπὸ τῶν  
 γραμματέων, τῶν θελόντων  
 ἐν στολαῖς περιπατεῖν,  
 καὶ ἀσπασμοῦς  
 ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς,  
 καὶ πρωτοκαθεδρίας ἐν  
 ταῖς συναγωγαῖς, καὶ  
 πρωτοκλισίας ἐν τοῖς δέι-  
 πνοις·  
 οἱ κατεσθίοντες τὰς οἰκίας  
 τῶν χηρῶν, καὶ προφάσει  
 μακρὰ  
 προσευχόμενοι, οὗτοι λή-  
 ψονται  
 περισσότερον κρίμα.

## LUKE XX. 46, 47.

Προσέχετε ἀπὸ τῶν  
 γραμματέων, τῶν θελόντων  
 περιπατεῖν ἐν στολαῖς,  
 καὶ φιλοῦντων ἀσπασμοῦς  
 ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς,  
 καὶ πρωτοκαθεδρίας ἐν  
 ταῖς συναγωγαῖς, καὶ  
 πρωτοκλισίας ἐν τοῖς δέι-  
 πνοις·  
 οἱ κατεσθίουσι τὰς οἰκίας  
 τῶν χηρῶν, καὶ προφάσει  
 μακρὰ  
 προσεύχονται, οὗτοι λή-  
 ψονται  
 περισσότερον κρίμα.

“ Here it is seen, that the latter end of St. Mark's sentence, grammatically speaking, forgets the beginning; τῶν θελόντων, in the first clause, requiring to be followed up by τῶν κατεσθιόντων and προσευχομένων in the last clauses. Accordingly St. Luke, who deviates but very little from St. Mark

throughout the whole passage, does deviate from him in this, and corrects the syntax in a manner the most natural and easy, writing οἱ κατεσθίουσι and προσεύχονται—

MARK VIII. 36.

καὶ ζημιωθῇ τὴν ψυχὴν  
αὐτοῦ.

LUKE IX. 25.

ἐαυτὸν δὲ ἀπολέσας, ἢ ζημιω-  
θείς.

XII. 20.

οὐκ ἀφῆκε σπέρμα.

XX. 28.

ἀπέθανεν ἀτέκνως.

“In these, and in other instances which might be mentioned, St. Luke shows himself anxious to avoid the Hebraisms of his predecessor. Moreover, in the arrangement of his facts it is found, that St. Luke agrees with St. Mark in a manner which could not be accidental, and which differs from St. Matthew.

“But as years rolled on after the ascension of our Lord, the church waxed more and more gentile in its members; and agreeably to this, whilst, as before, by internal evidence we determine St. Luke to have written after St. Mark, by internal evidence we determine him to have written chiefly, if not altogether, for a gentile community. Thus, whilst St. Matthew traces up the genealogy of our Lord to David, St. Luke goes on to Adam; the one being the Evangelist of the Jews, the other of all mankind. St. Luke marks the date of the Saviour’s birth and of John’s preaching by the reigns of Roman emperors; he speaks with peculiar accuracy and frequency of the ejection of unclean spirits, the gods of the heathens; he purposely waives an appeal to the Jewish law, where another Evangelist has introduced it, (compare Luke vi. 31, and Matth. vii. 12; Luke xi. 42,

and Matth. xxiii. 23;) he sinks in his narrative circumstances which would have no interest for the Gentiles; St. Matthew, for instance, tells us, that Jesus predicted the fall of Jerusalem, 'as he sat upon the Mount of Olives,' xxiv. 3, 4; St. Mark, 'as he sat over against the Temple,' xiii. 3, 4; whereas St. Luke gives the prophecy, and with that contents himself, xxi. 7, 8. He adapts his phraseology to Gentile conceptions, and whilst St. Matthew much more frequently talks of what Moses *said*, or of 'that which was *spoken* unto you by God,' forms perfectly understood by the Jews, as implying quotations from the Old Testament, St. Luke, though not renouncing the former expression, favours rather what is *written* in the law, what is '*written* in the book;' a distinction which we may observe well exemplified on one occasion in the language of St. Paul, for to Felix the *Roman* governor he speaks of himself as 'believing all things which are *written* in the law and the prophets,' Acts xxiv. 14; to king Agrippa, 'a man expert in all customs and questions which were among the *Jews*,' as 'saying none other things than those which the Prophets, and Moses *did say* should come,' Acts xxvi. 22. He explains what to Jews, or to those who held much intercourse with Jews, would need no explanation, 'the feast of unleavened bread, *which is called the passover*,' xxii. 1; 'a Mount, *which is called the Mount of Olives*,' xxi. 37; 'Capernaum, *a city of the Jews*,' iv. 31; 'Nazareth, *a city of Galilee*,' i. 26; 'Arimathea, *a city of the Jews*,' xxiii. 51; 'the country of the Gardarenes, *which is over against Galilee*,' viii. 26; 'Emmaus, *which was from Jerusalem about threescore fur-*



*longs,*’ (σταδίους ἑξήκοντα,) xxiv. 13. He gives *Greek* the precedence, ‘in letters of Greek, and Latin, and Hebrew;’ whereas St. John (who is the only one of the Evangelists besides that here enumerates the languages) says, ‘in *Hebrew*, and Greek, and Latin.’

“Of St. John’s Gospel it may not be thought necessary to speak so much at large. It has very little in common with the other Evangelists, but is composed with a very manifest reference to them. He takes for granted that incidents which they have related are known; and makes no mention of the circumstances of Christ’s birth, baptism, temptation, or transfiguration; none of the call of the Apostles, or of their names; none of the institution of the Lord’s Supper; many of the most important particulars of the trial and crucifixion he omits, whilst, on the other hand, many of a secondary importance he details in a manner to show that he was thoroughly familiar with all: the miracles he does not dwell upon; of five only he speaks at length, feeling that the world was already in possession of authentic accounts of them. In some instances, the allusion to his predecessors is marked: he tells us, that as Jesus returned home from Jerusalem through Judea, he tarried to baptise, and that John also was sojourning at *Enon* near to *Salem* for the same purpose; ‘for John,’ it is added, ‘was not as yet cast into prison,’ iii. 22: but who had said a word respecting any imprisonment of John? not the Evangelist who records this; he well knew, however, that others had spoken of it, and therefore he introduces this remark to obviate any possible objection

that his narrative was inconsistent with theirs. Again, in speaking of Martha and Mary, xi. 1, he breaks off, and, in a parenthesis, observes, 'it was that Mary who anointed the Lord with ointment and wiped his feet with her hair;' yet he had not communicated a syllable about this transaction in any previous passage, though others, he was aware, had. St. John therefore clearly considers himself as furnishing a supplement to the well-known labours of those who had already occupied the same field,—a supplement which the heresies of the times (for already had the mystery of iniquity began to work) rendered necessary. Now the appearance of such divisions in the Church indicates Christianity to have been then of a certain standing, and coincides very singularly with several incidental expressions in this Gospel which argue its late date. Thus St. John, in speaking of the Passover, calls it 'the Passover of the Jews,' to distinguish it, no doubt, from the Christian Passover, which it should seem was then of consideration enough to require some distinction in the terms, ii. 13. So, the lake which St. Matthew and St. Mark call the 'Sea of Galilee,' St. John calls the 'Sea of Tiberias,' vi. 1., xxi. 1; the new name derived from the town which Herod the Tetrach had built in honour of Tiberius having by this time superseded the use of the old one.—'This spake he, signifying by what death he (Peter) should glorify God,' xxi. 19, is another passage to our present purpose; for it carries along with it evidence that it was written after the martyrdom of St. Peter, and he was an old man when he suffered, v. 18. Moreover, the comment which St. John makes upon an

expression of Christ relating to his own end, leads to the same conclusion: 'Yet Jesus said not unto him, he shall not die; but, if I will that he tarry *till I come*, what is that to thee?' xxi. 22. Here, whilst he denies that Jesus said he should not die, he admits that he said he should live till *he* came; and this distinction he takes as though it would be felt to vindicate the good faith of his master, and correct the mistake of the brethren. And how?—It does it by the figure aposiopesis. St. John is conscious that the 'coming of Christ' was then acknowledged to be the destruction of Jerusalem, which had already fallen out when he wrote, and which therefore, according to the prophecy, he had lived to see.

"Thus do we find in this Gospel, as in the others, internal evidence of its truth, arising out of a coincidence between its date, which is discovered to be late, and the condition of the church at the time, which is discovered to be heretical. We are well aware that this scheme has its difficulties (indeed no solution of the phenomena presented by a comparison of the diction and matter of the four Gospels, which has yet been attempted, is without difficulties); they are in general, however, such as appear to us rather of a negative than of a positive character, resting not so much upon our knowledge as upon our want of it;—that if, for instance, successive Evangelists had made use of their predecessors' writings, we might expect to discover the principle by which they regulated themselves in the use; nevertheless that this we cannot always do; that sometimes it seems to be on the principle of an epitome, sometimes of a supplement, sometimes again

of neither one nor other, but to be a matter, humanly speaking, of mere arbitrary choice. Still we do not throw up a theory which has so much to plead for it, in despair, because we cannot, even with its help, unravel the thousand motives little and great, which determined men who wrote near eighteen hundred years ago, to this line or that, in every instance. Neither shall we stay to discuss how the original language in which St. Matthew composed (Aramaic or Greek) bears upon this question, nor how the preface of St. Luke; either of them matters which do bear upon it, no doubt, though not in a manner, as far as we can perceive, hostile or, at least, fatal to Dr. Townson's theory. But one objection which has been advanced against this scheme, and all others of its kind, is too specious to be passed over in silence.

“It is said that we have proved too much; that in thus accounting for the resemblances among the several Evangelists we injure them as independent witnesses. This, however, we deny; and we are the more solicitous to make the grounds of our denial good, because here, undoubtedly, is the weak part of Dr. Townson's Essay. That they successively wrote their Gospels, each his own, without any knowledge of the previous history of the other, and yet fell into whole pages of almost verbal agreement, is an untenable opinion; nothing less than a continued miracle, such as that conveyed in the exploded tale of the writers of the Septuagint, being enough to explain such a phenomenon; unless indeed we have recourse to an original document from which they all drew, a supposition which makes more knots than it un-

ties. But the same scrutiny into the Evangelists, which determines that they did not shut their eyes to one another's labours, determines, too, that each wrote from a knowledge of his own, notwithstanding. The variations of the several Gospels; the matter introduced into one or other above the rest; the explanations occasionally annexed; above all, the undesigned coincidences which may be detected on a comparison of them with one another, or with writers nearly contemporary,—sufficiently testify that though the witnesses have been admitted to converse together, and have availed themselves of their intercourse, they will still bear cross-examination and confronting, because each has a separate knowledge of the facts he attests, and is not the mere echo of his companion.

“St. Matthew we may let pass; he was a principal in the events he relates, and his narrative gives ample proof of it. But what have we to say of St. Mark? Whether this Evangelist was indebted to St. Peter for his information, as history directly asserts, and as his Gospel incidentally confirms, or to any other source, certain it is that his writings betray, by many minute particulars, the eye-witness: ‘the pillow in the hinder part of the ship,’ on which Jesus was asleep, iv. 38; ‘the *green* grass’ on which the multitude sat down, vi. 39; the ‘rising of blind Bartimeus, and the casting away of his garments,’ when our Lord met him, x. 50; the ‘ruler of the synagogue, Jairus by name,’ instead of the indefinite ‘certain ruler’ of St. Matthew, v. 22; the exception of ‘one loaf’ which the disciples had with them, viii. 14, where St. Matthew states gene-

rally that they had forgot to take bread, xvi. 5 ; 'the colt tied by the door without, in a place where two roads met,' xi. 4 ; the peculiar crime for which Barabbas was in prison, where St. Matthew contents himself with describing him as 'a notable prisoner,' xv. 7 ; the quality of Joseph of Arimathea as an 'honourable counsellor,' whom St. Matthew designates merely as a 'rich man,' xv. 43—45 ; the occasional preservation of the precise words uttered by our Lord, such as 'Talitha kumi,' 'Ephphatha,' vi. 41, and vii. 34 ; in these, and in other instances of a similar kind, there is a liveliness of description that determines the writer or his informant to have been also the spectator.

"In like manner St. Luke, who, whether from St. Paul or from personal observation, or both, 'had perfect knowledge of all things from the very first,' gives token enough that his acquaintance with the circumstances of our Saviour's history was intimate and independent : the minute particulars of the conduct of Martha and Mary at the village feast, x. 38, 42 ; the sudden exclamation of the woman in the company who had heard Jesus speak, xi. 27 ; the news incidently brought to him of the murder of the Galileans, and the immediate reflection our Lord makes upon it, xiii. 1 ; the small stature of Zaccheus, and the expedient to which he had recourse in consequence, xix. 3 ; the number of swords among the attendants of Jesus, xxii. 38 ; the rebuke which one of the thieves cast in the other's teeth, xxiii. 32 ; the broiled fish and honey-comb which were offered to Jesus after the resurrection, xxiv. 42 ; these are all particulars of a class and character which be-

speaking the narrator's possession both of accurate and original information. The same may be predicated of St. John, and be still more easily proved. But this is not all.

“The *independence* of the Evangelists as witnesses of the facts they attest, is further apparent from points of casual agreement, the very nature of which must satisfy the most suspicious critic that it does not and cannot come of collusion amongst the parties: the incidents on which the observation is founded are such as surprise us, by the artless manner in which they lock into one another, like the parts and counterparts of a cloven tally. St. Matthew, for instance, introduces us to a scene which represents ‘James, the son of Zebedee, and John, his brother, in a ship with Zebedee, their father, *mending their nets,*’ iv. Not a word is said of any accident having happened to the nets which furnished this employment to James and John. But let us turn to the fifth chapter of St. Luke, where the events of the same place, the same day, and the same people are related, and we learn that the Lord having bade Simon let down the net, he and his companions did so, and ‘they inclosed a great multitude of fishes, and *their net brake.*’ Here, therefore, the Evangelists, each telling his own tale in his own way, without any studied reference to his colleague, complete one another’s narrative and confirm one another’s veracity. Or again—‘When *the even was come,*’ says St. Matthew, viii. 16, ‘they brought unto him many that were possessed of devils, and he cast out the spirits with his word, and healed all that were sick.’ Now, why did they bring the sick



and the possessed to Jesus when *the even was come*, and not before? Let us suppose that St. Matthew's Gospel had chanced to be the only one that had descended to us; in that case the value of these few words, 'when the even was come,' would have been quite overlooked as affording an argument for the truth of the story; nor could it have been conjectured what thought was influencing St. Matthew's mind at the moment when he let them drop. But on the other hand, let us suppose that we had been long in possession of the three other Gospels, and that this of St. Matthew had just been decyphered among the Ambrosian manuscripts; and that, on comparing this passage with the corresponding one in St. Mark, i. 21. 29, it was perceived that the latter actually assigns this influx of diseased and demoniacal persons to the transactions of 'a *Sabbath-day*, after Jesus was come out of the synagogue;' and that, on referring to another place, Luke xiv. 3, we found that it was reputed unlawful amongst the Jews to 'heal on the Sabbath-day,' and that the Sabbath was not over till 'the even was come.' After this would not a new light strike upon us, and a conviction that this Gospel, in saying 'when *the even was come* they brought unto him all that were possessed with devils,' was telling the truth; and that truth was the more manifestly stamped upon it by the artless manner in which this fact was announced, and the entire absence of all explanation touching the day of the week, and the prejudice relating to it? We are not concerned about the perfect intelligibility of this passage in St. Matthew,—its meaning is obvious, and it would

be a waste of words to offer what we have done by way of commentary ; all that we have been anxious for is this, to point out the *undesigned* elucidation which one Evangelist receives from the other, and thence to infer the independence of the testimony of either. To take another case :—‘ At that time, says St. Matthew, ‘ Herod the Tetrarch heard of the fame of Jesus, and said unto his *servants*, This is John the Baptist,’ xiv. 1, 2. Now St. Luke, who speaks of this same incident, ix. 7, says nothing about the servants as being the persons to whom Herod communicated his suspicions ; but, in another place, he, and he only of the Evangelists, tells us of at least one servant of this same Herod having a disciple of Christ for his wife,—Joanna, the wife of Chuza, *Herod’s steward*, being one of those who ministered unto him, viii. 3,—a circumstance which certainly corroborates St. Matthew’s assertion that Herod communicated with his *servants* touching the character of Jesus, some of them being better informed on the subject than himself. Here there is at once a correspondence between two witnesses which argues their knowledge of one another ; yet withal such facts separately stated by either, as argue their knowledge of the matters they wrote about to be independent of one another.

“ Or, to put the question of the *independence* of their testimony to another proof :—St. John mentions many incidents with regard to the crucifixion in common with the other Evangelists, and there is every reason to think (as we have already said), from the tenor of his whole Gospel, that he had seen the Gospels of his predecessors ; but he, and

he only, speaks of Pilate 'sitting down in the judgment-seat, in a place that was called the *Pavement* : ' (*λιθόστρωτον*). Let us try this supplemental fact by another test, that of coincidence, not with any other Evangelist, but with something near contemporary history,—with Josephus. Pilate comes out of his own hall to his judgment-seat on the *Pavement* : this is St. John's assertion. The hall and the pavement were therefore, according to him, near or contiguous. Now let us turn to the Jewish historian :—'The city was strengthened by the palace in which he (Herod) dwelt, and the temple by the fortifications attached to the bastion called Antonia,' (Antiq. xv. c. xi. § 5.) Hence we conclude that the Temple was near the castle of Antonia. 'On the western side of the court (of the Temple) were four gates, one looking to the *palace*,' (Antiq. xv. c. xi. § 5.) Hence we conclude that the temple was near the *palace* of Herod ; therefore it follows that the palace was near the castle of Antonia. But if Pilate's hall was a part of this palace, as it was, (for there, Philo tells us, what indeed we might have guessed, was the residence of the Roman governor when he was at Jerusalem,) then Pilate's hall was near the castle of Antonia. Here let us pause a moment and direct our attention to a passage in the Jewish War, vi. c. i. § 8, where Josephus records the prowess of a centurion in the Roman army, Julianus by name, in an assault upon Jerusalem.

“ ‘This man had posted himself near Titus, at the Castle of Antonia, when observing that the Romans were giving way, and defending them-

selves but indifferently, he rushed forward and drove back the victorious Jews to the corner of the inner Temple, single-handed,—for the whole multitude fled before him, scarce believing such strength and spirit to belong to a mortal,—but he, dashing through the crowd, smote them on every side, as many as he could lay hands upon. It was a sight which struck Cæsar with astonishment, and seemed terrific to all. But his fate overtook him; as how could it be otherwise, unless he had been more than man,—for having many sharp nails in his shoes, after the soldiers' fashion, he slipped as he was running upon the *Pavement* (κατὰ λιθοστρώτου) and fell upon his back; the clatter of his arms causing the fugitives to turn about. And now a cry was set up by the Romans in the castle of *Antonia*, who were in alarm for the man.'

“From this passage it seems that a *pavement* was near the castle of *Antonia*; but we have already seen that the castle of *Antonia* was near Pilate's hall, therefore this pavement was near Pilate's hall. This then is proved from Josephus, though very circuitously, which is not the worse, that very near Pilate's residence a pavement (λιθόστρωτος) there was; that it gave its name to that spot is not proved, yet nothing can be more probable than that it did; and consequently, nothing more probable than that St. John is speaking with truth and accuracy, when he makes Pilate bring Jesus forth and sit down in his judgment-seat in a place called the Pavement. Thus does the narrative of St. John, in this particular, stand the trial we proposed.

“It would be most easy to multiply instances of this kind, the last of which is taken from Professor Hug’s Introduction to the Writings of the New Testament, a work which has supplied us with several other hints already embodied in this article; and which though not free from very serious objection, must be allowed to contain a vast deal of curious and interesting matter. Enough, however, has been advanced to show the nature of Dr. Townson’s argument, and the value of it; and that if we admit certain appearances in the Gospels to be inexplicable, perhaps, without some communication amongst their several authors, there are other appearances no less inexplicable without an independent knowledge of their subject on the part of each.

“Now, whilst this theory accounts in a great degree both for the resemblances and differences of the Evangelists, it seems to leave the question of inspiration untouched. In the *prophetical* parts of Scripture, it is clear to demonstration, that the Spirit of God supplied to successive individuals an intimate knowledge of his will with respect to *future events*; yet those individuals availed themselves of the writings of their predecessors notwithstanding; and we see no greater reason for doubting the inspiration of the Evangelists because they did so, than for doubting the inspiration of Isaiah because he sometimes adopts the language of David; or that of Jeremiah, because he does the same by Isaiah. Nor in the principle of *accommodation* (where there is no compromise) do we find any stumbling-block in our way. The

gift of tongues was doubtless a *spiritual* gift; but once imparted, it was as much subject to the discretion of the parties in the application of it, as if it had been learned by grammar and dictionary; and accordingly by some it was used, and by some (as we read) it was abused: it was used when the speaker *accommodated* his language to the audience he addressed; when he spoke Greek to the Grecian, and Arabic to the Arabian;—and it was abused when he addressed the latter in the language of Greece, and the former in that of Arabia, not caring, through vain glory, though he should be a barbarian to them, and they barbarians to him. In like manner the spirit influenced the *matter* which the Apostle delivered, as he influenced his *language*; but he did not in this case, any more than in the other, suspend the exercise of his own common sense, which would naturally dictate an *accommodation* (not a compromise) of that matter to the character and wants of those to whom he submitted it; nor in a Gospel, for instance, meant exclusively for Gentile converts, insist upon his dwelling emphatically upon Jewish privilege (however strong expressions to that effect might have been recorded with perfect truth, as having fallen from the lips of our Lord); nor in a Gospel meant for Jews, require him to omit the correctives specially administered to Jewish corruption. In all these instances, ‘the spirits of the Prophets,’ as St. Paul expressly tells us, ‘were subject to the Prophets.’—1 Cor. xiv. 32.

“Meanwhile this cannot fail to strike us, that in the case of the Apostles, both in their *hearts* and in their *understandings*, (the two provinces for the

operation of the Spirit of God,) we observe them presenting a very singular contrast to themselves, when contemplated before the Crucifixion, and shortly after it;—such a contrast as requires to be accounted for, and does coincide in a very remarkable manner with the supposition that an extraordinary illapse of the Holy Spirit had occurred to them in the interval, which enabled them to brave dangers from which they had before shrunk, and to understand scriptures to which their eyes had been before blinded. This same Spirit, therefore, it is reasonable to believe, did not desert them in the composition of those writings which they have left us, but guided them into all truth.

“The precise mode, indeed, in which the Spirit influenced the holy men of old, we do not pretend to determine; in this, as in almost any other investigation, it is an extremely easy matter to puzzle ourselves, or for others to puzzle us, if we will go far enough,—if we will not ‘know to know no more.’ A special pleader may confound a perfectly veracious witness, but the jury sees the man all the while to be a true man; and, without troubling themselves to unite the hairs which the other has split, accepts the testimony and forgets the logic. The precise mode in which inspiration directed the Apostles may be unintelligible; so is the precise mode in which instinct directs the swallow. The poor bird, however, does not meanwhile set himself down on the house-top and argue himself into a distrust of the principle, whatever it is, till winter cuts off his speculations and his life together; but prunes his wing, and commits himself to its guid-



ance, nothing doubting, and finds it land him at last, tempest-tost perhaps, on a soil where his foot can rest, and in a clime where he can bathe himself in the genial breeze."

## PART II.

### ON THE CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE.

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#### LECTURE I.

##### *On the Inspiration of the Holy Scripture, and Determination of the Genuine Text.*

IN my former and preliminary Addresses to this Class, it was my object to direct its attention to an introductory survey of the general nature of the evidences of Religion, Natural and Revealed; it now becomes my duty to resume and to conclude our course by a short exposition of those doctrines which our Church considers as the leading and fundamental essentials of her faith. To the general complexion of these doctrines I have already alluded in the conclusion of my Inaugural Address; and before I enter upon their more particular investigation, it may still appear advisable to devote our immediate attention to certain preliminary considerations, in which the foundation must be firmly laid, before the superstructure can be securely raised. For before we can with any confidence proceed to elicit doctrines from the documents of the Christian faith, we must first weigh the exact degree of the authority and sanction attached to

those documents. Of course as the documents of a faith acknowledged to be a divine revelation, their general authority must be equally acknowledged: but still, as it might be objected that we have nevertheless "this treasure in earthen vessels," and that therefore some mixture of human fallibility might be still suspected, it seems necessary in the first place to fix a precise idea in our minds of the certain sanction imparted to the doctrines delivered in these documents by the tenet of their plenary inspiration. Secondly, admitting the original documents to have been thus inspired,—still, since unless a perpetual miracle should intervene, we well know, from continual experience, that many changes of more or less importance will, in the course of repeated transcription, necessarily insinuate themselves into every document handed down from age to age by writing,—it becomes further necessary to ascertain the genuine text of those documents, before we can venture to pronounce as to the doctrines which they really contain. And Thirdly, having thus ascertained *what is written*, a further investigation of *what is the exact signification of that which is written* must arise. The text being fixed, sound canons of interpretation must be established in order to its satisfactory explanation, before a just foundation of confidence that we have rightly elicited its doctrines can be constructed.

Hence, then, we have three preliminary inquiries,—1. the Inspiration of the Scriptures,—2. the Determination of their genuine Text,—and 3. the Interpretation of that Text,—which claim our immediate attention, before we proceed to the exposition of doctrines.

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*I. On the Inspiration of Scripture.*

In the first place as to Inspiration.—The whole of the argument which we have previously considered as to the necessity of Revelation, appears to imply, as an inseparable corollary, the doctrine of Inspiration;—that is, that the teachers who were commissioned to impart this Revelation, and to consign its doctrines to such records as might faithfully hand them down to posterity, should have their faculties throughout their whole task so guided and guarded by the influences of the Divine Spirit on their minds, as to suggest to them all essential and appropriate truth, (as connected, that is, with the subjects to which the Revelation extended,) and to preserve them from all error. This doctrine, I say, seems involved in the very idea of Revelation; for whence originated the necessity of that Revelation, but from the incompetency of our minds to arrive at secure and certain conclusions on religious truth without it? But unless a certain and infallible standard of religious truth had been secured by this divine superintendence over the minds of those selected as its oracles, how would the requisite end have been attained?

I need not now enter upon the distinctions which some theologians have introduced into the subject; rather fancifully, perhaps, than necessarily enumerating several separate kinds of Inspiration,—such as inspiration of superintendency, inspiration of suggestion, and the like. One simple idea seems to me to include all that we can or need know on such a subject,—the idea of Divine influence so acting on the minds subjected to it, as to guide them (as I have said) into all appropriate truth, and to guard them

from every liability to error in delivering it. All questions as to the mode in which this influence may have acted, appear to me to savour rather of rash and over-curious speculation, than to make for edification. Now that our sacred writings do themselves really profess to lay claim to such an inspiration seems evident. All Scripture, they assert, is given by inspiration of God; and although it may be said that this text in its primary application appears to relate to the previous Scriptures of the Old Testament, yet we are fully justified in extending the same claim to the Scriptures of the New Testament, by the analogy of the case and by the assertions of the writers, such as that of Paul to the Ephesians, "that Christ by revelation made known to him the mystery, whereby when they read they might understand his knowledge in the mystery<sup>1</sup>."

Numerous indeed are the declarations of those Scriptures to the same effect. "The word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it *not as the word of men*, but as it is in truth, the *word of God*<sup>2</sup>." "He therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man but God, who hath also given us his Holy Spirit<sup>3</sup>." "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom *which God hath revealed unto us by his Spirit*." "We have received the *Spirit* which is of God, *that we might know the things which are freely given to us of God*, which things also we speak *not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Spirit teacheth*<sup>4</sup>." "We have the *mind of*

<sup>1</sup> Eph. iii. 3.<sup>2</sup> 1 Thess. ii. 13.<sup>3</sup> 1 Thess. iv. 8.<sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 7. 10. 12, 13.

*Christ.*" If then, on the evidence which we have previously considered, we feel bound to receive the testimony of these writers as worthy of all acceptance, we cannot consistently decline that testimony, when it asserts its own divine original and authority. Nor can less be inferred from the solemn promise of the divine founder of our faith to his Apostles, immediately before he was betrayed,—the promise of "that Holy Spirit of Truth who should testify of him, should *teach them all things, should bring all things to their remembrance* whatsoever Christ had said unto them, and *guide them into all truth.*"

Accordingly the earliest Fathers of our faith received the Christian documents without hesitation, as fully sanctioned by the divine inspiration of their contents. Thus Clemens Romanus, a contemporary of the Apostles, declares that they preached being filled with the Holy Spirit, and that Paul wrote to the Corinthians under the aid of the Spirit; and Justin Martyr says that the Gospels were written by men full of the Holy Ghost, and that the sacred writers were moved by inspiration.

Some writers of the best intentions, but not perhaps of the best judgment, have, however, weakened the argument on this very important point, by attempting to extend it too far. These have maintained what is called a *verbal inspiration*; that is, that the influences of the Spirit not only so assisted the minds of the evangelical writers as to guide them into truth, and to guard them from error, but moreover, actually dictated the very words which they employed,—an hypothesis not only unnecessary and unsupported by the facts of the case, but even at

variance with those facts ; for if it had actually been thus, of course whenever two evangelists relate the same parable or discourse of our Blessed Lord, we should necessarily have found them employing the very same expressions : but, on the contrary, it cannot be necessary for me to remind you, that while we always observe the closest substantial agreement on such occasions, yet we very frequently meet with as wide a variation of language, as can be consistent with such a substantial agreement. It obviously appears, then, that while preserved from mistake as to the matter of what they delivered, the words employed by the writers were such as any other honest narrators would naturally have used.

We must remember, too, that as Inspiration was given only to secure a certain and infallible standard of *religious truth*, from which no appeal could lie, so we have no authority for extending it beyond this object. In some points not immediately having this relation, we find that this guidance, as not needed, was not imparted. Thus we find St. Paul four or five times in a single chapter, observing with reference to some prudential directions to the Corinthians, that he gave these by permission, not by commandment, delivering his own private judgment, and speaking of himself, not of the Lord. But as has been well observed <sup>1</sup>, “ We may fairly conclude that an Apostle who so carefully and repeatedly guards his readers against making his private judgment of equal authority with commandments dictated by God, would not on other occasions have assumed the authority of a divine and inspired teacher, without

<sup>1</sup> Olinthus Gregory's Letters on Christianity, i. 274.



a full and perfect consciousness that he had a just claim to it."

Perhaps also, when we find St. Paul alluding to calculations on some minute chronological points connected with the periods of Jewish history,—as these chronological considerations can in no manner whatever affect religious doctrine, we are hardly authorized in including them among the *appropriate truths* to which Inspiration relates. I confess I have been grieved, when I have seen imputations, I am persuaded altogether unfounded, brought against writers who have employed freedom of inquiry on points like these.

But in everything in *any manner* bearing on religious truth, no such allowances can be made; here (it being the very object of Revelation to provide a certain and infallible standard) no deduction from the fulness of the inspiration, no appeal to any other authority can be permitted for a moment. We must be firmly persuaded, as a writer on the subject has justly stated, that the inspired writings contain a *perfect* and *infallible* account of the *whole will* of God for our salvation, of all that is necessary for us to know, believe and practise in religion<sup>1</sup>.

We surely can never safely listen to an hypothesis like that advocated by Dr. Priestley, who has argued that we are bound indeed to consider the *great truths* which the Apostles deliver as from God, to be divine and worthy of our highest regard; but not so all the *minutiæ* of things which they mention, nor their arguments and reasonings, either from facts or revealed doctrines. To which it has been

<sup>1</sup> Parry's Inquiry.

well answered : " This hypothesis destroys the proper authority of Scripture ; for either we must have another revelation from God to furnish us with a criterion for safely distinguishing between great things and the minutiae of things, or for this most important discrimination every person must rely upon his own judgment. Thus the opinion of each individual, modified as it would be by the endless varieties of character, self-love, prejudice and sinful passions, would be made in effect the rule of faith, and the determining authority in religion ; and the Scriptures would be deposed into a subordination to this self-elevated principle <sup>1</sup>."

It is well known that these low views on the subject of Inspiration have often betrayed Dr. Priestley himself, and subsequently Mr. Belsham, into statements and expressions which must appear to most Christian minds objectionable in the highest degree, and little consistent with anything like a *full* acceptance of the Christian Scriptures, as an *authoritative standard of truth* ; although undoubtedly no design could have been further from their minds than to impugn a revelation, to the support of their own views of which their best abilities were dedicated ; but I purposely abstain from quoting these passages, because I am fully aware that a collection of detached sentences, often hastily written, may present an unfair impression of the deliberate sentiments of the author ; and I am most happy in being able to add, than an accomplished and amiable writer, although in many respects of the same school, has himself candidly allowed of these expressions of Dr. Priest-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Pye Smith's Messiah, i. 109.

ley,—that they are most obnoxious, and in his own judgment very hasty and censurable<sup>1</sup>. I have only here alluded to this subject with a view of illustrating the dangerous lengths to which a departure from a full admission of the Inspiration of the Sacred Text, in every thing that affects religious truth, has a natural tendency to lead the unguarded mind.

## II. *On the Determination of the genuine Text.*

Having thus examined the authority imparted to the Christian documents by the Divine Inspiration from which they proceed, the genuine form of those documents next claims our attention. It is not enough to admit the authority which originally dictated them; we must further establish that what was so dictated has been preserved unaltered and uncorrupted, before we are enabled to rely that we have rightly ascertained the mind of the Spirit. Now it is self-evident that, without the intervention of a perpetual miracle, no documents can be transmitted in manuscript through many ages (as the writings of the New Testament were for fourteen centuries before the invention of printing,) without many variations insinuating themselves into the different copies, through the errors &c. of different transcribers; thus forming what are called various readings of the text. There is not a single ancient author who has descended to us in more than a single MS., of whose text we have not many such various readings; and the number must obviously always increase in pro-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Carpenter, Examination of Charges against Unitarians, p. 201, note.

portion of the number of MSS. preserved, and the care with which they have been collated. But does this injuriously affect the certainty of that text? On the contrary, as the errors of various transcribers will probably check and correct each other, the probability that we have succeeded in obtaining a genuine text approaching closely to the original autograph, must always be in exact proportion to the number of various readings collected and examined. Since the MSS. of the New Testament are almost infinitely more numerous than those of any other work, they present, as might naturally be expected, a greater abundance of various readings; and some persons of narrow information and weak judgment have at times been alarmed, lest our confidence in the certainty of the text should thus be diminished. But in fact this very circumstance ought to increase that confidence. The abundant materials for collation, and the minute, scrupulous and unwearied investigation which those materials have received, is truly the most effectual guarantee of the integrity of the text now exhibited in the best critical editions, which we may feel perfectly satisfied exhibit the Hebrew and Greek originals in a form of far greater purity and accuracy than has been attained in the case of any ancient classic.

But important as we must consider the labours of critical scholars, in thus restoring the complete integrity of the text, yet even in the commonest editions the variations are seldom of a nature *materially* to affect the meaning. Out of the immense number of various readings, the great majority relate to minute points of grammar or orthography:

*e. g.* *κἀγω* for *καὶ ἐγω*, *Σολομωνα* for *Σολομωντα*; changes of common connecting particles,—as *καὶ* for *δε*; the substitution of one synonymous or equivalent expression for another,—such as whether we read “Paul the prisoner of Jesus Christ,” or “Paul the servant of Jesus Christ;” omissions of words redundant to the meaning,—such as reading, “there is only one good,” instead of “there is none good but one, that is God;” and the like. I do not remember above half-a-dozen variations *materially* affecting the sense, and only half of these relate to any doctrinal point. To these instances I shall more particularly advert before closing this subject.

But before I proceed, I am happy to cite, as agreeing with the views above given, the observations made in the Introduction to a New Version by a sect from which, on the most essential points, I generally feel myself compelled frankly to avow my entire difference; but yet, as that sect has always considered critical inquiries as peculiarly claiming its attention, and cannot in the least be suspected of any bias towards *over-cautious* statements, it is gratifying to me to find it equally upholding the general credit of the sacred text.

“These various readings, though very numerous, do not in any degree affect the general credit and integrity of the text: the general uniformity of which, in so many copies, scattered through almost all countries in the known world, and in so great a variety of languages, *is truly astonishing*; and demonstrates both the veneration in which the Scriptures were held, and *the great care* which was taken in transcribing them. Of the 150,000 various readings

which have been discovered by the sagacity and diligence of collators, not one tenth nor one hundredth part make any perceptible, or at least any material variation in the sense. This will appear credible, if we consider that every, the minutest deviation, from the received text has been carefully noted; so that the insertion or omission of an article, the substitution of a word for its equivalent, the transposition of a word or two in a sentence, and even variations in orthography, have been added to the catalogue of various readings."

"Upon the whole we may remark, that the number and antiquity of the MSS. which contain the whole or different parts of the New Testament, the variety of ancient versions, and the multitude of quotations from these sacred books in the early Christian writers from the second century downwards, constitute a body of evidence in favour of the genuineness and authenticity of the Christian Scriptures far beyond that of any other book of equal antiquity<sup>1</sup>."

The whole subject of various readings has been fully and critically discussed in Bishop Marsh's excellent Lectures, and his translation of Professor Michaelis' Introduction. Our time will now only allow us to subjoin a very few remarks on the causes which have produced these variations, on the rules which may assist us in distinguishing the genuine from the spurious text, and on the means which may assist us in restoring the former. Now these variations must consist either of substitutions, omissions or interpolations; and each class may be either accidental and

<sup>1</sup> Impr. Vers. New Test. Introd. p. xxiii.

arising from the negligent inadvertence of transcribers, or intentional.

Accidental substitutions may be occasioned by the transcriber mistaking, from the similarity of the manuscript characters, one word for another; thus, *ἡγαπημένοις* 'to the beloved,' for *ἡγιασμένοις* 'to the sanctified' (Jude 1.): or again, such substitutions may arise from the influence of mental association employing, instead of the exact word in the original, an equivalent synonyme.

Intentional substitutions will take place, (1) as supposed corrections of some idiomatic peculiarity in the original, which to the transcriber may appear ungrammatical; or, (2) as in the case of quotations from the Old Testament, altering them into a closer agreement with some favourite version, as the LXX., &c.

Accidental omissions will obviously often arise from oversight. One of the commonest instances of this is in the case where, after a certain interval, words recur having exactly the same terminations, or, as they are called, *ὁμοιοτέλευτα*. Here the eye of the transcriber, in glancing from his transcript to the original, may easily be caught by the analogous termination, overlooking and omitting the intermediate clause.

Intentional omissions must have arisen from a weak fear lest some passage of the original should be capable of misapprehension; such as omitting in some texts expressions relating to the humanity of Christ, lest they should serve to favour the Arians. Every well-constituted mind must of course reject such a proceeding as a mean and criminal dissimu-



lation; but the examples of its ever having been practised are happily few, and no suspicion of this kind attaches to the received text.

Accidental interpolations may arise, (1) from inserting *memoriter* something which seems deficient in the original, especially in its quotations from the Old Testament; (2) from the original MS. having had marginal notes added to it, which the transcriber may occasionally mistake for omitted portions of the text intended to be inserted, &c.

Intentional interpolations would form a fraud far more guilty than even intentional omissions; inasmuch as the *suppressio veri* may possibly arise only from an excess of timid caution, but the *suggestio falsi* must be ascribed in such a case to a daring profanation of the most sacred charge. I am however willing to hope that such a crime has scarcely ever been committed: even the suspected interpolations are very very few; and they may, I think, all be accounted for as accidental.

Now on comparing the phenomena of any two proposed various readings, with the natural operation of the above causes, internal criteria will often arise, which may assist us in distinguishing the original from the corrupted readings: in substitutions, for instance, it will often be more probable, that one of the two readings may have suggested the other, than the converse. If a grammatical correction is made to replace an idiomatic solecism common in the writer's general style, the correction is probably the corruption. An omission generally must be considered as more probable and more easily occasioned by negligence than an interpolation, and therefore the fuller

reading will appear the more likely to be the true one. But if there be a majority of manuscript authority in favour of the omission, and if the circumstances be present which, as we have seen, might give rise to an interpolation, the contrary will be our conclusion.

Now as to the authorities which may assist and guide us in the task of emendation, the first class must clearly consist of the various MSS. of the original; but of these the number is not so much to be considered, as their quality, antiquity, and agreement with the most ancient interpreters.

Numerous as are the individual MSS., yet, as some of them have been copied from others, they will generally be found capable of arrangement into a smaller number of classes; all those referrible to the same class manifesting a general agreement in certain characteristic readings: these classes are usually termed schools, recensions, or editions of MSS. Such schools or recensions are particularly distinguishable in the Hebrew MSS. of the Old Testament.

Thus the critical system called Masora, most probably devised by the rabbins of Tiberias in the sixth century, has imparted a remarkable uniformity to the text of most subsequent MSS. generally written under its influence. The preservation of a copy of the Pentateuch in the most ancient Hebrew characters among the Samaritans, probably from the time of the original secession of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, presents a much earlier recension of this portion; and Kennicot has ascertained the existence of many MSS. neither exactly agreeing with the one or the

other. Similar recensions are less strongly marked in the case of the New Testament; yet critics have considered themselves able to distinguish them; for instance, the copies which appear to have been written for the use of the Western churches, are said to agree in certain characteristic readings with the Latin versions and Fathers; those transcribed at Alexandria, with the Fathers of that district, and with the Coptic version; those made at Constantinople, with the later Greek Fathers, &c.

Besides these MSS. of the original, Ancient Versions afford us another, and often a more secure, aid in distinguishing the genuine from the spurious text; since we are often more able to ascertain correctly the age of a version than that of a MS. Thus the Greek LXX. version of the Old Testament, written as early as the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus, is of very high importance and value: the old Syriac version of the Old Testament called Peschito, ascribed with probability to a period anterior to the close of the third century, is also useful.

The earliest versions of the New Testament appear to be, (1) the same Peschito or old Syriac version, which seems to have been executed at the close of the Apostolic age; and (2) the old Italic, quoted by Tertullian before the close of the second century. There appear indeed to have been several early Italic versions; four of these were collected and published by Pope Benedict XIV. 1740; but these were superseded by the Vulgate, subsequently executed by Jerome in the fourth century. The Coptic (3), Sahidic (4), and Ethiopic (5) versions, are all probably anterior to the fourth century.

The most ancient of the Chaldee paraphrases or Targums, such as that of Onkelos, attributed to the first century, and that of Jonathan Ben Uzziel, probably of the third or fourth century, are applicable in the same manner; all the other Targums are later than the sixth century.

Quotations from the Old and New Testament in the writings of the Fathers are often important, as ascertaining the received text in their time; and the comparison of parallel passages in the Scriptures themselves will often afford the most material assistance in these inquiries.

In the emendation of the text the evidence of all authorities of this kind must be carefully weighed, their comparative value appreciated, and the general style of the writer and the sense of context taken into account. The principal rule imposing upon us a just caution in our critical inquiries seems to be the following; that without some such authorities we should never indulge in critical conjecture. *Conjectural* emendation, excepting under the most palpable and urgent necessity, must always be *unsound*.

I would conclude this subject by illustrating the application of the above hasty remarks, in the examination of the six various readings which I have stated to be the most material in the New Testament. Of course it is unnecessary for me to observe, that I do not include in these, passages which some writers (in defiance surely of every sound critical canon,) may have marked as of doubtful authority, admitting at the same time that they are found in every extant MS. and version (*e. g.* the first chapter of St. Matthew).

St. Matthew exhibits only one variation which can be considered as materially affecting the sense, and even this involves no point either of Christian doctrine or duty. The passage I allude to is the doxology at the end of the Lord's Prayer, which is omitted in some of the best MSS.; it is absent also in the early Italic and Vulgate versions, and never quoted by the Latin Fathers. The Greek Fathers appear rather to quote it as a liturgical addition, than as a portion of the original. It is found, however, in the Syriac and some other early versions. If we compare the parallel passage in Luke xi., where the Lord's Prayer is also given, we likewise find the doxology omitted; but the best MSS. have moreover some other slight variations from St. Matthew,—such as closing with “lead us not into temptation,” and leaving out the clause “but deliver us from evil,” &c. In many of the MSS. of St. Luke these omissions are indeed supplied from St. Matthew,—an example of the alterations that may insinuate themselves, not from any sinister intention, but as supposed corrections. The comparison, therefore, of the parallel passages is not in this instance very decisive, because, on account of the other variations, it may be supposed that Our Lord delivered this prayer to his disciples on two different occasions, with slight changes, affecting the form of expression rather than the substance; for the petitions omitted are virtually implied in those which precede them. On the whole, the balance of the evidence seems decidedly against the conclusion, that the doxology formed an original portion of the Lord's Prayer;—we know certainly that it was added as a liturgical form in the

early services of the Greek Church, just as our doxologies are at the end of each Psalm. Now if we used such a form only with one single Psalm, it might naturally in time come to be regarded by the less informed as an integral portion of the said Psalm; and a transcriber, wishing to exhibit a full and correct copy, might thus be led to incorporate it. Since, therefore, we may easily thus account for the intrusion of the passage in question, in the few instances in which it is found,—while on the other hand it seems difficult to assign any cause which could have occasioned its omission in all the instances we have noticed, if it ever actually existed in the original autograph,—we cannot, I think, hesitate to believe that it has crept in in the above manner. But I must again add, that there seems no reason to *suspect even*, that it was interpolated with any sinister design, and that it affects not in the least any doctrine that can in any manner be disputed, since no theist can possibly doubt that the kingdom, the power, and the glory, belong to God.

In the Gospels of St. Mark <sup>1</sup> and St. Luke there

<sup>1</sup> I have not noticed in the text the question concerning the twelve concluding verses of the Gospel of St. Mark, because, as these verses occur in every Greek MS. now extant, with the single exception of the celebrated Codex Vaticanus, the general canons of critical evidence can hardly justify any serious doubts of its being the genuine production of St. Mark. Still, however, it ought to be stated, that in the earliest ages of the Church, the passage appears to have been wanting in some copies, though contained in others. The hypothesis of Michaelis, of a two-fold publication of St. Mark's Gospel, first at Rome, and afterwards at Alexandria, both by the Evan-

are no variations that demand our notice as material, unless we so reckon the variations in the copy of the Lord's Prayer given by St. Luke, before adverted to.

There are two doubtful passages in the Gospel of St. John<sup>1</sup>; but neither of them can, I think, be considered as involving any religious truth. The first occurs in the narrative of the miraculous cure performed on the cripple at the pool of Bethesda, in which the clause stating that an angel descended at certain seasons to disturb the water, is wanting in several of the best MSS., and marked with an obelus or asterisk, as doubtful, in others. It is however quoted by Tertullian, Chrysostom, and some other Fathers. Griesbach, while he does not reject it from his text, yet marks it as probably to be omitted. A very probable cause through which it may have been without any wilful fraud interpolated, has been assigned;

gelist himself (the former having been issued abruptly, in an unfinished state, on the imprisonment or death of St. Peter), appears to afford the most satisfactory explanation of these discrepancies. Without this paragraph the Gospel would terminate very abruptly with an account of the first visit of the women to the sepulchre.

<sup>1</sup> It can hardly be necessary to mention, as a third material and doubtful reading, the very evident interpolation of some Latin MSS. and one Greek, as late as the twelfth century, in John iii. 6. where, after the declaration, "that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit," we find inserted *ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστίν*. *Quia de Spiritu est*. But this reading is quite unsupported by MSS. of any authority, and has obviously originated in a marginal explanation of the text. Some of the Latin MSS. have corrupted this gloss into *Quia Deus Spiritus est*.



namely, that it may have been a common tradition concerning the pool in question : that some annotator may have written this tradition as a marginal note in his copy : and that, lastly, a transcriber from this copy, mistaking the note for a clause of the original, may have inserted it in his text. Such is the opinion of Michaelis and Marsh : and as it seems difficult on the other hand to assign any reason for its omission, if really found in the autograph, we certainly cannot rely upon it as genuine with any confidence ; but in parting with it we are clearly not deprived of any portion of Scripture, admitting any doctrinal or moral application.

The other doubtful passage in St. John's Gospel, although not affecting any point of doctrine, is yet so interesting and so instructive in its application, that we should naturally be very reluctant to resign it. We must, however, look only at the evidence of the case, and determine upon that solely. The paragraph in question is the affecting narrative of the woman taken in adultery, and the retreat of her conscience-stricken accusers at the memorable words —“ Let him that is without sin amongst you cast the first stone.” On this passage the evidence of MSS. and versions is very conflicting and indecisive, the numbers and authority of those which omit and those which retain it being nearly balanced. Griesbach retains it in his text, but marks it as doubtful. Under these circumstances, the conclusion of Michaelis, who is favourable to the genuineness of the passage, seems, as it is certainly the most gratifying, so also the most probable ; inasmuch as it is obviously extremely difficult to assign any probable

cause or motive, which could have led any transcriber to insert this narrative (extensive as it is) into the Gospel of St. John, unless he had found it in his copy ; whereas, on the other hand, it is easy enough to conceive why it may have been omitted by narrow-minded and timid persons, from a most weak and unfounded apprehension lest the leniency of the Saviour to the unhappy criminal should be misconstrued, as affording any encouragement to her crime. This cause has indeed actually been assigned as having led to the omission by Augustine, who lived in the fourth century.

Having thus examined three of the most doubtful texts, which we have seen to be unconnected with doctrine, three others remain which have indeed such a connexion, having been much discussed in the Trinitarian controversy. But before I introduce them I would remark, that those who most firmly hold the doctrines of our Church are by no means inclined to consider them as at all materially resting on these passages ; and that our leading and most distinguished critical authorities, such as a Marsh and a Blomfield, have been the first to evince that the doctrinal opinions which they most conscientiously embraced, did not in any manner operate so as to warp the fairness of their judgment, or interfere with the just freedom of critical inquiry. I am also happy to cite on all these points the observations of one, whom I have before more than once referred to as the ablest supporter of what we believe to be orthodox opinions in the present day, Dr. Pye Smith. His conclusions entirely agree with those which I should myself have drawn, but are supported by a

depth of scholarship far superior to anything which I could myself pretend to bring to the task.

The first of these texts is Acts xx. 28, which in the received text is read thus : “ to feed the Church of God, which he had purchased with his own blood ;” which might of course be cited as ascribing the title of Deity to the crucified Redeemer. But the question is, whether the above reading (which may be distinguished as No. 1,) “ the Church of God,” be genuine, as different MSS. exhibit several variations, viz. : 2. some read “ the Church of Christ ;” 3. others, “ of the Lord ;” 4. others combining this with the first noticed, “ of the Lord God,” and “ of the God and Lord,” and “ of the Lord and God.” Now Dr. Smith, after a most careful examination of the evidence in favour of each of these readings, candidly states that the preponderance of evidence appears to be in favour of the reading (3) “ the Church of the Lord ;” that (2) “ the Church of Christ,” was probably a designed explication ; that (1) “ the Church of God,” might have arisen from the involuntary association in the mind of a transcriber with this phrase, which occurs several times in the New Testament. (4) The readings which combine the two terms would be produced by copyists wishing to unite the readings of different MSS. before them,—a process which, though sadly uncritical, was by no means unexampled. At the same time Dr. Smith strongly argues, that the term “ Lord” is scripturally attributed to Christ in a very exalted sense, and is strictly equivalent to the terms “ Jehovah” and “ Adonai” of the Old Testament. But this is a point clearly belonging to the subject of

Interpretation, when discussing which we may perhaps return to it.

The second various reading which has derived importance from doctrinal controversy, is 1 Tim. iii. 16. "Without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness," or, as it would be more exactly rendered, "of piety:" "God was manifested in the flesh," &c. which in this form obviously asserts the divinity of the Incarnate Saviour. But it is disputed whether the true reading be, "God was manifested," or "who was manifested,"  $\Theta\bar{C}$  or  $OC$   $\epsilon\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\omega\theta\eta$ ; the difference in the original characters amounting only to a slight dash in the centre of one letter, and being so exceedingly minute that the best critics have disputed, after careful examination, what was the reading of the very same individual MS.: some contending that the dash alluded to was clearly a part of the original character; others, that the appearance of it arose only from part of a letter on the other side of the parchment being seen through, on account of its transparency. The evidence of the versions is decidedly in favour of reading "who," two versions alone, and neither of them early, viz. the Arabic and Slavonic, (as given in the Polyglott) reading "God." Out of the Fathers, Dr. Burton has quoted some seeming allusions to this text: but, as he fairly allows, a single quotation from Dionysius of Alexandria, (who flourished in the middle of the third century,) is the only one in which we can say with certainty that the words of St. Paul are expressly quoted; but in him we find the very phrase  $\Theta\epsilon\delta\varsigma\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \epsilon\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\omega\theta\eta\ \epsilon\nu\ \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}$ . Griesbach,

who further remarks on the greater probability of supposing the variations to have been derived from  $\delta\varsigma$  as the original, than the converse<sup>1</sup>, has placed  $\delta\varsigma$ , according to his general view of the evidence, in his text; and Dr. Smith also considers it as the safer reading. I will only remark on the text, that, while I am perfectly willing to embrace this reading, I cannot allow that it materially affects the sense: for the relative “who” requires an antecedent, and the only antecedent to which the context will permit us to refer it, is “the living God” in the preceding verse. Whether therefore the expression amount to “God was manifested in the flesh,” or “the living God who was manifested in the flesh,” the assertion is identical. Nor would the inference be materially affected, even if, with the Unitarian version, we should construe the relative “he who,” making it involve its own antecedent, a construction which,

<sup>1</sup> The various readings are  $\overline{\Theta\varsigma}$ ,  $\text{OC}$ , and  $\text{O}$ , the last giving the relative in the neuter, so as to agree with the substantive of the immediately preceding clause,  $\mu\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ . Now it would be easy to derive all these from  $\text{OC}$ ; for, first, a transcriber, who from the general force of the context, as stated in the conclusion of our present observations on the passage, might have been accustomed to refer the passage to the divinity of Christ, might easily have confounded  $\overline{\Theta\varsigma}$  for  $\text{OC}$ . And secondly, a transcriber, reading  $\text{OC}$  as a relative, might easily have been led (as a supposed correction,) to change the gender, so as to agree with the nearest antecedent  $\mu\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$ ; but *e contra*, it is not probable that a transcriber would presume to alter a clear  $\overline{\Theta\varsigma}$  to  $\text{OC}$ ; and still less so that he would have changed the neuter relative, so readily referred to a proximate antecedent, into the masculine, which, being far separated from any antecedent with which it can agree, gives an apparent harshness to the passage.

when the relative is used definitively as in the text, is, I am persuaded, entirely at variance with the genius and universal use of the Greek language<sup>1</sup>. But even were such a construction allowable, it does not appear to me that the text could be, after all, bent into consistency with their hypothesis of the mere humanity of Christ:—for to say of a being that he was manifested in the flesh, clearly implies that he had a previous and invisible existence. Would it not be absurd, for instance, to say of Moses, or any other mere man, that he was manifested in the flesh?

The last various reading to be noticed includes the

<sup>1</sup> On this subject I would refer to Dr. Smith: “When the relative  $\delta\varsigma$  stands independently, or by ellipsis of any antecedent, it appears to me, in all the cases that I have been able to discover, never to signify what the exigency of this passage requires, in order to dispense with an expressed antecedent; namely, *he who*; but always to denote a generalized indefinite *he*, *whosoever he may be*, *who*. In such cases also there is an enclitic  $\gamma\epsilon$  or  $\kappa\epsilon$ , or some other particle such as  $\alpha\nu$ ,  $\gamma\alpha\rho$ ,  $\delta\eta$ ,  $\mu\grave{\epsilon}\nu$ , or  $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ . After considerable pains spent in the search, both heretofore and lately, I have not succeeded in discovering a single instance that will justify the rendering of our passage, ‘He who was manifested in the flesh, was justified by the Spirit.’ (Impr. Vers.) Archbishop Newcome has adduced Mark iv. 25, Luke viii. 18, and Rom. viii. 32, as parallel; but the two first fail at first sight, as beyond all doubt the pronoun there is the general indefinite *whosoever*.” [In Romans viii. 32, Dr. Smith considers  $\theta\sigma\gamma\epsilon$  as a relative of an emphatic force, referring to  $\delta\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$  in the preceding verse as its antecedent.] “In the Iliad,  $\Phi$ . 103, we find  $\delta\varsigma$  used simply for *he*; but not to say that the extreme difference in the kind of language and style would prevent our transferring a pure and rare Homeric idiom to the Greek of the New Testament, the signification yielded is quite alien.”—Pye Smith on the Messiah, vol. iii. p. 355, note.

celebrated controverted text, 1 John v. 7: "For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one." The question is, whether this text be genuine, or a spurious interpolation. Now as to the critical evidence, this text is absent in every extant Greek MS., with one single exception,—that preserved in Trinity College, Dublin, which at the most cannot be earlier than the thirteenth century, and more probably is dated in the sixteenth, (but this is immaterial, as we know that the disputed verse had crept into the Latin Vulgate before the first of these dates.) It is equally and universally absent from the ancient versions; nor is it found in any copy of the Latin earlier than the ninth century. With reference to quotations in the Fathers, Tertullian has been supposed to cite the text, where he says, "The connexion of the Father, Son, and Paraclete, makes these three conjoint persons, which three are one substance, not one person, '*unum non unus*;' just as it is said, 'I and my Father are one substance, *unum*.'" Now it seems perfectly clear, that Tertullian is here explaining his own views of the Trinitarian doctrine, and illustrating them by a reference to the Gospel of St. John, and by no means to the Epistle; for if he had referred to the latter, he surely would have quoted it directly, or at least have employed the title 'Word' rather than 'the Son,' to designate the second person. In the middle of the third century, however, we find in the writings of Cyprian a citation which is much more plausibly referred to the disputed verse. This Father says, "Again, it is written of the Father, the Son, and



the Holy Spirit,—these three are one.” With regard to this apparent citation, however, it must be observed, that we know that some of the Latin Fathers<sup>1</sup>, within a century of this time imagined, the following verse of St. John, “*There are three that bear witness, the Water, the Blood, and the Spirit, and these three are one,*” or “*agree in one,*” (for the readings vary) to have a mystical sense, interpreting them of the Trinity, and supposing the Water to represent the Father, the Blood the Son, and the Spirit the Holy Ghost. Hence it is by no means clear that Cyprian actually quotes the seventh verse; he may very probably have alluded rather to this mystical interpretation of the eighth. Facundus indeed, who wrote in the sixth century, citing this very passage from Cyprian, positively represents him as having done so, since he refers it to the eighth, and not to the seventh verse.

It seems probable that from this source the clause first became introduced into the text: the mystical interpretation of verse 8. may have been first written as a marginal note in the copies, which some subsequent transcriber mistaking for a portion of the text, inserted, as he supposed, in its proper place. It seems probable that this was first done towards the close of the fifth century, and in the African province; for, as we have already observed, we here find the mystical interpretation of verse 8. first prevailing,—for Cyprian was Bishop of Carthage; and Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspa, early in the sixth century, certainly does appear to quote the text as

<sup>1</sup> Especially those of the African province, *e. g.* Augustine.

extant in his copies. Victor Vitensis also, a contemporary writer, in his narrative of the persecution of the orthodox African Church, in the year 480, by the Vandalic invaders who had embraced Arianism, states that the former drew up a confession of their faith, in which they expressly appealed to this verse. His whole narrative has been stigmatized for some revolting improbabilities which it contains; but as to our present point, it implies no more than the citation by Fulgentius, which appears undoubted. This, however, warrants no further conclusion, than that the interpolation was anterior to the sixth century.

On the whole, the critical evidence appears decidedly unfavourable to the genuineness of the verse; but it was probably interpolated by an innocent mistake, and not from any intentional fraud. Nothing, however, can be so injurious to a good cause, as the calling of fallacious allies to its support. The most learned divines of our Church in the present day have justly felt this: prelates like Marsh, and Blomfield, and Dr. Turton, the Cambridge Regius Professor of Divinity, have evinced that the leaders of our cause are far above the weakness of permitting any partial prepossessions to pervert the legitimate deductions of an honest criticism; and thus surely they have merited and must obtain a far higher degree of unsuspecting confidence, as authorities in behalf of the opinions of which they are the firmest advocates.

As to the particular text in question, even if we could have relied on its genuineness, it may be justly said, that it would have added very little to the stores which we possess without it; for it in effect scarcely advances a single point beyond the

undisputed texts in the Gospel of St. John, in which Christ declares that the Father beareth him witness, and the Spirit proceeding from the Father, testifieth of him, and that he and the Father are one; for in these we have the witness of the Father and the Spirit to the Son asserted, and the unity of the Father and the Son. Now, whatever explanations may be offered as to these expressions in the one instance, might clearly have been offered equally in the other; so that our argument would probably not have been materially advantaged, had we been advisedly able to retain the controverted passage in the Epistle: still less can the integrity and candour, which, holding impartially the balance of evidence, frankly acknowledges that the scale seems to incline against the reception of the passage, be construed as injuring the cause which we sincerely embrace as the cause of truth, and as such press closely to our hearts.

We cannot, I think, reflect on the minuteness of examination to which the whole body of our Scriptures has thus been subjected, without feeling that nothing but the intrinsic force of truth could have enabled them to sustain such an examination, and being ready to exclaim, with a proportional increase of confidence, "Lord, thy word is tried to the uttermost, and thy servant loveth it."

## LECTURE II.

*On the Means and Rules of Scriptural Interpretation,  
or Hermeneutics.*

HAVING by the application of a just criticism ascertained the genuine text of the Christian Scriptures, the next step in our progress must be to elicit the true meaning of that text by sound rules of interpretation. Hence a branch of theological study has arisen, to which those who have most fully cultivated it, have given the name of Hermeneutics. It may be said, indeed, that the principles of interpretation being for the most part obvious to common sense, it is but a waste of time to arrange them into a formal system; but in just the same manner it may be said, that the principles of right reasoning are obvious to common sense, and that therefore every logical system must be superfluous. But as it is the object of a sound logic, by the application of established principles to any given argument, to facilitate the detection of the fallacies which might otherwise lurk concealed in it, so may the use of approved hermeneutical canons be of the like importance in bringing to a ready test any proposed interpretation.

When we consider, also, the form under which the Scriptures have descended to us, we shall perceive many reasons which render the investigation

of this subject more essential. Those Scriptures are preserved in languages which have long ceased to be the living vehicles of oral communication, excepting indeed that they are actually represented by still vernacular dialects remotely descended from them. With regard to the earlier division of the sacred volume, the obscurities arising from this cause are greatly increased, as the Scriptures of the Old Testament are themselves the only extant monument of the particular language in which they are written; so that we are thus deprived of that most fertile and illustrative source of elucidation, the extended comparison of various authors, whereby we may probably find the particular expressions, which may on their first occurrence embarrass us in ascertaining their exact force, repeated in connexion with such various contexts as will readily fix their precise meaning. In the New Testament also, although the general language is copiously illustrated by the rich store of Greek classics, still we must remember that a variety of that language is employed, which may almost be termed a distinct dialect, and which is strongly tinged with Oriental idioms. Hence philological inquiries will form an important subject of examination at the very commencement of any complete system of interpretation.

Every science, moreover, employs many terms borrowed from common language in a secondary, or, as it is called, technical sense, restricted to some particular meaning required by the purposes of that science. Theology especially—dealing as it does in the most abstracted notions, and those most remote from the ideas of sense, and yet having to express

these abstracted ideas by the medium of language, the great source of which is derived from sensible objects,—must necessarily employ very many terms in a secondary, translated, and restricted sense; the investigation of which will form a most essential division of hermeneutics, and may be called *Theological Interpretation*.

Every language will also often have its conventional use materially affected by the varying manners of the age, national customs, and habits of thinking, prevailing at particular times. Figures will often hence arise, which require an historical knowledge of these circumstances for their illustration;—the branch devoted to these inquiries is termed *Historical Interpretation*.

From the poverty of language its expressions must often be equivocally applied to different objects. When from this or any other cause ambiguity results, it may be elucidated by the relations which those expressions bear to the context, by comparing the different possible senses with the general tenour of the same writings, with the circumstances under which they were used, &c. This may be termed *Comparative Interpretation*.

These divisions will, I think, include the most material topics which can be brought to bear on the elucidation of the proper or primary sense of any passage: but many portions of Scripture have besides this a remoter application, a secondary or figurative sense. This is at once palpable in the case of parables. Here our former inquiries could of course only enable us to ascertain the literal sense of each clause of the supposed narrative: the moral appli-

cation of that narrative must demand a separate consideration. But besides the parables, the Scriptures themselves represent many other parts of their contents as having a typical meaning. Hence the investigation of this secondary sense must form the concluding branch of hermeneutics.

Nor let it for a moment be supposed, that the spirit of these exact, and even minute, critical inquiries is in any manner inconsistent with the most genuine feelings of piety, or with the most profound and reverential regard for the sacred oracles thus explored. Our examination assuredly should never be pursued in a dry, hard, and presumptuous spirit,—never indeed in any other spirit than that of veneration and prayer. But if it be our duty, in embracing the doctrines proposed to us, to examine the Scriptures, whether these things be so or not, it must be, by a clear consequence, our duty to neglect no means of ascertaining the genuine testimony of those Scriptures. That testimony indeed, in all essential points, we hold to be unequivocal and clear, and intelligible to all men, wheresoever the perversity of the human will doth not oppose itself to the teaching of the Spirit of God. But yet it can never be unprofitable to demonstrate the validity of the processes by which we arrive at these fundamental truths. And while we have indeed every confidence that these are deeply and visibly stamped on the sacred record in characters to be overlooked or misrepresented only by carelessness or presumption; still that in many minor points a partial, though not impenetrable, veil of obscurity hangs over that record,—that it still contains *δυσερμήνευτά τινα*, its own in-



spired authority forbids us to doubt; as an homily of our own Church excellently remarks: "The Scripture is full as well of low valleys, plain ways, and easy for every man to use and to walk in, as also of high hills and mountains, which few can climb unto." That in this case, indeed, we have an higher power than that of any unassisted intellectual exertions of our own to look up to, is a most important and encouraging truth. But we must remember that the ordinary operation of this power is not to supersede, but to render effectual, by assisting, the proper and diligent application of the appropriate means placed within our reach. We accordingly see that characters the most eminent for piety have also been distinguished, as having set an example to the Church in the laborious prosecution of such inquiries. When at the same period religion and learning threw aside the darkness that had so long involved them, the first reformers were also the first (after a dreary interval, the first perhaps even from the age of Jerome) to revive a sober and well-directed school of Scriptural interpretation. It was the axiom of that most amiable and truly Christian scholar Melancthon, that the Scriptures could not possibly be *theologically* understood, until their *grammatical* sense were first correctly ascertained. Luther expressed similar opinions, with his usual energy; and the judgment of his fellow-labourer in the great cause, Calvin, is sufficiently exemplified in his elaborate volumes of Commentaries upon many portions of Scripture: "Commentaries," as it has most justly been observed, "which (though in the exercise of our Christian liberty we may freely question and dissent from many

points, both of doctrine and discipline, maintained by their illustrious author), are yet never to be perused without admiration and instruction, or mentioned without respect and gratitude<sup>1</sup>."

I. PHILOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION, as derived from the study of the original languages, first claims our attention: nor can its importance be lightly appreciated by any, excepting those who are wholly uninformed, and incompetent to pronounce any judgment on such a subject. For, although each of the Versions in most extensive use,—whether we take the Vulgate of the Roman Church, the Lutheran of the Germans, or the Received Translation of our own Church,—are, it may be very justly said, so far faithful transcripts of the original, that in all essential points they are capable of sufficiently instructing those whose means of information is limited to their use, and little likely to lead them into any important error. Still it necessarily results from the consideration of the general laws of human thought and human language, that not only all actual translations, but even any possible translation, must be marked with much of minor imperfection, and must fail in many points (though only in such perhaps as are of peculiar delicacy and nicety,) to exhibit fully and adequately the entire full and exact colouring of the original. The habits of thinking of each individual nation are materially affected and tintured by the variety of their social institutions and circumstances; and language, the vehicle of human thought, derives an impression corresponding to these mental

<sup>1</sup> Bampton Lectures, 1824.

diversities. Hence each language derives its peculiar character and genius ; and the full and precise force of its peculiar expressions must often be quite untranslatable into any other tongue, since no other can present exactly identical modifications in the intellectual processes which have formed it. How often, in Greek especially, which has been well termed the most perfect vehicle of human thought, do we experience this difficulty in exactly rendering all the nice shades of meaning which its expressions convey?—How ill for instance, will an exact translation, word for word, of a speech in Thucydides represent the force and terse energy of the original<sup>1</sup>!

It is obvious then, that the study of the original languages must, to every one who is desirous of appreciating the exact bearing and full force of any writings, be of the most serious importance. One of the Biblical languages is indeed generally cultivated in this, as in every other institution for superior education ; and I cannot but greatly regret the prevalent neglect of that, in which the earlier Scriptures are conveyed. The difficulty of the acquisition is, I apprehend, very generally overrated, and often probably operates as an obstacle to its introduction into

<sup>1</sup> I will give but one illustration from this author: *Σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες τ'ἀγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο· καὶ ταῖς ζυμφοραῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐξυνητώτερον ἂν προσφέροιντο.*—“Such parties as prudentially endeavour to establish on the most secure foundations the advantages of fortune against the reverses to which they are so liable, these also are able to endure seasons of misfortune with the readiest counsel.”—B. P. iv. 18. I have obviously paraphrased rather than translated the passage ; but how otherwise to render its meaning, a far abler scholar than myself might be embarrassed.

plans of education ; whereas from the great simplicity of the grammatical system of this class of oriental languages, its acquirement is most remarkably easy<sup>1</sup>. This simplicity will at once be understood, when I state that the nouns are destitute of casual inflections, and that the essential elements of the verbal system are restricted to two tenses, unaffected by moods, and subject only to a slight modification (explained and applied in an instant,) for the passive, reflective, and causative forms. The younger members of our collegiate class will at once perceive what a contrast this presents to the endless and fearfully intricate maze of a Greek verb. I speak from experience when I assert, that it is both possible and easy to impart in a single week as much knowledge of Hebrew, as will enable any diligent student to pursue its cultivation for himself with facility and satisfaction. To obtain, indeed, a profoundly critical scholarship in it must obviously be a more laborious task ; but to gain such an insight into the subject, as may enable the student to follow and appreciate the critical investigations of others, is, I repeat, easy. And when we consider that, besides the paramount interest of Hebrew to the Biblical student, it is also the key to a large class of oriental languages, especially to the Arabic,—practically perhaps the most important of all those

<sup>1</sup> With a view to facilitate to the present class the acquisition of these oriental dialects, I have appended to this lecture a comparative view of their grammatical elements ; so drawn up as, I trust, may place in a more obvious light their general analogies, and thus materially assist the introductory researches of the student.

languages,—I am trully surprised that its cultivation is not far more general.

I have already observed, that the obscurity of the Hebrew language is much increased by the paucity of its remains, these being confined to the single Biblical volume. We are therefore deprived of the illustrations to be derived from the comparison of various writings, which, by presenting the expressions, for the exact interpretation of which we are in search, under many different relations of context, explain and limit its application and meaning. The number of *ἅπαξ λεγόμενα*, well known to present the chief difficulties in dead languages, is thus greatly increased; and we must often have recourse to cognate dialects, such as the Arabic<sup>1</sup>, which being still spoken, affords that unrivalled source of illustration which only a living tongue can yield, and also presents a copious store of literary monuments. The ancient Versions, such as the Greek Septuagint, formed while the common usage of the Hebrew was yet recent, and before the derivative dialects had yet had time to undergo very material changes,—the Syrian or Western Aramean Version, written in one of those dialects in the first century,—the paraphrastic interpretations of the earlier Targums, written in the Eastern Aramean (*vulgo* Chaldee) dialect, &c.—will have the same weight, as to all questions

<sup>1</sup> Pocock has very strongly expressed his sense of the importance of the Arabic language. “Ego vero, si quid censeam, Theologo adeo utilem existimo [LINGUAM ARABICAM], ut si Textum Hebraicum aliquando penitius excutere necessarium ducat, eâ sine manifesto veritatis præjudicio, ne dicam dispendio, carere non possit.”—Pocock, Not. Miscell.

of interpretation, which we have before assigned them in settling the genuine text.

The Rabbinical commentators, since the dates of their writings range only from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, must be of comparatively small value.

But the knowledge of these oriental dialects is not important only to the interpretation of the Scriptures of the Old Testament; the Greek of the New Testament, being a provincial dialect materially affected by the vernacular orientalisms, likewise derives important illustrations from the same source. The inhabitants of Judæa, after their return from their captivity in countries in which the Eastern Aramaic (or Chaldæan, as it is commonly but inaccurately termed,) was commonly spoken, dropped their own previous Hebrew dialect, and adopted that of the people among whom they had sojourned; which, however, they corrupted by intermingling it with the Western Aramaic or Syrian, and more sparingly with the ancient Hebrew. This composite dialect formed the ordinary language of our Saviour and his Apostles, and has greatly tintured the writings of the latter. This oriental character, which prevails throughout the New Testament, has been illustrated by many eminent scholars.—I quote the following examples from one of these, an academic friend of my own, our late Hebrew Professor of Oxford, who would have yielded to few of the number, had not death arrested his career in early youth.

“Examples,” says this writer<sup>1</sup>, “are obvious;

<sup>1</sup> Nicholl's Sermons, p. 166, 167.

such as *σπλαγχνίζεσθαι*, to have mercy, whence the expression *bowels of mercies*; *ἐνωτίζεσθαι*, to hear; *ἀναθεματίζειν*, to declare one devoted to the severest punishments of God; which are so many expressions which derive their signification exclusively from the Hebrew, and are only Greek in form. Again, as examples of those expressions which have received some peculiar signification from the Hebrew, Chaldee, or Syriac, may be mentioned *δύναμις*, as a miracle; *δικαιοσύνη*, as almsgiving; *θυγάτηρ*, a daughter, (implying the inhabitants of a place in general); *ὀφείλημα*, for sin; *υἱός*, a son, (for that which is connected with, or belongs to, any person or thing); *κρίσις*, for true doctrine; *πορνεία*, for idolatry; *δέχεσθαι*, to hear; *ἀποκρίνεσθαι*, to commence speaking; *κοιμᾶσθαι*, to be dead; *τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν*, to lay down one's life: *ζητεῖν ψυχὴν*, to lay snares for one's life; *πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν*, to respect the external condition (and many other uses of the word *πρόσωπον*); *μισεῖν*, to hate, in the sense of loving less than something else. Further, if we examine the grammatical construction of phrases, and all the minuter circumstances of connexion in sentences, we shall find a still greater confirmation of the existence of this principle in the New Testament: and a person who has attentively considered the peculiarities of that kind in those languages, will constantly feel and recognise many, I might say most, of them, in the course of reading it, without any extraordinary degree of attention. Examples are; the manner of expressing negation, *οὐκ ἀδυνατήσει παρὰ Θεῷ πᾶν ῥῆμα*, with God nothing shall be impossible; and, *πᾶς τεχνίτης πίστεως τέχνης οὐ μὴ εὗρεθῇ ἐν σοὶ ἔτι*, no



craftsman of any craft shall be found any more in thee : the periphrasis of the nominative by εἰς, as, καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσι, and the three are one : the change of gender, where the thing signified is considered rather than that expressed ; as, τὰ ἔθνη ἐν σαρκί, οἱ λεγόμενοι ἀκροβυστία, Gentiles in the flesh, who are called the uncircumcision : the use of pronouns, when added to a genitive depending on the preceding word ; as, τὰ ῥήματα τῆς ζωῆς ταύτης, which is translated, *'the words of this life,'* but which signifies, agreeably to the Hebrew construction, *these words of life, these life-giving words ;* λόγος τῆς ὑπομονῆς μου, translated, *'the word of my patience,'* meaning, *my precept of constancy :* the mode of expressing the superlative ; as, εὐλογημένη ἐν γυναιξίν, most blessed of women : the mode of expressing a strong asseveration ; as, εἰ δοθήσεται σημεῖον, there shall not be given a sign : of expressing an accusative by the intervention of a preposition ; as, ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐξελέξατο διὰ τοῦ στόματός μου ἀκοῦσαι τὰ ἔθνη τὸν λόγον τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου, which is translated, God made choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the Gospel ; but which would be better rendered, God hath made choice of us (*i. e.* me), that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of God. Moreover, the same person cannot fail to recognise in the New, a considerable resemblance to that which prevails in the Old Testament, and in oriental writings in general, to a certain extent, in the general character of its composition ; which, without any artificial involution of sentences in one another, is remarkable chiefly for the connection of the several ideas by a

certain parallelism of the significations or the words, and the juxta-position of synonymous or antithetical sentences, and in which the individual members of the sentences, either succeed one another without any conjunction, or by means of the most simple ones; and the sentences themselves are made to depend upon one another by the simplest particles of connection or transition, without the aid of many of those words of relation or expletives, which are so frequent in other languages:—a circumstance calculated to make him observe the mutual dependence of the different parts, and feel better the scope of a whole narrative or discourse; and in some cases, if he uses due judgment and caution, will enable him to correct or to verify the interpretation of individual words <sup>1</sup>.”

<sup>1</sup> It may be useful to append to the above quotation from Nicholl's Sermons the following comparative list of the original oriental forms of the idioms referred to. Σπλαγχνίζομαι, derived from the Hebrew idiom of using רַחֲמִים, literally bowels, to signify mercy.—'Ενωπίζομαι, a translation of the Hebrew חֲזַוִּין, derived from אָן, an ear.—'Αναθεματίζω, from the Hebrew הַחֲרִים.—Δύναμις, used to signify a miracle, in imitation of the Hebrew גְּבוּרָה.—Δικαιοσύνη, for almsgiving, from Hebrew צֶדֶקָה.—Θυγάτηρ, for the inhabitants of a place in general, from the Hebrew use of בֵּת.—'Οφείλημα, for sin, as the Hebrews used חֹב, the Chaldeans חֻבָּא, and the Syrians ܠܡܢܐ.—Υἱός, for all that is connected with anything, as the Hebrew בֶּן.—Κρίσις, for true doctrine, as Hebrew מִשְׁפָּט.—Πορνεία, for idolatry, as the Hebrew פְּהַל.—Δέχεσθαι, to hear as לָקַח.—'Αποκρίνομαι, to commence speaking, as עָנָה.—Κοιμᾶσθαι, to be dead, as שָׁנַב; also used in this sense by Sophocles. See El. 510.—Τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν, to lay down life: this idiom is not peculiar to the Hebrew, as *animam ponere* is used in the same sense by Cicero, IX. fam. 24. s. ii.; by

The older Syrian Version, rendered into a kindred dialect as early as the Apostolic age, will afford material assistance in illustrating the orientalisms of the New Testament.

The Septuagint Version of the Old Testament also, —being written in an Hebrew-Greek, or, as it is generally called, Hellenistic dialect, closely resembling that of the New,—is of the greatest use in illustrating all its idiomatic peculiarities.

Generally also the labour of interpretation will derive material benefit from the various early Versions.

Nor are the quotations in the Fathers, especially those of the four first centuries, to be neglected. These are often accompanied by so much of explanatory matter, that it is easy to extract them in the form of regular scholia. Chrysostom is peculiarly rich in such expositions; and they have been, as far as relates to the Gospels and Pauline Epistles, collected as scholia by Theophylact, Euthynicus, and Theodoret<sup>1</sup>.

Ovid, II. Eleg. 10, 43; by Propertius, lib. i. Eleg. 13. v. 15; and by several other Roman authors.—*Ζητεῖν ψυχὴν*, to lay snares for another's life, from the Hebrew *בָּקַשׁ אֶת נַפְשׁוֹ פְּלוֹנִי*. —*Πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν*, to respect the external condition, from *נִשָּׂא פָנִים*. —*Μισεῖν*, in the sense of loving less than something else, as the Hebrew *שָׂנֵא*.

<sup>1</sup> In the middle ages many writers compiled a sort of perpetual commentaries to individual books of Scripture, extracted from the Homilies, &c. of the principal Fathers. Such was the origin of the 'Catenæ Patrum,' well known to all Biblical scholars. Some also embodied in their *γλῶσσαι* terms and phrases at the time rapidly becoming obsolete. See Mori *Hermeneutica*, p. 112.

II. THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION.—Of the technical or secondary use of words as applied to theology, we have numerous examples ; such as χάρις, grace ; κλησεις, calling ; ἐκλογή, election ; ἀνακαίνωσις, renovation ἀναγέννησις, regeneration ; ἁγιοσύνη, sanctification ; δίκαιος and its derivatives, as applied to justification ; σωτηρία, salvation ; λύτρωσις, redemption ; πνεῦμα and its derivatives, as applied to spirituality, &c. ; σὰρξ, in the sense of carnality ; φῶς and σκότος, for moral illumination and obscurity ; κόσμος, in an unfavourable acceptance, for the wickedness of the world ; ἔργα, for outward and formal works of righteousness ; πίστις, as restricted to religious faith ; εὐαγγέλιον, the good tidings, or gospel ; λειτουργία, divine service ; and many other words. In these cases, as the secondary and technical sense of the expressions is always greatly modified from their ordinary acceptance, and often only figuratively borrowed from it, we cannot fix their exact force by the common philological methods ; but must learn it from the illustrations and explanations afforded by the general tenour of the various Scriptural passages in which they occur ; thus comparing, as it were, spiritual things with spiritual, and adhering to what is generally termed the analogy of faith. To this class we may also refer the language used in speaking of the Deity and his affections, in which we can never consider the terms as applied strictly and properly, but according to that distant analogy, which sensible objects and human ideas can alone afford us of Him who is invisible and incomprehensible. We may instance such passages as his having “breathed into the nostrils of Adam the

breath of life," " Christ sitting on the right hand of the Father," &c.

III. The HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION comprises the explanations and illustrations, of the expressions of particular passages of Scripture, which may be derived from considering the historical circumstances of the times in which the authors wrote,—the manners, feelings, customs, ceremonies, &c. prevailing around them, and the like particulars of a local and temporary character. Thus we may illustrate the epithet which St. Paul applies to the Athenians, *δαισινδαίμονέστεροι*, and the characteristic description of them by the historian of that Apostle's journeys, that they spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing, from all that we historically know concerning the mental and moral character of that extraordinary people. Their altar to the Unknown God, and their conduct in leading St. Paul into the Areopagus, admit of similar illustration. And the same observation applies to the narrative of the circumstances which occurred at Ephesus, and the zeal of the city, *νεωκόρος οὖσα τῆς μεγάλης Θεᾶς καὶ τοῦ Διοπετοῦς*, and the interested clamour of the artists of silver shrines:—the particulars of the tumult raised through the instigation of the Asian Jews, when Paul had presented himself accompanied by some others under a vow, for purification in the temple at Jerusalem; when they represented that he had polluted the temple by the introduction of Greeks;—the intervention of the Roman garrison of the neighbouring fortress; and the circumstance of his being carried off by the stairs, *ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναβαθμοὺς*,—must all

be imperfectly understood, unless we are historically informed of the nature of these vows and purification; of the jealous feelings of the Jews with regard to their temple; of the relative position of the castle Antonia and the porticos of the temple, and of the fact mentioned by Josephus, that the Roman garrison which lodged in that fortress was in the habit of keeping guard in the porticos of the temple, which surrounded the courts of the Gentiles, to prevent disorders. We may notice, in like manner, the practice which the tribune proposes to employ, of putting the question by the scourge; the right of exemption which Paul pleads, as having inherited the freedom of Rome; either because his city Tarsus was a *municipium*, *jure civitatis donatum*; or, if this be considered improbable, because some of his ancestors had, (as Josephus informs us was the case with several Jews,) been rewarded with that freedom for military service;—the observation of the tribune, that he had purchased this privilege, known at the time to have been venal;—St. Paul's appeal as a Roman citizen unto Cæsar, and its consequences. Again, after he had been on this account transferred to Rome, he was, as we read, committed to custody under a soldier. Now we learn, as Dr. Lardner has fully shown, that whenever this peculiar mode of confinement was adopted, the prisoner was bound to the soldier by a single chain: and accordingly we find that St. Paul, in his address to the Jews, whom he then assembled in his prison, and in his Epistle to the Ephesians purporting to have been written at the same time, alludes to his confinement under the term *ἄλυσις*, a chain, in the singular, which is in such a

case alone appropriate; whereas in other instances we always find *bonds* (in the plural) employed. Paley has strongly urged the evidence of authenticity drawn from this undesigned coincidence. But it is clear in this, as in many other instances, that the force of the argument cannot be well appreciated without the aid of historical interpretation.

The terms also which so often occur, describing the sects, ranks, offices, &c. among the Jews or Romans, must be explained from this source. Hence also the peculiar use of many words: ὁ νόμος, for the Levitical law; ἡ γῆ and ἡ οἰκουμένη, in a restricted sense, as applied to Palestine; τὰ ἔθνη, all nations excepting the Jews, &c. In the Epistle to the Hebrews more especially the allusions to the sabbatical rest of the promised land, to the priesthood of the Messiah, and to the sacrificial types, require perpetual elucidation from an historical knowledge of the religious antiquities of the people to whom that Epistle is inscribed.

IV. Lastly, We arrive at the mode of elucidating any ambiguous expression or passage by comparison, or COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION. Now this comparison may be either with the immediate context, or with the circumstances to which it relates,—with the general scope of the writer,—and with the analogy of Scripture and faith; and thus the obscurity may often be satisfactorily removed.

We have an instance of the explanation afforded by the immediate context in 1 John ii. 16; where we read, “every thing that is in the world is not of the Father;” where if we took πᾶν τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ in the usual sense of all created things, it would



yield no consistent sense, but the context fully explains its acceptance in this passage, by subjoining the particulars it was intended to comprise, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life.

Comparison with the circumstances to which any expression relates, is strictly analogous to comparison with the context in which it stands. From such a comparison it is obvious, that in the phrase, "let the dead bury their dead," we must understand the dead to mean, not the physically, but the spiritually dead. When our Saviour enjoins a disciple, "Follow thou me," we may understand him as speaking literally; but when St. Paul says, "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am a follower of Christ," the expression has clearly a figurative sense.

The comparison of parallel passages will also often greatly assist the task of interpretation. Thus, in Gal. vi. 15, we read, that "neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." And again, in 1 Cor. vii. 19, "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God:" whence we may conclude, that the new creation spoken of in the first passage is identical with such a renewal of our moral nature as may sanctify us to future obedience. Thus also we read, 2 Cor. i. 21, that God hath anointed us; and what is meant by this divine unction we learn from 1 John ii. 20, where it is said that we "have an unction from the Holy One," that we may "know all things." And again, verse 27, that "this same anointing teacheth you of all things,

and is truth:" whence we perceive that spiritual illumination is indicated.

That parallelism of members which, being the great characteristic of Hebrew poetry, has materially affected even the prose style of writers whose minds were so strongly tinctured from this source, has also been beneficially applied to exegetical illustration: *e. g.*, in 1 Cor. iv. 5, we read, "God will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and he will make manifest the counsels of the hearts." Here, τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους in the first member of the parallel is sufficiently explained by τὰς βουλάς τῶν καρδιῶν in the second. And again, in 1 Cor. xv. 50, this parallelism occurs: "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." Now, here in the first clause we might perhaps suppose σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα to be used metaphorically for carnal passions, since it is perfectly true that these cannot inherit the kingdom of God; but the parallel member proves that it is to be understood physically of our corruptible body thus constituted, and implies that this body must undergo some mysterious change before it can be translated into the incorruptible kingdom of God.

Comparison with the general scope proposed by the writer must also throw much light on the separate passages intended to subserve this end. Thus, John has declared at the end of his Gospel, that his scope was to persuade those to whom it was addressed, that Jesus was the Messiah. We must, indeed, consider his ideas of the personal dignity of the Messiah as most exalted; and we may then

account for his dwelling so especially on the pre-existence, not only before Abraham, but before all created things, and on the divine character and glory of the creative λόγος—on his unity with the Father and the like.

Thus also in Romans iii. we find the conclusion of a long train of argument stated in these terms: “We infer, therefore, that man is justified by faith, without the works of the law;” and hence we perceive to what argument all the preceding particulars are to be referred.

Of course, the more extended the range of such a comparison is, the more satisfactorily must the conclusions at which we arrive appear to be established. If we find the doctrines which we embrace sanctioned by the general tenour of the whole body of the Scriptures, thus universally collated, that sanction is obviously the highest possible. From such a collation, arises what has been called the analogy of the Scriptures, or the analogy of faith.

The authority, indeed, of a far more limited examination even of the general and uniform tenour of any single inspired writing, must be admitted to be conclusive on any doctrinal question by all who attach any definite idea to the term inspiration. Now, to such a standard the Christians whose general doctrinal views harmonize with those of our Church, have always most readily and most confidently appealed. And I am persuaded, that even our opponents, if they could divest themselves of prejudice, would arrive at the same conclusions as to the obvious tenour of many of these writings. To illustrate this, I would suppose a case, which would

necessarily remove all prejudice, but could not affect the questions at issue in any other manner. I would suppose, then, that any of the Pauline Epistles—that to the Colossians, for instance—having been lost for ages, should be suddenly brought to light by the researches of some Maio among the Palimpsests of the Ambrosian library at Milan (the passage alone which recites Paul as the writer being effaced), so that it should be circulated for a time as an early Christian MS. of some unknown author. I will then suppose that the opinions of different sects were sought as to its doctrinal character and value. It cannot be doubted that all, holding the opinions which it is my place to advocate, would embrace it gladly, as worthy of all acceptance, and hail it as another early testimony to those doctrines. And I hope I do not speak uncharitably—I am sure I do not wish to speak uncandidly—when I frankly profess my full conviction, that those whose unhappy opposition to these doctrines I most deeply lament, would consistently reject it as, although early, yet produced subsequently to what they consider as corruptions of the simplicity of Christian faith; and clearly indicating the belief of the author in the divinity and atonement of Christ. It may be said, indeed, that all this is mere assertion. It may be so; but I would most earnestly wish any person of those views to read over that Epistle once only in this manner, endeavouring to divest himself of his knowledge of its author and authority, and candidly then to put to his own breast the question—what would be his conclusion as to the school to which the writer belonged? and whether he could himself

fully approve the document, and recommend its dissemination? I certainly speak these things far more in sorrow than with any other feeling; and although I thus certainly believe that those to whom I allude hold opinions entirely opposed to the authority of the very Scriptures to which they themselves appeal, yet I am very far from imputing to them any thing like an *intentional* perversion of that authority. The case seems rather to be this: They are deeply prejudiced in an opinion rashly assumed *à priori*—that certain doctrines are contradictory to reason, and cannot be true, and therefore cannot *really* be sanctioned by the Scriptures of truth; and that on these grounds, however forced and unnatural it may appear, that interpretation can alone be correct which explains away those doctrines<sup>1</sup>. With such views, it cannot be surprising, that the deeper is their respect for Scripture, the more earnest must be their endeavours to efface from it every apparent testimony of the kind. I can only regret again and again, that men, of many of whom I willingly say, "*Tales cum sint utinam nostri essent*," should pursue a path which appears to me so unsafe.

The branch of hermeneutics relating to comparative interpretation would be very incompletely treated, unless we adverted to the more difficult subject of the conciliation of apparent discrepancies—ἐναντιοφανῆ, as the exegetical critics term them. This being a question of detail, we can now only refer to any approved commentaries for that detail, or to the excellent compilation of Horne in his article on this

<sup>1</sup> e. g. Socinus.

subject, in his Introduction to the Critical Study of the Scripture ; and we must content ourselves, for the present, with a few illustrations of general principles.

When the apparent discrepancies relate to points of doctrine, we shall always find them to arise from our not paying sufficient attention to the exact force in which the expressions are intended to be taken, and to the precise limitations under which a due examination of the general tenour would show us that the propositions thus seemingly opposed should be justly interpreted. Thus, when St. Paul writes, that “by faith man is justified without the deeds of the law ;” and St. James, that “by works a man is justified, and not by faith only ;” we must understand St. Paul to speak of that true living faith—that vital and operative principle—the very source from which every good work emanates, and which includes them all ; and he accordingly pronounces this to be the only principle through which the saving influences of the Spirit can act upon the soul ;—whereas St. James clearly uses the expression ‘faith’ in the passage referred to, not in this extensive sense, but merely for what has been called an historical faith and simple persuasion, convincing the understanding of the truth, without affecting the heart or influencing the conduct, and which he justly describes to be as dead as a body without vital spirit.. We cannot for a moment suppose, either that Paul means to assert that such a dead faith can justify, or that James means to deny that a living and operative faith is the principle through which justification is applied to our souls. So that, when we rightly



weigh and interpret their expressions, their apparent variance is at once harmonized. In instituting such comparisons we may be guided in ascertaining the genuine sense by such rules as the following :—If a doctrine is incidentally alluded to in one passage, but fully illustrated as a leading topic in another, we should obviously derive our correct standard of the doctrine from its fuller exposition, and endeavour to make our interpretations of the casual notices accord with this. Where one passage is perfectly clear, but the other involved in any degree of obscurity, our explanations must be deduced from the former. And, lastly, we must be careful to make those explanations accord with the general analogy of the Scriptures.

Apparent discrepancies arise also from misapprehending the oriental idioms of the language. Thus, to one not aware that in these idioms ‘to hate’ is commonly used for ‘to love less than another,’ it might appear that the declaration, that “he is unworthy of Christ, who does not hate his father and mother,” was plainly repugnant to the first commandment with promise ; but we find it explained in the parallel passage in another evangelist in this sense, as simply implying that Christ is to be preferred. Thus also, “No man can serve two masters, for he will love the one and hate the other,” is only an idiomatic form of saying “he will prefer the one to the other.”

The discrepancies which occasionally appear in the historical parts of Scripture, may very generally admit a natural and easy explanation from the corruptions which have accidentally crept into the text:



The collation of the catalogues of David's thirty-seven warriors, preserved in 1 Chron. xi. and 2 Sam. xxiii., by that very learned and singularly acute critic, Kennicott, affords perhaps the most satisfactory specimen of an investigation of this kind which can be cited. It is scarcely possible to cast a single glance over the parallel lines of the original Hebrew text of the two passages, as there given, without at once perceiving that the variations have mostly arisen from accidental mistakes of transcription; and it is unnecessary to add, that many of the necessary corrections are confirmed by the readings preserved in different manuscripts, versions, &c.

Such discrepancies are, perhaps, most common in the statement of numbers; and when it is considered how easily one of the alphabetical characters employed in Hebrew and Greek MSS. for numeral figures might be mistaken for another, these may be easily accounted for, by supposing an incorrect reading to have crept in, in one of the seemingly opposed places: *e. g.* in Matthew and Mark we read that our Saviour "hung upon the Cross from the sixth to the ninth hour;" whereas John describes him as standing before the judgment-seat of Pilate about the former hour. Now it may indeed be said that John, who uses the indeterminate particle *ὥσπερ*, 'about,' does not profess to speak with strict accuracy. But it is, I think, gratifying to find from an early metrical paraphrase, of the fifth century,—which gives three, not six, as the hour mentioned by John, and in which we cannot suspect a false reading, as the laws of the metre require *τρίτην*, and will not admit *ἑκτὴν*,—that the former reading must,

at the time of the paraphrase, have existed in this place, which, from the similarity of the numeral signs 7 and 3, might readily have been corrupted in other prose MSS.: indeed in some MSS. the reading which we suppose to be correct is still found. Thus also when we find the prophecy of Zacharias xi., concerning the thirty pieces of silver, “the price of him that was valued,” introduced in the received text as if from the prophet Jeremy; but find some copies reading only from the prophets generally, without any name,—we cannot doubt the latter reading to be genuine, especially as this mode of general citation from the Prophets is common in the New Testament.

These minute discrepancies often admit of many modes of conciliation; and even if they did not, must appear to every candid mind quite unimportant. For instance, in the narrative of the restoration of sight to the blind Bartimeus, we read in Matthew xx. and Mark x., that this miracle was performed after Christ’s arrival at Jericho, and when he was going forth from thence: but in the parallel passage of Luke xviii., that it took place *ἐν τῷ ἐγγίξειν αὐτὸν*, “as he drew nigh to that place.” Now one mode of conciliating these passages would be, to suppose that this expression of Luke corresponds with the first clause of Mark, *καὶ ἔρχονται εἰς Ἱεριχὼ*, and that a subsequent clause answering to the following words in Mark, *καὶ ἐκπορευομένου αὐτοῦ*, had dropt out of the text. Or, again, it may be supposed, that during our Saviour’s sojourn in that town he, as usual, went about doing good; and that the circumstance occurred during one of these ex-

cursions, when he was returning towards the town, —a conjuncture to which both the expressions will equally apply. Or even, as we know that Luke was not himself present, but derived his information from careful inquiry from those “who from the beginning were eye-witnesses,” it cannot in any way detract from our general reliance on his authority, although we should suppose him to speak with less exactness on a point so perfectly indifferent. Inspiration must indeed imply infallible accuracy on every point affecting religious doctrine;—but to maintain that it must necessarily in minutiae so utterly insignificant supersede the ordinary methods of information, is more perhaps than we are in any way authorized to undertake.

The discrepancies in the sacred historians are, it may most safely be asserted, slight, compared with many found to occur in those narratives of profane historians, to which we yet attach the most unhesitating credence:—Who will compare them, for instance, to those which mark the different narratives of Hannibal’s march across the Alps, in Polybius and Livy? —An example has often been cited which is so apposite and cogent, that I cannot refrain from again repeating it. Clarendon states that the Marquis of Argyle was condemned to be hanged, which sentence was executed on the same day; four other historians affirm that he was beheaded on the Monday, having been condemned on the preceding Saturday. Yet this contradiction never led any person to doubt whether the Marquis was executed, or not<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> We cannot pass over this subject of the *Ἐναντιοφανῆ*,

*On the Secondary Sense of certain Parts of Scripture.*

In addition to these observations on the interpretation of the proper sense of Scripture, we cannot close our present subject without adverting to the more remote sense,—the secondary or typical interpretation, which the authority of Scripture itself instructs us to apply to certain portions of its contents.

without adverting to the genealogies of our Saviour, as given by St. Matthew and St. Luke. The whole of this subject is undoubtedly involved in very great difficulty and obscurity. We can only remark, that the very existence of such difficulties adds in one sense to the evidence of our religion, by proving the perfect good faith with which its documents have been handed down to us: for we know that these apparent discrepancies attracted notice at the very earliest period. Tatian composed a regular Harmony of the four Gospels, as early as A. D. 170; and Julius Africanus, in 230, wrote an express treatise on the two genealogies, as given by St. Matthew and St. Luke; referring the one to the natural, the other to the legal, descent of Joseph. Epiphanius, with more probability, considers that of St. Luke as the genealogy of Mary.—We may surely be sufficiently contented, that either of these explanations will afford a satisfactory solution: while our general confidence may be increased by the proof thus afforded, that even to obviate an acknowledged difficulty no alteration was, from the beginning, permitted in the Gospels handed down to us. I would especially refer to the comprehensive and copious notes in the Rev. Adam Clarke's Commentary, for a very full survey of every thing material which has been advanced with respect to the above, and various other questions, connected with these genealogies—such as the omission in St. Matthew of certain generations between David and Jeconiah, and the different descent ascribed by St. Matthew and St. Luke to Zerubbabel, in which, as in the case of Joseph, the one appears to follow the natural, the other the legal line.

Now this secondary interpretation, though connected with the ordinary application of figurative or allegorical language, yet advances beyond it; for in common metaphor the sense of the words is immediately applied, though that sense be the figurative, not the strict, sense of those words: *e. g.* when the Psalmist prays the Deity to lift up the light of his countenance upon him, or to shelter him beneath the shadow of his wings, the figurative terms signify indeed favour and protection; but they are immediately applied in a single meaning, and have no remote or secondary force. When we have once interpreted them ‘Regard me with thy favour, and guard me with thy protection,’ we have no further signification beyond this immediate sense to seek for. But where the secondary sense prevails,—besides the immediate sense of the words, the things expressed by those words have themselves a more remote application, and are symbols indicating some ulterior subject. Thus in the parable of the prodigal son, the ordinary rules of philological interpretation will enable us rightly to understand the circumstances of the imaginary narrative; but beyond this the moral application of that narrative still requires investigation. A very near connexion does, however, undoubtedly exist between ordinary figures and regular parables, or even types; for the figure arises from the more brief and direct employment of some analogy; and the parable or type is only a more extended metaphor or simile, expanded till it assumes a substantial form of its own, through which form it is mediately applied.

Now when we consider that the first oracles of

our religion are the earliest extant monuments of human thought, and preserve to us memorials of the very infancy of human society; and take into account that those oracles, being delivered for the use and instruction of human beings, must, in order to attain that end, be accommodated in their form to the modes of thought and language prevalent at the time among them,—we may readily perceive reasons, why figurative expressions and typical symbols should often be employed. It has been very judiciously observed on this subject, that “in the earlier and simpler stages of society and of language, such a mode of giving form and utterance to the conceptions of the mind, so far from seeming rare and unintelligible, is known to have been usually the more prevalent and popular. The original signification of those metaphors which make up so large a part of all language, both spoken and written, must then have been fresher in the memory of man: they were daily, if we may so express ourselves, in the process of being increased in their number, and extended and modified in their import, as the occurrence of new ideas or new associations demanded. The mind, habituated to this process, would catch and retain, with quite sufficient rapidity and distinctness, the truths and instructions conveyed through the medium of those images and allegories, which in fact do so largely present themselves in the literature, both sacred and profane, of the ruder ages. It may be added, that the wisdom and theology of the Egyptians, to whose customs the Israelites had been so long inured, appear, from the remotest antiquity to which we can trace them, to have been

involved in figurative and mystical representations. The whole hieroglyphical system must have been little else than a tissue of metaphor and allegory addressed to the eye instead of the ear<sup>1</sup>." Thus we find Moses assigning symbolical meanings to the great days of festival,—to the golden plate of the priestly mitre,—to the great initiatory rite of the covenant, &c.

The employment of parables, or apologues having a moral application, is the simplest instance of a mediate or secondary sense. The use of such apologues is indeed common to almost every nation, and familiar to the mind from infancy. From the early instance of Jotham's parable of the trees electing a monarch, (Judges ix. 7,) whereby he reproved the conspiracy of the Shechemites and the usurpation of Abimelech,—the Scriptures abound with examples of this kind; more especially and most beautifully those of the New Testament. The principles of their interpretation are in themselves so plain, and have been so often and ably illustrated, that it must be superfluous now to insist on them. One only caution I would wish to inculcate,—that we are rather to keep in view the general drift and scope of the apologue, than to indulge in seeking a mystical intention in every expression which occurs in its detail.

Types are nearly related to parables: for as parables are imaginary narrative having an allegorical

<sup>1</sup> Bampton Lectures, 1824, p. 15.—In the paragraphs which follow I have endeavoured briefly to incorporate the general views contained in this last composition of my lamented brother.



application to some subject remotely represented and signified by them—so are types real objects or events having a like application.

If we at all admit the inspired authority of the New Testament, we cannot on that authority hesitate to admit the typical nature of many of the objects and events thus recorded in the Old Testament. That Moses, for instance,—as being (though in an infinitely inferior sense and degree,) the mediator of a covenant, and the captain and deliverer of the visible and typical Israel of God,—bore a figurative and predictive relation to that greater Prophet, whom he foretold as like unto himself, even to the eternal and heavenly Captain of our Salvation;—that Israel bore the same relation to the elect Church of God in all future ages;—that all the sacrificial ordinances of the Elder Covenant were but the *τύπος καὶ σκιά τοῦ μέλλοντος*, and did but prefigure the Lamb of the great sacrifice of the New, when “Christ our passover was slain;”—that Aaron, as the appointed high priest, was a type of him who is made for us an high priest for ever;—that David in his kingly power and character thus represented the future king of the spiritual Israel; and that in the sufferings and sorrows which caused him so repeatedly and pathetically to pour out his soul before God, he bore, however faintly and imperfectly, the figure of him who, for us, suffered and sorrowed as no man ever has or can:—all this we must assuredly grant. That this mode of interpretation is thus far sanctioned by the usage of the divinely commissioned writers of the New Testament, must be allowed by all, excepting those who, in the

pride and rashness of their hearts, have ventured directly or indirectly to question the inspiration of that record.

But on this subject undoubtedly the most discreet caution, the greatest sobriety of interpretation should be carefully adhered to. To admit many instances of typical application on the authority of inspiration is one thing;—to enlarge them at the unauthorized suggestion of human imagination, quite another. The only safe rule seems to be, to restrict in general our exposition of Scriptural types to those express points in which the Scripture itself authorizes us to consider them as typical, or which immediately flow from the nature of the relation or character which we are taught to regard as constituting the analogy between the type and its antitype. Neglecting this just limitation, many have been the commentators who have run into the wild and dangerous extreme, of perverting the historical truth of Scripture into a visionary train of mystical allegories. Philo-Judæus, nearly at the commencement of the New Dispensation, set the leading example of thus fancifully allegorizing all the records of the Old. Origen unhappily caught all his wild imaginations, extended them, and propagated them in the Christian Church. Through the darkness of the middle ages, almost every passage of Scripture was supposed, besides its historical sense, to carry a threefold mystical signification:—the tropological, or moral; the apagogical, or its application to the spiritual hopes promised by the Gospel; and the allegorical. The great reformer Calvin was almost the first, after a long series of ages, to restore to

Scriptural interpretation its just rules, and sober application;—to the very judicious character of his Commentaries in this respect every competent student will give a ready testimony.

The secondary sense ascribed to some passages of Prophecy appears in part to result from the previous consideration of types. If we admit the typical nature, for instance, of the kingdom and '*sure mercies*' of David, we cannot but admit that the prophecies which bore a primary relation to that kingdom must also be capable of an ulterior application to its spiritual antitype. But here again great caution is necessary, nor can we consider ourselves in any way entitled to suggest such an application without the direct authority of Scripture. And while we carefully avoid the latitude with which the theory of *accommodation*, as it has been called, is applied by some modern writers of the German school, who seem to consider all the quotations in the New Testament from prophecies of the Old as mere ornamental illustrations, quite analogous to quotations from Homer in a paper of Addison's or Johnson's;—still, to deny that such citations are ever adduced by the sacred writers simply as exemplifying analogous and parallel cases, seems to be running into an extreme no less extravagant in an opposite direction. Here again I would with the greatest satisfaction refer, as before, in every particular instance, to the Commentaries of Calvin<sup>1</sup>, a

<sup>1</sup> I may cite, as instances of this sober spirit of criticism, Calvin's remarks on the application by St. Matthew of the prophecy (Hosea, ii. 1.), "Out of Egypt have I called my Son," to Christ; and that from Jeremiah xxxi. 15, "In Ramah was

writer whom, on the one hand, no one will accuse of any Neologian tendency, while, on the other, the most sober and judicious critic will find nothing in his exposition revolting to the strictest rules of just interpretation.

there a voice heard, lamentation," &c., to the murder of the innocents by Herod. On the first, Calvin sums up his observations: "*Proinde sit hoc nobis extra controversiam, locum non debere ad Christum restringi. Neque tamen a Matthæo torquetur, sed scitè aptatur ad præsentem causam.*" Concerning the second, he says; "*Certum est a Prophetâ describi cladem tribus Benjamin quæ accidit ejus tempore.*"—"Quum tunc completum fuerit Prophetæ vaticinium, non intelligit Matthæus illic prædictum fuisse quid facturus esset Herodes, sed Christi adventu renovatum fuisse luctum illum quem multis ante seculis pertulerant Benjamitæ."

## APPENDIX TO PART II.

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*Containing the Rudiments of the Hebrew and Arabic Grammars.*

THE primary object of this publication being the instruction of a collegiate class, I have conceived that it would form a useful Appendix to the observations contained in this Philological portion of our lectures on the importance of the study of the Oriental dialects, and the facility of their acquisition, to subjoin a few brief remarks; which appear to me likely materially to abridge the labours of the student, and to remove those preliminary difficulties which would otherwise embarrass him at the very entrance.

I. And, first, of the Alphabet.—The difficulties of seizing a new alphabetical type would be at once overcome, were the student apprised *in limine* that the Hebrew letters were in fact only a varied form of the very same characters which the Greeks borrowed from the Phœnicians; and with which he is, therefore, already perfectly familiar. The series of letters employed as numeral signs, which correspond throughout in both languages, sufficiently demonstrates this: and although the Greeks subsequently discontinued the alphabetic use of three of the Phœnician characters, they still retained them in their

proper places as arithmetical ἐπίσημα, with their oriental names; namely, Ϝ for 6, called βαν, (retained also in its alphabetical power as the Æolic digamma by the Romans;) Ϟ for 90, called σανπι (a corruption of the Hebrew *tsadde*, occasioned by a false etymology derived from the resemblance of its form to a combined Σ and Π); the force of the Hebrew letter must have been *ts*;—and thirdly, Ϛ for 100, called κοππα, retained in its place as the Roman Q.

The ancient Hebrew character, as exhibited in the shekels of Jerusalem, and still preserved by the descendants of the Samaritans, is in fact nearly identical in form with the Greek, if written facing to the left, as in the alternate lines of the ancient βουστροφῆδον inscriptions. The Hebrews adopted their more modern character from the Chaldæans, after the Captivity; and this character is itself formed from the older, disguised by a fuller and blacker mode of writing,—just as the black Gothic character was formed from the Roman.

## COMPARATIVE ALPHABET.

Greek.	Hebrew.	Arabic.	Numeral Power.	Names.	
A	א	ا	1	αλφα	אלף
B	ב	ب	2	βητα	בית
Γ	ג	ج	3	γαμμα	גימל
Δ	ד	د	4	δελτα	דלת
E	ה	ه	5	ε	הא
F	ו	و	6	φαν	ווי
Z	ז	ز	7	ζητα	זין
H	ח	ح	8	ητα	חית
Θ	ט	ط	9	θητα	טית
I	י	ي	10	ιωτα	יוד
K	כ	ك	20	καππα	כף
Λ	ל	ل	30	λαμβδα	למך
M	מ	م	40	μν	מם
N	נ	ن	50	νν	נק
Ξ	ס	س	60	ξι	סמך
O	ע	ع	70	ο	עין
Π	פ	ف	80	πι	פא
Θ	צ	ص	90	σανπι	צדי
Q or Q	ק	ق	100	κοππα	קוף
P	ר	ر	200	ρω	ריש
Σ	ש	ش	300	σιγμα	שין
T	ת	ت	400	ταυ	תו

The Hebrews wrote the following letters differently when they occurred as finals, and then assigned to them new numeral values.

ך 500

ם 600

ן 700

ף 800

ץ 900



The Arabs, by placing additional dots over their characters, form six additional letters; thus, ث (τ thrice dotted) has the force *tz*, and represents 500; خ (γ dotted above), χ, 600; ذ (δ dotted), *ds*, 700; ض (ʒ dotted), *tds*, 800; ظ (θ dotted), *tth*, 900; غ (o dotted), *ghh*, 1,000<sup>1</sup>.

From the above comparison, it will appear that we are fully authorized in representing the Hebrew letters by the Grecian characters, evidently identical with them in origin; or, which may be more convenient, by their Roman equivalents; excepting, as in the case of θ, where these are wanting, and we must therefore employ the Greek type. It by no means however follows, that we assert the pronunciation of

<sup>1</sup> Sir William Jones has expressed an opinion that most, if not all, the alphabetical characters employed in the world are deducible from a common original type; and that the elaborate Devanagari of the Sanscrit is only disguised by the characters being, as it were, set in frames: some strong resemblances may undoubtedly be detected, especially in the different dental characters. Many resemblances may also be found in various alphabets to the phonetic characters of the Egyptians, as deduced from their hieroglyphics, when written cursively. (See Champollion.) We may possibly, therefore, be led to believe that all alphabetic writing has been derived (as is partially the case with the Chinese,) from hieroglyphics employed to express their initial sound; as the character of a *lion*, for instance, to express the sound L. But this may seem a bold speculation; and to dilate upon the arguments which may countenance it, would be here assuredly out of place. It may however be added, that this idea is certainly favoured by the Semitic names of the letters; Aleph being *an ox*, and Beth *a house*; and the characters being such as may easily have originated in the one case from a rough sketch of an ox's head, and in the other from that of a building.

the Hebrew and Greek letters to be identical, since this is a circumstance which varies in every dialect; as for example, the Germans pronounce their *w* like our *v*, and their *v* like our *f*; and we know that the Romans, *e contra*, pronounced their *f* like our *v*: yet no one on this account would think of varying the common alphabetical form. When the true pronunciation of a language is so hopelessly lost as that of the Hebrew, it is obviously still less advisable to depart from the alphabetical forms of common origin with which we are familiar, in pursuit of the unattainable object of expressing more correctly an unknown pronunciation. A few observations alone on this subject can be necessary. It must be superfluous to state, that the character H represents, as originally in Greek and always in Latin, an aspirate;—in the oriental tongues it was probably a very strong one. Our only ancient authorities for the comparative pronunciation of the Greek and Hebrew letters, are the Greek representation of the Hebrew proper names in the translation of the Septuagint; and the collection of the original Hebrew and several Greek versions in six parallel columns by Origen (about A.D. 230), called the Hexapla. The first column contains the original Hebrew; the second the same, read according to the pronunciation of that period, in Greek characters. Considerable fragments of this work still remain, and have been published by Montfaucon; and a very sufficient specimen (including the whole first chapter of Genesis,) is given in a much more accessible book, the *Bibliothecæ Græca* of Fabricius, tom. ii. p. 346.

The results affecting the ancient pronunciation of

the Hebrew letters, as deduced from a careful examination of these authorities, may be shortly stated as follows. We there find the harsh aspirate H often represented by  $\chi$ ; also the pronunciation of T given to the representative of  $\Theta$ , and *vice versa*, the pronunciation of  $\Theta$  to the representative of T. The three characters standing in the place of  $\Xi$ ,  $\vartheta$ , and  $\Sigma$ , have indifferently the pronunciation  $\Sigma$  assigned to them. The name *samech* occupying the place of the Greek  $\xi$ , seems further to indicate that the power of  $\Sigma$ ,  $\sigma\gamma\mu\alpha$ , originally belonged to this sibilant, and that the assigning the combined power of  $\gamma\varsigma$  to this place was a subsequent innovation in the Greek alphabet. Altogether I should consider it advisable to represent  $\var�$  by  $\Sigma$  or S;  $\var�$  by S, with a mark beneath; and  $\var�$  by the Greek  $\vartheta$ , as we have no other alphabetical form for the very common sound *ts*, unless we should borrow from the Russian. In the Septuagint and Hexapla the representative of  $\Pi$  is generally pronounced  $\Phi$ . The other consonants appear to have been pronounced just as their Greek representatives.

The *vexata quæstio* of the vowel points next presents itself: and here, as is often the case, we may perhaps safely conclude, that the truth lies between the disputants. While, on the one hand, we may allow to the adversaries of points, that the complicated system adopted by the Masoretic school had no existence before the seventh century, and is therefore far too late to confer any authoritative precision, in cases otherwise doubtful; tending only to embarrass by introducing uncertain variations into a grammatical system otherwise remarkably simple:—still,

on the other hand, we must concede to the defenders of points, that the combined authority of the Septuagint and Hexapla compels us to acknowledge the existence of some system of vowel points before the commencement, and in the first centuries, of our æra; for, in these authorities, we find the great vocal *matres lectionis*, as they are called, varying in the pronunciation very consistently with the vowel points as ordinarily received. Thus, the representative of A, if affected with  $\alpha$ , is read  $\alpha$ ; if with  $\epsilon$ ,  $\epsilon$ ; if with  $\eta$ ,  $\eta$ ; if with  $\circ$ ,  $\circ$ . The representative of E is, under like variations, read  $\alpha$ ,  $\epsilon$ , or  $\circ$ . The representative of I, however, most generally retains its proper power. The representative of O is, in many proper names,—Obedia, Odollam, &c.,—pronounced as  $\circ$ ; but it often also varies, according to the associated vowel points, to  $\alpha\alpha$  and to  $\epsilon$ ; and occasionally (but not very frequently) a  $\gamma$  is prefixed. On the whole, therefore, the character appears to have expressed a variable but broad vowel sound, uttered with a deep guttural breathing. The representative of F is read  $ov$  or  $\omega$ , according to the attached vowel points.

In order to exhibit more clearly the evidence afforded by the Hexapla on the subject of the vowel points, &c., I shall copy from that authority the Hebrew text and its Greek reading, as there given, of the creation of light, Gen. i. 3 and 4; placing in a central column the original Greek representatives of the Phœnician letters, and thus exactly showing their deviation in pronunciation.

In the Hebrew column I have inserted the points, in order to bring the whole subject before the eye.

Hebrew Text.	Derivative Characters.	Reading of Hexapla.
וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי	FIAMP AAEIM IEI	Ου ιωμερ Ελωιμ ιει
אֶרֶץ וַיְהִי-אֶרֶץ :	AFP FIEI <del>AFP</del>	ωρ ον ιει ωρ
וַיֵּרָא אֱלֹהִים	FIPA AAEIM	Ου ιαρ Ελωιμ
אֶת-הָאָרֶץ פִּי-טוֹב	ATEAFP KI ΘFB	εθαωρ χι τωβ








The analogy of the Arabic is also favourable to vowel points, of which they have three: *fatha* ' , *a* and *e*; *damma* ˆ , *o*; and *kesra* ˙ , *i*. But even these are said to have been introduced subsequently to the age of Mohammed, the earliest MSS. of the Koran being without them.—N.B. All these points, if doubled, carry a final *n*.

One of the strongest arguments against the present system of points and Rabbinical method of reading, is derived from the name Cyrus, כִּיּוּרֶשׁ, KFPΣ, which, thus pointed, would be read *Choresch*; whereas the Septuagint always reads it (and it occurs sixteen times in the Old Testament,) Κύρος; now it is quite incredible that this well-ascertained name should have been ever really represented by a combination of sounds so dissimilar as the Rabbis would persuade us. On the whole, the arguments, as I have said, seem to preponderate in favour of the early usage of some vowel points, but under a system less complicated than that of the Masoretes. As, however, the early MSS. of the Bible were always without points, the application of those points, as established by the school above named, can in any doubtful case present us with nothing of superior authority to the very fallible judgment of a very indifferent set of critics of

the seventh century ; and as they add great embarrassment to the first study of the Hebrew language, they may assuredly be most advisably neglected by the student in the first instance. Afterwards, when he shall already have acquired some familiarity with the language, he will be enabled to acquire, with comparative ease, the whole doctrine of points, as a subsidiary critical aid, of some, but I am persuaded not very great, importance. In the following introductory grammatical sketch, I shall therefore omit the consideration of points and all matters connected with them.

The introduction of vowel points into the Hebrew, appears to have originated in an attempt to record the pronunciation of that language when it was gradually falling into disuse as a living speech. Should our own language thus become extinct, it is evident that our very anomalous pronunciation of our vowels could only be recorded to posterity by diacritical points : take, for example, the sentence, "When the tróubled móther bírd héard hér yóung chírp, she húrried back without fártner delay." In these few words we have the vowels *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, and the diphthongs *ea* and *ou*, where I have placed the accent, all pronounced identically. The Edgeworths have on this principle, in order to facilitate the first acquisition of reading, published a horn-book, in which the true pronunciation is indicated by diacritical points ; yet no one would say, as is absurdly said in the parallel case of Hebrew, that our vowels without these diacritical points are quiescent.

Besides the vowel points, the Hebrew and the Arabic have the following orthographical signs.

Hebrew.	Arabic.	Use.
<i>Dagesch forte</i> , a point inserted in the middle of a letter ;	<i>Teschdid</i> ,  , or  , or  ;	signifies that the letter so marked is to be doubled
<i>Dagesch lene</i> , a similar point, only removes the aspiration otherwise attached to the letter.		
<i>Sheva</i> , :	<i>Gezm</i> ,    ,	shows the letter so marked to be destitute of a vowel, and to be pronounced together with the following consonant.
	<i>Elif unionis</i> ,  ,	signifies that the first consonant of the word to which it is prefixed, is to be thrown back and pronounced as if it were the final consonant of the preceding word.

I do not here mention the Hebrew accents ; being convinced that such signs, if of little value in a language like Greek, must *à fortiori* be of none at all in Hebrew.

## GRAMMATICAL PRINCIPLES.

### I. *Roots.*

The primary consideration in the structure of every language must be the elemental roots which form it ;



or those elementary sounds, in themselves expressing only the general idea ; without determining whether the abstract substance of that idea be alone denoted ; or whether it be predicated as an attribute, or as exerted in action ;—in other words, whether it be used as a substantive, an adjective, or a verb. Thus in Latin the root *am*, denoting love, may be modified into the substantive *amor*, the adjective *amicus*, or the verb *amo* ; besides many other derivatives, as *amator*, *amabilis*, *amicitia*, and the like.

But although the root, considered abstractedly as a root, be indeed in itself indifferent as to those ulterior affections which distinguish the different parts of speech ; yet practically this is far from being the case ; for some primary ideas are in their very first suggestion connected with action, and therefore of a verbal nature,—such as *to go*, *to eat*, &c., &c. ; others with attributive qualities, as *good*, *sweet*, &c. ; others with the simple essences, such as names of animals, &c., which must be necessarily in their primary application substantives. Hence we may perceive, that of roots many must be in their first usage applied as substantives, and many as adjectives, as well as many others as verbs ; and that the application of each class to other parts of speech than that most proper to it, must be secondary and derivative.

Hence, when grammarians state that the roots of all Hebrew words are primarily verbal, we must consider this as a mere convenient fiction ; for such a root as ALN, *a tree*, is obviously a mere name, and therefore a substantive ; ΘFB, *good*, an attributive quality, and therefore an adjective : and the far greater part of the class of indeclinable parti-

cles, such as prepositions and conjunctions, appear practically unconnected with any verbal roots; although Horne Tooke and his followers would seek to contest this.

It is however undoubtedly true, that the greater part of the subjects of our ideas are capable of being considered as exerted in action, and may therefore yield verbal forms; and whenever this is the case, we find in Hebrew the simplest form of the root employed verbally,—as the third person singular preterite of a verb. These radical forms generally consist of three letters; and therefore it is usual to derive the Hebrew vocables generally from triliteral verbal roots.

These roots may be used as nouns, in two forms; I. simply without addition (just as in English the root *love* may be employed either as a noun or verb.) Thus QDS<sup>1</sup> may signify, verbally *he sanctified*, adjectively *holy*, or substantively *holiness*.

II. Or the derivative nouns may be formed by prefixing to the triliteral roots the initials M or T, or (less frequently) A or I; also by adding, as feminine terminations, the finals E or T, often with F or I prefixed; and more rarely N or I; occasionally both initial and final formative letters are used. The following examples may be given, in which the roots are distinguished by capitals, and the formative ini-

<sup>1</sup> In all the examples the oriental letters are expressed by their Greek and Latin derivatives, in order that the eye may more readily apprehend these familiar characters. It will be a useful exercise for the student to transcribe them in Hebrew characters. It must be remembered that the *F* is the digamma, and has the force of *ou*.

tials and finals by small letters: 1. initially augmented, mSPØ, *judgment*; tQ<sup>f</sup>E, *hope*; aSMN, *fatness*; iəHR, *oil*: 2. finally augmented, HKMe, *wisdom*; ADRT, *glory*; MLK<sup>f</sup>t, *a kingdom*; RASit, *beginning*; RASn, *first*; PLAi, *wonderful*: 3. both initially and finally augmented, mLAKe, *work*; mMSLt, *dominion*; tRDMe, *drowsiness*; aKZRi<sup>f</sup>t, *cruelty*.

These formative letters joined to the triliteral roots are E, A, M, N, T, I, *F*; and are therefore often denominated, by a convenient grammatical designation, the Eamentif letters. In Arabic the same letters and also S are added, as formatives of nouns, to the triliteral roots. These formatives, together with the personal affixes of verbs, the casual affixes of nouns, &c., are contradistinguished by the epithet *servile* from the radical letters, or those essential to the root and unchangeable.

There are certain classes of triliteral roots considered as irregular; because they throw away or change their initial, medial, or final radical letter in the process of conjugation as verbs, or in the formation of derivative nouns. The Eamentif formatives are prefixed or appended as before. Thus, 1. a final E is thrown away or changed into I or *F*,—*e. g.* HI. *a living creature*, from HIE; PRI, *fruit*, from PRE; SQui, *moisture*, from SQE; 2. an initial I is rejected or changed into *F*,—thus DO or DOe, *knowledge*, from IDO; m<sup>f</sup>SB, *a seat*, from ISB; t<sup>f</sup>RE or t<sup>f</sup>Rt, *law*, from IRE: 3. an initial N rejected, SiA or SAt, *excellency*, from NSA; mTN or mTt, *a gift*, from NTN: 4. a medial *F* is rejected or turned into I,

—thus, DM, *rest*, from DfM; DiN, *judgment*, from DfN: 5. a medial, if it be the same letter with the final, and thus redoubled, is retained only once; and thus the root assumes a biliteral form,—thus, LB, *the heart*, from LBB.

The irregular or defective roots above classed constitute the great difficulty in investigating the themes of Hebrew words, under which they are usually arranged in the Dictionaries. In order to investigate the root of a word we must take the following steps.

First, we must reject the conjoined particles, prepositions and pronouns, which in Hebrew form affixes coalescing with the word, as will be explained in the next articles; and in like manner the personal affixes of the verbs<sup>1</sup>. Secondly, if the word be a noun, the Eamentif formative initials and finals must be removed. Thirdly, the root thus obtained may still require to be further changed, if belonging to any of the five defective classes:—for instance, if of the first, it will require E to be added, or substituted for the final I or F; if of the second, an initial I must be prefixed; if of the third, an initial N must in like manner be supplied; if of the fourth, a medial F must be inserted or substituted for a medial I; if of the fifth, the second radical must be doubled.

The mode of investigating the Arabic roots is

<sup>1</sup> This first process is simply analogous to rejecting the terminations indicating cases and person in Latin or Greek nouns and verbs, and will be at once understood from the following grammatical rules.

similar in its general principles ; and it will not be necessary in this elementary view to enter on the details.

## II. *Nouns.*

*Number and Gender.*—As in most other languages, the Hebrew and Arabic nouns have distinguishing terminations for the singular and plural numbers, and the masculine and feminine genders. This adoption of plural terminations appears, indeed, to have been one of the first steps which has taken place in the formation of languages ; and the monosyllabic dialects of China are almost the only ones which can distinguish the plural number only by adding separate particles signifying *many* and *other*. In all other languages the plural terminations have coalesced so as to form an integral part of the word, although originally even these may have been significant particles.

In Hebrew the singular termination E and (in construction) T ; and in Arabic Ao, I, and Ton,—are feminine : all others masculine.

The plural terminations are, for the Masculine, in Hebrew IM or I (the M being omitted in construction). In Arabic the plural masculine is FNa for the nominative, or for the oblique cases INa.

The plural feminine is in Hebrew FT<sup>1</sup> ; in Arabic, A Ton for the nominative, and for the oblique cases Ten. The Arabic has also a dual number, which is

<sup>1</sup> There are, however, anomalies in the employment of the plural terminations : some masculines, as ABFT, *fathers*, having feminine terminations, and *vice versâ*. Thus the very irregular word ASE, *a woman*, the feminine of AIS, *a man*, makes in the plural NSIM, with a masculine termination.

in both genders AN. The Hebrew is sometimes said to use the masculine plural IM as a dual termination for both genders.

The neuter gender is not distinguished from the masculine.

Adjectives are nowise distinguished in form from substantives, with which they are regularly made to agree in number and gender. Thus: SKL  $\Theta$ FB, *good skill*, (masc.); HKME  $\Theta$ FBE, *good wisdom* (fem.); DBRIM  $\Theta$ FBIM, *good words* (pl. masc.); BETFLFT  $\Theta$ FBFT, *good maidens* (pl. fem.).

*Cases of Nouns.*—The cases of nouns are in all languages simply the expressions of the more common relations which the objects or ideas designated by those nouns bear to each other. All such relations generally are denoted by particles termed prepositions. But in the case of the relations which are of most perpetual occurrence, and which therefore most constantly affect the expression of our ideas in language, the particles denoting them have, from their frequent repetition, very usually coalesced with the nouns to which they were applied, either as initial prefixes or final terminations. The latter form what we call the *cases* of languages, like the Sanscrit, the Greek, and the Latin: for we cannot doubt, I think, that all these terminations were derived from particles originally significant as prepositions; just as much as *cum*, when it is joined terminally with the ablatives of pronouns, as *mecum*, *nobiscum*, &c.; or  $\theta\epsilon\nu$  and  $\delta\epsilon$  postfixed to Greek nouns, and signifying motion towards or from the objects;  $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\acute{\iota}\eta\theta\epsilon\nu$  and  $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\acute{\iota}\eta\nu\delta\epsilon$  are quite as much cases, to speak with correct logical precision, as any

others in the language<sup>1</sup>. The number and relations of the different cases are by no means strictly identical, even in cognate and derivative languages: thus, the Greek has no ablative distinct from its dative, which the Latin does however possess, but only in the singular. The Latin ablative, besides the relation of removal from (whence it derives its name), includes also those of location in a place, and of instrumentality by or with. The Sanscrit, clearly one of the most perfect dialects of the same great family of languages with the Greek and Latin, has in the pronouns three distinct cases to express these several relations. The Greek expresses ablation and derivation from, as well as possession, by its genitive; and by its dative, instrumentality and location, as well as accession to. We need not wonder that the relations indicated by the cases are thus vague; for we shall find an equal vagueness attaching itself to the attempt to express relations by prepositions. Prepositions are, in fact, the most equivocal terms in language. Busby, in his Greek Grammar, has observed of one Greek preposition, "*Εν* fere præpositi sensus complectitur omnes." He might have easily extended the same remark to half the prepositions in every language. In Sanscrit it should however be observed, that the genitive and ablative singular in

<sup>1</sup> This is most obviously the case with regard to the Homeric pronominal forms *ἐμέθεν* and *σέθεν*, which are undoubtedly the true ablatives of their respective pronouns. Bopp agrees with me in supposing the casual terminations to have been formed by involved prepositions. See his Dissertation in the Memoirs of the Akad. der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1826.



some of the declensions of nouns agree in termination (as they do always in Greek). In the plural the dative and ablative commonly assume the same forms, as in both numbers in Latin. In the Sanscrit pronouns, however, the cases are regularly distinguished.

In Hebrew the more common relations of nouns are expressed by initial prefixes instead of final terminations, as in the Indo-European class of languages just alluded to. But it is obvious that this difference of position can make no real difference in the nature of the contrivance; and we may therefore consider these initial prefixes as strictly analogous to the cases already noticed. These prefixes are the following:

1. *By* or *with*, and *in*,  
the relations of instrumentality and location, are expressed by the prefix

B, abbreviated from  
BE.

2. *To*, the relation of accession, or dative, by

L, abbreviated from  
AL.

3. *From*, the relation of ablation, by

M, abbreviated from  
MN.

These initials may be said to coalesce with the roots of the nouns, quite as much as the terminal cases of other languages.

The objective relation, or accusative, is not constantly expressed by any sign; yet the particle AT is so frequently employed in this relation, that it may be fairly considered as its proper adjunct. It is occasionally, indeed, translated by *μετά*, *cum*, and *with*; but the phrases will often suggest other prepositions as more natural, *e. g.* 'to fight *with*' is

rather to fight *against* ;' 'to dwell *with*' and 'to be buried *with*' is 'to dwell &c. *among*.' And we may perhaps only consider all instances of such a sense, as examples of the vague use of prepositions already mentioned. AT is also occasionally prefixed to the nominatives of passive and intransitive verbs ; but this rather confirms its application to denote the objective relation than otherwise.

The relations of the genitive in the classical languages are extremely vague. It may most generally be considered as a mere attributive form, exactly corresponding in force to a derivative adjective. In this case the Hebrew expresses it merely by appending it to the end of the governing noun ; just as we (only reversing the order), prefix a noun, in a genitive sense, in our compound words,—thus : *a house-top* for *the top of a house* ; in Hebrew GG, BIT, *top-house*. The governing noun thus placed in construction, if a plural, rejects the final M ; if a feminine, changes the final E into T, thus :—DBRI HKMIM, *the words of the wise* ; IRAT IEFE, *the fear of the Lord*. The relation of possession commonly attributed to the genitive is often in Hebrew expressed by the dative prefix L,—thus : MZMF<sup>r</sup>R L DFD, *a psalm belonging to David*. But a like convertibility of the possessive genitive into a dative must be familiar to every classical student.

In Arabic the prefixes B and L are used as in Hebrew ; but not the ablative prefix M, for which the full preposition MN is employed. The cases also alter the terminal vowel points, employing for the nominative a terminal *damma*, o ; for the accusative *kesre*, e ; and for the other cases *fatha*, a : and as these are written double, they are considered as

carrying a final n;—but this *nunnation*, as it is called, is never pronounced, and in construction is not written.

*Other prefixed Particles not indicating Case.*—These prefixes, though quite unconnected with the relations of case, are yet usually considered together with them, from their similar form. 1. *Prefixes of Articles.*—In Hebrew E (supposed an abbreviation of EIA, the third personal pronoun), is often prefixed, and emphasizes the noun like the Greek article *ὁ*, as *ὁ Χριστός*. The Arabic in like manner often prefixes its article AL. —S, abbreviated from the relative ASR, is prefixed in a corresponding sense, as a relative or interrogative particle. 2. *Prefixes of Conjunctions.*—These are quite analogous to the post-fixed enclitic conjunctions *que* and *τε* of the Latin and Greek. Thus in Hebrew and Arabic the prefix F denotes the conjunction *and*; and K, that of similitude.

*On the Comparison of Adjectives.*—The comparative degree is expressed in Hebrew and Arabic simply by connecting the superior with the inferior object by the ablative preposition MN, or its Hebrew abbreviation M, in the sense of the Latin *præ*; thus wisdom is said to be ΘFBE MPNINIM, *bona præ margaritis*.

The Arabic also prefixes A.

The superlative is expressed in Hebrew either by simply repeating the word, as OMQ OMQ, *deep deep—superlatively deep*; or by an union analogous to the partitive genitive of the Greeks, *δια θεάων*, *e. g.* ORIḶI GFIM, *fierce among nations*; OBD OBDIM, *a servant of servants*.

The Arabic prefixes A.

In Hebrew the comparative may also be denoted by *IFTR*, *more*; and the superlative by *MAD*, *most*.

### III. *Pronouns.*

In Hebrew and Arabic the personal pronouns yield abbreviated derivative suffixes, which serve as their substitutes in construction; forming, if joined to the prefixed particles denoting the relations of case, the cases of the pronouns; if appended to nouns, the possessive pronouns; and if appended to verbs, their pronominal accusatives. The personal inflections of the verbs are also considered as abbreviated from the pronouns, but are much altered from the common suffixes; of which latter alone we shall treat in this article, reserving our observations on the personal inflections for the article on Verbs.

A similar system of abbreviated pronominal suffixes is common to very many of the most unconnected languages; *e. g.* to the vast Malayan family of tongues in the Indian seas and Pacific, and to the Esquimaux, and dialects extending from the great lakes to Delaware in North America. We may consider it to have been common to the ruder form of most languages; for, although it does not prevail in the most polished dialects of the Indo-European family,—viz. the Sanscrit<sup>1</sup>, Greek and Latin, Slavonic and Teutonic, in all which the grammatical structure is most elaborately refined; yet in the

<sup>1</sup> It should be mentioned, however, that a similar system of abbreviated possessive pronominal suffixes does partially prevail in the Persian; where it is, however, confined to the singular number; the suffix *M* denoting *my*; *T*, *thy*; and *S*, *his* or *her*.

branch of this Asiatic race, which from its position appears to have quitted the parent stock at the earliest period, and to have been driven to the furthest West by the successive waves of the great tide of emigration, namely, in the Celtic dialects (as exemplified in the Welsh), we find the grammatical structure, as might have been expected, much simpler. And here also we discover the system of abbreviated pronominal suffixes, which are employed as governed by prepositions, and which also under the same identical form constitute the persons of the verbs. Yet it may be most clearly demonstrated that the Welsh belongs to the Sanscrit or Indo-European, and not to the Hebrew or Semitic class of languages. But these *intermediate* analogies of grammatical structure are exactly what we should expect to find in an earlier offset, which must have left the great central cradle of our race at a period before the differences of the great classes of dialects could have become so strongly marked, as subsequently to have almost obliterated every trace of a common origin; of which, however, remote vestiges may still be detected, though by no means of a nature to be confounded with that close analogy of grammatical structure which pervades what have been well called the great *families* of languages; such as the Indo-European on the one side, and the Semitic on the other.—But it is time to proceed to the particular consideration of the Hebrew and Arabic pronouns. They will be seen in the following comparative Table.

FULL PRONOUNS PERSONAL.		Pronominal Suffixes. Same in Hebrew and Arabic where no difference is specified.	Examples.
Hebrew.	Arabic.		
S. 1. ANI, or ANKI, } 2. AT, or } mas. ATE, } AT, or } fem. ATI, }	ANA, ANTa, mas. ANTE, fem.	I, Accus. NI, Heb. Ka*, Ke,	OBDI, <i>my servant.</i> OBDKa, } OBDKe, } <i>thy servant.</i>
3. EFA, mas. EIA, fem. P. 1. ANHNf, 1. ATM, mas. ATN, or } fem. ATNE, }	Efa, mas. Eia, fem. NHNo, ANTM, mas. ANTN, fem.	f, Heb. EA, Arab. E, Accus. NE, Heb. Nf, Heb. NA, Arab. KM, KN,	OBDF, Heb. OBDEA, Arab., <i>his servant.</i> OBDE, <i>her servant.</i> OBDNf, Heb. OBDNA, Arab., <i>our servant.</i> OBDKM, } ONDKN, } <i>your servant.</i>
3. EM, or EME, } mas. EN, or } fem. ENE, }	EM, mas. EN, fem.	M, or EM, N, or EN,	OBDEM, } OBDEN, } <i>their servant.</i>

N.B. In the Arabic column I have inserted in a smaller character the final vowels, which are only expressed by points.

\* In the suffixes of the second person singular and plural, K is substituted for T in the full pronoun; but in the verbal suffixes T is restored. A similar change of T into K or the kindred Q is not unusual in other languages: thus the Greek T frequently becomes Q in Latin derivatives, e. g. *Quis* from *Tis*.

With the cases denoted by the prefixed particles a pronoun will stand thus. The simple suffix, as a possessive, will of course perform the functions of a genitive. The triple combination of the relative and dative affixes with this pronominal form, viz. SLI (*which to me*), is in some grammars represented as a genitive.

	Singular.	Plural.
Dat.	LI, <i>to me</i> .	LN $\mathcal{F}$ , <i>to us</i> .
Acc.	ATI, <i>me</i> . postfixed to verbs NI.	ATN $\mathcal{F}$ , <i>us</i> . postfixed to verbs N $\mathcal{F}$ .
Ablat.	MMNI, <i>from me</i> .	MMN $\mathcal{F}$ <i>from us</i> .
Instru- mental }	BI, <i>by me</i> .	BN $\mathcal{F}$ , <i>by us</i> .

The Coptic pronouns most nearly resemble the Semitic : here we have—Singular 1. ANK, yielding the possessive I ; 2. NTK, suffix K ; 3. NTO $\mathcal{F}$ , masculine, suffix  $\mathcal{F}$  ; 3. feminine, NTOS, suffix S : Plural, 1. ANON, suffix N ; 2. NTOTN, suffix TEN ; 3. NTOOU, suffix OU. The same suffixes form the personal terminations of verbs.

#### IV. Verbs

are universally <sup>1</sup> words which express an action with reference to the person engaged, and the time when it occurred ; either as done, suffered, or caused to be done by that person ; with sometimes a further indication whether it were an actual event, or only a possible contingency. Hence the distinctions, 1. of Persons ; 2. of Tenses ; 3. of the active, passive, reflective, and causative Forms or Voices ; 4. of the Moods.

<sup>1</sup> The infinitive, which may seem an exception, is in truth an indeclinable verbal noun.



1. We should strictly consider the Persons in the first place. But as they vary in the Semitic languages in the two tenses, our observations on both must be combined; here, confining ourselves to the preliminary statement, that the personal terminations are generally recognised as abbreviated fragments of the personal pronouns;—as will indeed probably be found to be the case in every class of languages, if the different dialects be collated for this purpose with sufficient attention.

2. The Tenses in Hebrew and Arabic are only two, which are commonly represented as a preterite and future. But the distinctions of time are by no means precisely marked: for the genius of these languages seems rather accommodated to the purposes of poetry, which almost indifferently apprehends its subjects as past, present, or future, by the lively transitions of imaginative fancy. Indeed we familiarly observe, even in the far more precise classical languages, a similar confusion of tenses in any spirited style of narrative, not only in poetry but also in prose. How often, for instance, in the campaigns of Cæsar do we find the present substituted for the past. Thus in the Semitic languages we may most justly consider the two tenses as aorists; for although, when simply used, the first has generally a past and the second a future sense, yet if both be connected by the conjunction *and*, whichever is placed last assumes the force of that which preceded. This is by the common grammars, attributed to some mysterious power of the conjunction by which it is supposed to convert the general sense of the tense, and is therefore called the *conversive*; whereas in truth it does but sub-

ject (as a connective particle) a tense in itself indeterminate to the general force of the context, and thus determine its exact acceptance<sup>1</sup>. The present tense is often expressed by the first aorist, and often by the participle, the verb substantive being understood.

<sup>1</sup> These observations on the conversive force ascribed to *F* will be confirmed by the consideration, that the particle *AZ*, *then*, has exactly the same force: *AZ* *ISIR*, *then he sang*; *AZ* *IDBR*, *then he spake*. Bythner, even while laying down the common rule for the conversive *F*, more correctly explains the true nature of its effect, by the remark, “*In continuatâ sententiâ unum tempus plerumque transit in naturam alterius.*” Although the *F* when prefixed to the second aorist, commonly esteemed a future, imparts to it a preterite sense as often as the sense of the context requires, yet, under other circumstances, it leaves the future sense unaffected: thus, in Psalm cxix. 33, 34. “Teach me the way of thy statute, *FAḌRNE*; and I *will* keep it. Make me to understand, *FAḌRE*; and I *will* keep thy law, *FASMRNE*, and I *will* observe it with my whole heart.” On the whole it will afford the best explanation of the phænomena if we consider the second aorist to imply simply a succession of time in the action “and afterwards.” This in passages like the above would necessarily imply a future sense; but in narrative passages merely that one action was performed subsequently to that recorded before.

In the prophetic writings we occasionally find the so-called preterite used in a future sense without any *F*. The splendid description of the desolation about to befall Edom (Isaiah, xxxiv. 14, 15.) will afford a good example. “But there (*ERGIOE*) *shall* repose the night bird. There (*QNNE*) *shall* make her nest the quipuz (an animal sometimes supposed to be an owl or raven, sometimes interpreted a venomous reptile,) (*FTMLØ*) and *shall* lay her eggs.” Here we have three verbs evidently all used in a *future sense*; of these, the two without the *vau* are of the so-called *preterite form*; and that which has the *vau* alone possesses the true form supposed to mark the future

The paradigm of these two tenses in the common active form is here subjoined. The three radical letters are expressed by the figures 1 2 3. I have occasionally expressed the final vowel points by small letters, where they seemed essential.

*First or Past Aorist.*

	Hebrew.	Arabic.
Sing. 1. <i>pers.</i>	1 2 3 T I	1 2 3 To
2. — <i>mas.</i>	1 2 3 T a	1 2 3 Ta
<i>fem.</i>	1 2 3 T e	1 2 3 Te
3. — <i>mas.</i>	1 2 3 <i>the</i>	1 2 3
<i>[simple root.]</i>		
<i>fem.</i>	1 2 3 E	1 2 3 T
Plur. 1. <i>pers.</i>	1 2 3 N F	1 2 3 NA
2. — <i>mas.</i>	1 2 3 T M	1 2 3 T M
<i>fem.</i>	1 2 3 T N	1 2 3 T N
3. <i>mas.</i> }	1 2 3 F {	1 2 3 F A
<i>fem.</i> }	1 2 3 N {	1 2 3 N

*Second Aorist.*

	Hebrew.	Arabic.
	A 1 2 F 3	A 1 2 3
	T 1 2 F 3	T 1 2 3
	T 1 2 F 3 I	T 1 2 3 I N
	I 1 2 F 3	I 1 2 3
	T 1 2 F 3	T 1 2 3
	N 1 2 F 3	N 1 2 3
	T 1 2 F 3 F	T 1 2 3 F N
	T 1 2 F 3 N E	T 1 2 3 N
	I 1 2 F 3 F	I 1 2 3 F N
	T 1 2 F 3 N E	I 1 2 3 N*

As to these personal inflections, it is sufficiently obvious, that the suffixes of the first aorist coincide with the common pronominal suffixes, or with other similar abbreviations; for in using T and TM instead of K and KM, they only return to a nearer agreement with the full pronouns. F of the third person plural masculine exhibits the only discrepancy. The prefixes of the second or future aorist seem also, for the most part, clearly derived from the pronouns; A, first person singular from ANI; N, first person plural from NF; T of the second person singular and plural

<sup>1</sup> A paragoric E or N is occasionally added to these personal terminations, just as the N is to the third person singular of Greek indefinites.

from  $\Delta T_E$  and  $\Delta T_M$ : I and T, the prefixes masculine and feminine of the third person singular and plural, seem more difficult to be accounted for.

If, with a wider spirit of research into the general analogies of grammar, we extend our view to the comparative structure of other languages, we shall always, I am persuaded, discover that the personal inflections attached to verbs, are uniformly derivative forms of the personal pronouns. But an accurate and laborious collation of the various cognate dialects, and especially of their earliest forms, will be necessary. I may shortly exemplify this in the Indo-European family of languages, which have been the most carefully studied. I have placed the Sanscrit at the head of this table. Next I have placed the Greek, adopting the Doric flexion of the verbs in  $\mu$  as the oldest type. It is clear that  $\omega$  is a later contraction of  $o\mu$ , the  $\mu$  though rejected in the active being still preserved in the passive  $\mu\alpha$ , and represented by the final  $o\mu$  of the potential, and  $ov$  of the imperfect. So also is the original  $\tau$  of the third person, though rejected in the active, preserved in the passive  $\tau\alpha$ . The Latin is of course placed next to its Greek parent; and the Slavonic follows, which, in the forms of its verb substantive and common verbs, presents the exact antitypes of the Greek and Latin forms in  $\mu$  or  $m$ , and in  $\omega$  or  $o$ . The Teutonic is taken from its earliest dialect, the Gothic; and the Celtic from its Welsh offspring. The general identity of formation must at once strike the eye;—indeed Leibnitz has well observed, that it is by thus analysing the grammatical structure, which forms the very skeleton of languages, rather than

by confining our attention to mere vocabularies, that we may best detect their true affinities.

	Singular.			Plural.		
	1.	2.	3.	1.	2.	3.
<i>Sanscrit.</i>	mi	si	ti	mes or mah	t'ha	nti
<i>Greek.</i>	μι or ω	σι or ε	{ τι or the τ cast away }	μεε	τε	ντι
<i>Latin.</i>	m or o	s	t	mus	tis	nt
<i>Sclavonic.</i>	mi or	si or	ti or	mui or	te or	uti or
	aiou	aesche	aete	aemi	aete	aioute
<i>Teutonic.</i>	{ simple root. }	{ is }	tha	mes	aith	nd or nt
<i>Celtic.</i>	m or v	t or st	{ simple root. }	m	ch	ynt

These personal inflections are, as we have noticed, in the Celtic the ordinary recognised pronominal suffixes; and if we look at the Greek, &c., we shall see good reason to derive the first singular, *μι* from *εμε*; the second, *σι*, from *σε*; the third *τι*, from *τοε*, *τα*, *το*,—the ancient form of the pronoun, afterwards employed as the article, and thus incorporated into the digammatized form *αττοε*. The first plural *μεε* seems to be from *αμεε*, the ancient form of *ημεε*. The second and third are more obscure; and for these I must refer to the subjoined note<sup>1</sup>. It may, indeed

<sup>1</sup> We are at least sure, that the Welsh second person plural is from the corresponding pronoun *chwi*. The root of this plural person in Sanscrit, and all the other Indo-European languages, appears to be *Yu*,—hence *Υμεε*, the Latin and Slavonic *Vos* and *Vas*. Here the initial *T* or *Σ* of the singular *Tu* and *Σv* appears dropped; but in the Gothic plural *IZWIS*, and indeed in the Greek dual *σφω*, it appears retained; and in the Celtic represented, as is usual in that dialect, by its guttural *ch*. From such an original plural of *Tu*

seem necessary to apologize for at all introducing this apparent digression from the Hebrew into the

or  $\Sigma v$ , TWIS or ZWIS, the personal termination *tis* or *te* will naturally result.

With regard to the third plural termination *nti*, the Welsh, as was long ago observed by Lhwyd (see *Archæol. Brit.*) has alone preserved the original form of the pronoun *hwynt*, from which it is regularly deduced. May we be allowed to conjecture, that as *n* and *u* are often commutable (*e. g.* the French *épouser* from the Latin *sponsare*,) there may have been an ancient form of  $\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$  as  $\alpha\nu\tau\upsilon\varsigma$ , of which the plural would readily yield *anti*?

Those who may wish for further information on these very interesting inquiries, I would refer to Bopp "über das Conjugations System der Sanskrit Sprache," to Grimm's "Deutsche Grammatik," and especially to Dr. Prichard's elaborate and convincing treatise on the "Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations," which necessarily involves a full comparative view, by far the ablest hitherto published, of all the Indo-European family of languages. I cannot, however, resist the opportunity of swelling this note, by appending what appears to me the most demonstrative illustration of the doctrines of the text,—a comparative view of the present tense of the verb substantive in the principal dialects of the Indo-European family. He who can here fail to perceive the most absolute identity of type, must be destitute of every faculty required in such investigations.

	Singular.			Plural.		
	1.	2.	3.	1.	2.	3.
<i>Sanscrit.</i>	asmi	asi	asti	smah	st'ha	santi
<i>Persian.</i>	am	ai	ast	aim	aid	and
<i>Greek.</i>	εἰμι	εἰς	ἐστί	εσμεν	εστε	εἰσι
	εμμι	εσσι		ειμες		εντι
	εσμι?			εσμες?		
<i>Latin.</i>	sum	es	est	sumus	estis	sunt
<i>Sclavonic.</i>	esmi	esi	esti	esmui	este	suti
<i>Gothic.</i>	im	is	ist	sijum	sijuth	sind

The Sanscrit, like the Greek, also possesses a dual, 1. *svah*,

text ; but I am convinced that the general principles of any individual grammar can only be rightly apprehended from these extended comparative views. Without comparative anatomy, how narrow would be our view of the physiology of the human frame ! And comparative philology bears exactly the same relation to every particular grammatical system, and is calculated to throw the same light upon the whole.

The near agreement of the Coptic personal inflections with the Hebrew has been already noticed, when treating of the pronominal suffixes.

3. *Of the Imperative.*—The Semitic languages have

2. and 3. *stah*, like the Greek *εστον*. The Welsh is more disguised, but still easily to be traced by a careful analysis, to the common type. If we compare the other root employed in the verb substantive, the Latin *fui* (from the Greek *φύναι*), with the corresponding Sanscrit *bhavami* and the Teutonic *beon*, we shall find the result equally satisfactory ; and here the Welsh is more exactly parallel : thus the Welsh perfect, Sing. 1. *bum*, 2. *buost*, 3. *bu*, Plur. 1. *buom*, 2. *buoch*, 3. *buont*, corresponds closely with the Latin *fui* (olim *fuim* ?), *fuisti*, *fuit*, *fuimus*, *fuitis*, *fuērunt*. But I must refer to Dr. Prichard's treatise for fuller details. If we compare many other verbs in Sanscrit and Greek, e. g. *dodami*, and *δίδωμι*, *I give* ; *jarami* and *γῆρημι*, *I grow old*, the result will be an equally close agreement, extending not only to personal inflections, but to tenses, moods, and voices. I will conclude this note, already too long, by citing only a collation of the Latin and Gothic form of the verb *to have* : *habeo*, Gothic *haba* ; *habes*, *habais* ; *habet*, *habaith* ; *habemus*, *habam* ; *habetis*, *habaith* ; *habent*, *haband* :—Perfect, *habuit*, *habaida*. The participle is equally close, and will serve to exhibit the identity of the system of declension : *habens*, *habands* ; *habentis*, *habandis* ; *habenti*, *habandin* ; *habentem*, *habandan* ; Plural, *habentes*, *habandans*.



no distinction of moods, with the exception of the Imperative, which has only the second person in both numbers and genders distinguished, as in the following table:—

	Hebrew.	Arabic.
<i>Sing. mas.</i>	12I3	A123
fem.	12ƒ3I	A123I
<i>Plur. mas.</i>	12ƒ3ƒ	A123ƒA
fem.	12ƒ3Nƒ	A123Na

4. *Of the Participles.*—The Hebrew grammarians very confusedly reckon under the active voice, called Kal, not only the active present participle answering to the Latin in *ns*, but also the passive past participle answering to the Latin in *tus*; while they ascribe to the proper passive form another participle appearing to bear a future force, like the Latin *ndus*. I shall, however, as more simple, insert the truly active present participle alone in this place, reserving the others for our article on the passive voice.

This participle is as follows:

	Hebrew.	Arabic.
<i>Sing. mas.</i>	1ƒ23	1A23 on
fem.	1ƒ23E	1A23 Ton
<i>Plur. mas.</i>	1ƒ23IM	1A23ƒNa
fem.	1ƒ23ƒT	1A23Ton

It need not be observed that the participles are merely verbal adjectives.

5. *Of the Infinitive.*—The infinitives of verbs are obviously nothing but indeclinable verbal substantives, expressing simply the action abstracted from

all reference to the person of the agent, &c. The infinitive in Hebrew is either simply the root, or interpolates a *F* before the third radical, thus: 12*F*3. The Arabic infinitive adds *Aan* to the root.

6. *Of the Passive Voice.*—In Hebrew the Passive (called Niphal <sup>1</sup>), prefixes *N* to the active form of the first or past aorist and to the participle, omitting the *F* interpolated before the third radical, where it is found in the active; for it is by no means even there of constant occurrence. In the second aorist or future it is nearly identical with the active, merely omitting the interpolated *F* before the third radical. In the imperative and in the infinitive, it prefixes *E*, and omits the same interpolation. The participle already mentioned, prefixing *N*, is that accounted by the grammarians the proper passive participle, analogous in its force to the Latin *ndus*. But the past passive participle, called *Paval*, which, as I have said, the grammarians curiously refer to the active form *Kal*, interpolates the *F* before the third radical (instead of the second, as in the present active participle), and is thus, 12*F*3.

In the Arabic the passives are distinguished from the actives only by the change of the vowel points; the most marked of which is, that the vowel point of the first syllable active is constantly fatha, *a*; and in the passive damma, *o*.

7. *Of the Reciprocal Form, or Mede Voice, called*

<sup>1</sup> These names are derived from the forms of the verb *POL*, *to work*, as read with points, which was originally taken as the exemplar. The active form is called *Kal* (*light*), from the simplicity both of its form and conjugation.

*Hithpael*.—This is expressed in Hebrew by prefixing ET in the first or past aorist, the imperative and infinitive; and by inserting T after the initial prefix of the second or future aorist. To the participle it prefixes MT. It also doubles the middle radical by the strong dagesh. A remarkable example of a cluster of verbs in this form occurs in a very splendid passage of Isaiah (xxiv. 19, 20).

ROE	ETROOE	EAR <sub>2</sub>
shattering	<i>shattereth itself</i>	the earth

PFR	ETPFRRE	EAR <sub>2</sub>
bursting	<i>bursteth itself</i>	the earth

MFO	ETMFΘΘE	EAR <sub>2</sub>
moving	<i>moveth itself</i>	the earth

NFO	TNFO	AR <sub>2</sub>	KSKFR
nodding	noddeth	the earth	as drunken

FETNFDDE	K	MLFNE
and <i>shifteth itself</i>	as	a temporary lodge

The Arabic has among its various forms one, reckoned as the fifth, which occasionally assumes a similar mede or reciprocal character; and which in like manner prefixes T, and doubles its middle radical by teschdid.

8. *Of the Causative Form, called Hiphil*.—As in Latin *sisto* signifies *stare facio*, causatives of similar force are much more common in the Semitic languages. The Hebrew causative prefixes E, and inserts I before the third radical, assuming the form E12I3 in the first aorist imperative and infinitive. In the participle it prefixes M instead of E. But in

the second aorist it only inserts I instead of *F* before the third radical. The passive of the causative, called Hophal, agrees with the common passive Niphal, only substituting the prefix E, wherever Niphal employs the prefix N. The 119th Psalm, verse 68, affords a good example of the active participle of this form:

Θ*F*B            ATE *F* MΘIB  
Good [art] Thou, and *doing good*.

The genius of the Hebrew peculiarly affects this repetition of identical roots under varying forms: thus, Gen. i. 11,

TDSA      EAR<sub>2</sub>    DSA    OSB MZRIO ZRO  
Let sprout forth the earth sprout of grass seeding seed.

The Arabic has an equivalent form, reckoned the fourth, which prefixes A.

9. *Other Forms of Verbs.*—The above are all the Hebrew forms which can be distinguished without vowel points. But with the points it has one more form, called Piel, the force of which is intensive. This doubles the middle radical by a strong dagesch, and takes the points *i* and *e* instead of two *a*'s: thus, Kal being 1 a 2 a 3, Pihel is 1 i 2 2 e 3; and the passive, called Puhel, is 1 u 2 2 a 3.

The Arabic has a similar form of an intensive force, doubling the middle radical by teschdid: this is reckoned the second in the copious table of the verbal forms in this language, amounting in all to twelve, distinguished by various prefixes, interpolating A and *F*, &c.; and having various forces ascribed to them, as desideratives, frequentatives, expressions of colour,

like the Latin *flavesco*, &c. ; but these have no Hebrew representatives, excepting in the instances already noticed.

The above rules apply to all the regular verbs. The irregular or defective roots, which in conjugation throw away their initial, medial, or final radical, have been sufficiently explained in our article on the roots.

*Conclusion on the Extent and general Affinities of the Semitic Languages.*

We have already, in the course of these remarks, had frequent occasion to exemplify the affinities, which at once demonstratively prove that numerous individual languages may be readily reduced to a comparatively few great mother tongues; all the descendants of which still attest their common origin by the exact identity of their grammatical mechanism in the systems of declension and conjugation, and by the close agreement of whole classes of words forming the great elementary materials of speech, such as the various pronouns, the names of number, and the verb substantive, together with the appellatives of the most striking objects of nature and the commonest relations of life. Of these great mother tongues Asia has been ascertained to contain as many as twenty-three, apparently very distinct<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Between these mother tongues coincidences, which can scarcely be considered as accidental, and such as would ultimately conduct us to a still higher common origin, may, I am persuaded, be detected. But still it must be allowed, that the connexion is vastly more remote than that between

And to this number Europe will only add one independent language, and that (which renders the circumstance the more remarkable) spoken by a very limited population, namely, the Basque, restricted to a narrow corner of the Bay of Biscay, but yet perfectly unrelated to any other known tongue. The dialects of far the greater portion of Europe, including those of the Russian or Sclavonic provinces, the Germanic and Scandinavian, the Greek and the descendants of the provincial Latin in southern Europe, and the Celtic in the north-west,—we have already seen to belong to a single class, which is also common to Persia and India; and the only remaining dialects, those of the Finns and Hungarians, have likewise a common affinity among themselves, and are of Asiatic origin, being branches of a Siberian tribe originally settled between the Tobol, the Volga and the Jaik; whence a portion of them, during some of the violent migratory convulsions of the population, which distinguished the middle ages, burst upon Pannonia in the ninth century: the northern Finns, however, appear to have been an earlier offset. But of the great family of languages allied to the Hebrew, of which we are now more especially treating, the peninsula of Arabia appears to be the great central *patria*; while on the north-east it includes Palestine, Syria, Cappadocia (inhabited by the Leuco-Syri), and the valleys of the Tigris and Eu-

daughters of the same family. If we may pursue the metaphor, they are extremely distant cousins—not sisters; and great injury has been done to the cause of rational philology, by confounding the two classes of phænomena. But we shall have occasion again to return to this subject.

phrates, and on the south-west the districts of Tigri and Amhara in Abyssinia. These languages are usually termed the Semitic, from Shem, the son of Noah, the ancestor of Aram the founder of the Syrian branch, and of Heber, and through him of the Arabic descendants of Ismael, as well as of some other clans through Joktan. Yet many of the Arabic tribes are traced to the race of Ham, as are the Canaanitish nations and the Phœnicians, who assuredly spoke dialects of the same mother speech. And, indeed, there seems no good reason to ascribe diversities of language to the original ramifications of the Noachian family; whether we ascribe that diversity to the dispersion of Babel, or, with many orthodox commentators, suppose the miracle then recorded to have consisted rather in a temporary confusion of mind, producing as its effect a corresponding confusion of expression, rather than to any miraculous change in the permanent dialects, and refer their subsequent diversities to the operation of gradual causes arising from long separation, distant emigrations, and new associations, constantly modifying the simplicity of earlier language. Whichever of these views we may adopt, there seems no authority whatever for attributing distinct tongues to the immediate families of Noah's first descendants, rather than to subsequent causes, which may have blended together in a course of common emigration the members of different Noachian houses.

But however this may be, we may recognise the following subdivisions of the Semitic mother tongue.

1. Aramaic, spoken by the posterity of Aram, the fifth son of Shem, who occupied the countries bor-



dering upon the Euphrates and Tigris. This was again subdivided into two dialects,—*a.* the Eastern Aramaic, spoken on the north of Mesopotamia, and extending to Babylon; a dialect falsely called the Chaldæan, inasmuch as the Chaldæans, though on the dissolution of the first Assyrian empire they occupied Babylonia, appear to have been a race of foreign conquerors;—*b.* the Western Aramaic or Syrian, ranging to the south-west of the Euphrates. 2. The dialect of the Canaanites and Phœnicians. The only fragment of this still preserved is the specimen of its Punic or Carthaginian daughter, exhibited in one of the plays of Plautus, the *Pœnulus*, which has been satisfactorily arranged by Bochart, and the first line of which will be found in the note beneath <sup>1</sup>. 3. The Hebrew. 4. The Arabic. 5. The Æthiopic of Abyssinia.

<sup>1</sup> Ten lines are given together with a Latin translation in the *Pœnulus*; but the first will afford a sufficient proof of the language being Semitic, for this place. This, according to the reading of Lambinus's edition, is, "Ny th Alonim v Alonuth si corath ismacon sith," which Plautus himself translates, "Deos Deasque veneror, qui hanc urbem colant." Now if we read it *Hebraicè*;

נא את עליונים ועליונות שקרת יסמכון זות

which, if read with points as in the Hexapla, will be, "Na eth Elionim v Elionuth sechorath ismecun zoth;" and the literal translation will be, "Rogo Deos Deasque, qui hanc urbem sustinent." Here the terminations of the masculine and feminine plurals IM and UTH, the conjunction V, and the title ELION, *Most High*, applied to the Deity, sufficiently prove the character of the language. We know from Philo Biblius (who quotes Sanchoniathon), that the Phœnicians used this

The close agreement of these dialects will be at once obvious, if we subjoin as a specimen the two first petitions of the Lord's Prayer, as rendered into each of them.

1. Eastern Aramæan,	}	ABFNA DBSMIA
<i>vulgò</i> Chaldee,		
2. Western Aramæan,	}	ABFN DBSMIA
or Syrian,		
3. Hebrew,		ABINF SBSMIM
4. Arabic,		ABFNA ALLeDsI PI ALSsMFAT
5. Æthiopic,		ABFN ZBSMIT
English Translation,	}	Father-our-which-in-heaven.
<i>verbatim</i> ,		

N.B. In this translation the affixes are marked by *Italic* characters, and joined by hyphens to the words with which they are connected in the Semitic forms.

1. ITQDS	SMK,	TATA	MLKfTK
2. NTQDS	SMK,	TATA	MLKfTK
3. IQDS	SMK,	TbFA	MLKfTK
4. LITQDdSe	ASMoKa	TATI	MaLKfToKa
5. ITQDS	SMKa,	TMḶA	MNGSTKa
Hallowed [be]	name- <i>thy</i> ,	come	kingdom- <i>thy</i> -

term Ἐλιοῦν, as the appellation of their gods. Concerning another word in this one line, קרַת, here read Corath, *a city*, we may also observe, that it is closely connected with Carthage itself; as it forms one of the etymological roots of the name of that very city, originally Carthada, which Solinus and Eustathias inform us meant *the new city*, Νεάπολις; and must therefore have been קרתאחדתא, thus read Carthachedta, Καρχήδων. This root entered into the denomination of many cities in Palestine, *e. g.* Cariath arba, *four towns*; Cariath Baal, *Baalstown*; Cariath iarim, *Woodtown*; Cariath sanna, *Brambletown*; Cariath sephar, *Lettertown*. An etymologist may perhaps refer the Celtic appellative for a city, Caer, to the same root.

This specimen will be sufficient for the purpose of exhibiting the close agreement of the various dialects.

I have already noticed the near affinity of the Coptic or ancient Egyptian with the Semitic family ; and some striking coincidences may be found in the language of the Barbers in Northern Africa. I shall in conclusion subjoin a table of some of the most marked resemblances of Semitic and other great mother tongues, extracted from the work of Dr. Prichard referred to. But before doing this, it seems advisable to state somewhat more accurately than is commonly done, the question concerning the resemblances of these great distinct mother tongues ; and to inquire how far those resemblances may be considered as accidental, and how far we are entitled to regard them as the still extant evidences of that primary connection which we undoubtedly believe to have originally existed between the different varieties of the single species of men.

We have already seen the most demonstrative proof, that the numerous languages of the world may be reduced to a comparatively small number of great parent tongues. Of these parent tongues the number can scarcely exceed one hundred. Asia (see Klaproth's *Asia Polyglotta*,) has been ascertained to contain no more than twenty-three ; to which, as we have already stated, Europe adds one only, viz. the Basque. From a careful examination of the information which Vater, in his continuation of Adelung's great philological work (the *Mithridates*), has collected concerning the dialects of America, I am persuaded that the distinct parent tongues of the New

Continent cannot exceed forty ; and more accurate investigation would probably reduce that number <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The number of distinct American tongues has often been so much exaggerated, that I am induced to subjoin a few words on this subject. In the first place I would observe, that the same phenomenon of the wide extension of a very few mother tongues, which is found in Europe and Asia, undoubtedly prevails throughout the greater part of North America ; for if we draw a diagonal line from Behring's Straits to the mouth of the Mississippi, we shall find the vast space included between this and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans occupied by the subdivisions of only five great parent stocks. 1. The well-known Esquimaux, reaching over all the Arctic coast from Cook's Inlet on the west to Labrador on the east, and extending into the north-eastern extremity of Asia on the one side and into Greenland on the other ; a rude people, but with a language extremely artificial and complicated. 2. The Lenni Lenappe: the Knisteneaux of Lake Winnipeg, and the Algonquins of Canada on the north, the aborigines of New England in the centre, and as far as Carolina on the south, together with the Illinois on the west,—are all clearly identified in language, and acknowledge the Lenni Lenappe as their “grandfather.” Their tongue is as elaborate as the Esquimaux ; and all their traditions refer to the north-west as the point from whence they have emigrated, indicating a route which would naturally derive itself from the extremity of America which approximates towards Asia. 3. Mingled with these in their migrations were the Mengwe, a people of ruder speech. One division of these, the Six Nations or Iroquois, are settled near Lake Champlain ; another, the Nadowessi, or Sioux, between the Mississippi and Missouri. 4. Another considerable race, the Chippewyans of Mackenzie (who must not be confounded with the southern Chippeways belonging to the Lenni Lenappe,) extend to the north-west of the Knisteneaux, and cross the Rocky Mountains, the Nagailer, &c. being kindred tribes. 5. Florida on the south of the Lenni Lenappe is occupied by the Cherokees, Chickasaws and Creeks, all whose dialects are nearly allied.

The

Concerning Africa we have little satisfactory information in this respect. One hundred, or one hundred and fifty languages are often spoken of by Seetzen and others as there prevailing; but I am persuaded, from the analogy of the other three quarters of the globe, that, if we assign one parent tongue to every four of these, we shall make an

The countries on the west of the Upper Missouri, Louisiana and Mexico, certainly appear more diversified in their tongues; but in the latter the Aztec, the language of the ruling conquerors whom the Spaniards there found, is connected with that of the tribes of Sinaloa, Sonora and Pimeria along the continental shore of the Gulf of California, and more remotely with the dialects of the Yucuatlian and Kolus-chian races in the extreme north, occupying the coast from 43° to 60° N. lat. Thus are the native traditions deducing their migrations from this quarter confirmed by philological inquiries. Mingled among the southern Aztecas (the invaders of this district), the Huasteca is an extensive dialect, as one branch of it still spreads from Guatemala over the peninsula of Yucatan, and formerly constituted the aboriginal dialect of the principal West Indian islands, Cuba, Hispaniola and Jamaica. With these proofs of the general fact of the wide extension of parent tongues before us, we shall be naturally led to refer the contrary assertion, sometimes made, of the occurrence of many such distinct tongues in narrow districts, to the mistake of dialects for these. Thus, when Humboldt says that the different speeches prevailing in Mexico are as distinct as Greek, German, French and Polish, we may readily admit this, and yet believe them to be sisters; as the Indo-European dialects, to which they are compared in this respect, undoubtedly are. For further particulars on this interesting subject, and for everything connected with the languages of South America, I must refer to Vater's elaborate work, and to the admirable digest of all the information which has yet been acquired in these researches in Dr. Prichard's *Physical History of Man*.

ample allowance, amounting to twenty-five in all. This would swell our estimate of the distinct parent tongues of the whole globe only to eighty-nine; so that, if we estimate them in round numbers at one hundred, we need not fear that we shall have understated them.

Now if we look at the inferences deducible from this leading and indisputable fact, we should, even if we were unable to advance another step, find those inferences most satisfactorily converging towards the Biblical theory, which ever teaches us to regard the whole human race as a single species: for it is difficult to conceive any hypothesis of the origin of languages, which must not necessarily limit a peculiar language to the members of a single family, at the period of its first appearance; and we may therefore gather very satisfactory evidence, that the many million actual families of the earth must assuredly have descended from not more than one hundred original families. It is surely a far easier step than this to deduce that hundred from a single family in the first instance; and this I call a converging argument.

Still further, if we compare, as Dr. Prichard has elaborately done in his excellent treatise on the Physical History of Man, the tribes positively identified as descendants of the same family by community of language, we shall often find those physical and anatomical varieties springing up among them, which some writers have erroneously attempted to represent as proofs of a distinction of species in the human race.

The evidence, therefore, might be regarded as per-

fectly satisfactory, even were we obliged to stop at these hundred great mother tongues, and to acknowledge that between them no further connexion could be traced: for we might very easily conceive, that the original language of the first family of our race, being extremely simple in its structure, and consisting, it may be, only of a few appellatives of the most prominent objects of sense, and most necessary implements and relations of life<sup>1</sup>, might have com-

<sup>1</sup> I do not absolutely assert my persuasion that this *was so*,—only that *we may easily conceive it to have been so*, and have no proof to the contrary. Many, I am well aware, are prepossessed with an idea that the first language must have originated in direct Divine inspiration; and considering also a simple as equivalent to a rude state, would shrink from such a representation as the above. But I may observe, that there is no authority for all this in the only record from which we can draw information. The Deity seems to have implanted in man an instinctive desire to denote the objects around him by those varied sounds which his singular powers of articulation (whence the epithet Μέροπες ἄνθρωποι) so admirably fit his organs for producing. Man's reason being ever cultivated by education, his instinctive powers thus superseded remain, under ordinary circumstances, dormant, and escape observation. But Herodotus has recorded an experiment of an Egyptian king, who, from a curious desire to ascertain the origin of language, shut up a band of infants, and brought them up by means of dumb nurses, who alone were permitted to have access to them. The result was, that when the children grew up they were found to have established a conventional language among themselves. Now, although I certainly shall not undertake to guarantee the authenticity of this story, yet neither shall I hesitate to acknowledge, that it appears to me perfectly consistent with nature; and well illustrates my opinion of the instinctive propensity of man to denote the objects of his thoughts by articulate sounds. The Deity, then, in every point of view appears the original



municated only to the more complicated dialects, which afterwards arose, traces easily so far obscured as to defy detection. It is only when the structure of languages becomes more artificially complicated, and a single root is preserved as it were in multitudes of varying forms and compounds, that their affinities are so marked as to attract observation. Such languages are termed polysynthetic; and it is a common observation, how much more clearly the connexion of these may be traced, than that of the simpler monosyllabic tongues. Still, however, the best authorities on this subject have been of opinion, that even between these distinct mother tongues, instances of coincidence may still be traced, far too numerous, and of a nature far too marked, to be considered with any probability as the mere result of accidental coincidence. But in order to enable the reader more satisfactorily to judge for himself, what may, and what may not, be attributed to casual coincidence on this subject, I shall subjoin, in a post-

*giver* of language: inasmuch as he is the author of our instinctive desires, and the framer of all our mental faculties and bodily organs. The first man, called into existence in all the perfection of adult power, would at once have exercised those powers,—and this instinctive propensity to employ language among the rest. Nor is there a single word in the sacred record which seems to imply anything further. Adam is only said to have employed articulate words as the denominations of things: if so, language must necessarily have been extremely simple in its origin, and have become gradually more complicated, as new ideas and relations arose in the slow lapse of ages. Shuckford, in his *Connexion of the Sacred and Profane History of the World*, has ably advocated views similar to the above.

script at the end of this article, a precise statement of the data affecting the subject, and apply the mathematical doctrine of probability to the solution of the question, to what extent the phænomena of coincidence can be considered as accidental, which appears to me the only method of arriving at any satisfactory conclusion.

M. Klaproth, in his elaborate work on the languages of Asia, terms these instances of agreement between the most distinct mother tongues, “antediluvian coincidences;” in consequence of his own peculiar hypothesis, which is assuredly, however, not a little inconsistent with the plain sense of the Scriptural narrative. He has given copious examples of them in various tongues; but our present object being mainly to illustrate the connexions of the Semitic family, we cannot better conclude our present subject than by here giving the table of the coincidences between the Semitic and Indo-European, which Dr. Prichard has inserted in the close of his excellent work on the Celtic and other Indo-European languages, already referred to.

“Among the first ten numerals there are a few terms which appear to be cognate.

Semitic Dialects.	Indo-European Languages.
1. echad, Heb.	aika, Sansk.
	yik or eek, Pers.
3. Ordinal in Chald.	3. Ordinal in Sanskrit.
תְּלִיתִי—tlithay, (Dan. ii. 39.)	tritaya.
6. shesh, Heb.	shash, Sansk.
7. shevang, Chald.	seven, sibun, &c.

“The following are some verbal roots and nouns which are evidently of the same origin. Among them are verbs which nearly resemble the two verbs substantive already traced in the Indo-European language.

## Semitic Dialects.

## Indo-European Languages.

בִּית—bith from בִּוּת—	beith, Erse.
būth, Chald. to tarry,	bȳdh, bôd, W.
dwel, (Dan. vi. 18.) often	buden, Pers.
used in the Targum for	bhu, Sansk.
לֹו. In Arabic this word	be, beon, Teut.
is بَات—bat, or بَيْت	
—beit, to tarry, be situ-	
ated <sup>1</sup> .	

But the verb in Hebrew which closely corresponds with the Indo-European verb substantive, and in fact identical with it, is יֵשׁ—yesh, he is; in Arab. اِيس—is <sup>2</sup>.

khól, (whole, all)

hôr, horim, hori, (moun-  
tain)

It can hardly be doubted that יֵשׁ is a real cognate of the Indo-European verb.

is, Erse.

ys, Welsh.

as, Sanskrit. &c. &c.

ὅλος.

hôlh, Welsh.

ὄρος.

<sup>1</sup> Buxtorf. Lex. Heb. p. 69. Michaëlis Supplem. in Lex. Heb. voce בִּוּת.

<sup>2</sup> Gesenius's Lexicon, Cambridge edition. See Genes. xxviii. 16. Deuteron. xxix. 17, &c. p. 316.

Semitic Dialects.	Indo-European Languages.
láish, (lion)	λέων.
leōm, (people)	λεώς.
luach, (a stone table)	lhêch, (a flat stone.) λίθος.
loang, (throat, swallow)	lung, lingua.
tōr, tōri, (Chald.)	ταῦρος, ταῦροι.
keran, (Chald.)	cornu, κέρας.
gúvra, (Chald.)	gwr, vir.
ærez, in Chald. ארעא—	} erda. erth. dhara, daiar. terra.
argha (צ being, however, often mutable into d, which would make ærda.)	
עֲבִי—gnabi (clouds)	
נער, pronounced Nερ in Origen's Hexapla, Hos. ii. 1. (a youth.)	
נַעֲרָה—naærah, puella.	} narah, Sansk. ἀνήρ.
ganaz	
chetoneth	γάνος.
sepel (Jud. v. 25.) (a cup)	χιτών.
yayin	simpulum.
	vinum, οἶνος.

Here we find ' stand-  
ing for the digamma or  
vau. An insertion of the  
vau will convert many  
Hebrew into Indo-Euro-  
pean words, as

2. yadang (know,) in	} vidan, εἰδεῖν. oἶδα, vaidā.
Pih, yiddang.	
3. halak	walk.

Semitic Dialects.	Indo-European Languages.
4. rong (evil)	wrong.
5. chiva (an animal) chavah, life.	} vivo, viva. jiva, Sansk.
6. ragang	ῥήγνυμι, frango, i.e. frago.
kúm, (arise, come)	komm, come.
laat, (to hide, secrét)	lateo, λήθε.
arar, aru, ar, (curse)	ἄρα, ἀράομαι.
ād	ad, at.
lakək, also lakhak and likhak	} liah, Sansk. λείχω, lick.
אוד—ud	udus, ud, Sansk. ὕδωρ, &c.
thiggenu (Gen. iii. 5.)	θιγγάνετε, (Gen. iii. 5.)
tardemah ex radam	traum, dream.
mōth	motus.
moth and } mēth }	meath } meatham } Erse, to die.
olem, (age)	olim, Lat.
charats, (cleave, wound) slightly, Gesenius)	} χαράσσω. scratch.
לעה—laghah, (to babble)	} The same element in λακέω, laugh, lächeln, loquor?
לעז—laghaz, (speak bar- barously)	
לעג—laghag, (laugh and speak unintelligibly)	
In all these we recog- nise one element.	

## PRONOUNS.

atta, pron. (thou)	tu.
ta, suffix.	ta, t'ha, suffix in Sanskrit.
hi, (she)	hi, si.

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Semitic Dialects.	Indo-European Languages.
hu, (he)	evo.
anu, suffix NU.	ni, nos, nau.

“ No sufficient comparison of the Egyptian and other Northern African dialects with each other and with the Semitic languages, has been made to allow of any general statement as to their relations. I may however observe, that those who have denied that any affinity can here be traced appear rather to have presumed the fact than to have proved it. The affinity of some striking words among the personal pronouns in the Egyptian and Hebrew languages is such as to excite a strong suspicion that more extensive resemblances exist, though it does not appear probable that the idioms of Northern Africa are even so nearly related to the Semitic, as the latter are to the Indo-European languages<sup>1</sup>. ”

Thus far Dr. Prichard. But I cannot conclude these remarks on the coincidences of languages, as evidencing the derivation of the whole human race from a common origin, without adverting to another

<sup>1</sup> With regard to the coincidences between the Semitic and other mother tongues, besides the Indo-European, we have already pointed out the close analogy of the Semitic and Coptic pronouns. The dialects of the language of the Lenni Lenappe, in North America, will afford us another analogy more striking from the remote distance of these nations. In these American dialects *ni* represents the pronoun of the first person singular and plural, like the Hebrew ANI, NI, and NU : *ki*, the second person, equally resembles K and KEM. The first singular pronoun is very similar in many of the most unconnected American dialects : in Esquimaux, *nga* ; Chicasaw, *anwa* ; Apalachian, *na* ; Waikuri, *me* ; Pima, *ani* ; Tara-

point of analogy connected with languages, which appears to me quite as important as any mere verbal resemblances,—I mean the prevailing uniformity of what may be called the general principles of universal grammar. All languages employ similar classes of general terms, such as pronouns. All languages connect these pronouns with terms indicating action, so as to produce verbs varying through persons and numbers. And this identity of the general principles of the mechanism of language is often far greater than can be accounted for by ascribing it only to an identity in the general metaphysical operations of the human mind. In the forty distinct mother tongues of America, for instance, though few marks of verbal coincidence can be traced, yet the elaborate mechanism which pervades the whole, and the methods by which they express very complicated relations, and various modifications of the original ideas, evince the most remarkable identity of design.

humara, *ne*; Cora, *ne*; Othomi, *ma*; Huasteca, *nana*; Maya *en*; Aztec, *ne*.

Dr. Prichard has pointed out some curious coincidences between the Algonquin dialect of the Lenni Lenappe and the Irish.

	<i>Irish.</i>	<i>Algonquin.</i>
<i>Island,</i>	Inis,	Inis.
<i>Lie,</i>	Gai,	Ga.
<i>Water,</i>	Visce,	Isca.
<i>Soft,</i>	Bog,	Boge.
<i>All,</i>	Cac'uile,	Kakeli.
<i>Everything,</i>	Cac'cine,	Kakina.



\* \* *Postscript on the Application of the Doctrine of Chances to determine how far the Coincidences of Language can be probably regarded as accidental.*

1. *Preliminary data.*—The following steps appear the necessary preliminaries in order to reduce to a precise and definite form the great problem concerning the coincidences of terms essentially the same, as applied to the same objects in different languages; to determine, that is, how far such coincidences can be, with any probability, ascribed to accidental resemblance, and at what point they assume the more important character of evidences of an original connexion between the dialects which exhibit them. In the first place we must determine (by an approximation sufficiently near) the number of elementary combinations which various languages have at their disposal to indicate the objects which they undertake to designate.

Now it is a very easy task to approximate to the number of radical words commonly received into languages; and we cannot materially err in estimating the average of these at 2000; for the ordinary Hebrew and Greek dictionaries give us a number little exceeding this (although certainly including, in several instances, repetitions of the same essential root under slightly varied modifications), and Cary's list of Sanscrit roots amounts only to 1754. These radical words of a language must of course be coequal in number with the primary ideas which they are required to denominate.

But in considering the stock of articulate signs which language employs as its instruments for this

purpose, it is not to these verbal roots that we must, in the first place, direct our attention, but rather to the combinations of letters out of which they are formed; and here, as we are treating of the comparison of different languages, we must consider as identical those alphabetical combinations which, from the common permutation of letters of the same organs, readily pass into one another in the dialectic varieties of the same original speech; as, for instance, the Greek *βαίρω* into the Latin *venio*. These permutations of the several vowels into each other, and similarity of the dentals, labials, and gutturals, are familiar to all grammarians; but they are most copiously treated, and illustrated by examples of their influence on the derivative forms in various dialects, in Lhwyd's *Archæologia Britannica*, and in Dr. Prichard's important work on the Comparison of the Celtic and other Dialects of the Indo-European Family. It will at once appear, on referring to such sources, that in order to represent the roots of language under any permanent and persisting form, such as they would preserve in their course through different cognate dialects, we must have recourse, not to the ordinary alphabetical characters, but to a notation expressing under the same sign the letters most readily and frequently commutable, and distinguishing those alone less liable to be confounded. We should thus, I apprehend, recognise only eight literal elements as permanently distinct: 1, the vowels in general; 2, the labials, *p*, *b*, *f*, and *v*; 3, the dentals, *t* and *d*; 4, the gutturals, *k*, *g*, *q*; 5, *m* and *n*; 6, *l*; 7, *r*; 8, the sibilants, *s* and *z*.

Thus, assuming eight permanently distinct literal

elements, we may easily approximate to the number of their combinations as employed in language. For this purpose we may fairly assume trilateral combinations as the average form of roots: such are the great majority of the Hebrew roots, and the same number of letters are by most philologists ascribed to the original Greek roots. We cannot, then, materially err<sup>1</sup> in assuming the possible trilateral combinations of our eight permanently distinct characters as a near approximation to the elementary literal roots constituting the whole original stock which language can employ for the formation of its terms. Now, as the same letter may be repeated over and over in the same root (as in the Hebrew BBE, the Latin *mamma*, &c.), it is evident that the possible ternary permutations of eight characters will be the cube of that number, or 512.

If it should be objected that the number of elementary literal roots of language, as thus found, is not much more than a quarter of the primary verbal roots actually existing in most tongues, before estimated at about 2000, it may be at once answered that this very objection really confirms our views, as we find languages unable to supply this demand without repeating over and over again, in different senses, literal roots essentially the same, and varied only by slight modifications of pronunciation, not to be con-

<sup>1</sup> If there be an error in thus overlooking the biliteral and pluriliteral roots, it must obviously be an error in defect, and therefore will understate rather than overstate the arguments in favour of the conclusions we are anxious to establish, as will shortly be seen.

sidered as in any manner affecting the essential identity of the terms in cognate dialects. Thus, in English we have *bad*, *bed*, *bid*, and *bud*; and in Hebrew Zbb, Sbb, Sbb, and Zkr, Skr, Skr. These repetitions forcibly evince the small number of the elementary literal roots.

2. *Application of the Doctrine of Chances to solve the Question, How many accidental Coincidences may be expected to occur between any two Languages.*

From the preceding investigation it should appear that we may fairly assume 512 as a sufficient approximation to the number of elementary literal combinations, and 2000 as the verbal roots or primary terms which languages must express by their means; and from these data we shall proceed to institute our calculations, only observing, in the first place, that if any one should consider these approximations as erroneously assumed, it will be easy to substitute such corrections as may be supposed necessary. The advantage of the method pursued in reducing the question from loose and vague generalizations to precise and definite statement, and of subjecting it to that test of mathematical reasoning which can alone lead to solid conclusions on any argument involving probability, must still remain incontrovertible. In order, then, thus to subject to calculation the question, How many accidental coincidences may be expected between any two mother tongues—*e. g.* the Semitic and Indo-European classes—we may proceed as follows.

These two languages having each 512 literal roots, with which they are required to express 2000 radical words, will be evidently, as far as the present ques-

tion is concerned, in the same situation with two individuals having each a die with 512 faces, (the faces of both dice being distinguished by the same regular series of numbers, or other corresponding marks,) and having the trial of 2000 throws allowed them. If we adopt this illustration, the accidental coincidences of the terms which may happen to be employed by both languages to express the same object, will obviously be strictly analogous to the cases of doublets occurring in the same throw between the two dicers.

Now, according to Demoivre's formula, Problem 3, *Doctrine of Chances*, we may readily find in how many trials an event will probably happen, if the number of cases favourable and unfavourable to its happening in any one trial be given; for, let  $x$  be the number of trials required,  $a$  the favourable and  $b$  the unfavourable cases in any one trial, and let  $q$  be so assumed that  $q : 1 :: b : a$ , or  $q = \frac{b}{a}$ . Hence he

deduces, by a process which it is unnecessary here to repeat, the equation, that whenever  $q$  is pretty large in respect to unity,  $x = q \times \text{hyperbolic log. } 2$ , or  $0.693$ ; therefore  $x = 0.7 \times q$ , nearly; and  $x$  so soon converges to the limit  $0.7 \times q$ , that this value of  $x$  may be assumed in all cases, be the value of  $q$  what it may. To apply this to the particular instance presented by our problem, the favourable case for a doublet being one only out of 512; here  $a : b :: 1 : (511 = q)$ ; therefore  $x = 511 \times 0.7 = 357.7$ . Therefore we may expect a doublet with the two dice in about 358 throws, or a coincidence in the two languages in the same number of terms.

We have thus, then, ascertained in what number of terms a single coincidence may be expected; but a further process is necessary before we can infer from hence what number of coincidences may be expected in 2000 terms, or in the total number of radical words; for it appears, upon investigation, that the number of events rendered probable is far from increasing in a proportion equally rapid with the increasing number of trials, so that we should be altogether in error were we to conclude that the number of coincidences in 2000 terms would be the same multiple of one, that 2000 is of 358, the period of the arrival of the first coincidence. Demoivre, in his fourth and fifth problems, has investigated this subject, and established a formula, of which a numerical expression is given below<sup>1</sup>. Hence we learn that in our problem four coincidences may be expected in  $(511 \times 3.672) = 1870.392$  terms, or about  $4\frac{1}{3}$  in 2000.

The probable accidental coincidences, therefore, between two languages, such as the Semitic and Indo-European mother tongues, will be less than

<sup>1</sup> When  $q$  is not very small, the value of  $x$  (the number of trials in which the event may be expected,) will be

For a single event..... $0.693 \times q$ .

— double event..... $1.678 \times q$ .

— triple event..... $2.675 \times q$ .

— quadruple event. .... $3.672 \times q$ .

— quintuple event. .... $4.670 \times q$ .

— sextuple event..... $5.668 \times q$ .

And if the number of events be pretty large in respect to unity, call it  $n$ , and then  $x = \frac{2n-1}{2} \cdot q$ .



five, if our data have been correctly assumed; and the only error to the suspicion of which they appear at all liable, is one having a tendency to give an estimate in excess, not in defect; for it may, perhaps, be said, that in taking only trilateral elementary roots into our account, we have excluded unfairly certain biliteral and quadrilateral combinations, and thus taken the number of roots too low. But in proportion as we should increase the number of these elementary literal roots, it is obvious we shall diminish that of the probable accidental coincidences. In this case therefore we shall have certainly understated rather than overstated the force of our argument, in favour of the original connexion of the mother tongues compared, as derived from the superiority in number of the actual coincidences to those which can appear at all probable as of accidental occurrence. No one can cast a hasty glance over the table of coincidences of the Semitic dialects with those of the Indo-European languages, without being at once struck with the evidence of such a superiority. It is quite unnecessary to insist how strong an argument is thus afforded in favour of the Scriptural hypothesis of the original unity of the human species; and this argument is the more valuable, as being purely derived from that mode of reasoning which alone can never be suspected of being in any manner biassed by prejudice,—simple mathematical investigation.

3. *To determine in what proportion the improbability of accidental coincidence is increased, when we find several consecutive coincidences in corresponding series*



of terms, e. g. the successive persons of verbs, &c., in two languages.

We have already seen to what a small extent coincidences of any kind, such as are found to exist between the most unconnected languages, can with any probability be considered as accidental. But the analogies which occur between the more nearly related dialects, in which we find long series of consecutive coincidences presented by the successive numerals, the several pronouns, and the connected system of terminations, &c., constituting what may be called the whole mechanism of nouns and verbs, and the like, are obviously of such a nature that it may seem almost a waste of time to enter into any argument to prove the utter absurdity of ascribing them to accidental resemblance; yet the subject is interesting, and may be so briefly illustrated, that I am induced to subjoin a few words concerning it.

Now, if we take the three singular persons of the Sanscrit verb substantive *asmi*, *asi*, *asti*, the probability that the coincidence of the first person in another language, as for instance in the Slavonic *esmi*, can be accidental, will be only  $\frac{1}{512}$ . If the second person in Slavonic, *esi*, be also found to coincide, the probability of accidental coincidence of the two consecutively will be reduced to  $\frac{1^2}{512^2}$ . If the third, *esti*, still agree, the probability that this consecutive triplet can be casual is again brought down to  $\frac{1^3}{512^3}$ .

If, as is actually the case, the three plural persons equally coincide, the probability of such an accidental sextuplet will exhibit the enormous disproportion

$\frac{1.6}{512^6}$ \*, or 1 to some tens of thousands of billions.

As similar coincidences extend through a majority of the moods and tenses of many verbs, it were easy to extend the argument; but the above may perhaps be regarded as sufficient. In the above instance it is true that the coincidence of the personal terminations may resolve itself into the coincidence of the original pronominal forms; but it is obvious that this view would only present the very same consecutive coincidences under another aspect.

4. *To determine the probable number of accidental coincidences which may be expected in a given number of languages (say 100) in any single term.*

As the coincidences can only occur between the languages compared together in pairs, or taken two and two, we must first inquire into how many binary combinations we may thus arrange the given number of languages (which call  $n$ ), and this will be =  $\frac{n \cdot n - 1}{2}$ , or in 100 languages  $50 \times 99 = 4900$ .

Next, as the chances of doublets in a single trial with any given number ( $m$ ) of pairs must be the

\* Demoivre, Problem 88, *Doctrine of Chances*, investigates the probability of consecutive events, and he includes the consideration of the number of trials allowed, which he calls ( $n$ ), and the number of consecutive events ( $p$ ): he deduces thence his general formula; but as in the case before us

$n = p$ , that formula as applied to it will become  $\frac{a^p}{a + b)^p}$ .  
See *Doctrine of Chances*, page 244.

same as the chances of doublets in the same number ( $m$ ) of trials with one pair, we may thus solve our question by an application of Demoivre's formula before given; for in 4900 trials with one pair, since  $4900 = q$  or  $511 \times 9.57$ , we may expect ten events, from the equation with which our former extract (p. 109.) concludes, since  $\frac{(2 \times 10) - 1}{2} = 9.5$ : we

may therefore expect ten accidental coincidences between 100 languages in a single term.

By similar reasoning we may infer that in the whole 2000 radical terms we shall have a number of more than 19,000 coincidences between the whole 100 languages taken collectively. This will show us that little dependence can be placed on general comparisons of all the known languages considered in a mass, as an argument to support the opinion of the original unity of our species, since, thus considered, so large a number of coincidences may probably be accidental; but the true point to which we ought to direct our attention is the comparison in detail of each definite pair. We have already seen how favourable such a comparison proves to be in the instance of the Semitic and Indo-European classes; and since these, *primâ facie*, appear quite as distinct as any other two families, we have at least a favourable ground of presumption that the other languages, which at present appear widely dissimilar, may by a similar examination be shown to have been probably originally connected. Comparative philology is, indeed, as yet too much in its infancy to allow our doing this at present to any considerable extent; but

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I shall conceive my time to have been very usefully spent, if I have in any degree succeeded in illustrating the path necessary to be pursued in order to bring the question to the arbitration of a precise and strict method of reasoning.

## PART III.

ON THE PECULIAR DOCTRINES OF  
CHRISTIANITY.LECTURE I <sup>1</sup>.*On the Mysteriousness of certain Doctrines of the  
Christian Religion.*

THE subject which it is proposed to examine in our present Lecture is the question, How far the mysteriousness of any doctrines can be considered a valid objection against the reception of those doctrines, as the genuine communications of a real revelation.

Now, before we can effectually examine this question, it is obviously necessary that we should in the first place clearly define the idea which we attach to the term ‘mystery’, on which the discussion turns.

As our business is rather with the application of the term than with its history, its etymology can

<sup>1</sup> In parts of this Lecture the author has availed himself of the general arguments of a Discourse on the same subject by his ancestor Bishop Conybeare, which, having passed through many editions during his life, was republished by Bishop Randolph in the *Enchiridion Theologicum*: but he has throughout re-modelled the form; and the illustrations are entirely original, and adapted to the philosophical views of more modern science.

only interest us as a mere subject of curiosity. It is well known to be derived from the Greek, *μυστήριον*, originally applied by that nation, especially to the most secret and ineffable rites of their religion ; and as these were principally borrowed from the Orientals, the term has been deduced, not without probability, from the root *מצר*, which in the Semitic languages signifies something hidden or concealed. The theological acceptation of the term, it may be observed, remarkably agrees with the force of such an original root ; as it is used to denote a doctrine, of which our comprehension is imperfect, and which is therefore partially veiled from us.

In the Scriptural use of the term it sometimes denotes the latent application of a parable or type,—sometimes those religious truths previously unknown, but at length brought to light by the Christian Revelation,—and sometimes also those doctrines which involve facts clearly communicated to us as *facts* in Revelation, while yet the exact manner in which those facts take place is not revealed, and therefore transcends our present powers of comprehension ;—such as the spiritual union between Christ and his Church—and the change which our bodies shall undergo at the resurrection, when “ this corruptible shall put on incorruption.”

Now it is to this latter signification that the term is generally restricted in its modern theological acceptation,—as denoting doctrines in which we believe some fact to be revealed, while yet the exact manner of that fact is unexplained, and therefore surpasses the powers of our present faculties

to comprehend. Such, more especially, are the doctrines of the Atonement, of the Trinity, and of the Hypostatical Union, as it is called, of the divine and human natures in Christ. With regard to these doctrines, we believe these facts to be revealed,—namely, in the first instance, that the vicarious sufferings of Christ have redeemed those who turn to him in faith, from the sentence due to their sins ; although we feel ourselves unable to explain the reasons, why such a sacrifice was required, or the exact manner in which it produces its effect. Again, we believe that the Scriptures assert that there is in the divine nature an union, and that yet together with that union there exists also a distinction ; although what is the exact nature of that union, and of that distinction, we are not instructed, and we presume not to conjecture. And lastly, we believe that the same Scriptures so describe the person of Christ as to imply, that together with his human soul there was constantly present a divine principle ; although we are left in the dark as to what was the exact nature of the union of these two principles, or what the exact manner in which the one acted upon the other.

Here, then, we see exemplified the *nature* and *degree* of that *imperfection of knowledge*, which attaches itself to what are usually termed the ‘mysteries of religion’. The logical conditions which they involve will, I think, be found to amount to nothing more than these :—That, in the actual state of our faculties and knowledge, we may admit that a given cause produces a given effect ; although we feel ourselves unable to apprehend or explain



the exact manner in which that cause produces that effect ;—and again, that we may have distinct ideas of the relations towards ourselves, under which the divine nature is exhibited to us ; while yet we are perfectly incompetent metaphysically to comprehend that nature as it is in itself. From these considerations it will, I think, be obvious, how utterly destitute of foundation is the objection, that in contending for *mysterious* doctrines, *i. e.* doctrines of which our comprehension is in many particulars imperfect, we contend for *unintelligible* doctrines. But in truth the difference between unintelligible and incomprehensible is wide and important. A proposition is unintelligible, concerning the terms of which we can frame no ideas. And in such a case to say that we assent to the proposition, is obviously an idle mockery ; for what is assent but a perception, or at least a firm persuasion, that the extremes of a proposition agree or disagree ? But where we have *no manner* of ideas of these extremes, we can have no such perception or persuasion ; and as no combination of terms really insignificant can make a real proposition, so no combination of terms to us perfectly unintelligible can, with respect to us, be accounted propositions.

But the incomprehensibility of a doctrine implies an affection of our knowledge altogether different from unintelligibility. Unintelligibility implies, as we have seen, the absence of all ideas : incomprehensibility implies merely the inadequacy of our ideas. Where, in the infinitude of relations which may belong to any subject, any of them are such as transcend our present faculties, such that we

have not full and adequate ideas concerning them, all propositions on such a subject must be to us mysterious, must involve considerations concerning which much must as yet be imperfectly comprehended by us.

Another source of imperfect comprehension will be found in the *indeterminate* character which belongs to our ideas of many objects, and more especially to those of a spiritual nature. We should consider that in those revelations which God is pleased to make, he deals with us as with *men*, and does not produce in us any new faculties different from what we had before. If, therefore, any of the truths revealed involve ideas which we are incapable of deriving from the ordinary operation either of our senses or reflection, in what manner can these new ideas be conveyed to us? It is clear that the only alternative must be either by the creation of new faculties, or, if this be inconsistent (as from experience we learn that it is inconsistent) with the order of the divine dispensation, then the only manner in which these new ideas can be communicated, must be by representing them by some other ideas with which they have a remote resemblance and analogy;—such are the doctrines concerning the filial relation of the second to the first person of the Trinity, and the like. To this representation by analogous ideas we may, indeed, conceive the Apostle to allude when he says, “Now we see through a glass, (or rather ‘by the reflections of a mirror,’ *κἀντοπτρον*,) darkly, and not face to face.” But all such analogous ideas must be necessarily indeterminate; and most of all, those analogies by which alone spiritual things can be repre-

sented in the reflections arising from the mirror of material nature, with alone which our present faculties are conversant.

Our real question then will be, whether the general laws and limits of our knowledge be such, that we are authorized, and indeed bound, to reject all propositions concerning the terms of which our ideas are at all inadequate or indeterminate? and, in order to answer this question, we must enter a little more at length into a consideration of the general analogy and extent of our knowledge. I would examine, then, whether this imperfection be something *peculiar*, and affecting *only* the doctrines proposed to our assent by the Christian Revelation; or whether it be not in truth an imperfection belonging to the *general* condition of our faculties and knowledge?

Imperfection, indeed, appears to be the necessary condition of the knowledge attainable by any being of finite faculties. Nature around him is truly infinite. Any finite apprehension of it, therefore, must necessarily be inadequate and imperfect, and consequently blended with much of mystery. Mystery in fact is a relative rather than an absolute term. We cannot say that any truth is mysterious in itself,—it is mysterious only to us. To reject doctrines, therefore, because they are mysterious, is in effect to deny that there is anything like a gradation in the scale of intellectual natures,—or to assert that we stand so high in that scale, as in fact to be omniscient, and therefore entitled to reject every doctrine which we cannot perfectly comprehend, as being in itself incomprehensible and impossible. On

exactly the same grounds the mind of the savage of Australia would be authorized to reject any of the truths ascertained by the science of the civilized European.

Now it is a trite observation, that the persuasion of the certainty and indefinite extent of our knowledge, is the persuasion of vulgar and uninformed minds ; while the intellects that have attained to the highest pinnacles of human science, have thence most clearly discerned the narrow and impenetrable limits that bound the field open to our investigation. Such minds have ever been the first to assent to the confession of the poet,

..... οὐδὲ τὰ πάντα  
ἐκ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι γινώσκουμεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πολλὰ  
κέκρυπται.

Not all by Heaven to man is yet reveal'd,  
But much remains in darkness still conceal'd.

It needs not, indeed, an oracle to inform us that a just appreciation of the true limits of our knowledge, a modest confession of what has been well called a “*docta ignorantia*,” constitutes the highest claim to the reputation of such a wisdom as alone can appertain to our condition : to think otherwise is, as I have said, the common error of a vulgar mind. If an utterly uninstructed person should, for instance, be told that such inquiries as, why a stone let loose from our hand would fall to the ground, or why the rays of the sun enabled us to behold objects, were questions which engaged the gravest attention of philosophers like Newton, such a person would at first be probably lost in incred-

lity, and would at once profess that in his own views nothing could be clearer than these things. In like manner, if we proceed to the metaphysical examination of many of the ideas which seem most familiar to us, —of time, for instance, —of space, or motion, or matter, —how unexpectedly indeterminate do we not find those ideas become to us ! How often, if pressed for an exact philosophical definition, will not candour oblige us to return the well-known answer on such an occasion, “ Si non me rogares, intelligo <sup>1</sup> ! ”

The region of science, indeed, is as a vast mountain chain, whose summits are lost in impervious clouds, and its base buried beneath a fathomless ocean, while a very small portion of the middle space is alone accessible to our footsteps, or cognizable by our senses. It has often been most justly observed, that our knowledge is rather a knowledge of effects than of causes : rather a *relative* knowledge of things as they are *in the properties by which they affect* us, than a *direct* knowledge of their essential nature as they are *in themselves*. Dr. Reid has justly illustrated this as to our notions both of body and of mind. “ What,” he observes, “ is body ? It is, say philosophers, that which is extended, solid, and divisible. Says the querist, I do not ask what the properties of body are, but what is the thing itself ? Let me first know directly what body is, and then consider its properties. To this demand I am afraid the querist will meet with no satisfactory answer, because our notion of body is not direct, but

<sup>1</sup> The reply of St. Augustine when asked to define what was Time.

relative to its qualities ; we know that it is something extended, solid, and divisible, and we know no more. Again, if it should be asked, What is mind? It is that which thinks. I ask not what it does, or what its properties are, but what it is? To this I can find no answer, our notion of mind not being direct, but relative to its operations, as our notion of body is relative to its qualities <sup>1</sup>."

Every true advance, indeed, which has been made in the progress of human science, has been effected by restricting its aims and limiting its investigations to the more narrow range of subjects strictly cognizable by its powers. So long as Philosophy aimed at determining the essential and metaphysical nature of things, and thence reasoning downwards on the high *priori* road, it was but sowing the wind and reaping clouds ; but when, more modest, she became content with generalizing her observations on their properties, and ascertaining the laws of their mutual operations, her harvest was indeed rich with the most interesting and most useful truths ; for it may be observed, that the limitation of the field of our knowledge is such as still to include within its boundaries all that it most concerns our utility to know. A knowledge, indeed, of the prime causes and metaphysical essences of things might be very interesting to our curiosity ; but undoubtedly that which is most immediately connected with any purpose of utility to ourselves, must be the knowledge of the external properties and relations by which these things affect us, and the ultimate laws which regulate these affec-

<sup>1</sup> Essay on the Active Powers of Man.

tions. If such, however, be really the general condition of our knowledge, is it not blended throughout with mystery? And is there not, in fact, a close analogy between the mysteries of science and the mysteries of theology, as to the nature of the limits at which, in both cases, definite knowledge terminates and uncertainty commences?

If, for example, it is clearly revealed that in the divine dispensation towards man the atonement offered by Christ is the only appointed means for procuring the salvation of man, although we may not adequately comprehend the exact manner in which these means operate, is the degree of obscurity which attaches to this belief greater than, or is it even different in kind from, the obscurity which belongs to our persuasion of the physical fact that the planets gravitate towards the sun, although we are utterly unable to comprehend what the primary cause of gravitation is, or in what exact manner any given body attracts any other body? In both instances the cause and its manner of operation are equally in themselves mysterious; in both cases the results, in the relations by which they affect us, are equally manifest.

Again, if we believe in the unity of the divine nature, and yet in a trinal distinction especially revealed under relations which affect the dispensations of that divine nature towards man, is there anything more contradictory in this belief, than in our persuasion that the radiant principle propelled to us from the sun comprises three distinct classes of rays, those affording light, those affording heat, and those producing chemical effects?—and again, that the lumi-



nous rays themselves present another ternary division in the primary colours into which they may be resolved? Of course I do not bring forward these analogies as affording any illustration of such a subject, further than to show that the doctrine in question cannot justly be charged with any contradiction or inconsistency, as it involves no suppositions different from such as are involved in the physical truths of which we are most assured.

In both instances also the points veiled in obscurity, and those manifestly known, are strictly analogous. We are indeed utterly incompetent to comprehend, or even to form any idea of, the divine nature as it is in itself: of this we can only say, with Job, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou discover the Almighty unto perfection? It is higher than heaven; what canst thou do? it is deeper than hell; what canst thou know?" This infinite and incomprehensible nature we believe, however, to be revealed to us in the relations in which he has been pleased to manifest himself as the Creator, the Redeemer, and the Sanctifier of man. And even thus, in the analogy which I have referred to, we know absolutely nothing, we can know absolutely nothing, what the radiant principle propelled from the sun is in itself; but, nevertheless, it is distinctly manifested to us by the several properties under which it affects us, as giving light, giving heat, and producing chemical effects.

Again, is there deep mystery in the hypostatical union of the divine and human natures, which our Church acknowledges in the person of Christ? She

compares in her creed that union with the union of a spiritual and material principle, of a reasonable soul and body in the person of man; and who is there that will tell us that his ideas of this latter union are adequate, determinate, and perfectly free from all mystery? although undoubtedly if we fully know anything, this is that very subject which we might most reasonably expect ourselves to be able perfectly to comprehend, since it relates only to our own constitution,—to that of which we might be supposed most immediately conscious. Yet who will say that he has adequate, or indeed, as we have already seen, any direct ideas of mind or of matter? Who will say that he can in any way conceive in what manner the one acts upon the other? And again, if our own individuality be a subject so perfectly clear, how shall we account for all the speculations of metaphysicians on this very subject?

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I will conclude this subject by subjoining a few further illustrations of the analogy between the general condition of our knowledge, and the limits of the information on religious truth communicated to us by the Christian Revelation. I shall endeavour to adduce a few more examples of the imperfection and inadequacy of our general knowledge, and of what may be justly termed the mysteries of natural reason and science.

If we carefully examine the field of our science, we shall find mystery attaching itself even to its very elements; the simple and primary ideas which lie at its very foundation are altogether obscure and indeterminate. What is matter? Let Locke answer us.

“If any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find that he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of *he knows not what* support of such qualities as are capable of producing simple ideas in us.” Again, what is the real elementary constitution of things? Is there one *πρώτη ὕλη*, primary matter, common to all things? And are all the varieties of nature only different *formal* modifications of this one primary matter? or are there numerous real elements, distinct in their essence as well as in their properties?

What are the properties of matter? Here, as these properties are the immediate object of the senses, we might expect less difficulty. Solidity has been generally accounted the primary and most important property of matter. Take away solidity, it has been said, and matter vanishes. Dr. Priestley, however, and other metaphysical philosophers, such as Boscovich, have not hesitated to make this experiment; they have taken away solidity, leaving matter no other qualities than attraction and repulsion. “The appearances from which the solidity of matter is inferred, are nothing more,” says Dr. Priestley, “than superficial appearances, and therefore have led to superficial and false judgments, which the real appearances will not authorize; resistance, on which alone our opinion concerning the solidity or impenetrability of matter is founded, is never occasioned by solid matter, but by something of a very different nature, viz. a power of repulsion always acting at a real and often an assignable distance from what we call the body itself. When I press my hand against the table, I naturally imagine

that the obstacle to its going through the table is the *solid* matter of which it consists ; but a variety of philosophical considerations demonstrate, that it requires a much greater power of pressure than I can exert to bring my fingers into actual contact with the table. Electrical appearances show that a considerable weight is requisite to bring into actual contact even the links of a chain hanging freely in the air, they being kept asunder by a repulsive power belonging to a very small surface, so that they do not actually touch, though they are supported by each other. It has been shown from optical considerations, that a drop of water rolls upon a cabbage-leaf without ever coming into actual contact with it." He goes on to draw similar inferences from the Newtonian doctrine, that light is reflected by a power of repulsion acting at some distance from the reflective body ; from the expansion of bodies by heat, and their contraction by cold, which proves that their component particles are not in actual contact, &c. Hence he concludes, that matter consists only of certain fixed centres of attraction and repulsion <sup>1</sup>.

But what are attraction and repulsion ? We may understand, perhaps, how motion can be imparted from one body to another by actual contact and impulse, (although some metaphysicians have rendered our ability to explain even this somewhat doubtful) ; but how does a magnet repel the same pole of another magnet, and attract its opposite ? It certainly seems to act at a distance ; but what

<sup>1</sup> Priestley's Correspondence with Price.

is more incomprehensible, than that a body should act where it is not present? Is there, then, any material effluvium proceeding from the one magnet to the other, and so forming an intermediate chain of communication? If so, how far do we comprehend the nature of this effluvium, or the mode by which its particles are set in motion? Again, although material effluvia emanating from the magnets may seem to account, on the principle of impulse, for the case of repulsion, how can any such theory of material impulse account for attraction,—which is a motion in a direction exactly opposite to that which must necessarily result from such a supposed impulse?

Both the obscurity of our knowledge on these and similar points, and at the same time the certainty of our practical conclusions from the knowledge we actually do possess, is well exemplified in an introductory section of Paley's argument in his *Natural Theology*. While speaking of the mechanical functions of the parts of the animal frame, he observes, "The principle of muscular motion, viz., upon what cause the swelling of the belly of the muscle, and consequent contraction of its tendons, either by an act of the will or by involuntary irritation, depends, is wholly unknown to us. The substance employed, whether it be fluid, gaseous, elastic, electrical, or none of these, or nothing resembling these, is also unknown to us: of course the laws belonging to that substance, and which regulate its action, are unknown to us. We see nothing similar to this contraction in any machine which we can make, or any process which we can execute." So far, it is con-

fessed, we are in ignorance, but no further: since (as he proceeds to show,) “although the exact nature of the cause be unknown, yet the adaptation of the means by which it acts lies perfectly within the reach of our faculties. All this,” he observes, “is mechanical, and is as accessible to inspection, and capable of being ascertained, as the mechanism of the automaton worked by magnetism. Of the magnetic effluvium we know perhaps as little as we do of the nervous fluid. But magnetic attraction being assumed, (it signifies nothing from what cause it proceeds,) we can trace, or there can be pointed out to us, with perfect clearness and certainty, the mechanism, viz., the steel bars, the wheels, the joints, the wires, by which the motion so much admired is communicated to the fingers of the image; and to make any obscurity, or difficulty, or controversy in the doctrine of magnetism, an objection to our knowledge or our certainty concerning the contrivance, or the marks of contrivance, displayed in the automaton, would be exactly the same thing as to make our ignorance (which we acknowledge,) of the cause of nervous agency, or even of the substance and structure of the nerves themselves, a ground of suspicion as to the reasoning which we institute concerning the mechanical part of our frame.” Thus far Paley on entirely another division of the argument: but yet, I think, we may fully and fairly apply his observations to our own present purpose; for in like manner we may observe that in the mysteries of religion, we are in ignorance indeed as to the exact and essential nature of those mysteries, of their original cause, and of the precise manner of their

action ; yet that they do exist, and that they do act, being assumed, this ignorance affords no objection to our reasoning as to the practical consequences which we believe these truths ought to exercise on our conduct.

With regard to the obscurity of our knowledge of these physical facts, we may further proceed in the language of one of the ablest chemical philosophers of our day, Professor Berzelius. “ With all the knowledge,” he observes, “ we possess of the forms of the body considered as a piece of mechanism, and of the connexion and mutual relations of its constituents to one another ; yet the cause of most of the phænomena within the animal frame lies so deeply hidden from our view, that it certainly will never be discovered. We call this hidden cause the vital power ; and like many others who before us have in vain directed their deluded attention to this point, we make use of a word to which we can affix no idea. This *power to live* belongs not to the constituent parts of our bodies, nor does it belong to them as an instrument ; neither is it a simple power, but the result of the mutual operation of the instruments on one another,—a result which varies as the operations vary, and which often, from small changes and obstructions, ceases altogether. When our elementary books inform us that the vital power in one place produces from the blood the fibres of the muscle ; in another, a bone ; in a third, a medullary substance connected with the brain ; and in another again, excrementitious humours designed to be carried off,—we know after this explanation as little as we knew before. This



*unknown cause* of the phænomena of life is principally lodged in a certain part of the animal body, viz. the nervous system, the very operation of which it constitutes. The brain and the nerves determine altogether the chemical processes within the body ; and although it cannot be denied that the exercise of their functions tends to produce chemical effects, yet we are constrained to confess that the chemical operations therein are so far beyond our reach, that they entirely escape all our observations,—our deepest chemical researches ; and the finest discoveries of later times give us no information on this subject. Nothing of what chemistry has taught us hitherto has the smallest analogy to the operations of the nervous system, or affords us the least hint toward a knowledge of its occult nature ; and the chain of our experience must always end in something *inconceivable*. Unfortunately this *inconceivable something* acts the principal part in animal chemistry, and enters so into every process, even the most minute, that the highest knowledge which we can attain is the knowledge of the nature of the productions ; whilst we are for ever excluded from the possibility of explaining how they are produced <sup>1</sup>."

Such are the Physical observations of a most distinguished chemical philosopher. And do we otherwise than speak with a strict analogy, if as theologians we should say, "The highest knowledge we can attain is the knowledge of facts and their practical consequences ; whilst we are for ever excluded

<sup>1</sup> Berzelius' View of the Progress and Present State of Animal Chemistry.

from the possibility of explaining the essential properties and original causes of those facts''? This last extract from Berzelius has been also quoted, with the same application to this subject, by an able writer on the evidences of the Christian religion, Dr. O. Gregory; to whose article on mysteries in revealed religion I would particularly wish to direct your attention. This writer has also shown how much of the same imperfection attaches even to that branch of our knowledge which is considered as the surest province of exact science, even to mathematics,—to that which is emphatically termed 'the instruction.'

I would conclude in the most just language of the writer to whose name the epithet of 'the judicious' is commonly attached, the admirable author of the Ecclesiastical Polity. "When I behold with my eyes," says he, "some small and scarce discernible grain or seed, whereof nature maketh a promise that a tree shall come, and when afterwards of that tree any skilful artificer undertaketh to frame some exquisite and curious work; I look for the event: I move no question about performance either of the one or of the other. Shall I simply credit nature in things natural? Shall I in things artificial rely myself on art, never offering to make doubt; and in that which is above both art and nature refuse to believe the Author of both, except he acquaint me with his ways, and *lay the secret of his skill* before me? When God himself doth speak those things, which either for height and sublimity of matter, or else for secrecy of performance, we are not able to reach unto, as we may be ignorant without danger,

so it can be no disgrace to confess that we are ignorant. Such as love piety will, as much as in them lieth, know all things that God commandeth, but especially the duties of service which they owe to God. As for his dark and hidden works, they prefer, as becometh them in such cases, *simplicity of faith*, before that knowledge, which, curiously sifting what it should adore, and disputing too boldly of that which the wit of man cannot search, chilleth for the most part all warmth of zeal, and bringeth soundness of belief many times into great hazard."

\* \* I cannot refrain from here adding an extract strongly bearing on the difficulties which thus embarrass our general knowledge, taken from the very valuable Essay of Mr. Whewell on Astronomy and General Physics considered with reference to Natural Theology; forming the third of the Bridgewater Treatises.

"When the Newtonian philosophy had explained so many mechanical facts, by the two great steps,—of resolving the action of a whole mass into the actions of its minutest particles, and considering these particles as centres of force,—attempts were naturally soon made to apply the same mode of explanation to facts of other different kinds. It was conceived that the whole of natural philosophy must consist in investigating the laws of force by which particles of different substances attracted and repelled, and thus produced motions or vibrations *to* and *from* the particles. Yet what were the next great discoveries in physics?—the action of a galvanic wire upon a magnet; which is not to attract or repel it, but to turn it to the *right* and *left*; to produce mo-

tion, not to or from, but *transverse* to the line drawn to the acting particles : and again, the undulatory theory of light, in which it appeared that the undulations must not be longitudinal, as all philosophers, following the analogy of all cases previously conceived, had at first supposed them to be, but *transverse* to the path of the ray. Here, though the step from the known to the unknown was comparatively small, when made conjecturally, it was made in a direction very wide of the truth. How impossible, then, must it be to attain in this manner to any conception of a law which shall help us to understand the whole government of the universe !

“Still, however, in the laws of the luminiferous æther, and of the other fluid (if it be another fluid,) by which galvanism and magnetism are connected, we have something approaching nearly to mechanical action, and, possibly, hereafter to be identified with it. But we cannot turn to any other part of our physical knowledge, without perceiving that the gulf which separates it from the exact sciences is yet wider and more obscure. Who shall enunciate for us, and in terms of what notions, the general law of *chemical* composition and decomposition ? Sometimes, indeed, we give the name of *attraction* to the affinity by which we suppose the particles of the various ingredients of bodies to be aggregated ; but no one can point out any common feature between this, and the attractions of which alone we know the exact effects. He who shall discover the true general law of the forces by which elements form compounds, will probably advance as far beyond the discoveries of Newton, as Newton went beyond Aristotle. But

who shall say in what direction this vast flight shall be, and what new views it shall open to us of the manner in which matter obeys the laws of the Creator?

But suppose this flight performed;—we are yet but at the outset of the progress which must carry us towards Him. We have yet to begin to learn all that we are to know concerning the ultimate laws of organized bodies. What is the principle of *life*? What is the rule of that action of which assimilation, secretion, development, are manifestations? and which appears to be further removed from mere chemistry, than chemistry is from mechanics. And what again is the new principle, as it seems to be, which is exhibited in the *irritability* of an animal nerve? the existence of a sense? How different is this from all the preceding notions! No efforts can avoid or conceal the vast but inscrutable chasm. Those theorists, who have maintained most strenuously the possibility of tracing the phænomena of animal life to the influence of physical agents, have constantly been obliged to suppose a mode of agency altogether different from any yet known in physics. Thus Lamarck, one of the most noted of such speculators, in describing the course of his researches, says, “I was soon persuaded that the *internal sentiment* constituted a power which it was necessary to take into account.” And Bichat, another writer on the same subject, while he declares his dissent from Stahl, and the earlier speculators, who had referred every thing in the œconomy of life to a single principle, which they called the *anima* the *vital principle*, and so forth, himself introduces several principles, or laws, all

utterly foreign to the region of physics; namely, *organic sensibility, organic contractility, animal sensibility, animal contractility*, and the like. Supposing such principles really to exist, how far enlarged and changed must our views be before we can conceive these properties, including the faculty of perception, which they imply, to be produced by the will and power of one Supreme Being, acting by fixed laws! Yet without conceiving this, we cannot conceive the agency of that Deity who is incessantly thus acting, in countless millions of forms and modes.

“How strongly, then does science represent God to us as incomprehensible! his attributes as unfathomable!”

The author proceeds to show how much our difficulties will be increased, if we attempt to trace out the general laws which regulate the instincts, affections, passions and will, of the animal world; and still more, the moral choice and rational motives of intelligent beings.

## LECTURE II.

*Alienation of Man's Moral Condition.*

AT the very entrance of our inquiry into Christian doctrine, the leading and characteristic attribute of that religion, as a remedial dispensation, presents itself; but the necessity of that remedial dispensation, and its adaptation to meet the exigencies of the case, cannot be appreciated without a previous examination of the moral condition of our nature, to which the remedy is to be applied. The investigation of that condition has, indeed, ever formed the most interesting problem of ethical speculation. Philosopher and poet have alike inculcated, that self-knowledge, is in order and importance, the first of all knowledge, and that "the proper study of mankind is man." But when we enter on this inquiry, none can seem, to our first survey, more entangled with perplexing paradoxes: the moral condition of man will appear in a high degree mysterious,—his state full of apparent contradictions. A poet has strikingly described the first impression of the subject:—

" Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,  
A being darkly wise, and rudely great,



With too much knowledge for the sceptic's side,  
 With too much weakness for the stoic's pride,  
 Man hangs between, in doubt to act or rest,  
 In doubt to hold himself a god or beast."

The theologian will expand the contrasted picture. — "What," exclaims a forcible writer of this class<sup>1</sup>, "what is so great as man, and yet what so little! what so great if you mark the occasional traces of his original grandeur, what so little if you follow the prevalent course of his desires and conduct!"

"What so great as man! How exalted the dignity of his nature above the inferior animals! What a gift is reason! what a distinction speech! What a thirst he has for knowledge! what a desire after happiness! what a mind, in some faint measure representing the Deity! Whither cannot his powers extend themselves! what discoveries of science! what inventions in the arts! what a thirst after something which is not found beneath the sun,—after a good which has no limit! what enlargement, what constant improvement, the soul is capable of! In spite of all his misery, he has a feeling, a sentiment, which elevates him, and which he cannot repress. Nothing satisfies his ambition but the esteem of rational and intellectual beings. He burns with the love of glory; he has an idea of a lost happiness, which he seeks in every thing in vain. He is a dethroned *monarch*, wandering through a strange country, but who cannot lay aside his original habits of thought and expectation."

"And yet what so little as man! What contra-

<sup>1</sup> Wilson's Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, Lect. XIV.

dictions is this strange creature daily and hourly exhibiting! As to his ends and capacities, he is great; as to his habits, he is abject and vile. His reason is expansive, comprehensive, devoted; and yet his passions mean, uncertain, and perverse: his mind *vast* and noble; his desires *impure* and corrupted; his dissatisfaction with external things separating him from the earth, and yet his propensities chaining him down to it; his thoughts full of grandeur, but his affections narrow and grovelling. In his aspirations, he rises up to angels; in his vices, he sinks below the brutes. In his conceptions of futurity, immensity, eternity, he is sublime; in his follies, pursuits, and desires, he is limited, degraded, childish. Thus man is a maze and labyrinth to himself, full of grandeur and full of meanness;—of grandeur, as to his original dignity, as to the image of God, his capacity for religion, his longing for immortality, his thirst of truth, his large designs and projects; and yet low and debased as to his passions, his changeableness, his pursuit of any folly or error, his degrading pleasures and appetites, his delight in sensual things, and neglect of his intellectual and moral nature.”

Hence the apparent contradictions which have arisen between different philosophical and theological views of human nature. If with Butler, in his well-known three discourses on that subject, we consider human nature as the designed moral constitution of man,—a constitution in which reason and reflection maintain their appropriate ascendancy, and the animal instincts and passions observe their due subordination, every portion of that nature thus

harmoniously co-operating, “according to the effectual working in the measure of every part,”—if, I say, we employ the term ‘human nature’ as designating the *designed* system of our moral constitution, and its *proper* and *intended relations*, we shall undoubtedly agree with him that a virtuous course of action is altogether *congenial* to that nature; but if we employ the term in its more *usual* and certainly most *practical*, if not most *philosophical*, acceptation, as designating the *aggregate* sum of human motives, not viewed with reference to their proper dignity and subordination, and their designed relations, but considered only according to their *average influence* on the determination of human conduct, can we still adhere to the same conclusion? can we still maintain that virtuous action is equally congenial to human nature thus *practically* considered, and to *the general tenor* of its *actual* operation? That nature indeed, if *philosophically* investigated, presents ample traces of its *designed* constitution; the appropriate relations and due subordination of its several moral constituents may be easily ascertained by such an examination; and it may be readily shown, that whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, and lovely, are most agreeable to that designed constitution, most suitable to its proper ends, and most calculated to promote its real interests—its best and highest happiness. But I fear, that if we look not at the *abstract* design of the system, but at its *actual* condition and workings, we shall see a picture sadly the reverse of this: if we inquire how far the just ascendant of the rational principle is preserved, the general answer will, I fear, be conveyed in language

which, from the common feeling of its justice, has become proverbial—“*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor* ;” or, as the philosopher will more fully describe it, “Φαίνεται καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὃ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ· ἀτέχνως γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι, τοῦναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως<sup>1</sup>.”—“There appears, besides reason, another principle innate in the human soul, which resists and opposes itself to reason; and just as the limbs of the body when afflicted by the palsy are torn aside in a direction contrary to that in which we designed to move them, the like also happens with regard to the soul.”

Plutarch still more closely traces this corruption to its source, when he says, “Φυομένοις μίγνυται τις ἐν πᾶσι κακοῦ μοῖρα· τὰ γὰρ σπέρματα εὐθὺς θνητὰ ὄντα ταύτης κοινωνεῖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἐξ ἧς ἀφυΐα μὲν ψυχῆς, νόσοι τε καὶ κήδεα ἐκείθεν ἡμῖν ἔρπει<sup>2</sup>.”—“Some portion of evil is mingled in the nature of all, from our birth; for since the very seeds of our being are mortal, they bear a common part in causing this: whence *depravity of soul*, diseases and cares, assail us.

If from the language of general confession we proceed to the evidence of fact,—if we turn to the pages of history, to the records of any considerable portion of our race, or any considerable period of its existence,—what shall we find their great staple to consist of, but the history of human crimes, and human misery? Do we really read the history of

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Ηθικ. Νικομ.*, Α. ιγ.

<sup>2</sup> *De Consol. ad Apoll.*

beings animated by a principle of enlightened benevolence, or the frantic and furious passions of those hateful, and hating one another? But whence arise these wars and fightings among them, as an Apostle has well asked, but from the perverted passions that rebel in their moral constitution? Universal experience in every country and in every age will attest these melancholy truths, as to the *actual* operation of our natural principles; and the more clearly it can be shown that these things are, in fact, abhorrent to the evident design and purpose of the moral constitution of our natures, the more necessary will be the conclusion, that our nature is indeed 'far gone' and widely perverted from its first estate.

In pursuing this inquiry, I will first consider the general admissions of mankind on the subject; secondly, the testimonies of Scripture; and lastly, appeal to the experience of our own bosoms.

I will, as I have said, give the precedence to the general admissions of mankind, and premise them to Scriptural testimonies; because, though the latter must of course be the convincing authority to all those who admit their inspiration, yet it is an object which I would always keep in view, to show that these testimonies strictly accord with the phenomena of which an *unbiassed* examination of nature must convince us; and thus to exhibit the strong internal evidence of truth which they carry about with them, in always addressing us as beings placed exactly in such a moral condition as we *actually* find ourselves, and offering to us those remedies which such a condition most requires. To prevent our arguing in a circle, then, we must evidently com-

mence by examining the independent evidence of those truths which the Scriptures assume.

In alluding to the general tenor of human history, we have already anticipated an argument which I know not how any can evade; for if an objector should refer this general depravation, as some have done, to faulty governments or institutions, he will obviously only shift the difficulty,—he will still have to account for the general prevalence of the institutions thus represented as corrupt and corrupting,—he will reason only like the Indian, who supports the world on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise;—the ultimate support will still require to be sought. But I may further appeal to the ablest of the gentile philosophers who have directed their scrutiny to our moral condition. I have already cited the testimony of Aristotle—I may equally refer you to that of his predecessor Plato, by citing the remarkable conclusion of one of the dialogues of that philosopher, of which human nature forms the express subject. In this Socrates is represented as strongly inculcating the paramount importance of a just knowledge of the real condition of the most essential part of our nature—the soul. This, he observes, can be obtained only by reference to the Deity—the source of that soul. He then enlarges on the degrading servitude of sin; and, addressing himself to his disciple, draws from him the confession, that he indeed labours under the consciousness of this bondage—a bondage from which (Socrates concludes by assuring him) he must seek for deliverance, not relying on anything which he,

as his philosophical instructor, was able to accomplish, but on the will and power of God alone<sup>1</sup>.

The religious views and practices of almost every country strongly express the same humiliating confession; they all plainly indicate a painful feeling, that man had incurred a guilt offensive in the eyes of the Deity,—that his mind had contracted pollution from its connexion with his carnal passions,—that a stain existed, which required the most painful inflictions, either in this world or the next, for its purgation. Hence the varied rites of purification;—hence have the votaries of India or Egypt sought to wash away their moral pollution in the sacred streams of the Ganges or the Nile;—hence the sacrifices of expiation by which those who felt the divine justice to be outraged, vainly imagined it could be appeased; offering thousands of rams; or, with a more perverse superstition, immolating human victims; and, to enhance the value of the sacrifice, by offering the dearest object—giving their first-born for their transgression—the fruit of their body for the sin of their soul<sup>2</sup>;—hence the varied and often excruciating systems of corporeal penance, undergone from the conviction of guilt, from the natural apprehension that a moral government must imply the *retribution of punishment*, and the hope that these voluntary endurances might be accepted as *satisfactory*. The *conscious wants* which these things indicate were strikingly illustrated, when a

<sup>1</sup> See the concluding paragraphs of the First Alcibiades.

<sup>2</sup> See Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.*, lib. i. p. 40, as to such sacrifices in Phœnicia.



poor Indian devotee, writhing under such self-inflictions, on hearing the doctrine of him who came to seek and save that which was lost, proclaimed by a Christian missionary, exclaimed, "This, this is what I have so long sought for, but hitherto sought in vain." How beautiful, indeed, to such as he must appear the feet of those who preach the Gospel of peace—a *peace* so *deeply* needed, so *anxiously sought* ! Hence also the views, added to all these temporal expiations, of the necessity of a *future penal purgation* for the soul : such views we find to have tintured most of the religious systems of the East—the probable cradle of our race. Thus Zoroaster is said to have taught that souls after death must be cleansed from the stains of sin, and from all the defilements which they had contracted from their union with matter, and, after a *long purgation* by fire, be fitted for their re-absorption into the Deity from whom they had emanated. Many of the Stoical and Platonic schools seem to have participated in these notions ; for we by no means find them confined to rude periods or uncultivated nations. Thus we find Socrates, in the *Phædo*, introduced as asserting that the souls of many had contracted such an earthly tendency from the contagion of the body and its carnal lusts, that they were condemned to flit around the depositories of their corporeal tenements, and, as spectres, to haunt the graves that covered the dust of Death. Cicero, in the close of the *Somnium Scipionis*, repeats the same doctrine ; and we find it strikingly expressed by the most learned of poets, in a passage evidently intended to convey a phi-

losophical view of psychological opinions of his time :—

“Quin et supremo quum lumine vita reliquit;  
 Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes  
 Corporeæ excedunt pestes: penitusque necesse est  
 Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.  
 Ergo exercentur *pœnis*, veterumque malorum  
*Supplicia* expendunt. Aliæ panduntur inanes  
 Suspensæ ad ventos; aliis sub gurgite vasto  
 Infectum *eluitur* scelus, aut exuritur igni.  
*Quisque* suos *patimur* manes. Exinde per amplum  
 Mittimur Elysium, et *pauci* læta arva tenemus:  
 Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe  
 Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit  
 Æthereum sensum, atque aurai simplicis ignem<sup>1</sup>.”

“Even when those bodies are to dust resign’d,  
 Some old inherent spots are left behind;  
 A sully’g tincture of corporeal stains  
 Deep in the substance of the soul remains.  
 Thus are her splendours dimm’d, and crusted o’er  
 With those dark vices that she knew before.  
 For this the souls a various penance pay,  
 To purge the taint of former crimes away:  
 Some in the sweeping breezes are refin’d,  
 And hang on high to whiten in the wind;  
 Some cleanse their stains beneath the gushing streams;  
 And some rise glorious from the searching flames.  
*Thus all* must suffer; and those sufferings past,  
 The clouded minds are purified at last.  
 But when the circling seasons, as they roll,  
 Have cleans’d the dross long gather’d round the soul,  
 When the celestial fire, divinely bright,  
 Breaks forth victorious in her native light,  
 Then we, the chosen *few*, Elysium gain,  
 And here expatiate on the blissful plain.”

<sup>1</sup> Æneid. vi. 735.

Now here I would particularly observe the universal necessity assumed to exist for this penal purgation—*Quisque suos patimur manes*; and even, after all, that few only can be thus qualified for the happier scenes of future existence—only *PAUCI læta arva tenemus*.

The voice of Scripture represents the moral condition of man in full accordance with the views indicated by these general admissions. It recognises all the apparent contradictions of that state; all its appeals are founded on the assumption of its being exactly what we find it; and to beings so situated all its addresses are directed.

That the design of our moral constitution, and the appropriate tendency of its highest principles are toward good, is distinctly asserted. Thus we read, that even they “who have not the law, are yet, through this natural constitution, a law to themselves, and show the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another;” so that after this higher spiritual principle, this inward man, we delight in the law of God; but while we perceive, in arguing from the original design and appropriate direction of our moral faculties, this tendency to virtuous action; if we look at their actual state and operation,—these are uniformly represented in the Scriptures as altogether perverted. The language we have already quoted from Aristotle, on the existence of an innate principle opposed and rebellious, and impressing on our moral powers the perverted direction of paralytic action, is in the closest harmony with the represen-

tation of St. Paul :—" I see another law",—another constraining principle of action, that is,—“ in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members : so that that which I do, I allow not ; for what I would, that I do not ; but what consenting unto the law of God, that it is good, I therefore hate, yet that do I. I find then, a law, or dominant principle, that when I would do good, evil is present with me.” To the same purpose we read, in the next chapter, that “ the carnal mind is enmity against God : for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can be.”

What picture, then, of moral misery can be more strongly coloured ?—to find so much of opposition between our practical motives and the sanction of even the higher principle of our own moral nature,—such a want of conformity between the will of man and the will of the great Creator, to which the simplest dictates of reason assure us that all things should and must submit ! Can we wonder at the emphatic language in which St. Paul describes it as “ the body of this death,”—at his earnest exclamations for deliverance from a state so wretched, and his gratitude at the hope of that deliverance through Jesus Christ our Lord ? It seems almost superfluous, after thus submitting to you this explicit declaration of the perverted state of our moral affections, to multiply quotations describing the necessary consequences of that perversion ; such as where we read that “ the imaginations of man’s heart are evil from his youth ;”—that “ the heart is treacherous above all, and frail, infirm, or diseased,” (for thus

should the text Jer. xvii. 9. be rendered, and not, as in the common translation, “desperately wicked,”—a force which obviously never belongs to the original epithet **שׁוֹנֵא**; and on such a subject surely every motive should lead us to avoid even the appearance of using overcharged expressions.) Again, “All we like sheep have gone astray, we have turned every one to his own way.” The only conclusion, then, must be that of the Psalmist: “If thou, O Lord, shouldest mark iniquities; O Lord, who should stand?” We cannot deny the Apostle’s assertion, that “the Scripture hath concluded all men under sin.”

Thus, a real conviction and candid acknowledgment of the state of the evil must necessarily precede every application for an availing remedy: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us; but if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.”

And what, then, is the experience of our own breasts on this subject? Repugnant as it may be to our pride to admit in express terms truths so humiliating to the imagined dignity of our nature, yet in our inmost hearts we shall, I believe, very generally discover a secret consciousness of the justice of these representations. He, indeed, who can really imagine that his moral *conduct*, or, what is much more essential, his moral *feelings*, actually coincide with any standard of his moral duty which his reason can approve, must have a conception of that moral standard so low and inadequate, or so exalted a view of his own character, as falls probably to the lot of few

who ever sincerely take the trouble to bestow any serious attention on the question.

The grounds, indeed, on which anything like self-complacency can be built, must arise from a very imperfect view of the extent of the general field of our duties, and from considering them as entirely confined to those which arise from our social relations. In these the relations of reciprocal interest so evidently prevail, and they are so obviously regulated by an immediate principle of utility, in which every individual closely participates, that it requires very little expansion of the mere motives of self-interest to prescribe their discharge. A general feeling of sympathy also as to the distresses of others, (which many Philosophers indeed represent as little more than an instance of the natural association of painful ideas derived from our selfish experience) will naturally prompt us to desire the happiness rather than the misery of those about us. Nor will I at all deny the common existence of an easy and kind temper,—of an amiable, although I fear imperfect, principle of benevolence. It is the alienation and perversion of a moral constitution originally designed pure and good, of which the Scriptures assure us,—of powers enfeebled, and passions misdirected and aggravated,—not of the utter extinction of every good feeling,—not of the substitution of principles simply evil.

And further than this, if we estimate our duties aright, we shall assuredly feel that these social duties, important as they are, are yet a single branch only, and that an inferior branch, of our moral obli-

gations. Higher, infinitely higher, must be those arising from the relations which creatures owe to their Creator, the source of being and of every good. What can so properly claim the highest affections and supreme regard of moral agents, as the contemplation of that Being whose very essence is abstract goodness? Reason unites with Revelation in pronouncing that the first and great command of moral obligation is, and must be, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might." But who can for a moment compare the actual state of his affections and feelings with a rule like this,—a rule, notwithstanding, which the full conviction of his reason approves,—and not become deeply conscious how lamentably imperfect in this highest relation those feelings and affections remain? What an incapacity is there in our minds to fix themselves on the contemplation of Deity! What coldness and deadness of affections towards Him! What torpor as to spiritual objects! What distaste and disinclination for spiritual services! This is, as we all experience, a state of feeling perfectly distinct from unbelief of those objects; for we are sensible of it, even while most firmly persuaded of the truth of those objects. But yet, how such a state of feeling can be co-existent with a belief in these things would surely seem unaccountable, did not our own experience assure us of the fact. Yet even when our reason has been most deeply impressed with the proofs, which the exquisite frame and provisions of nature bear to the incomprehensible perfections of the almighty Author of nature,—even when we have accepted, with the



conviction of faith, the revelation of the still greater riches of his grace,—still, how often does it seem that these most powerful considerations are insufficient to excite any warm and lively affection : how little does our spirit feel of that thirst for Himself, even the living God, which yet we admit to be the genuine character of true devotion ! What, then, can account for such lamentable imperfection, such complete failure in that which forms the very highest branch of all moral obligations, the first source of all moral affections, unless we ascribe it to a fearful depravation of our moral constitution from its original state ?

If we could strip ourselves of our own experience, if in imagination we could for a moment place ourselves in the condition of any other order of moral intelligences, and suppose those intelligences to speculate *à priori* as to what would be the feelings which would arise in the minds of moral agents endowed with reason, and capable through that reason of arriving at the knowledge of the Deity, and of all their obligations to Him ;—their view of the Deity forming, indeed, the very crown and perfection of their reason ;—if, I say, we could conceive any other order of spiritual intelligences speculating *à priori* on the feelings with which beings thus constituted must regard the Deity ;—can we for a moment suppose, that they would believe to be possible such a languor of affections as we experience ? Is it not, then, clear that this languor, this alienation and estrangement of the soul from her God, implies, that her original constitution has undergone a fatal change ?

But if the source of our whole moral duties be thus polluted in its very first springs, is it at all probable that the stream can flow onwards pure and undefiled? I have already admitted indeed, and accounted for on obvious principles, our superior discharge of the social duties of the second table. But even here we shall find, that the love of our fellow-creatures, in order to be pure and consistent, must proceed from that love to the Creator, in which we have seen ourselves to be so deficient. Natural kindness of temper may indeed carry us far, but may still stop short when most needed. The question is not how we perform our social duties when they happen to be agreeable to our inclinations, but how we discharge them when they exact severe sacrifices, and impose painful self-denial,—how far the narrow spirit of selfishness is extinguished in us,—how far we regard every man, not his own things, but the things of others; in interest, as in honour, preferring one another. Who is there that can read over that most lovely picture which St. Paul has drawn of Christian charity, and flatter himself that he is reading a description of his own natural character?

I have thus endeavoured to impress on you the primary importance of forming a just estimate of the actual moral condition of our nature; since it is only when thus sensible of an existing evil, that we can seek or appreciate the means of restoration, which it is the great object of our religion, as a remedial dispensation, to propose. I have hitherto, therefore, dwelt rather on the fact of our moral depravation, than on the cause assigned for that depravation; both because it is our conviction of the fact which

must bear this practical application, and because the fact itself is capable of a proof, alas ! too easy, from even the most cursory observation, and universal experience. But as to the cause, whatever possible view we may take of the subject, *that* is wrapped in the densest clouds, in impenetrable darkness. And, such indeed is the *general* condition of our knowledge ; it is a knowledge of *facts*, not of causes, of the *ὅτι*, not of the *διότι*. Nor is such a knowledge unsuitable to our nature ; for it is obvious that it is the former—the knowledge of the fact alone—which generally involves any practical application. The cause, the *πόθεν τὸ κακόν*, the origin of evil, especially moral evil, in a creation proceeding from infinite goodness and almighty power, has in every age, since philosophical inquiry first exercised the reason of man, presented itself as the great crucial question—the problem which has at once baffled all its attempts at solution, and most effectually manifested the limits of our present faculties of investigation, and their utter inadequacy to trace out the deep things of God ; demonstrating most forcibly the propriety of attending to those limits, and the folly of attempting to search out things that are too high for them.

The deep *mystery*, the many difficulties attaching to the Scriptural account of the origin of evil in our moral constitution, is not the mystery of Revelation only ; the difficulties are equally those of Natural Religion,—of the reason and mind of man. In touching, therefore, on the Scriptural narrative of the Fall, it will not be imagined that I shall engage in any idle attempt to explain its difficulties,—difficul-

ties in many respects from their very nature inexplicable by our present faculties. I shall enter on the inquiry with a deep sense of its awful mystery ; and my object will be rather to show how necessarily those difficulties arise from the subject, and to point out and guard against the injury and *increased obscurity*, which can alone result from presumptuous explanation.

God, we are told, created man upright ; but he placed him in a state of probation. Now the very idea of probation seems to involve that of possible fall and evil. It may be still asked, indeed, why it pleased the Deity to place his creatures in such a state of probation ; and to this our only answer must ever be, that it did so please him. And Butler has well shown that the general analogies of his natural government fully accord with his usually placing his creatures under circumstances in which their happiness is thus made to depend on the decisions of their own will, and the conduct to which it leads. The essential conditions of a state of probation are described by our great poet in a few lines ; in expressing my own preference of which to pages of metaphysics I trust I shall be excused ;—“ *Plenius et melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.*”

“ God made thee perfect, not immutable,  
And good he made thee, but to persevere  
He left it in thy power ; ordain'd thy will  
By nature free, not overrul'd by fate  
Inextricable, or strict necessity :  
Our voluntary service he requires,  
Not our necessitated ; such with him  
Finds no acceptance, nor can find ; for how  
Can hearts not free be tried whether they serve

Willing, or no, who will but what they must  
By destiny, and can no other choose?"

The nature of the trial to which our first parents are represented as having been subjected, is undoubtedly involved in much of obscurity and difficulty. But how, we may ask, could such a case be otherwise than obscure? Observation and experience are the only grounds of our knowledge. But what has our observation or experience ever presented to us at all approximating to the situation of the ancestors of mankind in their primary state? We know that the moral circumstances in which they were placed were widely different; we do not know that even their physical circumstances were similar to our own. On what grounds then can we, destitute as we are of every pre-requisite information, speculate as to what was a suitable trial to beings thus placed in a situation, of which we have and can have no adequate conception? As well might we attempt to reason on the probable moral condition of the inhabitants of another planet.

Neither, perhaps, can we be considered as having any sufficient authority to pronounce on the exact extent of the moral effects represented as having accrued to our nature from that Fall. Generally indeed, when we see so many of our natural principles rebellious against the dictates of that right reason, which yet we see to be properly the highest principle,—when we see the apparent *design* of the system so often defeated by its anomalous and perverted action,—we necessarily refer all these phænomena of aberration to the effects of subsequent corruption, and apprehend the original con-

stitution to have been characterized by their absence, and by the due subordination and just co-operation of all its parts. We see, however, that impeccability or exemption from temptation certainly formed no part of that difference; and on the other hand we may reasonably conclude, that more regular and abundant supplies of spiritual assistance formed a large part of what was lost; that the intercourse of the Deity himself, and of those angelic intelligences whom we are instructed to believe sympathize with and minister to his faithful earthly servants, was then much more full and uninterrupted. Will it be considered as too fanciful to suppose, that the spiritual influences dependent on the remedial provisions of Christianity may virtually, although in a different manner, restore the aids of which our nature was so deprived?

These consequences of the transgression of our first parents, this entail of a depraved moral constitution, may indeed appear to labour under a double difficulty. It may seem difficult naturally to explain how any such effect should follow from the cause, and equally difficult to reconcile its so doing to our ideas of the Divine goodness and justice. I will say a few words on each of these subjects. And first, as to the difficulty of accounting for the regular descent of this ancestral corruption. The subject is indeed mysterious; but the general subject of the descent of any constitution whatever is itself mysterious. The general law, that "the herb should yield seed after his kind, and the fruit-tree fruit after his kind," why all the individuals of a myriad descents should in-

herit precisely the same specific nature, is in itself a mystery—as complete a mystery as any doctrine of our religion can possibly be. We know indeed familiarly enough that it is so; but *why it is so*, we have not, nor can we have, the faintest idea. But to bring the analogy more close to the point, we see that this entailed inheritance is not confined to physical properties, but extends to intellectual properties also; for we perceive the different races of inferior animals to be widely distinguished from each other, and most widely from ourselves, by intellectual no less than by physical constitution. Can we say, then, that it is at all more *mysterious* that moral constitution should descend by inheritance, than that physical or intellectual constitution should so descend? Or can we deny that a constitution may be by any circumstances so essentially modified and altered from its first state, that this modification may be so transmitted? It is indeed, I am well aware, the ordinary rule, that only the maladies which affect the constitution from birth are so transmitted; but still we must understand much better than we do the *manner* in which that constitution thus transmits itself at all, before we can pronounce that it may not under extraordinary circumstances be altered to such a degree as to be capable of transmitting its altered state only.

Again, should it be objected that it is difficult to reconcile to our ideas of Divine justice and goodness the fact, of our thus inheriting as a consequence of ancestral transgressions such a depravation of moral constitution; we may well reply, that we fully *admit* the difficulty, but that it at once resolves itself



into the *general difficulty* attaching to *every possible theory* of the origin of evil. The fact that we actually possess such depraved constitutions is abundantly evident; and shall we find it all more easy to reconcile this *fact* with the Divine benevolence, than so to reconcile the *theory* which ascribes that fact to an ancestral origin? We find that the same evil certainly exists. The only question is, whether it exists with, or without, a certain antecedent cause. The admission of that cause may possibly *diminish the difficulty*, but how it can *increase it* I cannot perceive. That the difficulty indeed arises from our finite capacities only, and not from the essential relations of the things themselves, we readily admit; but so long as our faculties continue in their present state, an impenetrable veil of difficulty must enshroud the whole subject. For the removal of that veil we must await the period when “we shall see face to face, and know even as we are known.”

But these real difficulties have perhaps been increased by the presumptuous attempt to explain, or at least exactly to define, by a technical phraseology, these mysterious doctrines. A late writer, distinguished by his correct application of the logical canons of sound reasoning, Dr. Whately, has well observed on the increased difficulties thus produced by the unauthorized use of the term ‘imputation’ on this occasion, which seems to have been so applied by some theologians, that assuming Adam’s guilt to be imputed to his descendants, they seem to imagine that each of those descendants is held to be actually guilty of his offence. It is surely unnecessary to add, that neither the language nor the idea

has any real foundation in the Bible. All that we can really gather from thence is, that the offence of Adam is the *antecedent* cause, and the depravation of our moral constitution the *consequent* effect. It may indeed be said that we are thus partakers of his punishment; and this indeed, I am persuaded, is all that many of the writers who employed the term 'imputation' meant. But still the unjustifiable manner in which others have extended its application fully demonstrates the propriety of Dr. Whately's cautions. Undoubtedly, indeed, the corruption of our nature is a loss which we derive from the offence of Adam; but we shall perhaps speak most safely and correctly, if we describe this loss as inflicted upon us rather *through* than *for*, his transgression. Altogether the nearest illustration which our ordinary transactions can afford of the case, if indeed we can employ such illustrations with *due reverence*, is that of the forfeitures sometimes entailed on families, as in the deposition of a sovereign house, or the like. Thus the unfortunate Charles Edward shared the punishment in inheriting the privations of his deposed grandfather: but no proper use of language could state that the unconstitutional actions of James were *imputed* to him.

But *whatever* may be the *difficulties* attending *every view* of this subject, assuredly it would not diminish those difficulties to suppose, that the actual state of our moral constitution, involving as it does so much of contradiction and perversion, was the state in which it originally emanated from its Maker's hands. All the varied traditions, common to the creeds of almost all nations, of a better and happier primæval

state, and of subsequent declension and deterioration, express the general conviction of mankind on this subject; and we find some of the philosophical sects expressly inventing theories to account for it. Thus, the pre-existence of souls was maintained in a former and purer state; abusing which, however, it was imagined that they had fallen, and were condemned to inhabit their present grosser tenements as a state of penal transmigration.

I cannot better conclude this dark and distressing subject, than in the language of a writer on the evidences of our faith, equally able and amiable. "This is not a single or solitary instance of difficulty; it is only one of many inexplicable circumstances connected with the present state of mankind. If the case were otherwise,—if as long as we confined our views to what is called Natural Religion, all was clear and intelligible, and the world only became perplexing through the interference of Christianity,—this would be a plausible argument against Christianity, requiring us to look into the direct evidence by which it is established with additional vigilance. But this cannot be pretended. Christianity in fact furnishes the only clue. It does not acquaint us why we are born in a labyrinth; but it conducts us out of one, in which, without that guide, we must remain and wander for ever<sup>1</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> Sumner on the Internal Evidence of Christianity, p. 274.

## LECTURE III.

*On the Doctrine of the Atonement.*

HAVING in our last lecture considered the evil of our moral condition, as the exigency which imposes on any religious system professing to be divinely revealed, the necessity of assuming the character of a remedial dispensation, in order to prove its claims by *evincing its exact adaptation to our nature*; we have now to examine the remedial means which Christianity proposes, and their application to repair the evils which call for their introduction. Now, according to the Scriptural representations, these necessary remedies are, first, a *remission* of the punishment justly incurred by the transgressions into which this natural depravation is constantly hurrying us,—a remission which we are taught to consider as extended to us through the efficacy of the sufferings of Christ; secondly, a renovation and reformation of our depraved moral constitution, which is set forth as effected by the sanctifying influences of the Spirit.

Now the necessity of the *second* of these remedies is immediately obvious. Every one will at once perceive, that the perversion and corruption of our moral nature, which on a former occasion we fully considered, must indeed render some means

of renovation and restoration above all things desirable. But the first head, including as it does the *punishment* to which, under the *moral government* of God, the sinner is justly liable, and the atonement offered by Christ to remove these penal consequences of transgression, is undoubtedly a subject involving in itself much more of *mystery*. This is indeed emphatically one of those questions wherein we should scrupulously adhere to the caution, on which I have already so often had occasion to dwell, and (with a martyr of our Church) ‘venture to speak none otherwise than the Scripture doth, as it were, lead us by the hand.’ This is the subject which, according to any natural method of unfolding the doctrines of our faith, must in this stage of our progress claim our attention; and I earnestly desire that I may be guarded throughout the discussion, in treating it in this cautious and Scriptural spirit.

But, although in our methodical arrangement we may consider under distinct divisions these two great heads of the remedial dispensation—absolution and remission from the penal consequences of our past transgression, and the sanctifying renovation of our moral character—yet in the page of Revelation we shall find them closely and necessarily connected and combined. The scheme of the Christian atonement is in effect in its own nature such, that it cannot be sincerely received into the heart by a lively faith, without infusing there an abundant supply of *motives* and *practical principles* of the most constraining energy, and tending above all others to effect this moral renovation, and to restore to our moral constitution that conformity to the Divine character which

it has forfeited and lost. On this subject I would especially wish to refer you to an admirable essay of Erskine's, on the internal evidence of Revealed Religion; of which I can only say, that to myself it has been one of the most satisfactory theological treatises I have ever perused. In its argument it appears to me equally acute, profound and forcible, and characterized throughout by a sober and judicious tone of statement, which appeals irresistibly to the unprejudiced mind<sup>1</sup>. In the course of my following observations I may often perhaps enrich my argument from this source; but I am sure that for this no apology can be deemed necessary.

The Christian doctrine of the atonement implies, as its subject, *justification* from the guilt incurred by, and *remission* of the penal consequences apprehended from, our moral transgressions. This doctrine therefore clearly supposes, that our moral aberrations have really incurred such a guilt, and may reasonably apprehend such a punishment—views which bear a direct reference to the moral government of the Deity. Now in the very opening of these lectures we considered the evidence, which assures us

<sup>1</sup> I have indeed heard with the deepest regret, that the respected author has lately joined a small Scottish party, distinguished by the most unprecedented extremes of fanatical delusion, and the most fallacious pretensions even to miraculous power; but I shall not retract a syllable of what I have above advanced. We are too well acquainted with frequent instances of the inequality even of the most powerful minds. And I see not why the impossibility of approving subsequent views should check the candid expression of our just approbation of earlier sentiments.

that such is the character of the Divine government ; but no one who believes this, unless he should hold virtue and vice to be *absolutely* indifferent, can possibly believe them to be indifferent *relatively* to God's moral government. Our idea of the Divine nature, involving, as it does, the idea of abstract, essential and perfect goodness, implies that to such a Being everything of evil must be necessarily offensive.

Yet in using such terms as *offensive*, and the like, we must be very careful to remember, that we are speaking only from that *remote* and *faint analogy*, with which *alone* language derived from the affections, whereof the experience of the human breast is cognisant, can apply to the great Incomprehensible. We must shrink with horror from the idea, that in using this metaphorical language, we are really ascribing to Him, whose name is *love*, *irascible* or *vindictive* feelings, such as agitate our own bosoms. But without referring it to any such *vindictive* feelings, without referring it even to any *arbitrary* appointment whatever, we are yet able to conceive in what manner by a *necessary consequence*, arising from the very *nature* of the things, ultimate misery may result from having acquired characters depraved by sin, and thus placed in a state of *alienation* from, and *diametrical* contradiction to, the moral perfections of the Divine nature. As the author just referred to has strikingly observed, "At present the complicated system of this world's business and events forms, as it were, a veil before our eyes, and interposes a kind of *moral* distance between us and our God ; so that the opposition which exists between his perfect holiness and our corrupt propensities, does not often



meet us in the form of direct and personal encounter. But when death removes this veil, by dissolving our connexion with this world and its works, we may be brought into a closer and more perceptible contact with Him who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. In that spiritual world we may suppose that each event, even the minutest part of the whole system of government, will bear such an unequivocal stamp of the Divine character, that an intelligent being of opposite views and feelings will at every moment feel itself galled and thwarted, and borne down by the direct and overwhelming encounter of this All-pervading and Almighty Mind <sup>1</sup>."

If then this view of the subject be in any degree correct,—if the ultimate misery *penally* attached to sin be in any degree the *natural* and *necessary* consequence of the opposition between a depraved moral constitution and the Divine character, with which a future state may thus place us in immediate contact, it follows, that *no* system of *absolution* can be effectual in remitting that penalty, unless it should likewise be of a nature calculated, in the first place, to *remove the depravity* and *restore the holiness* of that moral constitution. "Pardon" (to recur to the language of the same writer)—"pardon, whilst this disease remained, were a mere name. Mercy therefore, if at all communicated, must be communicated in such a way as to heal this disease. For, if the punishment, as well as the criminality of sin, consists in an opposition to the character of God, the fullest pardon must be perfectly useless, whilst this opposition remains in the heart ;

<sup>1</sup> Erskine's Internal Evidences, p. 36.

and the substantial usefulness of the pardon will depend upon its being connected with such circumstances, as may have a natural and powerful tendency to remove this opposition, and to create a resemblance. *The pardon of the Gospel* is connected with such circumstances; for the sacrifice of Christ has associated sin with the blood of the benefactor, as well as with our own personal sufferings; and obedience, with the dying entreaty of a friend, breathing out a tortured life for us, as well as with our own unending glory in his blessed society. This act justifies God as a lawgiver, in dispensing mercy to the guilty; it gives a pledge of the sincerity and reality of that mercy; and by associating principle with mercy, it identifies the object of gratitude with the object of esteem in the heart of the sinner. The *abstract idea* of God's character, although involving the union of justice and mercy in the highest degree, may yet have little influence on our minds; because the invincible infinity of his essence adds incalculably to the natural vagueness and inefficiency of such impressions. It was, therefore, the part of a wise and benevolent Being to *embody* his attributes in a train of *palpable and intelligible action*, which might carry a *distinct* and influential appeal to our capacities and feelings<sup>1</sup>."

On such a subject, indeed, every mind that is properly awakened to a Christian feeling of its import, will ever be anxious to refer altogether to the very words of Inspiration,—thus flying for shelter from

<sup>1</sup> Erskine's Internal Evidences, pp. 73, 76.

the storms of controversial difficulties and perplexities, to hide itself, as it were, under the shadow of the wings of the All-wise and Almighty. It is to the Word of God, therefore, that we would appeal from all human systems ; deeply feeling the propriety, nay, the absolute necessity, of keeping strictly to what is written, rather than mixing human explanations beyond what is written,—explanations which very generally only ‘darken counsel by words without knowledge.’ But it has been the great disadvantage of doctrines like these, that they have too often been treated in a *dry, hard, and scholastic* manner, abstracting them from their tendencies of spiritual and moral influence, which apparently form the great *object* and *end* for which they were revealed. For be it ever remembered, that it is in a form of combination with these moral tendencies, and with a direct application to them, that the Scriptures *always* exhibit these doctrines ; while human expositions, *divesting* them of this *life* and *spirit*, endeavour to chain them down to a *precise technical* phraseology, which frequently, instead of *elucidating* the doctrines, tends rather to encumber them with difficulties and perplexities, quite extraneous to their genuine and simple Scriptural character. To that character and to that authority it will be my great aim to conduct you ; and I shall shortly hope here to find our only secure resting-place. The only legitimate object of our preliminary observations must be, to endeavour to do away any antecedent prejudices which may have been raised against this doctrine, by attempting to remove perplexities often occasioned by foreign

and injudicious additions, and to exhibit the genuine character and tendencies of its simple Scriptural form.

We have already seen, in following the views of Mr. Erskine, a striking exhibition of the moral tendencies of the Christian doctrine of the atonement through a suffering Saviour, to reclaim the soul from its state of alienation and opposition to the Divine character; a state which, while it should remain uncorrected, would in itself ensure and constitute its ultimate misery, independently of any other penal infliction. And it appears undoubtedly congenial to every apprehension on the subject which the mind of man can form, or which Revelation has conveyed to it, that this is a most essential part of the penalty impending on sin, and that any effectual remedial dispensation must, in the first place, be such as to provide for the *conversion* of the sinner's soul from this state of opposition into a *renovated* conformity to the Divine will. But whether this state of alienation be the *whole* extent of that penalty, or whether such a renovation be the *only* intention of that atonement, is a question of far more abstruse inquiry, and one on which I am alone induced to enter, lest a single and exclusive view of such a subject should appear liable to misconception.

Considered more generally, the whole subject of the atonement appears to depend on the character and relations of the *moral government* of the universe exercised by the Deity,—a government which every hypothesis admitting a Divine Being, and advancing beyond the *virtual negation* of the Epicureans, must imply as exercised by him.

Now the very idea of a moral government appears to include the notion of *laws*, and of *penal consequences* attached to the violation of those laws. It may, indeed, be objected, that these terms are derived from human and often imperfect analogies. Still, as these analogies afford in fact our only materials for reasoning at all on the subject, and, above all, as Scriptural language appears to countenance their application, the just conclusion from this proposition appears to be, not that we should abstain from using them as illustrations, but that we should use them with *caution*, remembering that they are *illustrations* only, and that we cannot presume that the thoughts of God are as our thoughts, or his ways as our ways.

But it may perhaps be further *objected* as to the idea of the *penal consequences* of sin, that the only just ground of *punishment* appears to consist in its *corrective* tendency, as preventing the repetition of an injurious offence, either by the culprit himself or others ; and that this quality scarcely appears to belong to the punishment of human offences in another state. To such an objection, however, it would be surely sufficient to answer, that it is deduced solely from our *ignorance*. God is the moral governor, not of the race of man only, but of the whole universe : of the whole extent of that government, and of the mutual relations of its various parts, we are alike utterly *ignorant*. We are ignorant, therefore, *how far* his dispensations in any one part of his universal dominion, *may not bear an exemplary relation* to many other parts : we know not how far the impunity of one race of moral agents might not introduce disor-

ders into the general system, analogous to those which a similar impunity in human governments would in them occasion. That there are other classes of intellectual agents besides ourselves concerned in the dispensations which affect us, certainly appears to be implied in the Scriptures. Although the necessary obscurity of such a subject may well school us to rein in all rash speculations upon it ; yet we undoubtedly read of one class of intellectual agents besides ourselves, who, like us, kept not their first estate, but fell far more desperately than ever we have done, while another class retained their heavenly purity. Both these classes are represented as having specific relations to the human race,—the former as viewing it with the most malignant aspect, the latter as delighting to look into the mysteries which concern our peace, and employed in the ministrations of mercy towards us. This at least may show that we are not an *insulated* tribe in the creation, and that the dispensations which *primarily* affect us, may have many *remoter* relations and *ulterior tendencies* extended beyond our own narrow sphere. I would not, indeed, allude to speculations of this nature as *competent to establish* our point ; but they are competent, I think, to show how soon our *ignorance* on such a subject *commences*, and to *nullify all objections* deduced from *conditions which are altogether placed beneath that ignorance*.

It is clearly impossible for us therefore to argue on any assumption contradicting the proposition that the moral government exercised by the Deity may very probably require that its sanctions should be upheld in an *exemplary* manner. The great question con-

cerning the Christian scheme of the atonement will always be found to resolve itself into the enquiry whether it seems most *consistent* with our ideas of the Divine mercy, that God should extend his mercy *immediately*, and on the sole condition of repentance, to the sinner, or *mediately*, through the vicarious sacrifice of a being intimately united with his own nature, offering himself to bear our sins. And in discussing this question we surely are not entitled to exclude from our argument the consideration in *how exemplary* a manner such an atonement must maintain the sanctions of the Divine government, and magnify the Divine law.

It has been said, indeed, that if it were suitable for the Divine Being to display mercy, that mercy would have been displayed without the necessity of any intervening means being employed to procure it. But this is surely an argument, which, as has been well observed by writers on this subject<sup>1</sup>, if *conclusive against the efficacy of an atonement*, must be *equally conclusive against the efficacy of prayer*; for may it not be said, in the very same terms, that if it be suitable for the Deity to grant the good things prayed for, he would give them καὶ ἐὺχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις, and if otherwise, he would not grant them under any conditions: that in the first case, the intervention of any medium, like prayer, must be unnecessary; in the second, unavailing. The injunction of the Saviour, therefore, "Seek and ye shall find, ask and ye shall have," and his assertion that

<sup>1</sup> This argument is most cogently stated in Archbishop Magee's elaborate treatise on the Atonement.



his heavenly Father should give his Holy Spirit to *those that ask him*, must on this ground involve full as much *difficulty* as his declaration that his blood was shed for the remission of sins.

The *analogy of prayer*, then, must convince all who believe in its efficacy, that it does please the Divine Being to make the extension of moral benefits *depend upon conditional means*, without the intervention of which it would *not be suitable* under the laws which he has prescribed for his dispensations to impart those benefits; and the same *analogy* may perhaps also assist us in acquiring some *insight* into the reasons which render these intervening conditions essential. We cannot suppose prayer necessary to act as any inducement to the Divine benevolence, we cannot suppose that his *nature* can be *flattered* by our homage, or that his compassionate *love* requires to be *awakened by clamorous entreaties*. But if we look at the moral effect of prayer on the heart, which truly offers it up,—if we have ever experienced how much the heart becomes opened, how much happier and holier a frame diffuses itself over the whole system of our moral feelings while we are engaged in prayer, we shall at once perceive that the act of prayer produces such specific effects, as morally to *prepare and fit* us for the more suitable reception of those blessings.

Similar views may very justly be applied to the case of the atonement: we do not consider it necessary as an inducement to the Divine mercy. But it may be essential, nevertheless, not only, as we have just seen, for the exemplary maintenance of the sanctions of the Divine government, but (like *prayer*)

as the most effectual means of producing *suitable moral dispositions* in those who are to become the subjects and recipients of that mercy. Their souls will be thus filled with the most overflowing gratitude to its first source, the God who so loved the world that he gave for his redemption his only begotten Son, and to the Divine Son “who loved *us*, and gave himself for *us*.” Thus, under such a scheme, doth the Saviour ‘draw us with the cords of a man,’ and realize the prediction, in which he foreshowed the manner of his death: “And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me,”—draw them with the *strongest motives*, and by the most *imperative obligations* that can possibly be brought to act on our moral nature; for must not all who really believe anything of this great doctrine feel that they are no longer their own, but bought with a price? How forcibly does St. Paul express his sense of this constraining influence, when he says, “I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me <sup>1</sup>.”

The objections which have been sometimes urged against this most affecting and most converting doctrine have, I am persuaded, often proceeded from attending, not to its simple and Scriptural statement, but rather to the incautious manner in which some of its advocates have represented it. For it has occasionally been exhibited under such a colour, as to give some ground to the caviller to maintain

<sup>1</sup> Gal. ii. 20.

that the scheme, so stated, supposes the Deity to be a governor of inflexible severity, exacting for every transgression an *exact equivalent* of punishment, but indifferent whether that punishment be inflicted on the guilty, or by vicarious substitution on the innocent. But surely nothing of this objection really applies to the genuine form of the doctrine, which I would most earnestly advocate with the devotion of every power of my mind : so repugnant, indeed, does it seem to me, to any of the ideas which we really attach to that doctrine, that I almost shudder while repeating it. Our common language of thanksgiving, at once confutes any such misapprehension :—" Almighty God, Father of all mercies, we thank thee for thine *inestimable love* in the redemption of the world, by our Lord Jesus Christ."

To no *vindictive* feelings, to no *inherent* severity, do we ascribe the punishment of sin, but solely to the necessary conditions of a scheme of moral government which requires exemplary sanctions for its maintenance, and which penal consequences may also, in great part, be the natural and necessary effect of the incapacity for happiness which sin effects in the moral constitution of the sinner.

Still less can we ascribe to *severity* the requisition of a vicarious substitute to bear the penalty incurred : that, again, we do ascribe, not to severity, but to infinite love. We acknowledge, the inability of our faculties adequately to fathom the depths of a mystery, which yet we believe to be entirely the mystery of a love that passeth knowledge.

We do, I say, ascribe this scheme to *infinite love*, united indeed with *infinite holiness*, and therefore in-

capable, perhaps, if we may so venture to speak, of *gratuitously* violating the sanctions of his moral government. With such a violation, indeed, if we were able to take into account the whole extent, and all the relations of that government, we should most probably discover God's *mercy*, no less than his *holiness*, to be incompatible. For I often think that we reason presumptuously, when we venture to speak of the nature of the Divine attributes as distinct and separate. In a being of infinite essence, perfections, and relations, they may be all blended together in one, and all work together in one direction. And thus, in this instance, as far as we can comprehend it, *holy mercy* being, as we have said, inconsistent with the *gratuitous* impunity of our sinful race, that love was manifested in providing a substitute and ransom.

With reference to this acceptance of a vicarious substitute in the place of the guilty, we must, indeed, ever feel it to be a deep mystery—but yet we may adore it as a mystery of love—and we may further observe, that there appears to be such a connection between the mysteries of our faith, that many of the difficulties which they singly present will be materially lessened, if we endeavour to view them in conjunction. This, as bearing upon the present question, that other doctrine of the mysterious union subsisting between the Father and the Son seems to me very important: that mystery we also acknowledge ourselves unable in any degree to comprehend; but still I think it removes from our minds every secret feeling of injustice, which might else seem to attach itself to the acceptance of an infliction on an inno-

cent person in lieu of the infliction on the guilty. For though analogous cases in human transactions have been pointed out, yet I must allow the justice of some observations on this subject inserted in a late Number of that most respectable religious periodical, the *Christian Observer*<sup>1</sup>. “If we analyse the matter closely, we shall find that any given instance of analogy which is adduced to prove the justice of the atonement, conveys to our minds rather the idea of injustice; and it is not till we rise above analogy, and take inspiration for our guide, that we can exclaim with the confidence of faith, ‘Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?’ We will not say that such analogies have no weight, but we must think them not wholly satisfactory, till assured that there is no latent feeling passing through the mind that injustice was committed,—injustice on the part of those who required or accepted the innocent victim as a substitute for the guilty.” But according to the view entertained by our church of the Christian atonement, no such latent feeling of injustice can for a moment arise; for, according to that view, he who required and accepted the sacrifice, was by an intimate and indescribable relation one with him who voluntarily tendered it; both were one in essence, and one in love to our race<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> March 1830.

<sup>2</sup> The proper consideration of the mysterious union of the Divine and human nature in the person of Christ, obviously belongs to another portion of these lectures; but as connected with the doctrine of his sacrifice, I would here observe, that the cavils sometimes urged against us, as though by such

Hence then I would argue, that according to our views of the intimate union of the Father and the Son, there can be no such secret feeling of injustice connected with the doctrine of the atonement, as with the human transactions sometimes introduced as analogous. History does, however, present us with one case, which seems quite free from every objection of the kind, and which, indeed, if any can, may justly be offered as an appropriate analogy: it forms, indeed, one of the most affecting and interesting narratives of ancient history, and is very commonly known, having been related by different classical authors, *e. g.* Ælian, Var. Hist. lib. iii., and Valerius Maximus, from the last of whom<sup>1</sup> I will

views we represented the Divine nature as becoming obnoxious to suffering or death, will be found altogether unfounded by any one who will examine any of our accredited writers, who have been ever careful, when expressly treating on the subject, to represent all things of this kind to be predicated only of the human nature of Christ. If any foundation at all has ever been given for such cavils, it must have been by rhetorical statements incautiously, and assuredly on such a subject, most *improperly* introduced. On a point of so mysterious a character we can hardly venture to speak; but we may perhaps safely observe, that as death is not the destruction of either of the parts of our compound being, but only their disunion, so the disunion of the compound nature of Christ may be properly termed the death of the joint person of Christ.

<sup>1</sup> Lib. vi. cap. 5. Timæus indeed doubted whether such a man as Zaleucus ever existed: but Cicero (de Leg. lib. ii. cap. 6,) favours the affirmative: he concludes however, “Sed, sive fuit, sive non fuit, nihil ad rem: loquimur quod traditum est.” And we may in like manner observe, that the absolute truth of the story does not affect our application of it as a mere illustration. Grotius first referred to this analogous case. De Satisfactione Christi, 75.

now translate it. "Nothing," says that writer, "can be conceived stronger than such examples of justice as the following: Zaleucus, king of the Locrian state, had provided for its administration the most salutary and useful laws. His own son having been found guilty of the crime of adultery, for which, according to one of these laws, he should have been sentenced to the loss of both his eyes; the whole city from their respect for the father, were desirous to procure for the youth remission from the penalty; Zaleucus, however, for a while resisted; but at length overcome by the entreaties of the people, by substituting the loss of one of his own eyes, and therefore requiring one only of his son's, he thus spared the use of sight to both,—by this arrangement yielding its *due penal sanction* to the law, and dividing himself by the most admirable temperament of equity between a merciful parent and just legislator."

Had the heathen who thus wrote been instructed in the Christian doctrine, could *he* have conceived the objections which have been made against the great instance, in which the Universal Parent has thus exhibited himself "*æquitatis admirabili temperamento, se inter misericordem patrem et justum legislatorem partitus?*" Would he not rather have joined in the exclamation of the Psalmist, "Mercy and truth are met together: righteousness and peace have kissed each other?"

Having thus endeavoured to state the genuine doctrine of Scripture in its simple form and combined with its practical application, and to remove, as we proceeded, such antecedent prejudices as might



have presented obstacles to its reception, I gladly hasten to the Scriptural proof of that doctrine, as the great basis on which alone we can finally repose. Hitherto I have but attempted to clear the way; but the last thing which I would desire to leave impressed on your mind is, not any speculative questions or controversial discussions, but the sure and certain testimony of the word of truth.

This testimony I may conveniently divide according to the order in which it presents and successively developes itself in the chronological arrangement of our Bibles, under the heads of—1. The early prophecies and sacrificial types which foreshowed the doctrine of the Christian atonement,—2. The declarations of our Blessed Lord himself,—3. The attestations of the Apostles, in executing after his resurrection their commission from him to plant the faith which he had founded, and to make disciples through the world. Thus in every portion of our Bibles may we find the traces of this great doctrine diffused, illuminating them throughout with a light, faint indeed at first, but growing more and more distinct at each successive æra, and shining more and more unto the perfect day of the Gospel, when the Day-spring from on high fully visited us, and the Sun of Righteousness arose in all his brightness with healing on his wings.

Before introducing the prophetical testimonies, however, to the offices of him that should come as a redeemer and restorer, I would premise the remark, that the advocates of these testimonies appear sometimes to have weakened the real force of their argument through injudicious attempts to

strengthen it by exaggerated statements of the perfect *explicitness* and *clearness* of these prophecies from the beginning; as though they were intended from the first to enlighten the earliest patriarchs as clearly in the great mystery of the Gospel, as those were enlightened in it whom the Apostles instructed after its consummation. The light of prophecy however, in truth, appears to have been, as we have said, a light shining more and more unto the perfect day. At each successive period it seems to have received an accession of clearness, and to have been ever marked by a gradual and progressive developement. St. Paul clearly alludes to this partial and gradual disclosure of the plan of Gospel redemption, when in one passage he speaks of the Gospel promised afore by the prophets in the Holy Scripture; and yet in another, calls it the mystery which had been hid from ages and from generations, and which was only now made manifest to the saints.

In accordance with these statements we shall, I think, find the results of a sober investigation of the facts as recorded in the Scriptures. In every age we shall perceive sufficient of hope granted to revive the spirits of the humble, and to reassure the heart of the contrite; but, notwithstanding, we shall undoubtedly find in the beginning, the specific nature of that hope veiled under obscure figures; and left (it is probable) to exist in a form far from exactly defined in the minds to which it was first revealed. Each new revelation seems to have added materially to its distinctness; and at length, in the pages of Isaiah, it indeed stands forth with remarkable lustre. But still it should appear that the full force even of

these most distinct prophecies was very imperfectly understood, till after their full accomplishment. For how else can we account even at the last for the general prejudices of the Jews, so obstinately refusing to receive as Messiah, one whose kingdom was not of this world; who offered himself as a spiritual, not a temporal, deliverer; and who, therefore, had in their eyes no comeliness that they should desire him.

To proceed with our inquiry into the particulars: the earliest revelation to our first parent seems to supply these characters of the promised deliverer, "that he should be a human being, in a peculiar sense the offspring of the female; that he should in some way, not yet known, counteract and remedy the injury inflicted; and that though previously a partial sufferer by the evil and malignant power which had succeeded in bringing sin and ruin into the world, yet he should in the end completely conquer it, and convert its very success into its own punishment <sup>1</sup>."

Now to assert that in this promise the precise person of the deliverer, or exact nature of the deliverance to be effected, were distinctly revealed to Adam, or that in the bruising of the deliverer's heel he was *fully* instructed to expect a *vicarious sacrifice*, is surely to substitute the reveries of unauthorized conjecture for the records of Holy Writ. It must be far safer and more sober to content ourselves with the statement, that he was thus led to hope for

<sup>1</sup> I quote this paraphrastic exposition in the words of Dr. Pye Smith.

a final *deliverer* from the sin and misery then introduced, for a final conqueror over the spiritual enemy of our race.

The typical nature of sacrifice which we find introduced in the first family of the earth, I shall reserve for a distinct consideration, after we have first reviewed the more direct prophecies ; confining ourselves, however, as connected with our present subject, to those which immediately relate to a spiritual deliverance and redemption.

As we find the Redeemer announced to the first parents of our race, so in the next great æra of the Divine dispensations (the selection of a peculiar people to preserve the knowledge of the true God amid the general corruptions of surrounding idolatry) we find the promise repeated to the father of the faithful ; when, as has been well said, “ that the chain of desire and hope for the deliverer of mankind might not be broken, in order to strengthen and preserve it the Father of Mercies laid the basis of a new and peculiar constitution with Abraham <sup>1</sup>.” To him, therefore, was the promise given. “ In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed ;” or rather, for the verb is in the Hithpael or reflected form, “ esteem themselves blessed ;” that is, as Michaelis justly explains it, “ shall believe that God has such an especial love for him, that he will bless us for his sake, and through our obedience to him.” Yet even from this promise we can hardly gather any *precise* description of the *exact* nature of the blessing fore-

<sup>1</sup> Pye Smith, vol. i. p. 243.

shown, or the means by which it was to be procured. The next prominent point that claims our notice is the memorable trial of the faith of Abraham, when he was called upon for the sacrifice of his only beloved son Isaac. On this subject I willingly quote the words of a writer distinguished among the divines of the present day for the cautious and sober tone of his interpretations, and his aversion to everything of overstrained application. "This," says Davison, "is justly to be considered a type of the sacrifice, as his restoration is of the resurrection, of Christ; and of all the prophetic types this appears among the most significant. It stands at the head of the dispensation of Revealed Religion, as reduced into covenant with the people of God in the person of their founder and progenitor. Being thus displayed as it is in the history of the father of the faithful, it seems to be wrought into the foundations of faith. In the surrender and sacrifice of a beloved son, the patriarchal church *begins* with an adumbration of the Christian reality." But, as this writer cautiously adds, "no expiation or atonement is joined with this emblematic oblation, consequently it was a symbol only of the *act*, not of the *power* and *virtue* of the Christian sacrifice; nor have we any Scriptural authority for assuming that any contemporary disclosure was made of its mystical import, or that Abraham was admitted to see in the offering of his son the greater oblation of the Son of God. The declaration that Abraham rejoiced to see the day of Christ, may be sufficiently explained with reference to his faith in the previous promise made to him; and we may well

believe the vision on Mount Moriah sealed up till the time of its consummation in the Gospel <sup>1</sup>."

The promise made to Abraham was renewed in the same terms to Isaac and Jacob. It was this hope, probably, which comforted the dying bed of the last patriarch, when he uttered the aspiration of faith, "For thy salvation I wait, O Jehovah," and was himself enabled to prophesy of the coming of the expected hope of all the nations of the earth under the appropriate title of Shiloh, the giver of peace.

The next great æra of religious dispensation,—the delivery of the law by Moses,—chiefly foreshows, through the medium of its typical expiatory sacrifices therein expressly sanctioned by Divine appointment, the true sacrifice of the great atonement. But these we have reserved for a particular consideration ; and the only direct prophecy wherein Moses foretels the future advent of another prophet like unto himself, is conceived in the most general terms, and without any specific allusion to this particular doctrine.

Of the latter, and what may be emphatically called the prophetic æra of the Elder covenant, such an admirable comprehensive view has been given in the work of Davison before alluded to, that I cannot in any other manner place the subject before you with such pregnant conciseness, as by here adopting the very statement there made. "In the volume of prophecy the Gospel economy breaks forth in accessions of information : the vicarious sufferings and appointed death of the Messiah are now introduced ; the atoning power of his passion is declared ; and the cardi-

<sup>1</sup> Abridged from Davison on Sacrifice, p. 171.

nal principles of the Christian doctrine, sacrifice, and expiation, embodied in the prediction of his Redemption. The prophetic volume hereby becomes the unambiguous witness of the Gospel doctrine. It does not speak in figure, as the rites of the law, but as the more direct oracles of truth. The law *foreshadowed*; the prophets *foretold*. This is the difference between those connected members of the predictive economy of Revelation. Nor shall I perhaps exceed the truth, if I state, that there is a discernible progress in all the communications made concerning this very doctrine of the atonement; for the prophetic psalms embrace the *sufferings* of the Messiah. But we do not read there of the *expiatory* office of those sufferings; that is an addition made by *later* prophecy. Thus in one brief view we have the atoning sacrifice simply foreshadowed by the Law; the sufferings of the Messiah depicted in the Psalms; his Passion and Atonement united together in the later prophecy. In conformity with this account I shall observe, that one chapter of the prophet Isaiah, the 53rd, or perhaps a single text of that chapter, ‘Thou shalt make *his soul* an *offering for sin*,’ comprehends more of the real disclosure of this Christian principle than could be previously gathered from all the Law and the Prophets. The books of Isaiah, Daniel, and Zachariah, taken together, complete the scheme of Revealed Truth in the Covenant of Grace. And as all the Christian promises, such as the pardon of sin, the gift of eternal life, and the supply of spiritual aid, are included in some or other of the representations of prophecy, the foundation of those promises, in the *atoning death* of the Redeemer, is made



conspicuous among them, and completes their system. In this manner was Christianity ‘witnessed by the Law and the Prophets<sup>1</sup>.’ ”

To these remarks nothing can be added ; but a short specimen of two of the most remarkable predictions on the subject may perhaps impress their force more effectually on the mind.

I shall first quote a part of Isaiah liii.

“ Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows...But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities : the chastisement of our peace was upon him ; and with his stripes we are healed...The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all ;...for the transgression of my people was he stricken...when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin (or when his soul shall make a sin offering ;) By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many...for he shall bear their iniquities...And he bare the sin of many.”

Equally explicit shall we find the remarkable prophecy of Daniel. “ Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people...to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness...and to anoint the most holy.” And at the end of sixty-two of these weeks, it is added, that the Messiah “should be cut off, but not for himself<sup>2</sup>.”

<sup>1</sup> Davison on Sacrifice, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> In these important texts I have adhered to the common version. In Dr. Pye Smith’s excellent discourses on the sacrifice of Christ (p. 24, 25, and notes) may be found critical versions collected from Rosenmüller, Gesenius, &c. In the texts

Having thus considered the testimony of prophecy to the doctrine of the Christian atonement, the subject of its sacrificial types next claims our attention ; but here, at the very threshold of our inquiry, a very important question presents itself. Were sacrifices in the first place an institution of positive Divine appointment ? or were they rather in their origin a mode of worship suggested by human reason, and only subsequently sanctioned by the Divine acceptance in the patriarchal days ? The judgment of the majority of Christians is undoubtedly in favour of the opinion of their Divine institution ; yet the opposite opinion has been supported by many distinguished names of those who have placed an equal faith in the authority of the Scriptures, and in the great doctrine of the Christian atonement. Among these we indeed reckon one father of the church, Chrysostom ; in mo-

cited from Isaiah liii, these present no substantial variations. In Daniel ix. 24. "to anoint the most *holy*," or in the Hebrew, "the holy of holies," may, it is observed, be understood either of the consecration of the Messiah himself, or of that of a spiritual temple to him. Dr. Smith prefers the latter, since the Hebrew phrase is constantly applied to the holiest recess of the Temple, and not to any person. In the 26th verse, "Messiah shall be cut off, *but not for himself*," the Hebrew of the latter clause is וְאֵין לוֹ 'and not to him.' Here Dr. Smith agrees with those who consider the version, "and no one will be for him," *i. e.* to defend or deliver him, as more agreeable to the Hebrew idiom than that of our received translation ; but, if I might venture to dissent from so high an authority, I would observe, that in all the instances I can remember where such a sense is implied, the Hebrew uniformly inserts "No MAN," or "No HELPER." Neither the Septuagint nor the Vulgate versions will here afford any material assistance, both being obviously very faulty in this place.

dern times Grotius and Warburton ; and in our own days the very able Davison. I do not mention Spencer, who of course maintains this view in his treatise *De Legibus Hebraicis* ; because in a spirit anticipating that of the modern neologian schools, his general theory appears to be that the whole of the Mosaic ritual was only a copy (adopted indeed under the Divine sanction) from the ordinary ceremonies of Gentile worship, especially as they prevailed among the Egyptians ; so that few, I apprehend, who seriously cling to the Christian name are likely to consider his conjectures either safe or sound.

Sacrifices are commonly divided into eucharistical, impetratory, and piacular, which last may perhaps be subdivided into penitential and *expiatory*. It is with the last class alone that our present subject is connected ; but in order to follow up the argument as to the origin of sacrifice, we must consider it generally.

Warburton and Davison are agreed in considering eucharistical sacrifice, *e. g.* the dedication of first fruits to God, to have been a natural representation by an expressive action of the feeling of gratitude, and as a general tribute of homage to the All-bountiful Giver. Impetratory or precative sacrifices might, it is said, be accounted for in a similar manner ; as by the offering of a portion of what was to be sown or otherwise propagated, men might be supposed significantly to represent their invocation of the Divine blessing ; and even animal sacrifices for sin, so far at least as they only represent penitential confession, are attempted to be accounted for on the like princi-

ples; the offering of some precious animal on the part of the penitent, and the devoting it to death, being considered as expressing *in action* a sentiment, which might thus be translated into words: "I confess my transgressions at thy footstool, O my God, and with the deepest contrition implore thy pardon, confessing that I myself deserve for these my offences the death which I now inflict on this animal." But beyond this Mr. Davison draws a marked line of distinction: while he agrees with Warburton, that piacular sacrifices, considered only in the above light, that is, as involving only *penitential confession*, are purely natural; yet regarded as possessing a force properly *expiatory*, and involving the idea of a vicarious atonement, he thinks it impossible to account for them on any principles of natural reason. For as the remission of sin is plainly altogether within the prerogative of God,—so reason could never suggest any power in animal blood to conciliate that remission, to wash away sin, to purify conscience, or to redeem the sin from its penalty. Expiatory sacrifice, he fully admits, must have been of God's own appointment, to reconcile it either to God or to man himself, till he was fallen under a deplorable superstition. But then he denies that we have any authority to conclude, that the primitive or patriarchal sacrifices were of this nature, and inclines to ascribe the first introduction of such to their authoritative promulgation in the Mosiac law <sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> These expiatory sacrifices are in the Mosaic Law, described under two titles, which our translators have rendered trespass offering and sin offering. Express directions as to the occasions calling for either, and their mode of oblation, are

From the brief simplicity of the records delivered in the very few instances noticed, as to the primitive and patriarchal sacrifices, we may indeed admit with this author, that we can scarcely derive any positive information on the subject beyond the simple fact, that "the altar is raised, the oblation is brought, and the victim is sacrificed"; but with what notions, with what specific intent, is not defined; with one only exception, in which sacrifice is described as a commanded *federal rite*, the ordained seal of God's covenant with Abraham in the promise of the Land of Canaan." As to this statement, however, I would observe, that although we may indeed be without any *direct* evidence of the nature of patriarchal sacrifice, we may still perhaps possess some *indirect* indications, which may aid our investigation of the subject.

to be found Leviticus iv. and vii. (et aliis locis), but it does not seem easy to draw any line of moral distinction between the circumstances which required either form of atonement: אָשָׁם ASM (or, according to the punctuated system, asham) is the Hebrew term both for the former expiation, and the offences for which it was made, חַטָּאת HĠAT, (or hattath), for the latter—this term closely corresponds both in its primary meaning and moral application with the Greek *Ἀμαρτία*. It is the term employed in the well-known expostulation of the Lord with Cain, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not have the excellency, and if not (חַטָּאת) sin (or a sin offering) lieth at thy door." Many interpreters, following the sacrificial sense, have explained this as an injunction of expiatory oblations; and could we be assured that their views were correct, the question concerning the antiquity and origin of these rites would of course be conclusively answered:—but we must not build too peremptorily on the use of a term confessedly equivocal.

To these I shall presently advert, after first remarking on the theory which ascribes the first introduction of expiatory sacrifice to the promulgation of the Mosiac law, that it certainly seems a little difficult to reconcile this theory with the *prima facie* appearance of the internal evidence of the record containing that law. In this we shall look in vain for a single expression indicating that such sin offerings were a *novel* rite, then for the *first* time introduced ; on the contrary, they are alluded to quite as familiarly as any other kind of sacrifices ; the particular ceremonial manner of their performance being prescribed in these, exactly in the same way that it is with regard to the branch of eucharistical sacrifices, and without any feature of distinction that can bespeak the one class to be an *innovation* rather than the other.

To return to the patriarchal sacrifices ;—we have, as I have already said, in my opinion, some indirect evidence with regard to these, in the sacrifices which prevailed in the Gentile world. For surely the most rational mode of accounting for the latter, is by ascribing them to a corruption of patriarchal tradition. But these Gentile sacrifices we well know were often considered as rites of *expiation* and *vicarious atonement*. Take, for instance, the well known case of the Egyptian sacrifices, in which the victim was first marked with a seal containing the impression of a man bound and kneeling, with a sword pointing to his throat, implying apparently the vicarious substitution of the victim as devoted to the death deserved by the penitent offering it ; a solemn imprecation

being made over that victim's head : " May all the evils impending over the sacrificers, or over the country be averted upon this head <sup>1</sup>."

In the Book of Job also,—which, if it be not itself of patriarchal antiquity, yet from the absence of all allusion to the Mosiac ritual, appears clearly to preserve a record of the religious observances of a tribe unacquainted with that dispensation,—we read that Job offered burnt offerings as a *sanctification* for his sons ; for he said, " it may be *that my sons have sinned*,"—a clear description of an expiatory offering.

If then the silence of the Mosaic record as to any *innovation*, and these *indications*, lead us to consider it as more probable that expiatory sacrifices really formed a portion of the patriarchal worship, Mr. Davison's own admission, that such cannot be accounted for rationally without having recourse to Divine appointment, must be quite conclusive against himself. And as we know that these patriarchal offerings were sanctioned by the Divine acceptance, does it not seem far most probable, that the religious rites of beings admitted to such a degree of spiritual intercourse originated in the Divine suggestion ?

But I gladly turn to that later period, concerning which we are all agreed ; and here it gives me the greatest satisfaction once more to quote Mr. Davison's express words. " The next epoch of Scripture brings us to the Mosaic Law. Here we have solid grounds to rest upon,—knowledge instead of conjecture. In this Law there is a Divine institution of sacrifice ; there is a declared expiatory use ; and

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, de Iside et Osiride, et Herodot. ii. 38, 39.



there is a paramount importance assigned to the blood of sacrifice, which renders it the chief instrument of the whole Levitical worship. Under this *institution* and *use*, sacrifice becomes one of the greatest and most complete of the typical prophecies. For here *oblation* and *atonement* are linked together under a Divine appointment ; and this combination constitutes them the adequate symbols of the *sacrifice* and *atonement* of the *Christian Redemption* <sup>1</sup>."

It is also with an entire assent to their justice that I add the remarks subjoined by the author, on the propriety of guarding ourselves against the hasty and unauthorized inference, that the full import of these types was clearly understood from the very moment of their promulgation.

"But this species of prophecy, by type, is in its nature of a latent kind. It needs to be interpreted by its Divine Author, or by the event ; that is, either by his word or his providence. For the type being a sign of some distant purpose in the Divine intention not yet revealed, and not a representative of human thought or action, it defies the power of human intellect, and is unlocked only by God, either by a specific revelation, or by its completion in due time, which then becomes the luminous exhibition of the sense designed. Not finding in the Law, fully digested as it is ; nor in the subsequent history of the Old Testament, full of religious matter ; nor in the Psalms, full of religious sentiment and doctrine, any proofs that the types of the Law had been divinely interpreted, we are not authorized to treat them as

<sup>1</sup> Davison on Sacrifice, p. 174.

more than a *concealed prophecy*, during their legal use, unless we choose to argue at a hazard, and make an oracle of our own conjectures. In the Gospel they are explained by their relative and analogous completion in its proper truths. They are there explained also by the positive elucidation of them dogmatically given, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews. But in the Old Testament no such key is applied to unlock their sense ; and therefore it exceeds our evidence to admit, that in those preceding times they had been fully explained in their Gospel import. They were a sacred hieroglyphic, of which their Divine Author alone could be the interpreter : and when his records do not vouch for the interpretation, I shall not believe it to have been given. The Mosaic period, then, presents the proper doctrine of *sacrifice* and *atonement*, but under the *veil* of a *type*<sup>1</sup>."

Thus have we examined the whole course of the antecedent testimony of type and prophecy, and seen it at each successive period developing itself with fresh accessions of explicitness and force, until at length the shadows were replaced by the substantial reality, and the volume of prophecy sealed up by its completion.

To the evangelical records of that completion let us now proceed. The whole tenor of the Gospel history, from its first to its final line, speaks one uniform language on this subject. When the angel announced the approaching nativity of the Christ, he declared his name as Jesus, the Saviour from sin. When the heavenly host hailed its accomplishment,

<sup>1</sup> Davison on Sacrifice, p. 175.

their strain proclaimed the birth of the Saviour, through whom peace descended among the sons of men. When his Baptist forerunner saluted him, it was with the exclamation: "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world." Of himself he declared, that the Son of Man came to give his life, a ransom for many. Foreshowing the manner of his death, he predicts that the Son of Man shall be lifted up (on the cross), that the world through him might be saved. Again he speaks of his flesh, which he would give for the life of the world; he beautifully describes himself as the good shepherd, that layeth down his life for the sheep. "Love one another" is his command, "*as I have loved you: greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.*" In his last ministerial act, the institution of the rite which was to preserve a continual memorial of his then approaching death until his coming again, he directs the attention of his disciples to his body which was given, and his blood shed, *for the remission of sins.*

It has sometimes indeed been objected, that some of the doctrines which we hold forth as the great fundamentals of the Christian scheme, are deduced rather from the more explicit doctrinal *instructions* of the Apostolic Epistles than from the Evangelical narratives. But even if it should be so in any case, this surely cannot form any valid ground of objection against those doctrines, when we remember that our Lord appears to have opened the minds of his disciples very gradually during his earthly intercourse with them; for although we meet with some previous occasional allusions to the subject, yet it

was not till after his resurrection that we read,—“Then opened he their understandings, that they might understand the Scriptures, that thus it behoved Christ to suffer.” His earthly ministry, indeed, appears to have been intended rather to supply the *subject* matter, upon which the *superstructure* of doctrine should be subsequently erected, through the teaching of that Holy Spirit, expressly promised to guide the minds of those who were to become the first promulgators of his religion into all truth—all truth, especially, relating to Christ. But these remarks seem in this place unnecessary ; for we have seen, that if every line of the Apostolic Epistles were effaced, this doctrine would not be in the least shaken ; it would still stand immoveably on the basis of the Gospels alone.

Paul, however, was undoubtedly one of the most earnest preachers of this, as the *great* and only foundation of our hope. Thus, in the Acts we find him enforcing on the ministers he had appointed their faithful care of the Church of God, (or, according to other MSS., of the Lord,) which he had purchased with his own blood<sup>1</sup>, employing this as the most constraining motive. The great subject of his Epistles throughout is, “Jesus Christ, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation for sin, through faith in his blood<sup>2</sup>,—who was delivered for our offences<sup>3</sup>,—who died for us while yet sinners<sup>4</sup>,—our Paschal Lamb, who was sacrificed for us<sup>5</sup>,—by whose death we are reconciled to God ; for we

<sup>1</sup> Acts xx. 28.<sup>2</sup> Rom. iii. 25.<sup>3</sup> Ibid. iv. 25.<sup>4</sup> Ibid. v. 8.<sup>5</sup> 1 Cor. v. 7.

have redemption through his blood ; he having made peace through the blood of his cross<sup>1</sup>;—who hath loved us, and given himself for us<sup>2</sup>,—by whom we are thus bought with a price<sup>3</sup>;—for Christ died for all, that those who live should no longer live to themselves, but to him who died and arose again for them<sup>4</sup>.” These are but a very few of the testimonies of the Pauline Epistles, and I have entirely refrained from quoting that to the Hebrews, because, though the evidence of its authenticity is such as in my opinion must satisfy every candid inquirer<sup>5</sup>, yet is perhaps rather weaker than that in favour of the other portions of the Christian volume: I am only embarrassed with the abundance of evidence and the task of selection, and it is therefore quite unnecessary to appeal to a document about which a moment’s doubt has ever existed. But, as you well know, that Epistle is entirely occupied by an exposition of the typical nature of the priesthood and sacrifices of the elder covenant, and therefore presents the atonement of Christ in almost every line.

All the other Apostles who have left us any writings entirely harmonize with the attestations of St. Paul. Thus Peter reminds us, that we were not redeemed with silver and gold from our vain conversation, but with the precious blood of Christ<sup>6</sup>,—who

<sup>1</sup> Rom. v. 10. Eph. i. 7. Col. i. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Eph. v. 25.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. vi. 20.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Cor. v. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Lardner sums up his very elaborate review of the whole argument connected with the genuineness of this Epistle thus:

“The writer very probably is Paul,”—vol. iii. p. 340.

<sup>6</sup> 1 Pet. i. 19.

suffered for us leaving us an example ; . . . and his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree <sup>1</sup>,—having once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, to bring us to God <sup>2</sup>.

In John, the great preacher of love, we read this as its highest example and motive : “ Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us <sup>3</sup> ;—the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sins <sup>4</sup> ;—for he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world <sup>5</sup> .” And in the very opening of the sublime visions of the Apocalypse, we find the ascription of glory unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood <sup>6</sup> . And the hymns of the glorified Saints, the ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands, that surround his throne, proclaim : “ Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power and riches and wisdom and strength and honour and glory and blessing ; for thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred and tongue and people and nation <sup>7</sup> .”

Surely if language has any definite meaning, these numerous passages can admit but one interpretation. Who can listen to them without feeling how strong must have been the force of prejudice which must have prevailed in the mind of one, whom yet I think it my Christian duty far more to pity than harshly to condemn, the unhappy Faustus Socinus, who frankly avows : “ If not once only but often it should be written in the Sacred Scriptures, that

<sup>1</sup> 1 Pet. ii. 21. 24.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. iii. 18.

<sup>3</sup> 1 John iii. 16.

<sup>4</sup> 1 John i. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. ii. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Rev. i. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Rev. v. 9. 12.

Christ made satisfaction<sup>1</sup> to God for sins, I would not therefore believe it." And again: "Any, even the greatest force is to be used with words rather than take them in this the obvious sense<sup>2</sup>." Far rather would we join in the Apostle's exclamation: "This is a true saying, and worthy of all men to be received, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners."

<sup>1</sup> It seems, however, but candid to state, that the objections of Socinus appear to have been excited, not so much by the simple Scriptural doctrine, as by the injudicious and unauthorized explanations which some writers have given of the idea of *satisfaction*, as implying that sin, as a debt, incurs an *exact equivalent* of punishment as a *payment*, and that the Deity, as a strict accountant, exacted this *equivalent*,—a notion which has little in common with the ideas I have above endeavoured to inculcate of the conduct of his moral government. Our Church, indeed, uses the term 'satisfaction;' but we need not, I conceive, interpret it to imply the above notion, but rather as representing the *adequacy* of this dispensation to repair the broken authority of the moral government of the world by a full, perfect, and sufficient exemplary sanction. Mr. Jerram, in his work on the Atonement, has some very judicious observations on this subject.

<sup>2</sup> Socinus on the Satisfaction, and Second Epistle to Bolarimicius.



## LECTURE IV.

*On the Divinity of Christ—Introductory Observations,  
and Evidence of the Old Testament.*

THE doctrine to which the order of our investigation naturally conducts us in the next place, and concerning which I have to lay before you that interpretation of the Scriptural testimonies which has been adopted by our own Church, and by the great majority of the Christian name, relates to the dignity of that Being, by whom, as we have seen in our last Lecture, so great a salvation has been wrought out for our race,—a dignity which we are fully persuaded is throughout these records so described as to imply (by any just construction) an intimate participation of the Divine nature.

This doctrine is indeed mysterious,—most mysterious; but to beings of faculties limited as ours are, can any doctrine affecting that nature which is emphatically infinite and incomprehensible, be other than mysterious? “Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do? Deeper than hell, what canst thou know?” I trust that the remarks which I have already made on a former occasion concerning the occurrence of

mysteries in the doctrines of Revelation, may be now remembered and applied. Our knowledge, as we then saw, is not in any case a knowledge of things as they are in their own nature, but as they are exhibited in their effects and operations. Our knowledge of Nature is, in fact, entirely limited to a knowledge of those effects and operations, and of the laws which regulate them; and as these form the relations through which alone the things themselves affect us, such is the only knowledge which it practically concerns us to possess: beyond this, information might indeed gratify a philosophical curiosity; but beyond this it is not required for our use; and beyond this it is not at present vouchsafed to us, whatever it may be hereafter, in some advanced stage of intellectual being. Our knowledge of things, then, is a knowledge of their relations to ourselves; and exactly analogous to this appears the knowledge of the Divine nature vouchsafed to us in Revelation. Of that nature, as it is in its essential existence, we know—we *can* know—absolutely nothing; it is solely revealed to us in the relations under which it is manifested to ourselves,—the relations of the *First* Source of all being, of the Redeemer of mankind, and of the Spirit that sanctifieth all the faithful. Now as we find the Divine attributes ascribed to each of these manifestations, and yet are uniformly assured that the Lord our God is one God, we believe that the Divine nature is indeed one, yet so that in that unity there is a distinction; but in what that union, or in what that distinction consists, or in what manner they co-exist, we know not, we profess not to know: here we confess our entire ignorance.

Now is there any one, I would ask, who can pretend that his intellectual powers are able so fully to grasp the subject of the Divine Essence, as peremptorily to pronounce the impossibility of any such distinction, or its absolute incompatibility with the Divine unity? Unless, however, we are prepared to feel ourselves competent to such an assertion, it must be perfectly obvious that the vulgar objections sometimes made against this mystery, as though it involved an absurd contradiction in terms, are as irrelevant as they are irreverent: they may be *scoffs*, *arguments* they cannot be.

Again, as to that branch of the subject with which we are at present more especially engaged, the union of the Divine and human nature in the person of Christ, or the *hypostatical* union, as it is technically termed, if we take the representation of it given in the authorized formulary embraced by our Church, that “as the reasonable soul and body is one man, so God and man is one Christ,” shall it be objected that this is a mystery? Without doubt great is the mystery. But let me ask again, Is our own personal union free from all mystery? What metaphysician will inform me of the exact nature of that spiritual principle, the soul; or who that has ever read the speculations of Berkeley, will assert that his ideas of matter even, and of his body consequently, are perfectly precise and free from every shade of obscurity? Who will inform me in what exact manner the material organs of sense act on the spiritual principle? or how that spiritual principle reacts on the material frame? Shall we, then, ignorant as we are of that with which we are certainly most intimately

conversant, even of our own constitution, shall we pretend to reject a doctrine concerning the manifestations of the Deity, claiming to be established by Divine revelation, because it involves a mystery? May we not here, with a slight alteration of phrase, apply the question of our Blessed Lord, "If when told of earthly things ye cannot comprehend, how shall ye comprehend if told of heavenly things?" We are bound, indeed, scrupulously to examine into the Scriptural evidence that the doctrine is thus supported; and, unless convinced by that evidence, not to embrace it on any second-hand authority. But from that evidence there can be no appeal; and we are bound to prosecute the examination with the simplicity of little children, with perfect candour, and with submissive teachableness of mind; without any of that proud and stubborn prejudice which may incline us to explain away what is written, in the spirit which has in some cases (I am most happy to say extreme and rare cases,) prompted men to say, whatever may be the true interpretation of the text, the obvious one must be false; or even if an Apostle hath said so, it does not follow that the doctrine is true, but that the Apostle is mistaken.

I am persuaded, indeed, that one source of the difficulties which are sometimes experienced in the reception of this doctrine is, as I have said before, because in the creeds and formularies of a Church it is necessarily presented in a dry, abstract, technical and scholastic form; whereas in the Scriptures we seldom find it thus directly and abstractedly enforced, but generally meet with it in a combined and *applied* form, coupled with some practical

inference ; thus when our Lord himself claims an unity with the Father, it is to encourage the sheep who have entered his fold with the certainty of his almighty protection. “ My Father who gave them me is greater than all, and none is able to pluck them out of my Father’s hand. I and my Father are one.” And when by his actions he most expressively implies his Divine authority, it is that men may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins. And thus, when in the beginning of his Gospel St. John has given us perhaps the most full and express attestations extant of Christ’s pre-existence from the beginning, of his Deity, and of his participation with the Father in the creation of the universe, his great scope seems to be, as may be inferred from the manner in which he sums up that remarkable passage, to point out the ingratitude and danger of those who should reject him, and the spiritual privileges of those who should receive him. “ He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not : he came unto his own, and his own received him not : but as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God.” And thus again, when St. Paul alludes to Christ’s pre-existence in the form of God, and asserts that when he took upon him the servile form of man, he emptied himself, (that is, of his proper dignity,) his object is to enforce the following his example of meekness and love. “ Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus.” From this structure of the Bible, which *ever* thus aims at presenting its great doctrines, not in any abstract scholastic method, but under this *practical*

*combination and application*, it may, indeed, at first seem that these doctrines may be rendered less obvious (being, as it were, latent in the application,) than if they were thrown together on the very surface, as in a technical creed; yet surely in our researches in such a volume, it is a bounden duty to make our researches penetrate beyond that surface; to investigate deeply, to collect, combine, and compare; and no one who has thus studied can, I think, be insensible to the very superior beneficial influence exercised by the Scriptural doctrines from this their combined form; from their always thus associating the materials of faith with the working of that faith by love, a moral power belongs to them far above what could have been possessed by any mere formal enunciation. As St. Paul, after enumerating the most distinguished spiritual gifts, concludes, "Behold, I show you a more excellent way" (referring to the grace of Christian love); so may it be well said that this grace, as being the end and consummation of knowledge and faith, must be the "more excellent way," towards which every intellectual truth should always be so enforced as most effectually to tend.

Yet in any human compilation from these Divine records, however we may regret (as every well-constituted mind must regret) the exchange from their own free and living spirit, to our dead and dry forms, still it is undoubtedly necessary to methodize our own statements, and to exhibit our interpretation under a more precise system of definitions, so as to prevent our views from becoming merged in utter vagueness and confusion. And if in any case it

should at first seem that the general body of the Church has carried this system of technical definition into subjects where it would have been more prudent to abstain from attempting an unattainable precision, it must be remembered that the system does not appear to have *originated* with her, but with those who in early times, dissenting from the views which she embraced, introduced the most rash and unauthorized speculations, themselves pronouncing dogmatically on the most mysterious subjects, conclusions which to the general mind appeared not only unsupported by, but opposed to, the Scriptural statements, thus spoiling the elements of Christian faith by a vain and deceitful philosophy. Under this conviction, it was undoubtedly the duty of the Church to express her negative to such presumptuous speculations ; and from her obligation to pronounce such a negative, in fact, and not from any voluntary engagement in such speculations, we shall find many of our most abstruse doctrinal formularies to have originated. Thus, on the mysterious subject of the hypostatical union of the two natures in Christ, one of these speculating sects maintained that the person of Christ consisted really of his Divine nature only, and that his human appearance was a mere visionary phantom ; another, that the two natures were so blended together in his person, as to be utterly confounded, and that they were converted the one into the other ; another, that the two natures were so distinct, as in fact to constitute two separate persons, the Divine λόγος having been only occasionally associated with the human nature born of Mary from the commencement of his ministerial office.



Can we, then, blame the Fathers of Chalcedon for expressing their dissent to a spirit of hypothesis so wild and so capable of perversion, by their celebrated decision, consisting chiefly of negatives ; *οὐσιωδῶς*, *really*, as opposed to the visionary theory, and in repudiation of the other rash systems above indicated — *ἀσυγχύτως*, *ἀτρέπτως*, *ἀδιαίρετως*, *ἀχωρίστως* ? We should, indeed, most properly feel, that on such a subject a disposition simply to receive that which is written is the proper frame of mind, rather than to subject it to a logical analysis into nice definitions, often requiring a far more exact comprehension of the matter so defined than our faculties can at all acquire. But still we may see that nothing of this kind *originated* with the great body of the Church, but, on the contrary, was forced upon her attention by the wranglings of wild and furious disputants without.

In proceeding with this subject, it will be my endeavour to keep your attention fixed on the Scriptural testimony, and faithfully to place before you a combined and synoptical view of that testimony. In this I shall commence by the testimonies involved in the prophetic part of the Old Testament. The evidence of the New Testament we may conveniently subdivide into : 1. The texts which relate to the pre-existence of the Word in a heavenly state of glorious association with the Father from all eternity. 2. Those in which the operations and attributes of Deity are ascribed to him. 3. Those in which worship is represented as due to him ; and 4. Those in which the express title of Deity is assigned to him. And lastly, that I may not appear to suppress any part of

the evidence, I shall examine those texts which appear to imply in some sense a subordination of the Son to the Father,—a topic, indeed, which our Church hath ever so little shrunk from faithfully examining, that it forms the express subject of the concluding section of the great standard work of Bishop Bull, his elaborate Defence of the Nicene Faith. Our former heads will also run nearly parallel with the sections of the same eminent divine on the pre-existence, coeternity, and unsubstantiality of Christ, the *προῦπαρξίς, συναΐδιον* and *ὁμοούσιον*.

I commence, then, with the earlier testimonies of the Old Testament; but here I would not be misunderstood as wishing to overstate my argument. The allusions scattered through the Old Testament appear to us, indeed, to imply this doctrine; but we are far from asserting that they were intended expressly to reveal it, or that they are of such a nature that their full import could be apprehended previously to their complete development and consummation in the New; even the disciples of the Lord did not, we find, so comprehend these Scriptures, until their risen Master opened to them the things therein, which related to himself; and then, as we read, they were so warmly moved by the discovery, that their hearts burned within them. What we have already observed as to the gradual development of the types and prophecies relating to the Atonement is equally applicable to the subject.

I will first cite, as asserting the eternal pre-existence of the Messiah, the very remarkable prophecy of Micah, specifying the exact place of his birth: and “Thou, Bethlehem of Ephratah, art thou little among

the millitary districts of Judah? from thee shall come forth in my presence to be sovereign in Israel, even He whose comings forth are from eternity, from the days of the everlasting period<sup>1</sup>.” Here eternal pre-existence appears distinctly implied; for the combination of terms in the original forms the strongest expression of infinite duration of which the Hebrew language is capable; and this duration can hardly be considered as here predicated only of the Divine *appointment* that the Messiah should appear, for, as the writer (Pye Smith<sup>2</sup>), from whom I abridge these observations well remarks, every human being, and every atom of existence, is equally with the Messiah an object of the Divine decree from eternity; besides which, the word מוֹצֵאִים, rendered “comings forth,” always in the original implies active proceedings, which cannot be attributed under any figure of speech to a being anteriorly to its existence. Now we have not only the authority of an Evangelist to apply this passage to Christ, but the Chaldee Targum, which paraphrases it “out of thee shall proceed the Messiah,” proves that the Jewish Church received it in the same application.

Secondly, the title “the Son of God,” so appropriated to our Lord in the Christian Scriptures, is expressly assigned to the Messiah (the declared object of that poem,) in the second Psalm: “The princes are firmly leagued together against Jehovah,

<sup>1</sup> Micah v. 2.

<sup>2</sup> In the translations and remarks here given, it will be perceived that this eminent authority is very generally followed.

and against his Messiah ; but I have anointed my king upon Sion, the mountain of my sanctuary." The Messiah is then, with the abrupt transition of animated poetry, himself introduced as speaking : "I will declare the decree : Jehovah hath said unto me, My Son art thou, this day have I begotten thee." The Talmudical authorities of the Jewish Church agree with the Christian Apostle in applying this Psalm to the Messiah.

The well-known prophecy in Isaiah <sup>1</sup>, of a sign to be given to Ahaz, wherein "a virgin should conceive and bear a son, and should call his name Immanuel," is expressly applied by St. Matthew to the nativity of our Lord ; and though much difference of opinion has prevailed whether this application be direct or typical, yet no one, who is not prepared without the shadow of authority to reject the introductory chapter of the Gospel as spurious, can, provided the inspiration of Matthew be admitted, deny that application to be correct. On the title Immanuel, Lactantius, a Father of the close of the third century, observes, by this name Immanuel the Prophet declared that God would come to men in the flesh.

Another very remarkable prophecy, containing the most explicit ascription of the Divine attributes and titles, follows the foregoing, with the interval of only a single chapter, and from the words in which it is introduced, seems almost to refer to the previous promise : "Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given : and the sovereignty is upon his shoulder ;

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah vii. 14.

and his name is called Wonderful, Counsellor, God the mighty, Father of Eternity, Prince of Peace; of the extent of his sovereignty and peace there shall be no end; upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to fix and establish it in justice and righteousness, from henceforth and for ever<sup>1</sup>.” “Interpreters,” says Dr. Smith, “ancient and modern, Jewish and Christian, and of almost every sect and community, have agreed in regarding this prophecy, to use the language even of Dr. Priestley, as evidently a reference to the Messiah. Some of these interpreters, indeed, have wished to translate **אל גבר**, ‘God the mighty,’ as only a mighty hero, grounding their proposal on the occasional latitude of employment of the term in the plural; but the singular form is always used as a description of Deity, and indeed exactly the same phrase recurs in the very next chapter of Isaiah, where the context will not possibly bear any other interpretation. ‘The remnant of Jacob shall return unto the mighty God, and they shall stay upon Jehovah, the Holy One of Israel’<sup>2</sup>. **אבי ער**, ‘the Father of Eternity,’ some have indeed translated ‘Father of the Age,’; but these could not have been aware that **ער** does not signify a limited portion of time, but absolute and indefinite duration<sup>3</sup>.

In the 40th chapter of Isaiah a passage occurs in which sublimity of description is beautifully tempered by the most affecting tenderness: “Say to the cities of Judah, Behold your God! Behold

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah ix. 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Isaiah x. 20.

<sup>3</sup> See Smith on the Messiah, vol. i. pp. 112. 114.

the Lord Jehovah will come with strength, and his arm ruling for himself: behold, his reward is with him, and his work before his face. As a shepherd to his flock so will he be a shepherd; with his arm will he collect the new-born lambs, and in his bosom bear them; the ewes giving suck, he will gently lead." Who can refrain from connecting this passage with the declaration of our blessed Lord, the great Shepherd of the flock, in which the same characters of supreme Divine authority and power, and of watchful pastoral care, are coupled together in a manner exactly parallel. "I am the good Shepherd, and I know my sheep, and am known of mine. As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep. And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold; them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice. I give unto them eternal life." Language which, as it has been most justly observed, would ill become a mere dependent being. It fairly answers to the Lord Jehovah coming in his strength; it implies an actual dominion over the minds, the moral principles, and the everlasting state of mankind; it is the style of a chief shepherd, in whose hand it is to confer the unfading crown of glory on his faithful servants.

I. Connected also with the good Shepherd who thus announced his intention of laying down his life for the sheep, is another remarkable prediction in Zechariah xiii., which we know, upon his own Divine authority, to have especial reference to himself, and which foretelling his death, also implies his intimate union with Jehovah. "Sword, awake against my

shepherd, and against the distinguished one of similar texture, or closely connected with me, saith Jehovah of hosts; smite the shepherd, and the flock shall be scattered: and I will exercise my care over the little ones." It is unnecessary to observe, that by the commission to the sword of Jehovah to awake against the shepherd, his predestination to death is denoted. The terms applied to him, גבר עמית, require some further explanation: גבר, 'the man,' or rather, as this expression always conveys the associated idea of strength and dignity, 'the mighty one.' The epithet עמית is from a root preserved in the Arabic dialect, signifying to twist one thread like another, and used to denote any resemblance founded on a sameness of internal constitution, as in Greek *σύγκλωστος*, which properly signifies what may be wound up in a clue, is transferred to the general idea of things similar and equal, of the same nature and kind. Here only it is used as an abstract term: in other instances it is used for the concrete; as, 'a fellow-man,' 'a fellow-citizen,' &c.<sup>1</sup>

II. We have in Jeremiah xxiii., and in the parallel passage, Jeremiah xxxiii., another prediction, which the general consent of Jewish and Christian expositors hath ever applied to Messiah, in which the title Jehovah is again expressly ascribed to him: "Behold, the days are coming, saith Jehovah, when I will raise up to David a righteous progeny, and he shall reign sovereign, and shall act wisely, and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Smith has some interesting observations on the connexion of this prophecy with those which precede it:—vol. i. p. 473.



land. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall rest in security: and this is his name which they shall call him, Jehovah our righteousness." The last lines in the parallel passage are indeed apparently corrupted, and might seem to ascribe this title to Jerusalem; but it appears more than probable, that the original words have sustained some alteration, and that the true reading is, as found by Kennicott in several MSS., and by De Rossi in one, exactly the same as in the preceding passage.

The last prophecy I shall now cite is that in Daniel vii., where, after the awful description of the Ancient of days preparing to sit in judgment with ten thousand times ten thousand before him, "one like the Son of man came in the clouds of heaven, and was brought near unto the Ancient of days. And to him was given dominion, and glory, and empire; and all people, nations, and languages, shall serve him: his dominion is an eternal dominion, which shall not pass away, and his empire that which shall not be destroyed." The habitual application to himself of the specific title 'the Son of man' by Christ, and the very general consent of Jewish and Christian expositors, assure us of its intended application; and we here find 'the Son of man' associated with the Eternal, the Ancient of days, in the most awful exercise of supreme dominion, and receiving from him an universal and ever-during empire.

I have here quoted a selection only from the prophetic testimony on this subject: I have avoided everything which appeared to involve matters of doubtful disputation; and I have even abstained

from citing those remarkable passages in the Psalms, describing God triumphing and reigning for ever,—the eternal and unchangeable Creator of the universe,—the object of adoration to angels,—which are all applied to Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews, because the genuineness of that Epistle is questioned by many of our opponents; although, when I consider that even a writer whose authority stands so high with those who on this doctrine differ from us, as Lardner, has professed himself satisfied of the authenticity of this Epistle, my caution seems to myself excessive.

It would be interesting, of course, if we could trace the impression which these prophetic testimonies actually made on the minds of those who waited for the consolation of Israel, in the interval between the conclusion of prophecy and the advent of him whom it foreshowed; but no writings which will assist us in this inquiry are extant. We have, however, a collection of cabalistical doctrines, called the Book Zohar, said to have been compiled by the disciples of Simeon, son of Jochai, a celebrated rabbi, who flourished before the destruction of Jerusalem, under Titus. As the work is written in the Chaldee or Eastern Aramean dialect, which became extinct before the fifth century, there appears every reason for conceding to it a date not very remote from that claimed; it is, however, disputed whether the mind of the author were or were not tinctured with Christian opinions. Of course, if he retained unblended Judaism, his work would be more interesting in this respect, as showing the influence of the prophecies on an unbiassed mind; and in support of this opinion

it is urged, that the work is full of Judaical doctrines quite inconsistent with Christianity: but even admitting him to have been one of the many congregations of Jews who believed, and yet were all zealously affected to the law, his work will still be good evidence of the natural application of these prophecies by a Jewish mind, as soon as it was opened to a comparison of them with the facts of Christianity. In this work the Messiah is expressly called Jehovah, the Angel of God, the Shecinah or Divine Glory, the Mediator, Michael the archangel, the Angel of the Covenant, the Word of the Lord, God the Holy and Blessed, the Image of God, the Brightness of his glory, the Lord of hosts, the Son of God, the Son of the Most High, the faithful Shepherd, the Lord of the ministering angels, the Angel Redeemer. I would conclude this part of my subject with a short notice of two of these titles, which, from their employment by other authorities, acquire additional importance; one of these is 'the Word of the Lord,' the Memra of Jah,—equivalent to the Divine λόγος of St. John. Dr. Smith has concluded, from an ample examination on this subject, that this expression, as employed by the Chaldee paraphrasts &c. designated an intelligent intermediate agent, and that in the sense of a mediator between God and man it became a recognised appellative of the Messiah; to which sense, however, the philosophy, of Philo Judæus<sup>1</sup> induced him

<sup>1</sup> It is extremely difficult, from the tendency to allegory which pervades every part of the Scriptural explanations of Philo Judæus, to judge, almost on any occasion, whether he is speaking figuratively or simply. For instance, he ex-

to add a further conceptual notion, representing it, 'more *Platonico*,' as being the archetypal conception of the ideas in the Creator's mind previously to the actual formation of his works.

The other title is, 'the Angel of the Covenant.' The angelic manifestations recorded in the Old Testament often appear to speak in the name and with the authority of Jehovah, and yet to be, in certain respects and properties, distinct from him who sent them. The Jewish expositors often consider these manifestations as equivalent to the preceding title, the Memra of Jehovah; and the early Christian Fathers were many of them persuaded that the one great mediator between God and man was, in effect, the *angel* of both Covenants.

pressly says that the angel who stopped Balaam, and he who comforted Hagar in the Wilderness, was the λόγος of Jehovah; and we might, therefore, naturally conclude that he held this λόγος to be a personal agent, and not merely a Divine attribute: but this persuasion will be shaken when we find that he represents the whole as an allegory, in which Balaam typifies a vain people, μάταιος λαός, and Hagar signifies the circle of natural sciences, as opposed to Sarah, the emblem of divine science. In Morgan's View of the Doctrine of a Trinity as ascribed to Plato, will be found an interesting discussion on the general views of Philo Judæus; yet, after a careful examination of all the passages in which the term λόγος is employed by that writer, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is at least occasionally employed by him to denote a personal manifestation of a Divine principle.

## LECTURE V.

*On the Divinity of Christ,—continued ;—Evidence of the New Testament.*

IN proceeding with our examination of the Scriptural evidences of that great doctrine of our Church,—the confession of the Divinity of its ever-blessed head and founder Jesus Christ, we have now arrived at that which is undoubtedly its great appropriate groundwork, the Scriptures of the New Testament ; for in those of the Old we never professed to look for more than distant and obscure intimations, and a general consistency and agreement in the harmony of the faith, then only to be clearly appreciated, when that faith should ultimately become more fully revealed. Even in the New Testament itself we still observe a gradual development of the great doctrines of our faith : our Lord himself professedly withheld their full manifestation until the completion of his earthly career, until having gone up on high, and received gifts for men, he sent his Holy Spirit to guide his disciples into all truth. It was not until the whole scheme was completed that its leading features were fully revealed. The purposes for which the Divine wisdom adopted this method of gradual development may be indeed to us inscrutable ; but

we cannot read the declarations of our blessed Lord himself, as recorded in the documents in question, and deny that it was adopted. In the earlier Gospels, therefore, which profess only to contain narratives of the earthly ministry of Christ, we must on these grounds naturally expect to find less clear and explicit declarations, than in those later Epistles, the very subject-matter of which is the exposition of the doctrine, after the scheme was completed and the Spirit had descended. But is it to be supposed, that we therefore for a moment admit that the Church after the resurrection of its Lord, was left without instruction in what we consider as the essential doctrines of Christianity? Far from it: to argue thus would be to assume that the first three Gospels were at any time the sole channels of Christian instruction, and to forget that with which they were associated in the designs of Providence,—the preaching of the Apostles; a preaching which we cannot doubt was in full accordance with the Epistles which two of their number, John and Peter, and their great associate Paul, have left to the Church as a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*. The latest evangelist, John, when authoritative teaching was about to be withdrawn, has in his narrative, more especially dwelt on those doctrinal intimations which the then state of the Church appeared to render more requisite.

The fact of this gradual development has given occasion to the objection, which appears to weigh much in the minds of those who dissent from our doctrine, that the tenour of many of the earliest Christian writings is on this point *negative*. But here I would pause to inquire, Is not our view of

the *tenour* of any writings often insensibly coloured by our own prepossessions on the questions in dispute? Thus, for instance, in this controversy, I most conscientiously think the tenour of many writings *favourable* to the received views of our Church, which those who dissent represent (and I question not their equal sincerity,) as *unfavourable*; and in the present discussion there is an especial cause why the opposite parties should entertain these contrary views of the tenour of some of the writings submitted to them. This cause is, that the Church no less than the Unitarians themselves, firmly holds the doctrines of the Unity of the Godhead, and of the proper, although not exclusive, humanity of Christ; although we believe this to be compatible with his participation in a higher and Divine nature. When, therefore, we find in any writing strong assertions of the former truths, it by no means follows, in our estimation, that its tenour is necessarily unfavourable to the views which we embrace as orthodox. Yet this conclusion is obviously always impressed on the minds of our opponents; while to us this impression appears to arise from a *petitio principii*—an assumption of that very incompatibility of those doctrines which is the subject under discussion.

But then it may be asked, Does not the less distinct publication of this truth in some of the Christian writings amount to a presumption against our correct interpretation of those others, which appear to us more explicitly to declare it? Surely, however, the whole argument must ultimately rest on the positive texts, and not on any negative tenour; and judgment must be formed on the validity of



our interpretation of these positive texts, in each individual instance, as we proceed in the following survey. The consideration stated should indeed lead to careful examination ; but if, after that examination, the texts appear decided and clear, this is surely the only ground on which the question can be determined in the last resort.

In another great Scriptural truth we have an analogous case of gradual developement,—I mean the great doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Might it not be said, with quite as much justice as it can be said that the general tenour of St. Matthew's Gospel is unfavourable to the divinity of our Lord, that the general tenour of the Pentateuch is unfavourable to the immortality of the soul ? But are the Unitarians of this country, therefore, prepared to reject the more distinct intimations of this truth in the prophetic writings, and its full and express declaration in the Christian Scriptures, which brought life and immortality to a perfect light ? Would they explain away all these declarations as strong figurative language, congenial to the spirit of Oriental hyperbole, but really signifying, by the *image of the resurrection*, only the *revival of the moral powers of the soul* under virtuous endurance, and by the *joys of heaven* the *happiness of an approving conscience* ? I am persuaded in this case they would be as repugnant to such a system of interpretation as I should myself be.

In these remarks I, of course, argue only with those who receive generally the same canon of Scripture with ourselves. Should any controversialists reject the authority of the Gospel of St. John and of the

Epistles, with these a different line of argument must obviously be necessary; and the preliminary point must be to establish a common standard of appeal. But I know of none who have gone the whole of this length; and only of one instance, and that requiring no serious critical answer, in which the authority of the Pauline Epistles has been impugned.

Many, however, have doubted the genuineness and authority of two documents,—the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse<sup>1</sup>. I am myself fully persuaded of the cogency of the evidence in favour of these books, and therefore I have not scrupled to incorporate their testimony on this subject; but yet I shall frankly confess that their cause rests on evidence, which, though satisfactory to me, it were doing injustice to the authority of the rest of the canon to represent as fully equal to that on which the other books repose. I feel bound candidly to mention this, and I should be perfectly willing that by any who doubt, the testimonies derived from these sources should be set aside without fearing any serious detriment to my general argument.

### *I. Texts asserting the Pre-existence of Christ from the Beginning.*

In examining the evidence of the New Testament on this subject, we shall begin with the texts which assert or imply the pre-existence of Christ, before the commencement of his earthly career, in heavenly glory with the Father. At the commencement of St.

<sup>1</sup> I would again refer to Lardner on these subjects.

John's Gospel we read, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God. . . The same was in the beginning with God. . . the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father<sup>1</sup>."

This λόγος, or word, is clearly, from what follows, not the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, the internal reason of the Deity, and therefore merely an attribute, but a Divine person, the same who was "tabernacled in the flesh among us." The phrase, "In the beginning," is, indeed, by those who dissent from our opinions, interpreted as if it meant only from the beginning of his ministry; but I believe it will be sufficient to mention this explanation: no lengthened arguments surely can be necessary to show that it is absolutely inconsistent with the context, and with the general tenour of all the other texts which I shall have to quote on this subject.

"No man hath ascended up into heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven [that is, whose proper and habitual dwelling is heaven] . . . . He that cometh from above is above all<sup>2</sup>." "For I came down from heaven. . . . And what if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before<sup>3</sup>?" Socinus and some of his immediate followers, to evade the force of these texts, have invented the very extraordinary hypothesis, that Jesus, in the interval between his baptism and his entrance on his public ministry, was actually for a time translated into heaven, to receive instructions to qualify him for the office he was about to undertake; but some of his

<sup>1</sup> John i. 1, 2. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. iii. 13. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. vi. 38. 51. 62.

more modern adherents, rejecting the idea of a local heaven as altogether puerile and suited only to the narrow intellect of the Jews, consider to *ascend into heaven* to be a Hebrew metaphor, denoting the searching into the truths of God; and his coming down from thence as merely indicating the superiority of *his mission*. This interpretation I can scarcely conceive more likely than the former to recommend itself as simple or natural to my auditors.

“Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am<sup>1</sup>.” This the Improved Version translates, “Before Abraham was, I am he,” that is, he should come, the Messiah; supposing an ellipsis, of which there are certainly two other examples in this same chapter, namely, vv. 24. 28., in both of which places ἐγώ εἰμι must undoubtedly be thus elliptically rendered “I am he;” and they interpret it as meaning only “My mission was settled and certain [in the Divine counsels] before the birth of Abraham.” But, as Rosenmüller has well observed, such an interpretation appears inconsistent with the tenour of the conversation with the Jews in the course of which this reply was made. Our Saviour having, when the Jews inquired, “Art thou greater than our Father Abraham? whom makest thou thyself?” replied by the assertion, “Abraham earnestly desired to see my day, and did see it, and rejoiced,” upon this the Jews, not understanding, or affecting not to understand, that Abraham’s prophetic foresight of the future Messiah

<sup>1</sup> John viii. 58.

was here intended, object, "Thou art not fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?" This objection we see clearly turned upon the question of actual existence; must not then the answer, "Before Abraham was, I am," be construed in a corresponding sense as applying to *actual existence*, in order to meet that objection<sup>1</sup>? To illustrate this, let us substitute the proposed explanation, and inquire how far it can afford any answer to the objection. The Jews object, "Thou canst not have seen Abraham, for he died long before thou wast born;" to which, on this supposition, our Saviour replies, "My mission was decreed by God long before his existence." But can this be considered as a relevant answer? As, on this answer, the Jews took up stones to cast at him, it is clear that they considered his language as implying some pretension, to make which incurred the appropriate penalty of blasphemy.

"And now, O Father, glorify me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." "For thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world<sup>2</sup>." The Socinian interpretation of these texts refers them only to the pre-ordained glory and predestined love of Christ arising from the foreknowledge and pre-determination of God: this is surely, as Dr. Clarke observes, very harsh and unnatural.

St. Paul<sup>3</sup> describes Christ as the first-born of every creature, who is before all things,—the beginning. According to the Socinian view, the whole creation *means*—what? the moral dispensation of the Gospel. Here again I am willing to trust this in-

<sup>1</sup> See Rosenmüller *in locum*.

<sup>2</sup> John xvii. 5. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Col. i. 15—17.

terpretation to the judgment of my auditors without remark.

In the sublime visions of the Apocalypse we find several express testimonies to the eternal pre-existence of Christ. In the very first chapter<sup>1</sup> we find, "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the living one, the beginning [first principle or head] of the creation of God." This book ends as it has begun, for in the last chapter we find the same expressions, strengthened by an additional synonymous phrase, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last<sup>2</sup>." According to the Improved Version, this expression in the last instance means that the complete dispensation of the Gospel is conducted throughout by Christ. In the first instance, by inserting the word 'God,' which is read in some copies, "saith the Lord God," they appear inclined to refer the very same expression to the eternal duration of the Father. How far this is consistent, or how far the above interpretation is natural, I will again leave to your own judgement.

I would further wish to impress on you the cumulative nature of the proof arising from the uniform tenour of so many separate texts, not one of which seems to us capable, without the most harsh and forced construction, of bearing any other meaning than that most generally accredited by the Christian body—as implying the pre-existence of its Divine head. But we are here requested by the dissenters from this doctrine to place such a harsh and unnatural construction, not on one, but on very many

<sup>1</sup> Rev. i. 11. 17. iii. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Rev. xxii. 13.

texts. I need not argue how much the difficulty of such a proceeding (which in any single instance it must require a tolerably strong resolution to overcome,) is enhanced by the frequent recurrence of the same necessity. Can we for a moment suppose such an obscure style, and expressions so seldom to be understood in their simple and obvious meaning, at all consistent with the preaching of Him, the especial character of whose ministry it was, that to the poor the Gospel was preached; or with the mode of teaching likely to be pursued by that Apostle, who felt himself to be a debtor to the barbarian as well as to the Greek, to the unwise no less than to the wise? It is unnecessary to add concerning texts so plain as these, that the early Christian fathers uniformly received them as really meaning what they obviously express. Whoever may wish for further information on this point, will find numerous citations from these writings in the sections *ἡ προῦπαρξίς* and *τὸ συναΐδιον* of Bishop Bull.

I would only add<sup>1</sup> on this subject, that the very texts which describe Christ's assumption of human nature, are so expressed as obviously to infer that this nature was not his proper and original mode of being. I need refer only to the apparently express assertion of this truth by St. Paul, when he declares to the Philippians that Christ, in taking the servile form of a man, (*ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*) emptied himself<sup>1</sup>, which must imply, divested himself of some former dignity; or, as it is amplified in the address of the same Apostle to the Corinthians, "Ye know the

<sup>1</sup> Phil. ii. 7.



grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that on account of you he became poor <sup>1</sup> though he was rich <sup>2</sup> ;” but I may with equal force, as I think, appeal to the ordinary terms in which the fact of his appearance on earth is denoted ; such as, “ the Word was made flesh ;” “ who was manifested in the flesh ;” “ God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh <sup>3</sup> ,” and the like. Now a very simple experiment will, I am persuaded, convince us that all these phrases are perfectly inapplicable to any being whose original and proper condition was that of humanity ; for we may take even the chief of mortal prophets, the promulgator of a former Divine covenant, and try how far we shall be able to make any consistent sense out of the above propositions, if, retaining their predicates, we should substitute Moses as the subject ;—thus “ Moses was made flesh,” “ Moses was manifested in the flesh.” “ God sent forth Moses in the likeness of sinful flesh ;”—surely it is quite self-evident that no such application of language can be tolerated.

## II. *Texts attributing the Creation of the Universe to Christ.*

Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν which we translate, “ All things were made by him, and without him was not any-

<sup>1</sup> Πτωχεύω, though in the more classical Greek it signifies to be, rather than to become poor, has generally the latter force in the Septuagint. See many examples quoted by Dr. Smith on the Méssiah, vol. ii. p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> Cor. viii. 9.      <sup>3</sup> John i. 14 ; 1 Tim. iii. 16 ; Rom. viii. 3.

thing made that was made <sup>1</sup>.” The Improved Version gives it thus : “ All things [which is explained to mean, all things in the Christian dispensation,] were done by him.” Now here we and those translators are at issue, both as to the true sense of the nominative or subject of this sentence, and the verb containing its predicate. As to the former, πάντα, ‘ *all things*,’ this expression may undoubtedly be restricted, by the context in which it stands, to mean all things of the particular class to which the proposition evidently relates ; but when not thus *palpably and obviously limited*, I believe it will be vain to look for an example of its meaning anything but all things whatsoever ; and equally vain will it be to search the context in St. John for any indication of limitation. As to the verb ἐγένετο, it is the passive form of the old verb γένω and γείνω, ‘ to beget, bring forth, produce,’ and always seems to imply the being brought into existence, or the being brought into some new state, or becoming. If I should refer to classical authority, I might quote sentence after sentence from the Timæus of Plato, where words of this root are applied to the creation of things by the demiurgus ; or I might turn to any of the metaphysical disquisitions of Aristotle concerning the natural production of things, for similar examples. But undoubtedly the Hellenistic Greek of the Septuagint affords the most appropriate illustrations of the idioms of the New Testament. Now in this the title of the very first book, Γένεσις, sufficiently attests the ordinary acceptation of the term in the

<sup>1</sup> John i. 3.

sense of creation ; and in the 90th Psalm we read, *Πρὸ τοῦ ὄρη γενηθῆναι καὶ πλασθῆναι τὴν γῆν*, “ Before the mountains were made and the earth was formed ;” and in the Epistle to the Hebrews <sup>1</sup> we read that, “ through faith we understand visible things to have been made [*γεγονέναι*] by invisible.”

We shall presently see, that if we apply any of the other critical methods of determining the true interpretation, the result will be altogether favourable to the received translation ; for I shall immediately proceed to the examination of parallel passages in the writings of the New Testament, and shall afterwards show that the early Christian fathers—who, whatever may be their merits in other respects, must undoubtedly be allowed as competent witnesses to the ordinary sense of the words of their own language as used in their own age,—uniformly understood the passage as implying the creation of all things through Christ.

In the same chapter we read, *ὁ κόσμος δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*, ‘ the world was made by him <sup>2</sup>,’ which may well be cited as a parallel and illustrative companion to the former text. Here the nominative *ὁ κόσμος*, being more inflexible than in the former sentence, cannot well be construed the Gospel dispensation. The Improved Version has here, therefore, recourse to a new expedient, concerning which I am somewhat embarrassed in what manner adequately, and yet inoffensively, to express my own opinion, for I would never willingly, and least of all on such a subject, employ language which should seem to approach

<sup>1</sup> Heb. xi. 3.

<sup>2</sup> John i. 10.

to sarcasm. Since the preceding clause describes Christ as the light, *ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον*, it is conceived that a passive particle may be borrowed from this active verb, and be supposed to be understood in the present clause, thus giving it the force, *καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο πεφωτισμένος*, 'and the world became enlightened by him.' How far such an elliptical construction is admissible, I shall willingly leave to the candid judgment of such of my auditors—and in this institution I trust I have many such—as are completely acquainted with the genius of the original language. I am aware, indeed, that one of the ablest defenders of this interpretation, of whose general talents I shall ever be ready to speak with unfeigned respect, has cited some examples which appear to him parallel<sup>1</sup>. I shall, however, confidently submit my own reasons for denying the analogy of these instances. It is true, indeed, that when *γίνομαι* is used under circumstances where the context plainly indicates reference to a preceding clause, the predicate of the preceding clause is often understood and implied; but always, I apprehend, in cases where that predicate would in English be sufficiently expressed by simply using the referential particles 'thus' or 'so.' We often use the verb 'to be' thus elliptically in English: *e. g.*, one political disputant might say, "I was never a friend to such and such measures," and another rejoin simply, "I am," without repeating the description referred to. In order to explain the point further, I

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Carpenter—Unitarianism the Religion of the Gospel, p. 170.

will cite the strongest of the supposed parallel cases adduced, and compare it with the elliptical construction thus attributed to St. John. The case is this : When the tribune who had apprehended Paul<sup>1</sup>, surprised at this prisoner's claiming the privileges of a Roman citizen, observes, "For a great sum obtained I this citizenship," St. Paul rejoins, *ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ γεγέννημαι*, "But I was even [so] born." Here it is evident (as I have above observed,) that the referential particle 'so' is all that is required, even in common English construction, to supply the full sense. But let us try a similar experiment on the text in St. John, "That was the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world : he was in the world and the world by him" *ἐγένετο*,—"was made," as we construe it. But were we to substitute "was made so," would the sentence even then intelligibly convey the sense, "the world was made enlightened by him?" And if we turn to the context, the very next clause seems almost inserted to show, how contrary to the mind of the writer such an interpretation would be; for it runs, "And the world knew him not," evidently showing that the idea prominent in St. John's mind was, not that the world, by accepting the true light, became enlightened, but, on the contrary, that it rejected that light. The following sentence also appears strongly to corroborate the received interpretation, and to militate against the proposed violent ellipse : "He came unto his own, and his own received him not:" this would convey a sense exactly parallel to the preceding clauses, as we

<sup>1</sup> Acts xxii. 28.

translate them, “The world was made by him, and the world knew him not;”—but scarcely, I think, if we were to render them, “The world became enlightened by him, and the world knew him not,” even if this rendering conveyed any intelligible meaning, which assuredly to my mind it does not, but appears to involve two contradictory and reciprocally destructive propositions.

“He is the firstborn of the whole creation [πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως], for by him were all things created [ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα ἐκτίσθη] that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible . . . : all things were created through him and for him [τὰ πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔκτισται]: and he is before all things, and by him all things consist<sup>1</sup>. Here the parallel with St. John’s Gospel is exact: the πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἔκτισται of the one closely corresponds to the πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο of the other. In the last instance we found the nominative intractable; here the verb is still more so, for that exclusively appropriated to creation is employed. The former expedient, therefore, of considering “all things” to mean *the things of the Gospel dispensation*, is again resorted to, “than which,” says Dr. Clarke, “nothing can be more forced and unnatural.” I may add, also, that the dependence of the whole passage on the introductory phrase πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως proves that we must understand the πάντα which were created as synonymous with πάση κτίσις, ‘the whole creation;’ but sure am I, that no instance of the application of this expression to any moral

<sup>1</sup> Coloss. i. 15, 16, 17.

appointment, or anything but a true physical creation, can be found in the whole compass of the Greek language.

“God hath spoken to us by his Son, by whom also he made the worlds <sup>1</sup> [τοὺς αἰῶνας].” The Improved Version translates τοὺς αἰῶνας ‘the ages,’ but the Jewish writers of St. Paul’s time familiarly employed the corresponding Hebrew עולָם in the sense of ‘worlds,’ of which they reckoned a three-fold division,—the upper, middle, and lower world. Michaelis, Ernesti, Schleusner, Gesenius, Bretschneider, &c. &c., certainly the most competent modern philologists, give it this sense: and in this sense it seems again used in the 11th chapter of this Epistle: “By faith we understand that the αἰῶνες were prepared by God, so that the visible things were made by invisible causes.” Here the corresponding terms of the parallelism being αἰῶνες and τὰ βλεπόμενα, we must, I think, understand the former of the visible universe.

In 1 Cor. viii. 6. we read, “God the Father, of whom are all, and Jesus Christ, by or through whom are all things.” Here the distinct prepositions ἐξ οὗ and δι’ οὗ applied to the agency of the Father and Son in the work of creation, have often been noticed. Some of the Christian fathers explain them as attributing to the Father the first source of creative energy, and describing the Son as the channel through whom that energy operated. I do not find any remarks on this passage in the Improved Version; but I suppose that ‘all things’ would as usual

<sup>1</sup> Heb. i. 2.



be restricted to the Christian dispensation. I can only observe that the same term being here applied to the Father's works and the Son's, therefore, if we suppose ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα to ascribe universal creation to the Father, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα must do so equally to the Son.

In the Epistle to the Hebrews<sup>1</sup> we read that "when God bringeth the firstbegotten into the world, he saith unto him, Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth : and the heavens are the works of thy hands . . . . They shall perish, but thou remainest ; and they shall wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed : but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail." The Improved Version considers this address to Christ by the Father as not being an address to him, but an assertion for his encouragement and support of the Father's own immutability, to show that he was able to grant him what he had promised,—a durable kingdom.

I may conclude this article as I did the preceding, by observing that all the early Greek fathers, who may be considered as witnesses of the ordinary acceptance of the idioms of their own language in their own age, uniformly understood these passages as denoting the creation of the natural universe by Christ. Many examples may be seen in the first section of Bishop Bull and in Dr. Burton's Ante-Nicene Fathers.

<sup>1</sup> Heb. i. 6. 10—12.

### III. *Texts attributing other Divine Attributes and Operations to Christ.*

I have now to proceed to the numerous passages in which other attributes and operations, which it seems impossible to ascribe to less than Divine power, are expressly claimed by Christ, or ascribed to him, such as—1, knowledge of the secret thoughts; 2, universal presence with his disciples through all ages; 3, acting on their hearts by spiritual influence; 4, granting their prayers; 5, his pronouncing *with authority* the forgiveness of sins, as by the exertion of his own proper judicial power; 6, the quickening and raising men at the last day; and 7, judging the world. Now although these may seem less evidence of Divine claims than the creation of the world, which we have just seen ascribed to him in his pre-existent state, yet they are surely sufficient, even of themselves, to establish those claims; for of what human prophet can we conceive it to be spoken, that he worketh whatsoever things the Father worketh; that he searcheth the hearts and knoweth intuitively what is in man; that he is ever in the midst of his disciples, wherever two or three are gathered together in his name, granting of his own authority their petitions, supporting and sustaining and working spiritually in their hearts by his own power; that having thus guarded and guided them through life, he will raise and quicken them at the last day, when he cometh to judge the quick and the dead? When we read characters like these, must not the effect produced on our minds be that which the conviction

of his resurrection produced on his hesitating disciple? Must it not extinguish every remaining doubt, and make us ready like him to exclaim, "My Lord and my God!"? But I proceed to the Scriptural proofs of those important points; and here we shall have fewer impediments to clear out of our path, for the passages are less susceptible of verbal criticism; and since the single instances taken separately seem of less importance, they have been less exposed to the endeavours of a prejudiced judgment to explain them away.

1. Instances in which our Lord is said to have known the thoughts of those with whom he conversed we find in Matthew ix. 4, "And Jesus, seeing their *mental meditations* [ἐνθυμήσεις], said . . . ." (The original term here most strongly denotes the private operations of the mind); and xii. 25, "But Jesus, knowing their mental meditations, said to them . . . ." In Luke vii. 39, we read that he answered the objections of the Pharisee, scandalized at his condescension to the woman, who was a sinner, though he spoke them only within himself; and in ix. 47, that "he perceived the thought, or reasoning, of their heart;" in John ii. 24, that "he knew *all men*," (this, indeed, the Improved Version translates "all of them;" but as the force lies principally in the following words, this is quite indifferent to the argument,) "because he needed not that any should testify of man, for he himself knew what was in man;" in John xiii. 11, "He knew who should betray him." In John xvi. 19. 30, he replies to the inquiries of his disciples, though expressed only privately among themselves, "for he knew what they

were desirous to ask him ;” and at the conclusion of the explanations he then gave them, they appropriately remark, “ Now we know that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any should ask thee.” And therefore we subsequently find one of them, when pressed by him to declare the state of his affections towards him, answering, “ Lord, thou knowest all things ; thou knowest that I love thee <sup>1</sup>.” Nor can it be said that this was a knowledge imparted to him only for the more effectual discharge of his earthly mission, for in the sublime visions of his glorified state in the Apocalypse, we find him described as claiming this power in terms which it must at once be felt can properly belong to Deity alone : “ All the churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts, and will give unto every one of you according to your works <sup>2</sup>.” Here the Improved Version has translated ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἐρευνῶν, the *emphatical* idiom, “ I am he [*the one being*] which searcheth,” by the *unemphasized* “ I search :” the difference is, indeed, not very material, but it is totally at variance with the genius of the original language ; and although I would not willingly indulge in uncharitable suspicions, it yet *certainly does seem to me* mistranslated with the object of weakening the apparent ascription of a Divine attribute. As connected with this inspection of the secret thoughts, we may mention his knowledge of distant events, as a power implying a like participation in the Divine omniscience : thus he declares to Nathanael, “ Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast

<sup>1</sup> John xxi. 17.<sup>2</sup> Rev. ii. 3.

under the fig-tree, I saw thee<sup>1</sup>." I am aware indeed that it has been objected to such arguments that a like power seems ascribed to St. Paul, where he says that he pronounced judgment concerning offences which had been committed in the Corinthian Church, as present in spirit though absent in body<sup>2</sup>. But then we must observe, that St. Paul nowhere states that he learnt these offences by this spiritual presence; on the contrary, he expressly says, that he became acquainted with them by common report; and the phrase cited appears entirely analogous, as Dr. Pye Smith has well observed, to that very common figure of speech, by which we often say of scenes in which we take a warm interest, that our hearts and minds are there, though our bodies are absent, as in the familiar line of Ovid: *Et quo non possum corpore, mente feror*.

2. The next class of operations, apparently implying Divine power, ascribed to Christ, is his *universal* presence, at all times and places, with his disciples, to predicate which justly of any being seems obviously to involve the attribute of ubiquity. But we find Jesus distinctly asserting his claims to this power: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them<sup>2</sup>;" and again, in his last discourse with his disciples after his resurrection: "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world<sup>3</sup>." This supporting promise we find him fulfilling to his Apostles, when he appears accompanying them as a very present help in trouble

<sup>1</sup> John i. 48.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Cor. v. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xviii. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. xxviii. 20.

throughout all their persecutions ; of which we have an example when, appearing to Paul at Corinth in a vision, he encourages him by this assurance, “ Be not afraid, for I am with thee, and no man shall set on thee to hurt thee, for I have much people in this city<sup>1</sup>.” And again, “ In the following night the Lord stood before him, and said, Take courage<sup>2</sup>.” Thus, as St. Paul gratefully acknowledges to Timothy, “ When all others deserted him, the Lord stood with him and strengthened him<sup>3</sup>.”

3. To the same effect we may cite the spiritual influences on the hearts of his disciples ascribed to him, which will suitably lead us to the following articles,—his hearing their prayers, and forgiving their sins. Thus we find him declaring, “ I will give you a mouth and wisdom<sup>4</sup>.” Now I would ask, do we ever find, or can we conceive, any merely human prophet thus addressing a party commissioned by him? Can we, for instance, conceive Moses to declare to Aaron, “ *I* will give thee a mouth and wisdom?” yet on the Socinian hypothesis, how is such an assumption at all more justifiable in the one case than in the other? Thus also he declares, “ *I* will send the Spirit, the Comforter to you, who shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you<sup>5</sup>.”

4. Again, we find his disciples throughout the Acts, evidently acting under the faith that his promised presence implied his power to hear and grant

<sup>1</sup> Acts xviii. 10. See Smith, xi. 260, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xxiii. 11.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Tim. iv. 16, 17.

<sup>4</sup> Luke xxi. 15.

<sup>5</sup> John xvi. 7. 14.

their prayers; thus they are commonly described as "those who called upon the name of Jesus,"—a phrase clearly equivalent to that which Pliny uses a little later, when he describes the early Christians as singing hymns to Christ as to a God. Now, that this phrase, *ἐπικαλέομαι*, cannot be explained away (as has been attempted) to mean only 'called by the name,' *i. e.* called Christians, seems evinced by the example of the practice meant, which follows its mention under the very same phrase in the case of the protomartyr Stephen, "*ἐπικαλούμενος*, and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit<sup>1</sup>." To call on him, therefore, is assuredly in this instance to offer him the highest spiritual prayer.

Thus, again, in the narrative of the proceedings of the eleven Apostles for supplying the place of the Apostle Judas, we find them offering the prayer evidently to Jesus<sup>2</sup>: "Thou, Lord, who knowest the hearts of all men, show whom thou hast chosen<sup>3</sup>." And again, when Paul and Barnabas were visiting and regulating the Asiatic churches, we read that when they had prayed, they commended them to the Lord on whom they believed. The next example which I shall cite appears especially interesting, because it combines both the head on which we last touched, (namely, the ascription of spiritual influences to Christ as emanating from him,) with the present subject,—his power to receive prayer. St. Paul, speaking of that infirmity which he terms "his thorn in the flesh," says, "On account of this I besought the Lord thrice that it might depart from

<sup>1</sup> Acts vii. 59.<sup>2</sup> See Smith, iii. 52.<sup>3</sup> Acts i. 24.



me, and he said to me, My grace is sufficient for thee; my power is perfected [shows its perfection] in thy weakness." "Most gladly," adds St. Paul, "will I therefore the more glory in my suffering, that the power of Christ may protect me." Now here the whole context renders it quite clear that the Lord addressed in this prayer, and who answers it by the promise of his strengthening grace, is the same Christ on whose power he who offered it relied for his protection. But here I would again ask, Can we conceive any human prophet thus addressed by a disciple? Can we conceive any pious Jew thus addressing Moses,—“I thrice besought Moses that my infirmity might depart from me; and Moses said to me, My grace is sufficient for thee; my strength is perfected in thy weakness: therefore I rely on the power of Moses to protect me?”

There is another passage in the fifth chapter of the First Epistle of St. John, which has always appeared to me to bear on this subject, and to affirm most strongly the propriety of our addressing our prayers to Christ; yet as its application depends on the exact antecedent to which we refer, a personal pronoun, and one certainly capable of a double reference, I would only wish to submit the passage to your own fair judgment. The Apostle first sums up the argument of his Epistle thus: “These things have I written unto you, that ye may know that ye have eternal life who believe in the name of the Son of God<sup>1</sup>. And this is the *freedom of address* [παρ-

<sup>1</sup> I have translated this verse from the reading adopted by Griesbach: the common reading does not in any manner dis-

ῥησία, which word the common translation renders inadequately ‘confidence,’] which we possess towards him, that if we should ask anything according to his will he heareth us.”

Now the question will be, to whom do the ‘*him*’ and ‘*he*’ in this verse refer?—towards whom have Christians this freedom of address?—who thus heareth their petitions? The *general antecedent* is clearly the Son of God. But it may still be said, that the reference intended is not to the whole of this compound title, but only to its latter member; not to the Son of God, but to God alone. I do not myself hesitate to say, that to me such a construction appears very harsh; but having thus expressed my own opinion, I would not further press the point. The following verse forcibly describes the efficacy of this prayer: “And if we know that he hear us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of him.” But the object to whom this effectual prayer is supposed to be addressed clearly depends on the question above stated.

5. He who thus appears to be the proper object of spiritual prayer, and the source of spiritual grace to his disciples, himself assumed, as we find, during his earthly ministry, a tone of power and authority which we can conceive only to belong to absolute Divinity. Is it not the peculiar prerogative of Jehovah that he alone pardoneth iniquity, transgression, and sin? Yet did Jesus pronounce (with the confidence of plenary jurisdiction,) to the paralytic,

agree in force and sense, but presents a tautological repetition which is there removed.

“Son, be of good cheer, thy sins are forgiven thee<sup>1</sup>.” This, indeed, has been endeavoured to be explained away as a mere declaratory absolution, such as he himself authorized his Church to convey to the penitent; but it is evident the Scribes, when they said within themselves “Why doth he thus speak blasphemy? who can forgive sins but God alone?” understood his claim in a far superior light; and his own reply to them implies that they had so far construed his meaning justly. Another similar instance is recorded under very affecting circumstances by the Evangelist Luke<sup>2</sup>, when, disregarding of the proud taunts of the self-righteous Pharisee, he so kindly encouraged the humble assiduity of the female penitent, remarking that “she to whom much was forgiven loved much,” and pronounced the authoritative sentence, “Thy sins are forgiven thee,”—an assumption of power which we find, as before, astonished the bystanders, who began to say within themselves, “Who is this that forgiveth sins?” on which, as if re-asserting his authority, he again said to the woman, in like words of power, “Thy faith hath saved thee; go in peace<sup>3</sup>.” Dr. Smith has well contrasted with this authoritative form of pardon by our blessed Lord, the very different manner in which the Apostles themselves, the first and highest depositories of the office of remission, as conceded to them from him, speak on this subject. In no part of their discourses or writings do they profess to forgive sins. They never employed lan-

<sup>1</sup> Matt. ix. 2, 5, 7, 48; Mark ii. 5. 9; Luke v. 20. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Chap. vii.

<sup>3</sup> Luke vii. 47—50.

guage approaching to that of our Lord on this occasion. They always taught that by faith in *him* we receive remission of sins ; that in him we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins ; and that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ we are saved. But to him they ascribe the authoritative act of pardon in the most express and proper terms ; thus, “ even as Christ forgave you <sup>1</sup>.”

The declarations of the supremacy of our Lord in the Gospel economy are so powerfully summed up by the same writer <sup>2</sup>, that I must here again copy his words, as summing up generally the spiritual powers ascribed to Christ in the three last articles, as those by which he constantly guides, governs, and supports his Church : “ In all things he hath the pre-eminence ; the privileges of that economy, and all its happiness, were bestowed in his name ; to his effectual power and grace its success is attributed ; as its agents derive their commission from him, so they own their responsibility to him, and all those who receive its blessings form an universal body which he claims as his own especial property. In language analogous to that which is appropriated to the Deity in the Old Testament, they are called ‘ *his* people,’ ‘ *his* sheep,’ ‘ *his* church,’ ‘ *his* elect.’ In this view, very remarkable is his authoritative declaration concerning the calling of his Church among the Gentiles : ‘ Other sheep have I which are not of this fold ; these also must I bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and there shall be one fold and

<sup>1</sup> Col. iii. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Smith, ii. 326.

one shepherd.' This is the unequivocal language of almighty and efficient power."

6. As we are thus taught to look to his grace for guidance, and to his power for support, throughout our earthly conflict, so when that conflict shall have ended, it is on the same Divine energy (and what less than an energy truly Divine could suffice for this?) that we are instructed to rely for the reanimation of our natures, by a new and never-dying vital principle, at the last day. His own voice hath pronounced this in a tone of authority not to be mistaken: "This is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but raise it up at the last day<sup>1</sup>." "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give unto them eternal life." "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall not die eternally<sup>2</sup>." "Because I live, ye shall live also<sup>3</sup>."

It is no new testimony, then, that St. Paul adds, but merely a repetition of his blessed Master's own declaration, when he writes, "When Christ, *who is our life*, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory<sup>4</sup>." And again, "We look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things to himself<sup>5</sup>." Now I

<sup>1</sup> John vi. 39, 40.

<sup>2</sup> John xi. 25.

<sup>3</sup> John xiv. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Col. iii. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Philip. iii. 20, 21.

would ask any unprejudiced minds, whether they can conceive of expressions like these, that they are justly to be attributed to any merely human prophet? Could Moses have said, "I am the resurrection and the life; I will raise at the last day all whom Jehovah hath given me; because I live, they shall live," *thus assigning his own essential life* as the source of theirs? Could Moses thus have been called the life of his disciples? Could those disciples have been bidden to rest in the expectation of a wonderful and glorious change in their natures through any energy whereby he, as an earthly prophet, could, without blasphemy, have been declared able to subdue all things unto himself? Words surely, *if any such words can be found*, predicable of Divine energies, of Divine operations alone. But if the difficulty, the impossibility, of thus speaking of an earthly prophet be felt and acknowledged, I would earnestly entreat all who may hear me to ask themselves, why such expressions are so commonly applied to Christ? why, but because he had indeed a different and superior nature, the only nature which can justly be called "the resurrection and the life," even the nature of that God "who quickeneth the dead <sup>1</sup>?"

7. The texts that describe the agency of Christ in the final judgment of the world are too numerous and too obvious to every one's memory to require quotation. None can need to be reminded of *that day* when the Son of man shall come in his own glory; .... *that hour* in which all who are in the tombs shall hear his voice and come forth; when he

<sup>1</sup> Rom. iv. 17.

shall sit on his throne of glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from his goats; and he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on his left, and shall say to those on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world<sup>1</sup>." I am aware, indeed, that the Socinians will here object that this power of judging the quick and the dead may be delegated by Him to whom alone judgment belongeth—to human instruments; as when it is said of the Apostles, "Ye also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." In support of this view they refer to the declaration of St. Paul at Athens, that "God will judge the world in righteousness, by that *man* whom he hath ordained." But we, no less than they, allow that our judge participated in our nature, and we are soothed by the reliance on his sympathy, resulting from the conviction thus graciously accorded that he is not one who cannot be touched with a sense of our infirmities. We gratefully allow that he is *truly and fully man*; but we hesitate to admit that had he been *merely man*, the proceedings of his awful tribunal could have been recorded in such terms as those in which they are recorded. In those records we conceive that we witness the proceedings of plenary autocracy, not of delegated authority; of Divine power, not of human weakness.

We have thus, then, successively seen that the great Captain of our salvation is described in the

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxv. 31, &c. John v. 28.



writings which we receive as inspired, as pre-existent with his Father before all worlds, and himself the great instrument of their creation : we have seen in all his ministration towards his Church, attributes apparently inseparable from Divine power ascribed to him ; his universal presence with it ; his hearing and granting its prayer ; his guiding it by his spiritual influence ; his knowledge of the secret thoughts of the heart ; and his great final act in quickening the dead and judging the world.

IV. *Texts concerning the intimate Union of Christ with the Father, and his Divine Titles.*

We may well conclude with those texts in which we find, 1, an intimate union with the Father, and 2, an identity of operation predicated of Christ, 3, thence ascending by those in which the title of the Son of God is assigned to him in a peculiar and emphatic sense to, 4, the declarations which appear to us to attribute in like manner the Divine title itself,

1. In the first place, I will take those texts which describe the Son as alone possessing an intimate knowledge of the Divine essence, and the sole channel through which that knowledge can be communicated to mortals.

“Neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him<sup>1</sup>.”

“No man hath seen God at any time ; the only-

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xi. 27.

begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him <sup>1</sup>."

"If ye had known me, ye should have known the Father also ; and from henceforth ye know him, and have seen him. Philip saith unto him, Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us, Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip ? he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father ; and how sayest thou then, Show us the Father ? Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me <sup>2</sup>."

These are his own declarations. By St. Paul he is repeatedly termed the "image of the invisible God <sup>3</sup>," "in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily <sup>4</sup>," "the brightness of his (God's) glory [*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*,—more properly, the effulgence of the Divine glory beaming forth from it, as light radiating from the sun], and the express image of his person [*χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*, the outward and visible sign and impression representing the Divine essence, as its archetype <sup>5</sup>]."

Here again I would ask, Can we, without the most offensive violence, apply these phrases to any merely human prophet ? Could Moses have said, "He that hath seen me, hath seen Jehovah ; for I am in him, and he in me." ? Could it have been said of Moses, that he was the image of the invisible God, the effulgence of his glory, the express type of his essence ?

But here I would pause for a moment, to turn

<sup>1</sup> John i. 18.

<sup>2</sup> John viii. 19 ; xiv. 7—11.

<sup>3</sup> Cor. iv. 4. Col. i. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Col. ii. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Hebr. i. 3.

from controversial argument to what is ever more valuable,—the practical application of the doctrines we would enforce. It has ever appeared strongly to me, that these texts, which thus exhibit Christ as the only sensible manifestation of the Divine nature to man, point out a most important adaptation of the Christian scheme to the wants of our nature and the limitation of our faculties. To minds constituted like ours, the abstract idea of the Divine nature, which no man hath seen at any time, which hath nothing like unto itself whereunto we may liken it, conveys no *definite* impression; and *abstract* ideas, thus *vaguely* conceived, have little power to move our affections; surely, then, it is most mercifully provided, that to the Christian mind this *incomprehensible* essence is *sensibly* represented under a form upon which our devotional affections can fix and attach themselves, since “the Word became flesh and tabernacled among us, and *we beheld his glory*, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” In the person of Christ, a *sensible object*, such as our faculties need for their contemplation, is placed before them, and that sensible object *embodies* to our minds all the abstract perfections of the Divine nature.

2. But the Son not only claims this sole intimate knowledge of the Father, he further asserts his title even to a parity of operative power. When challenged for his breach of the Sabbatical law, he boldly vindicates himself thus: “My Father worketh hitherto; I also work<sup>1</sup>.” On this text Dr. Smith has

<sup>1</sup> John v. 17.

well observed, "Let the serious reader impartially reflect upon the fair meaning and implications of these words. The subject is, Works of Power. The speaker puts his own work of power, in the miraculous cure which he had effected, on the same footing of consideration as the works of the Deity in the conservation and government of the universe; and upon this parity he grounds his right thus to work on the Sabbath day. If we suppose that Jesus was conscious of no relation to the Deity, except such as belonged to a mere human being, or to any other mere creature, can we free his assertion and his argument from extreme absurdity and arrogant impiety? His opponents understood him as adhering to his crime, and aggravating it. They conceived him to be 'making himself equal to God'; and he did not deny their inference; he did not protest against their construction of his words." In his answer, on the contrary, while he carefully refers all his power to the Father, as derivative from him and communicated by his instruction, he still plainly affirms, that what things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise; and he illustrates this by the remarkable declarations which were quoted in a former article, that the Father had communicated to the Son his own special attributes, of having life in himself, of quickening the dead, and of judging the world.

To the same effect we may quote his remarkable declaration<sup>1</sup>, when, having asserted his power to bestow everlasting life on his sheep, and to preserve

<sup>1</sup> John x. 28. 30.

them from perishing,—for none could pluck them out of his hand, inasmuch as they were given him by the Father, from whose hand none could pluck them,—he concludes thus : “ I and my Father are one ;” not  $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$  but  $\epsilon\nu$ , not *one person* but *one thing* : as Chrysostom explains it, “ When our Lord says, I and my Father are *one thing*, he means one in *power* ; for the subject on which this whole discourse turned was *power* :” to which observation we may add, that the power implied throughout this whole discourse, and in which the Father and the Son are one, is obviously a power competent to Deity alone,—the power to bestow eternal life, to preserve to the last, and to defend from every opposing power whatsoever : and thus was he understood at the time, for we read that the Jews took up stones to stone him, because he, being a man, made himself God.

3. I shall conclude this summary of the evidence on which the great body of the Christian Church conceive this important doctrine to rest, by a consideration of the Divine titles ascribed to Christ ; and in the first place we may direct our observations to his constant designation, ‘ the Son of God.’ It is true, indeed, that this title is capable of being ascribed in a lower figurative sense, as Adam is termed the Son of God by creation, and as magistrates of sovereign dignity, especially under the Jewish theocracy, are styled the Sons of the Most High, in virtue of their official appointment. But in this application to our blessed Lord, this title is ever accompanied with epithets and circumstances which appear to imply a signification strict, peculiar and single : he is emphatically *the Son, the beloved Son*, who was

in the bosom of the Father, the *only*-begotten Son, evincing that the title can be thus applied to no other being save him alone.

It is a title which, we find, implied the possession of miraculous power: "If thou be the Son of God," said the Tempter, "command that these stones be made bread." "Of a truth thou art the Son of God<sup>1</sup>," was the repeated acknowledgment which the most extraordinary displays of such power produced: thus was he "declared to be the Son of God with power<sup>2</sup>."

It is a title, the promulgation and admission of which appear to have been equivalent to the general preaching and confession of the Christian faith. Thus the Evangelists preached Christ, "that he is the Son of God<sup>3</sup>;" and thus their converts declared their reception of his religion in the common form, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God<sup>4</sup>." I am well aware that it may be said, and as I think justly, that in such passages this title, 'the Son of God,' appears used as an *official title of the Messiah*, and seems to have been at this time generally received as an acknowledged designation of that expected Deliverer; so that such confessions may be considered as simply equivalent to the reception of Jesus in the character of the Messiah. But then I conceive the question will still recur, Why, and in what sense, was the Messiah distinguished by this title? If we take the Jews of the time as our witnesses, we must surely conclude that it was in the

<sup>1</sup> Matth. xiv. 33. xxvii. 54. &c.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. i. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Acts ix. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Acts viii. 37; 1 John iv. 15. v. 5.

*highest* sense, and that they regarded its assumption as a *blasphemous* assumption of the *Divine title and honours*; for we find that when, on his examination before the high-priest, Jesus admitted that claim, "the high-priest rent his garments, saying, He hath blasphemed; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, you have now heard his blasphemy<sup>1</sup>." "We have a law, and by that law he ought to die, because he hath made himself the Son of God<sup>2</sup>." Surely, then, we are fully authorized to construe this title in its highest and Divine sense, as implying an intimate connexion of nature and essence with the Eternal Father, such as is signified to us by an analogy, taken necessarily from the only relations with which our intellects are conversant,—faint and obscure, indeed, as all those analogies which represent to us heavenly things by the dark mirror of earthly similitudes must necessarily be, yet evidently denoting the closest participation of the same nature,—the relationship, namely, of parent and son. May we not, then, conclude with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and express our conviction of the supreme dignity of this title by his interrogation, "Unto which of his angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee<sup>3</sup>?"

Thus prepared, we are not surprised to find the express title of Deity plainly, as we hold, ascribed to Christ by St. John, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος<sup>4</sup>. I willingly subjoin the Unitarian explanation of this text; and I would only earnestly implore any who may

Matth. xxvi. 65.

<sup>2</sup> John xix. 7.<sup>3</sup> Hebr. i. 5.<sup>4</sup> John i. 1.



hold it, calmly and fully to reconsider whether it is perfectly satisfactory even to their own minds. “‘The Word was God,’ rather a God,—since to him the word of God came; as our Lord himself says, ‘He called them Gods to whom the word of God came,’ and he was the representative of the Most High.” I will only further ask, Would it not seem most unnatural to apply the whole verse to the highest of former prophets, Moses, or to any other son of man who ever has been, or whom we can conceive ever to be? Could we say, In the beginning was Moses, and Moses was with God, and Moses was God? Yet if we regard the Unitarian interpretation as admissible, why might we not thus speak? for assuredly to Moses all the suppositions on which that interpretation depends are equally applicable. “In the beginning of this new age, this grand æra of the moral world,” might we say, borrowing their words and applying them to the institution of the earlier covenant, “he, Moses, was appointed to be the revealer of the Divine will; and Moses was with God, favoured by his Heavenly Father with peculiar intercourse with him; and Moses was a God, since to him the word of God came; and he was the representative of the Most High<sup>1</sup>.”

I have in a former Lecture considered the disputed reading of 1 Tim. iii. 16, “God was manifest in the flesh,” and then endeavoured to show, by an

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Carpenter (Unitarianism the Religion of the Gospel, p. 61,) explains in these terms the application of the Divine title to Christ. I have only substituted Moses as the subject of his predicate.

examination of the context, that although we should adopt the reading ὃς instead of Θεὸς, and thus make it “who was manifest in the flesh,” still, as God is the only antecedent to which the relative can be referred, the sense will remain unaltered. But after citing the preceding marked testimony of St. John, it seems superfluous to adduce other passages usually considered as applying the Divine title to Christ, but in which that application would require more of controversial argument for its elucidation. These assuredly would be little likely to weigh with those who will not at once admit the plain construction of the words of the beloved Apostle as conclusive.

In this summary of the evidences of the New Testament to the doctrine I am vindicating, I have omitted the consideration of the joint mention of the three persons of the Trinity in the baptismal dedication instituted by our blessed Lord himself, and in the benediction at the close of one of the Pauline Epistles, because this subject will more properly come under our consideration in the next Lecture, when we shall be considering the Scriptural doctrine concerning the third person of that Trinity,—the Holy Spirit.

#### V. *Texts relating to the Œconomical Subordination of the Son to the Father.*

But lest the Church should be erroneously supposed to have overlooked that which is undoubtedly by far the most difficult part of this deeply mysterious question, those texts <sup>1</sup> which seem to indicate

<sup>1</sup> The text, Mark xiii. 32, “Of that day and hour knoweth no one, neither the angels which are in heaven, nor the

that the Son hath derived his Divine nature, and all his Divine powers and attributes, from the Father,

Son, unless the Father," is undoubtedly one of the most difficult of those which have reference to this mysterious subject. The discourse of our Lord in which it occurs, and in which awful prophecies of the more remote end of the world are blended with denunciations of the more immediate visitation of Jerusalem, is very fully detailed by both of the first two Evangelists. All the first portion of this discourse is reported by both with a very close verbal agreement, excepting that St. Mark transposes some few of the ideas, as delivered by St. Matthew, and has some immaterial omissions (*e. g.* Matth. xxiv. 26, 27, 28): but the peroration on the duty of watchfulness is greatly abridged by St. Mark, and all the striking parables inculcating that duty, recited by St. Matthew in the following chapter, are entirely passed over. I mention these circumstances, because the parallel verse in St. Matthew (xxiv. 36.) omits the clause "neither the Son," but strengthens that which follows by adding the exclusive epithet "unless God alone." Now from these circumstances, in the controversies between the Orthodox and Arians in the early ages of the Church, we find that each party charged the other with interpolation in the one instance, or mutilation of the text in the other; but the weight of manuscript authority is decidedly in favour of the integrity of both passages as generally read; and the general retention of the verbal discrepance in this instance is one among the many proofs which may be cited of the religious attention given to the preservation of the genuine text; for it is obvious that if any sophistication had been permitted to intrude, it would have been applied equally to both places. The Trinitarians have usually explained this as spoken by Christ with reference to his inferior and human nature only. This interpretation has been assailed by the Unitarians with much coarseness, as attributing to our Lord "a miserable equivocation" (See *Calm Inquiry*, p. 201); and while I must condemn the coarseness of the censure, I will candidly confess that to my own mind the above interpretation

the one self-existent *source* of Deity, I need only refer to the language of the Nicene Creed, which she has adopted, in which the second person of the Trinity is described as Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, in contradistinction, as is well known by those who are at all acquainted with the Patristical authorities which throw light on this creed, to the first person, to whom the epithet αὐτόθεος was considered as exclusively appropriate. Thus, in Bishop Bull's standard work it is expressly stated, that the ancient authorities were

is scarcely satisfactory. May we not be content humbly to acknowledge, that to our faculties the whole subject of the derivation of the Divine nature, power and knowledge, from the Father to the Son (for the analogy of filiation clearly implies such a derivation), must ever remain inscrutably mysterious? And may we not refer this (like the other texts alluded to in the following pages,) to that mystery? The words "neither knoweth the Son, *unless* the Father (εἰ μὴ ὁ Πατήρ), seem to me to deny knowledge to the Son rather as *undervived* from the Father, than *absolutely*; and if so, the sense will agree with those texts in the fifth chapter of St. John in which he refers all his Divine power and attributes to the Father as their source. Basil thus explains the passage: Τὴν πρώτην εἰδήσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Πατέρα ἀνάγει ἡ αἰτία τοῦ εἰδέναι τὸν υἱὸν παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς. "He refers the primary knowledge to the Father; for the cause of the Son's knowledge is from the Father."

I readily conclude with the caution, no less wise than modest, with which Irenæus sums up his remarks on this text, justly shrinking from the presumption and danger of pressing too far our inquiries into the secret things of God: "Tales quæstiones concedamus Deo: ne forte quærentes altitudinem Patris investigare in tantum periculum incidamus uti quæramus an super Deum alter sit Deus." The passages of Basil and Irenæus will be found at length in Clarke on the Trinity, p. 147.

agreed that even with respect to the Divine nature, as regards *order* and *æconomy*, a superiority belongs to the Father, as the source and origin of the Divine nature<sup>1</sup>, and a subordination to the Son, as to him who derived that nature and all his attributes from the Father; while yet in that nature itself, and all its essential perfections, both Father and Son were coequal. From speculating at any length on such a subject, or attempting to define with metaphysical precision a subject so far transcending all our faculties, the pious mind will probably shrink with *religious*, and I will add with *judicious* awe; but I will only observe, that even the imperfect analogy of human filiation may illustrate the perfect consistency of these positions. From our own parents we derive our beings and all our attributes, yet is there no inferiority of nature between us and them: we may possess all the qualities of humanity in the same perfection that they can.

I will only proceed to quote a few lines from Bishop Bull on this subject. “How then, you will ask, can these positions be reconciled? I shall answer, easily. When the Son is called second to the

<sup>1</sup> A learned friend has greatly gratified me by pointing out the strict accordance of the views here taken of the Sonship of our ever blessed Lord with the unanimous sentiments of the principal reformers. Calvin says, “Quamvis Dei nomen Filio quoque sit commune, tamen κατ’ ἐξοχὴν Patri interdum adscribi [solet] quia Fons est ac Principium Deitatis, idque ut notetur simplex essentiæ unitas.” Inst. I. xiii. 23. Zanchius also says “Filius αὐτόθεος dicitur, quia habet essentiam divinam, quæ est a seipsá, non verò quia eam habet a seipsá; habet enim a Patre.”

Father, or a minister to the Father, this denotes the subordination of persons, inasmuch as the one derives his origin from the other; but does not imply any inequality of nature in these Divine persons. The Father, as the Father, is the first person in the Holy Trinity; the Son, the second after the Father. In all Divine operations the Son is the minister of the Father, inasmuch as he ever operates *from* the Father, who is the source and origin of all his Divine operations as well as of his being, and God the Father operates *through* him: but the Father is never said to operate from the Son, or the Son through the Father; whence Clemens Alexandrinus, than whom no one ever thought more agreeably to the Catholic faith on the subject, yet did not hesitate thus to write concerning the Son of God: ‘Every operation of the Lord is referrible to the Omnipotent Father; and the Son himself, if I may so speak, is a certain paternal energy’<sup>1</sup>.” To the same effect I may cite the words of a more recent, but scarcely less able, and assuredly not less orthodox, writer, Dr. Pye Smith: “Now all these circumstances mentioned in John v. 17—36, of delegation, instruction, commission, and a perfect union of will, motive and purpose with the Divine Father, were the necessary attributes of a Mediator and Saviour who, by the nature and conditions of his office, was to be the servant of God, his chosen, the delight of his soul, whom the Father set apart and sent into the world, and who was faithful to him that constituted him, as a son over his father’s house. They are all characters of official subordination, yet the

<sup>1</sup> *Defens. Fid. Nic.* sect 4. c. 2.

other parts of the same description present characters of supremacy; a parity of operative power<sup>1</sup>; the sovereign power to confer animal life<sup>2</sup>; the effecting of that mysterious and astonishing work; the future restoration to life of the whole human race<sup>3</sup>; the exercise of judicial authority<sup>4</sup>; and a claim of homage to the Son, the same in kind and equal in degree with the homage which is due to the Almighty Father<sup>5</sup>."

Many of the difficulties which present themselves in the Scriptural examination of this great subject will, I am persuaded, admit a satisfactory solution, by keeping in mind this œconomical subordination of the Son to the Father; and we must never forget, while considering these questions, that the Trinitarian, as fully as the Unitarian, admits the proper, although not exclusive, humanity of our Lord. The former believes that Christ was very man and very God; the latter, that he was very man only. To his human nature we refer his growth in wisdom and grace, his tears and sufferings, his agony in the garden, his exclamation, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? his death on the cross. We find, as we believe, this union of Divine and human attributes plainly predicted of Christ in the Scriptures; we confess it to be an inscrutable mystery, far transcending all the limits of our faculties; but shall we therefore reject it? Need I again repeat that

<sup>1</sup> John v. 17.

<sup>2</sup> John v. 21.

<sup>3</sup> John v. 25.

<sup>4</sup> John v. 27—29.

<sup>5</sup> Scripture Testimony to Messiah, vol. ii. p. 82—85. The latter part of the extract I have abridged by giving a summary reference to passages before examined at length.



our own natures, the union of our own material and spiritual principles, is an equal mystery? On such a subject, then, the highest wisdom, as well as the soundest discretion, must be (as saith a father of our English Church), “to speak none otherwise than the Scripture doth, as it were, lead us by the hand,” and to determine with the Protestant Queen on another controversy,

What that word doth make it,  
That we receive and take it.

I shall conclude by only observing that the great point to be aimed at in all religious doctrines, is not to be able to define them metaphysically, but to hold them sincerely in their *practical application* and *devotional influence*.

Now to hold the faith which we esteem orthodox, or the great subject of our Lord's divinity, thus practically, is to receive the Saviour as that Divine Being who emptied himself of the glory which he had with the Father before the world was, and became man, as the Nicene Creed emphatically add's, *for us men and for our salvation*, that so he might come to seek and to save that which was lost, and take away the sin of the world by the sacrifice of himself upon the cross;—it is that we should trust in him as the almighty and ever-present head of the Church;—it is that we should rely on his Divine power, from which no other power can pluck the sheep that are his;—it is that we should depend on his all-sufficient grace;—that we should address our fervent prayers to him in the confidence that he heareth and hath

power to grant them;—that we should call on him to forgive our sins, and to receive our spirits;—it is that we should look to him as the resurrection and the life, who shall at the last day quicken all that sleep in the grave, and raise to eternal life all that are his; when he shall come in the clouds of heaven, and sit on the throne of his glory to judge both the quick and the dead.

It is under this practical application and not with any metaphysical definitions, that this great doctrine is ever revealed to us in Scripture; and I shall little scruple to add, that had all our public formularies of faith contented themselves with such an exhibition, I am fully persuaded that many who are now repelled, and have recoiled into what I must consider dangerous error, might still have been retained by us in the unity of Scriptural faith. While I sincerely profess that I most conscientiously myself adhere to those formularies, as to the most correct exposition,—since these metaphysical discussions have, as I have formerly shown, been forced upon the Church by the wild speculations of the ancient heresies opposed to her,—yet I shall candidly acknowledge my earnest desire that in the present day some of them were rather retained for the private subscription of those whose professional education has trained them to a knowledge of the circumstances under which they were composed, and a proper appreciation of their language; instead of being employed as the common symbols of our public congregations, a large majority of whom must necessarily remain destitute of the information absolutely requisite for their proper apprehension.

## LECTURE VI.

*On the Personality of the Holy Spirit ;—on the Trinitarian Testimonies of the Apostolical Fathers ;—and on the Influences of the Holy Spirit.*

THE course pursued in these Lectures now necessarily leads us to the consideration of the third person of the Blessed Trinity ; and the doctrines of our Church, now proposed to our examination, must be those which relate to the personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit. But since the argumentative portion of this examination will occupy but a narrow space, comparatively with that which was required by our former subject,—the Divinity of the second person of the Trinity (on which the great stress of the whole discussion has ever depended),—I shall be truly happy in the opportunity which will be thus afforded me, of devoting the conclusion of our Lectures to that which I have ever held forth as the great end of theological truth,—its practical application to the affections and conduct ; and no subject can be more pregnant with such an application than the consideration of the Divine influences of this Spirit of Sanctification on our souls. And now, especially, that I am about to bring this course to a final close,—now that I myself address you, in this

capacity, for the last time, (hoping for the future to consign the task to those who, from their nearer local connexion, will be enabled more assiduously to watch over your progress,) there is now, I say, no subject which I could wish more earnestly with my last words to impress on the attention of a class, composed of those whose youth is ripening into the more active seasons of life, than the truths which may thus direct their minds to that Divine support, whence all their intellectual powers, all their moral affections, must derive their highest strength and their holiest application.

I have already said, that the main stress of the Trinitarian discussion has ever related rather to the second than the third person, whom the Church believes to co-exist in the unity of the Divine nature. And the reason of this is obvious. The great question must ever be, whether the co-existence of any more than one person be, or be not, inconsistent with the idea of the unity of the Divine nature. Now those who feel themselves constrained, by what appears to them the force of the evidence, to admit that a second person may so co-exist, can have no further difficulty (on a similar ground of evidence) in admitting a third person. The analogy of the two cases will be perfect; and it will in fact be found, that this argument from analogy is that which principally sways the decision of the Trinitarian in this case. When the Saviour, about to withdraw his earthly presence, promises another comforter, we naturally infer that this other must be a being of analogous nature and essence to himself. When the Holy Spirit in the baptismal dedication

instituted by our Lord, and in the Apostolical benediction with which St. Paul closes an Epistle<sup>1</sup>, is joined with every appearance of parity with the Son and the Father, we again infer a like analogy in the several objects thus associated.

The only real question which presses on the mind with respect to this subject, is that which relates to the personality of the Holy Spirit. That all the titles and operations ascribed to the Spirit imply a distinct Divine agency, none have ever doubted. The inquiry must always be, Does this distinct agency imply a distinct personal agent? If this be conceded, the divinity of that agent would probably be scarcely allowed to lengthen the debate as an additional question.

But it will undoubtedly be carefully inquired—and it ought to be carefully inquired—whether the expressions of Scripture clearly indicate such a distinct personal agent, or whether they may not justly be interpreted as mere personifications of one class of attributes and operations of the general Divine nature,—in the same manner as we might personify the Providence, the Justice, the Mercy, or the Power of God? This very inquiry, however, will suggest an *experiment*, if I may so speak, which will materially tend to its elucidation. We may try how far any of these other terms will, without a harshness and force quite repulsive, bear insertion in any of the formularies we have cited; and, in order to try this experiment in the most satisfactory manner, we will take those attributes, with personi-

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. xiii. 13.

fications of which the style of Scriptural and devotional language appears most familiar,—the Mercy and Providence of God. But even with these we shall, I am persuaded, find the experiment entirely fail. Would not our minds be at once struck with the incongruity of combinations like the following : “ Baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Divine Mercy ;” or, “ The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Divine Providence be with you.” Yet it is clear in these instances that there is nothing in the *quality* of the attributes introduced at all inconsistent with the context of the passages to which they are thus applied ; but the incongruity from which we revolt arises entirely from the association of a personified attribute in the third place, together with two decidedly distinct personal agents in the former. Here the argument from analogy comes in with full strength ; and if we consider the nature of that analogy, we shall still more clearly perceive the exact force of its application. In the Father and the Son we have already recognised two distinct manifestations of Divine power. To the distinction of these manifestations we apply the term ‘ personality,’ rather from an analogy (necessarily imperfect) which the phænomena revealed to us appear to bear to personal distinction in human society, than from any *impractical attempt* to define with *metaphysical precision* the exact nature of that distinction : such analogical terms I conceive we must ever receive rather as *illustrations* than *definitions*.

But the substantial part of our argument is simply

this : We see the same Divine powers and operations which are ascribed to the Father ascribed also to the Son ; and that under circumstances which seem to imply a real individuality of being and operation, and not merely (as the Sabellian advocates of a modal Trinity argue) that both these Divine manifestations are but distinct characters assumed by one and the same being. For in all the language employed with reference to the relation of the Son to the Father, while on the one hand we find an intimate union implied, on the other we equally observe a distinct individuality. To faculties like ours, the real nature of that union and distinction must obviously ever remain mysterious and unknown. With reference to our intellectual limitations, the whole subject is—to borrow the language of German metaphysics—*transcendental* ; whether with the Latins we call it personality, or with the Greeks *ὑπόστασις*, which may perhaps be best explained subsistence, subjective mode of being, the latent support of known phænomena,—implying that we recognise in the known distinction of the *agencies* an analogous distinction in the mysterious *active principles*<sup>1</sup>. Whatever terms

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Smith has more clearly expressed this in the following words : “ It is our full conviction that the Holy Scriptures, in the revelations which they furnish concerning God, represent the essential and characteristic properties of Deity as inherent in three subjects, *ὑποστάσεις*, which we distinguish by the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit ; and the ground of this distinction we call personality. We utterly reject the notion that the three Divine persons are component parts of the Divine nature ; for the pure and infinite Deity is not a measurable and divisible thing. But we maintain that the Divine nature, infinite and all-perfect, en-



we employ, I say, we must frankly confess them to denote nothing more than a mysterious and unknown distinction. Thus, then, the case appears to us to stand, with regard to the manifestations of Divine power in the Father and the Son. When, therefore, we find manifestations of Divine power ascribed to the Holy Spirit under analogous circumstances of distinct agency, we naturally infer an analogous distinction of the agent. Our meaning perhaps will be best illustrated by carefully examining the remarkable promise of the Holy Spirit by our blessed Lord, to which I am persuaded we must ever refer, as by far the clearest revelation of his nature vouchsafed to us.

“I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever<sup>1</sup>.” Here we have an explicit indication of the personal distinction of the *Son* who prayeth, and the *Father who receiveth* the prayer: and *that other* Comforter whom the Father was to give certainly appears to bear an analogous relation to Him who gave him.

“The Comforter, the Holy Spirit, which the Father shall send in my name, He shall teach you all things<sup>2</sup>.” Here we have the masculine pronoun *ἐκεῖνος*, the most marked expression of personality which the language affords, referring to the neuter

tire and indivisible, is not participated, but possessed, by the three sacred persons. That a knowledge of the manner in which this fact is, falls not within the competency of our faculties, does not make the shadow of an objection.... such an incompetency is inseparable from our condition of being.”

<sup>1</sup> John xiv. 16.

<sup>2</sup> John xiv. 26.

antecedent τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Now it seems inconceivable, that if a mere Divine operation or attribute had been intended, such a variation of gender in the pronoun could have been introduced; but, receiving the terms τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον as a personal designation, and in that case only, such a change becomes the proper form. We shall correctly, therefore, render the passage, "The Father shall send the Holy Spirit, and that person shall teach you all things, and shall bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you." Here the operations described, as well as the form of expression, appear properly to belong to a personal agent.

"Except I depart, the Comforter will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him unto you<sup>1</sup>." Hence, then, we learn that Christ assumes the power of himself sending the Comforter, the Holy Spirit whom the Father was before said to send in his name. Every word here seems to us utterly irreconcilable with the Socinian hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, Christ is a mere mortal prophet; the Holy Spirit an attribute, operation, or influence of the great Deity: but on such an hypothesis, what rational explanation can be given of a passage which would then seem to assert the revolting impiety, that a mere man could, as from himself, send forth the spiritual influence of the supreme God?

"When he [ἐκεῖνος, that person, the Spirit of truth, τὸ πνεῦμα] is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he will not speak from himself; but what-

<sup>1</sup> John xvi. 7.

soever things he shall hear he will speak, and he will declare unto you things to come. He will glorify me, for he shall receive of mine and will declare it unto you<sup>1</sup>." Here the actions ascribed to the Spirit seem obviously personal, receiving and communicating the things derived from Christ, and thus executing a commission delegated from him. And here we may again inquire, of what parties are these things spoken, on the Socinian hypothesis? Have the advocates of that hypothesis ever seriously asked themselves whether they can conceive that this Spirit, which they understand to mean the internal spiritual principle of the Great Father, can properly be said not to speak from himself, but to borrow that which he communicates from the Son, whom the same hypothesis acknowledges in a human character only<sup>2</sup>?

If from this promise of our blessed Lord we turn to the records of its fulfilment, we still find the operations of the Holy Spirit described in terms which, according to every customary usage of language, appear distinctly to imply personal agency. "The Spirit said to Philip, Go forward, and join that chariot." "While Peter was in deep thought about the vision, the Spirit said to him, Behold, three men inquire for thee, arise and go with them, nothing doubting, for *I* have sent them<sup>3</sup>." "The

<sup>1</sup> John xvi. 13, 14.

<sup>2</sup> We may here also notice an œconomical subordination predicated of the Spirit to the Son, exactly analogous to that which we have before seen predicated of the Son to the Father.

<sup>3</sup> Acts x. 19, 20.

Holy Spirit said, Separate unto me Barnabas and Saul for the work unto which I have called them <sup>1</sup>.” “Paul and Silas were prohibited by the Holy Spirit from speaking the word in Asia. And when they attempted to go into Bithynia the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not <sup>2</sup>.” Here again we find the Holy Spirit described as the Spirit of Jesus : the inference that a mere attribute or operation of the Father cannot be intended, appears clear.

The visible representation which on two occasions accompanied the descent of the Holy Spirit,—when the Baptist saw the Spirit descending as a dove and resting on Jesus, and again, when on the day of Pentecost cloven tongues as of fire marked his outpouring upon the disciples,—may also be mentioned. I would not, indeed, lay much stress upon such an argument, yet surely it appears most congenial to our apprehensions to conceive such outward manifestations to indicate the presence of some personal agent, rather than the influence of a mere attribute,—we naturally connect them rather with an *ὑπόστασις* or subsistence than with an abstract quality.

I shall conclude this summary of what appears to us to be the tendency of the Scriptural evidence on this question, by noticing one text, on which those of opposite sentiments seem mainly to rely. This text is found in St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians <sup>3</sup>, and is as follows : “Who of men knoweth the things of a man, save only the spirit of a man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, save the Spirit of God.” From this ex-

<sup>1</sup> Acts iii. 2.<sup>2</sup> Acts xvi. 7.<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 11.

pression it has been argued, that the comparison here instituted could not be considered as correct if there were any personal distinction between the Spirit of God and God the Father, since we cannot conceive any personal distinction between the spirit of a man and the man himself. I would submit, that this passage relates only to the ineffable union and intimate communication which we believe to exist between the several persons of the Divine Trinity, as regards the unity of their common Godhead. It is here said, "The things of God knoweth no man, save the Spirit of God," with the same force that our Lord himself declares, "No man knoweth the Father, save the Son." The ineffable union and intercommunion of intelligence is here illustrated by the equally mysterious union of the intellectual and animal principles in our own nature : but that such an illustration should necessarily imply an exact identity of relation throughout, is surely scarcely required by the most severe logical rules.

## II. *Testimony of the Primitive Church to the general doctrine of the Trinity.*

Having thus stated, although necessarily in a summary manner, the views entertained by our Church of the Scriptural evidence concerning the mysterious, indeed, yet in its practical consequences (as it appears to us) very important, doctrine of the Divine Trinity, it remains only to show that in these views we entirely harmonize with the authority of the primitive Church. Now, whatever room for difference of opinion there may possibly be as to the weight

justly to be attached to the authority of the Christian Fathers, none, I conceive, can deny that they are competent witnesses as to the opinions generally received in their own times ; and it must be acknowledged, that the strongest corroboration which the justice of any interpretation of Scriptural testimony can admit must ever be, that the same interpretation of the tendency of that testimony has prevailed from the very earliest period.

One of the most ingenious writers on the opposite side indeed, Priestley, was so well aware of this, that he has endeavoured to exalt the small Jewish sect of the Ebionites into the station of the general Church, and thus to claim its sanction for Unitarian doctrines, ascribing the introduction of the views which we regard as orthodox to a later corruption, originating in the Platonizing Christians of the second century. To consider all the historical particulars involved in this discussion would lead us into a digression which would far exceed our present limits ; but as to these I shall fearlessly refer to the well-known controversy between the writer alluded to and Bishop Horsley, and I shall content myself with citing a few passages from the venerable relics of the earliest Christian antiquity, previous to the assumed origin of these supposed corruptions. I will begin with the contemporaries of the Apostles.

Barnabas, whom together with Paul the Holy Spirit had separated for the great work of evangelizing the Gentiles, in an epistle yet extant, expressly ascribes the creation of the world to Christ, " Our Lord," he writes, " was content to suffer for our souls, even though he be the Lord of the whole earth, to

whom God said, before the appointment of time, Let *us* make man after our own image." In this it is evident that he considers the Hebrew plurals as affording a corroboration of a plurality of persons in the Divine nature. He continues thus : " Had he not come *in the flesh*, how could men have been able to look upon him, that they might be saved, who, looking on the finite sun, which shall hereafter cease to exist, *and which is but the work of his hands*, cannot endure to keep their eyes steadfastly fixed against his rays ? <sup>1</sup>"

Hermas, whom St. Paul salutes by name in his Epistle to the Romans, asserts in his treatise entitled 'The Shepherd,' that "the Son of God was more ancient than any creature, seeing he was present in council with the Father for the creation of the world <sup>2</sup>."

Clement of Rome, whom the same great Apostle acknowledges in his Epistle to the Philippians as his fellow-labourer, thus alludes to such labourers in the Lord, in an Epistle of his which is indeed now only preserved in a Syriac translation, but of which Wetstein, no incompetent judge, strongly maintains the authenticity : " Labourers who are as the Apostles ;

<sup>1</sup> The authenticity of this epistle has indeed been called in question, but apparently without any sufficient ground, for Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian and Origen expressly cite it, and ascribe it to Barnabas ; and this testimony assuredly assigns to it a date as early as the second century.

<sup>2</sup> Irenæus and Origen quote 'The Shepherd of Hermas,' which, therefore, assuredly was written within the second century.



labourers imitating the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are themselves solicitous for the salvation of men;" and St. Basil<sup>1</sup> quotes another passage, from a part of his writings now lost, to a similar effect: "Ζῆ ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ὁ Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον."

I may conclude these testimonies of the Apostolical Fathers with the expiring prayer of Polycarp, that venerable martyr to the faith, which he had himself received from the mouth of the beloved Apostle John. His last words are recorded by the sorrowing brethren who stood around his stake at Smyrna, in a most interesting Epistle, still preserved, from them to the other Churches; and these last words plainly attest the faith for which he was breathing out his soul amidst the flames. He thus concludes his address to God: "For this and for all things I praise thee, I bless thee, I glorify thee, together with the Eternal and Heavenly Jesus Christ, thy beloved Son, with whom, unto thee and the Holy Spirit, be glory both now and for ever. Amen."

The testimony of contemporary heathen writers equally agrees with regard to the general reception of this doctrine by the early Christians. In the *Philopatris*, a satirical dialogue which is commonly ascribed to Lucian,—and which, whether written or not by him<sup>2</sup>, the historical allusions incidentally contained in it must forbid our placing later than the reign of Aurelian in the third century, if indeed they

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου. cap. xxix.

<sup>2</sup> See on this subject Heber's Bampton Lectures, p. 128.

are not more justly to be referred to the earlier period of Marcus Aurelius in the second,—Triephon is introduced as a Christian character ; and as such he represents his brethren as swearing in the name of the Most High God, the great immortal celestial Son of the Father, and the Spirit proceeding from the Father, one of three and three of one. And again, in mentioning their devotions, he describes them as commencing with the Lord's Prayer, and concluding with a *πολυώνυμος ᾠδὴ*, a 'many-named chaunt,' which has been conjectured with much probability to mean the ordinary Doxology.

If we turn to Justin, who flourished about A.D. 140, his agreement in the orthodox opinions concerning the Trinity is fully admitted by those who are most anxious to prove that such were not the prevailing opinions of the early Christians, inasmuch as they are in the habit of taxing him as the original corruptor of the simplicity of the Gospel, by the introduction of these very doctrines, which, as they say, he borrowed from the Platonic philosophy. Now the fact is, that Justin, in the weak wish to render the doctrines of Christianity more acceptable to the Gentiles, by pointing out imaginary coincidences between these doctrines and the tenets of their own admired philosophers, did (very absurdly, as I am quite willing to admit,) refer to some obscure passages in Plato as bearing a resemblance to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In the appendix I have entered more fully into the examination, how far any real traces of such a doctrine are there to be found ; and I must quite deceive myself as to the result of such an examination, if it be possible for

any one who has made it to believe for a moment that the Trinitarian doctrines of the Christian Fathers could ever have been derived from such a source.

A passage of Justin, however, in his argument with Trypho, has often been quoted by the Unitarians, as favourable to the early prevalence of their opinions among the majority of Christians, which, I am persuaded, if strictly examined, will by no means appear to warrant such a conclusion. Justin, desiring to confine the argument with his Jewish adversary to the particular question actually in debate between them, (namely, whether Jesus was or was not the expected Messiah,) observes, that this question only, and not his own opinions concerning the Divinity of that Jesus, was the point to be decided; “for,” he adds, “there are certain persons [τινές] of our race who confess this point, that he is the Messiah, although they consider him as a mortal of mortal parentage, οἷς οὐ συντίθεμαι οὐδ’ ἂν πλεῖστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάζοντες εἶποιεν, since Christ himself has commanded us not to believe the words of men, but the inspired doctrines of the prophets.” Now the force of the clause which I have left for the present untranslated is thus rendered by the Unitarian advocates, ‘to whom I myself do not assent,—no, not although a majority of the same Christian sentiments should thus speak;’ and hence they appear to argue that these Unitarians actually were the majority. But I do not exactly perceive by what process this conclusion can be elicited from a conditional proposition, which seems rather to imply the exact reverse, and which runs thus: ‘There are some few

[τινές] advocates for the simple humanity of Christ with whom I could never bring myself to agree, even if they had been many.' The obvious force of such words appears to me to be that they actually were few, and not many. I trust I shall not be considered as speaking with any disrespect of the Unitarians of the present day, if I observe that I should not myself scruple to speak of them in exactly the same terms, without certainly imagining myself to concede that they formed the majority of professing Christians. I might readily say of them, "There are some few who hold such opinions, from whom I myself must still have dissented, even though they had been many." I must add, however, that if I had wished to express this sentiment in Greek, I must have altered the mood of one of the verbs as it stands in the actual text of Justin, and said, *τινές εἰσιν οἷς οὐ συντιθείμην* [not *συντίθεμαι*] *οὐδὲ ἂν πλεῖστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάζοντες εἶποιν* : inasmuch as *συντίθεμαι*, a verb in the indicative, can never with any propriety be placed in opposition to *εἶποιν* in the optative, and it has been therefore with much force argued that the true version of this clause would be, 'there are some few such, to whom I do not myself assent; neither would many persons thus think and express themselves to me :' thus expressly asserting that the majority were Trinitarians, which indeed the other rendering seems to imply.

Tertullian also has been quoted by a distinguished advocate of the same school, as implying "that the majority of Christians in his time, (the latter part of the second century,) being plain unlearned men, zealous for the Divine Unity, warmly resisted the

Trinitarian doctrine, which some philosophic Christians were then endeavouring to introduce<sup>1</sup>.” The passage supposed to convey this implication is contained in a treatise directed against Praxeas, a leader of a party which we may certainly characterize as *Unitarian*, but in a sense directly the opposite to that in which this name belongs to the above writer, —a party who believed that the Supreme Father, the incarnate and crucified Son, and the Holy Spirit were *one and the same Divine person*, appearing only under *different characters*. Tertullian accounts for the growth of *this kind of Unitarianism*, (which probably would not have been very palatable to Mr. Belsham himself,) by observing that “the majority of believers being *simplices, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotæ*, ‘simple, not to say unskilful and of mean condition,’ and being moreover recently converted from Polytheism to the great doctrine of the Divine Unity, held the doctrine which they had embraced so zealously as to be alarmed at the idea of any personal distinction, (technically termed *οἰκονομία*)—*expavescant ad οἰκονομίαν*,—not conceiving the idea of such a distinction to be compatible with the Divine Unity, but regarding the personal distinction to imply a division of that Unity. And, as we have seen, the remedy which they proposed for this difficulty was to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit as one single person with the Father; what advantage, therefore, those who agree with Socinus can derive from the cause thus alleged for the prevalence of the opposite opinions of Praxeas, it is not very easy to perceive.

<sup>1</sup> Belsham’s Review of Wilberforce, p. 183.

Tertullian, indeed, far from admitting the early prevalence of opinions concerning the Trinity opposed to those which he himself held as orthodox, directly asserts the contrary in this very treatise, and boldly appeals to the consent of all earlier authorities in his own favour, *hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decurrisse* ; so that the falsehood of these heretical novelties stood at once prejudged by the general canon, “ *Id esse verum quodcunque primum ; Id esse adulterum quodcunque posterius.* ”

“ We may well, then,” observes the accomplished and lamented Heber, “ sum up the result of these testimonies in the words of Irenæus, who was contemporary both with Justin and Tertullian and Polycarp himself, and who, as a native of Syria and a Gallic bishop, was enabled to speak with greater certainty of the predominant opinions in the Eastern alike and the Western world.” “ This doctrine,” he tells us, after a clear and copious exposition of all those points for which the orthodox are now contending, “ This doctrine and this faith the Church, though scattered through the earth, has received, and guards as if her members were one single family. This she believes as with one single heart : this as with one single voice she proclaims and teaches, and delivers to her progeny. There are many languages in the world, but the tenour of our tradition is the same. The Churches in Germany believe and teach no otherwise, nor in Spain, nor in Gaul, nor in the East, nor in Egypt, nor in Lybia, nor those which are in the midst of the world, and in the central provinces of Italy. But as all the world is enlightened by the self-same sun, so does the doctrine of

truth shine everywhere, and enlighten all who desire to come to it. Nor will the most eloquent of our Christian teachers add to this tradition nor the weakest in the Gospel diminish aught from it. For when the faith is one, neither can an eloquent exposition add to its doctrines, nor the briefest statement detract from them <sup>3</sup>."

### III. *Influences of the Holy Spirit.*

But I turn with pleasure from the necessary but harsher and far less grateful task of the controversial enforcement of doctrine, to the reviving contemplation of the sanctifying influences which this promised Comforter of the Christian Church hath ever shed abroad in the hearts of its true members.

Nor let it be for a moment conceived that this most supporting doctrine savours in any manner of a heated enthusiasm, or is in the least inconsistent with the judgment of the soberest and most enlightened reason. So far is the reverse of this the fact, that, as has been well observed, several of the most philosophic heathens have firmly believed, and unambiguously asserted, the necessity of Divine influences operating on the human mind in order to the production of its highest virtues. Some striking examples to this purpose have been well selected by an able and very useful writer, who has preceded me in the compilation of a general outline of the evi-

<sup>1</sup> Irenæus, lib. i. cap. 3., as translated by Heber, Bampton Lectures, p. 116. The preceding survey of the Primitive Testimonies will be found much indebted to the judicious remarks and able criticism of the same author.



dences and doctrines of Christianity,—Olinthus Gregory. It were indeed easy to vary and extend his statements<sup>1</sup>; but I shall greatly prefer quoting the passage as it stands in his work to an idle affectation of originality. He thus writes: “That the philosophic heathens thought the Deity the inspirer of pure thoughts and holy conduct, as well as the author of animal life, will, I conceive, be sufficiently obvious from the few quotations I shall here select.

“Xenophon represents Cyrus with his dying breath as humbly ascribing it to a *Divine influence* on his mind that he had been taught to acknowledge the care of Providence, and to bear his prosperity with becoming moderation<sup>2</sup>. Plato describes Socrates as declaring that wheresoever virtue comes, it is apparently the fruit of a Divine dispensation<sup>3</sup>. And Plato also himself observes, that virtue is not to be taught but by Divine assistance<sup>4</sup>: and in his sixth book ‘De Republica,’ he affirms that ‘if any man escapes the temptations of life, and behave himself as becomes a worthy member of society, he has reason to own that *it is God who saves him.*’

“Simplicius has a prayer ‘to God as the Father and guide of reason’, so to co-operate with us as to purge us from all carnal and brutish affections, that we may be enabled to act according to the dictates of reason, and to attain to the true knowledge of him<sup>5</sup>.” Maximus Tyrius remarks that ‘even the best disposed minds, as they are seated in the midst

<sup>1</sup> Some additional quotations from Plato bearing on this subject will be found in Lecture II. p. 339, and at the close of the present Lecture.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. Cyropæd. lib. ii. c. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Plat. Mem., ad fin.

<sup>4</sup> Epist. p. 1014.

<sup>5</sup> Simpl. in Epictet., ad fin.

between the highest virtue and extreme wickedness, need the *assistance of God to incline and lead* them to the better side <sup>1</sup>.'

"Cicero declares that 'no man was ever truly great without some Divine influence;' and Seneca, when he is speaking of a resemblance to the Deity in character, ascribes it to his influence on the mind. 'Are you surprised,' says he, 'that men should approach to the Gods? It is God that comes to men; nay, which is yet more, *he enters into them*; for no mind becomes virtuous but by his assistance <sup>2</sup>.'" Thus, then, we see that this doctrine is altogether agreeable to those anticipations of truth, *προλήψεις τῆς ἀληθείας*, which God, never leaving himself without witness, hath as it were written on the natural reason of man. But the testimony of Revelation on this subject is in every line so explicit as to be questioned only by those who altogether reject Revelation; for unless we believe that these Divine influences can be and are communicated to the soul of man, every line of that Revelation will be found to involve some unaccountable contradiction. If otherwise, the promise of our Saviour, that our Heavenly Father shall give his Holy Spirit to them that ask him, becomes a fallacy;—if otherwise, every direction to spiritual prayer amounts to the imposition of a burthen utterly unprofitable. But if we turn to the Holy Scriptures, we shall find them throughout speaking of God and of his Holy Spirit as abiding with and dwelling in believers. Isaiah has a very striking passage to this effect: "Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose

<sup>1</sup> Max. Tyr., Diss. xxii.

<sup>2</sup> Senec. Epist. lxxiii.

name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, and I dwell also with him that is of an humble and contrite heart, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones<sup>1</sup>.” Our blessed Lord speaks in a manner yet more affecting on the same subject: “He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him; and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him<sup>2</sup>.”

It were endless to repeat all the texts in which the holy Apostles enforce the same doctrine. I can only subjoin a very few of those which seem most remarkable. “Because ye are sons, God hath sent his Spirit into your hearts, whereby we cry Abba, Father<sup>3</sup>.” “... who also hath sealed us, and given the earnest of his Spirit in our hearts<sup>4</sup>.” “... in whom ye are also builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit<sup>5</sup>.” “He that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit<sup>6</sup>.” “As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God<sup>7</sup>.” “He that keepeth his commandments dwelleth in him, and he in him<sup>8</sup>.” “And hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us<sup>8</sup>.” “He that hath not the Spirit of Christ is none of his<sup>9</sup>.”

To us, indeed, that striking display of Divine and miraculous power, those extraordinary operations of the Spirit which marked its operations in the infant growth of the Christian Church, are no longer granted: they were granted so long as they were

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah lvii. 15.<sup>2</sup> John xiv. 21. 23.<sup>3</sup> Rom. viii. 15.<sup>4</sup> 2 Cor. i. 22.<sup>5</sup> Eph. ii. 22.<sup>6</sup> 1 Cor. vi. 17.<sup>7</sup> Rom. viii. 14.<sup>8</sup> 1 John iii. 24.<sup>9</sup> Rom. viii. 9.

necessary ; they were granted until the faith of Christ was firmly established, and till the ordinary means of grace under the Christian dispensation had gained sufficient strength and stability to enable men to work out their salvation through kinds and degrees of spiritual assistance, which left a greater scope to the freedom of their own will and choice. They were, I say, thus long granted ; their end was then fulfilled—they were then withdrawn ; but although these miraculous and extraordinary gifts of the Spirit are indeed withdrawn, yet let us not conclude that his presence itself is likewise withdrawn : Christians never have been—they never can be thus forsaken ; they have the promise of him whose word standeth fast for ever, that the Comforter shall abide with them till the end of the world—shall ever dwell with them—shall ever be in them.

Of this Holy Spirit, then, we all of us are, or ought to be partakers *according to the plain and express doctrine of the Scriptures*. But how then, it may be asked, are we now to discover its presence in our souls ? The Apostles, indeed, on the day of Pentecost, when they felt themselves suddenly filled with all knowledge and gifted with all utterance in every tongue of the earth—ignorant and unlearned as they were before—could not doubt on this subject. With them the new powers which thus rushed upon their souls must have been strongly distinguished from all that they before possessed, and they must have been as sensibly conscious of the presence of the Holy Spirit within them as they were of their own existence. Are we, then, to look in our own cases for the same full assurance of the indwelling of

the Spirit in our souls? Are we to expect to distinguish with the same clearness his workings from the workings of our own minds? And unless we can pretend to such an experience, must we pronounce that we have not the Spirit of Christ, and are none of his? Far from this be our representations! Let us not deceive ourselves with such high expectations. Let us not plunge ourselves and others into despair by pretensions which it seldom if ever pleases Him, who dealeth his Spirit severally unto each as he will, in the present ages to realize. Let us not overlook the ordinary graces of the Spirit, while we look for those extraordinary gifts which were granted only for particular purposes and limited to a single age.

The dispensation under which it pleases our Heavenly Father now to act in the distribution of his grace, seems rather to be this:—He treats us as reasonable creatures, and seeks from us a reasonable service;—he would not force, but only turn, our hearts towards him;—he would act upon our wills so as to enable them indeed, but not so as to constrain them, to obey him;—he would not, therefore, pour upon us an overwhelming and irresistible stream of grace, but shed on us such gentle influences as dispose us indeed to choose rightly, but yet do not take from us our liberty of choice.

Again, (as it has been no less justly than eloquently observed,) “as in the kingdom of nature, though all things are sustained and upholden by the word of his power, yet he who ruleth in heaven above and in the earth beneath, is invisible to our eyes; so in the kingdom of grace his heavenly hand,

like the hidden spring of a machine, works unseen yet powerfully, is little in appearance, but in effect wonderful. He is about our path and about our bed ; and yet, behold, we go forward, but he is not there,—and backward, but we cannot perceive him,—on the left hand where he doth work, but we cannot behold him ; he hideth himself on the right hand that we cannot see him <sup>1</sup>.”

Let us not, then, seek for our proofs of the abode of the Spirit within us, in any violent and extraordinary commotion of our souls. Let us rather, indeed, be cautious and distrustful in giving heed to such feelings, as they may be too often but the workings of a heated and overwrought imagination, and lead us into dangerous self-delusion. Upon us the Holy Spirit no longer descends in the dazzling splendours of visible fire, nor with the sound of a mighty rushing wind, but rather as the gentle airs of heaven, which refresh all things, but are nowhere seen ; which blow where they list, yet no one can tell whence they come or whither they go. Let us remember what took place when the Lord revealed himself to the prophet in Horeb <sup>2</sup>. The Lord was not in the great and strong wind which rent the mountains, neither was he in the earthquake, neither was he in the fire ; but after the wind, and the earthquake, and the fire, there came a still small voice, and God was there <sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Ogden, Sermon 9, vol. i.      <sup>2</sup> 1 Kings xix. 11, 12.

<sup>3</sup> Lightning and Thunder, Heaven's artillery,  
As harbingers before th' Almighty fly :  
These but proclaim his style, and disappear ;  
The stiller sound succeeds, and God is there.—DRYDEN.

Yet although the operations which the Holy Spirit now carries on within us are indeed thus gentle and almost insensible ;—although he no longer gives such overpowering manifestations of his presence, as were once given (on the day of Pentecost) ;—and although it be perhaps a dangerous enthusiasm to expect such ; yet it is surely an error still more dangerous to believe that he leaves himself altogether without witness in our hearts. No ! Proofs there are still left of his habitation in our souls, not less certain because they are less striking. We cannot perceive, indeed, the manner of his operation ; yet that operation is not the less real. Neither do we know in what exact manner the dews of heaven, and the kindly moisture of the earth, act upon the seed which we commit to the ground, till its various parts become unfolded, and it sends forth its shoots full of life and vigour and beauty : we see not the cause,—we know not how it acts ; but we do see its power in its effects, and these will not suffer us to doubt of its existence.

Where then, let us examine, are we to look for these effects ? What are the gifts and fruits of the Spirit, which still remain, and shall ever remain, with us and with the universal society of the faithful in Christ ?

What we may gather from the Scriptures on this important subject seems to be this ;—that these (the ordinary operations of the Spirit, as they are usually called,) are principally the following : he convinces us of sin,—he sanctifies our wills,—he enlarges our hearts,—he enlightens our understandings,—he com-



forts us in all trials and adversities,—he helps our infirmities in prayer.

First, then, he convinces us of sin. The still small voice of conscience, which whispers hourly to our own souls, is the same still small voice which spoke to Elijah, even the voice of God. Judge, then, how impious, how dangerous it must be to refuse to listen to it, to attempt to stifle it, or try to quiet it by deceitful excuses! If we do so, like Ananias we lie not to man, but to God the Holy Ghost. There are few of us, probably, who have never, when rushing on blindly and impetuously to the commission of some sinful act, felt their course suddenly stopped by some unexpected but powerful check. It was no other than the Holy Spirit, who then interposed to save us from the ruin to which we were about to devote ourselves. It is he also who makes us feel the vileness and deformity of sin, excites in us an holy hatred and abhorrence of it, and fills our whole souls with grief and bitterness, whenever we transgress.

Having thus begun his work of converting us from sin and death to righteousness and life, he proceeds to sanctify our wills. He purifies them from those inordinate and wicked lusts, which set them at enmity with God; he overcomes their deadness and aversion to spiritual things; he makes us willing in the day of his power; he converts us from enemies and rebels to faithful servants of our God; he worketh in us both to will and to do. Thus the Lord declareth by his prophet Ezekiel, “I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will

give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them<sup>1</sup>."

Again, the Holy Spirit enlarges our hearts; he quickens and exalts our affections, and raises them towards heaven and heavenly things. There are few of us, it is to be hoped, who have not sometimes experienced some blessed moments at least; when our souls seemed lifted up above all the low and grovelling desires of the world,—filled with a clear and admiring sense of the beauty of holiness, with an earnest desire to follow after it, and with a wish to possess it rather than all the treasures of the earth; when we have felt ourselves aspiring and panting after the joys of heaven, glowing with a holy warmth of devotion, and been conscious that the love of God was indeed shed abroad in our hearts by his Holy Spirit.

It is to be hoped, I say, that such moments have been occasionally the portion of most of us. They are the glimpses and foretaste of those feelings which will form our happiness in a better state. In our present imperfect condition, indeed, even the best among us may perhaps have cause to regret, that such heavenly visitations are few and far between. Yet enough of them is vouchsafed to show us how poor and unworthy of our desires are all the enjoyments which the world presents to our senses, when compared with those which the Spirit of God communicates to our souls.

<sup>1</sup> Ezek. xxxvi. 26.

Another office of the Holy Ghost is to enlighten our understanding, that we may see the great mysteries of Christianity, and understand our duties aright. To this purpose we find the Apostle making this the substance of his prayer for the Ephesians ; “ That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, might give unto them the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of him ; and that the eyes of their understanding being enlightened, they might know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of his inheritance in the saints<sup>1</sup>.” And to the same effect our blessed Lord promises that the Spirit of truth shall teach us all things, that is, all those truths which concern our salvation<sup>2</sup>. Whenever, therefore, in reading the Holy Scriptures, we find the veil of darkness removed from before our understandings, those clouds of ignorance which had overcast our minds removed, and the doubts under which we had some time laboured suddenly cleared up ; when, while the voice of God’s ministers preaching the saving truths of the Gospel sounds in our ears, we are sensible of an inward voice speaking with greater efficacy to our understandings, to our hearts, and to our souls ;—then we may surely trust, that the influences we feel are those of the Spirit working within us.

Again, under all our trials and troubles the Holy Ghost is our supporter and our comforter. This is the peculiar title which is given him by Christ himself ; and how often have the followers of Christ experienced its justice ! Then only, when we are

<sup>1</sup> Eph. i. 17, 18.

<sup>2</sup> John xiv. 17. 26.

in affliction, do we perhaps know the full value of spiritual consolations. It is then that the Spirit soothes us into a state of peace which the world cannot give; assuring us that our God careth for us, inviting us to cast all our care upon him<sup>1</sup>, and to shelter ourselves under the wings of the Almighty, until the troubles which oppress us be overpast<sup>2</sup>. He causeth light to arise up for us in the midst of darkness; he giveth us beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, and the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness<sup>3</sup>.

Lastly, the same Holy Spirit joineth with and helpeth our spirits in prayer. Of ourselves, as Elihu observes, we cannot order our speech to God, by reason of darkness; and among heathen philosophers even, we have seen Plato distinctly making the same confession<sup>4</sup>; or, as one better instructed tells us, “we know not what to pray for as we ought.” Nor is ignorance our only obstacle in prayer: for since prayer is the immediate converse of our souls with God, wherein we are obliged to withdraw them from all sensible objects into a divine and spiritual world, so there is no one duty whatever, to which our carnal affections are more averse. Great reason is there, therefore, that the Spirit should help our infirmities, and make intercession for us according to the will of God<sup>5</sup>. It is he alone who first giveth us a hearty desire to pray, and then worketh in us those dispositions which can alone render our prayers effectual; touching our hearts with sincere shame and sorrow,

<sup>1</sup> 1 Pet. v. 7.      <sup>2</sup> Psalm lvii. 1; lxi. 4; xci. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Isaiah lxi. 3.    <sup>4</sup> See Part I., Sect. i.    <sup>5</sup> Rom. viii. 26.

while we confess our past sins ; making our souls plead for pardon with those groanings which cannot be uttered ; filling us with an eager hunger and thirst after righteousness, while we beg that the rest of our lives may be pure and holy ; causing us to resign all our own wills to God, when we say, “ Thy will be done,” and to place all our reliance on his providence, when we supplicate him for our daily bread ; and when our lips bless him for all the mercies he has vouchsafed us, warming our hearts with gratitude unfeigned ; thus teaching us in all things, by his inspiration, perfectly to love our Heavenly Father, and worthily to magnify his holy name.

The feelings which I have attempted to describe are those for which pious Christians are still indebted to the influence and presence of that Divine guest who condescends to make their souls his temple. These are the means whereby he worketh in them both to will and to do, while they are engaged in the great task of working out their own salvation.

And here,—addressing as I do those now passing through that most important and critical stage of their existence, the employment of which shall, far more than any other portion of its course, determine the future character and ultimate destinies of the whole,—what counsel can I wish, as your sincere friend, more earnestly to inculcate on your minds, than that which would lead you anxiously to commit all your ways to the enlightening and preserving influences of this Divine guide and protector ? When I look at your situation, as here engaged in cultivating your in-

tellectual powers, think not that I would say anything to discourage you in this noble task. No! God forbid that I should seem in any manner to undervalue the sacred duty of improving, by your most strenuous endeavours, his best gift, the reasonable soul! Far rather would I exhort you, in the words of the Apostle, to be in this respect *τῇ σπουδῇ μὴ ὀκνηροὶ*, not slothful in the most diligent effort, where that diligence is so well deserved. But it is not discouraging such diligence to remind you, that it belongs to the great Giver of all wisdom alone to consecrate and to bless its results, to give them a salutary bias and wholesome fruit, and render them productive alike of utility to society and happiness to your own bosoms. The intellectual powers are indeed mighty; but they are mighty for evil no less than for good. They may be a blessing, but they may be a curse, alike to the individual possessing them, and to society. The highest powers have been well used to advance by fresh discoveries the *aræ finium imperii*, the altars of the boundaries of the empire of human knowledge, to adorn civilized life by new arts, to advocate by appropriate argument the holy cause of morality and religion; and thus employed they cannot fail to impart to their owner intellectual joys of the purest character and highest order. But, alas! powers in themselves no less exalted have also been fatally abused, to the moral disorganization of society, to the unsettling all the most sacred, all the dearest ties that bind the social frame in an order admirable and lovely, an order, it is not too much to say, divinely appointed; and such perverted powers have shed their venom no

less internally than externally, and filled the bosom they occupied with discontented, restless, hopeless, gloom and misery. Which of these characters the powers now developing in your own minds may ultimately assume, I have the deepest conviction, depends on your seeking or neglecting the sanctifying influences which emanate from the Father of all lights. Need I, can I say more? But it is not the formation of your intellectual characters in your particular calling as scholars, which is the principal ground of anxiety in this ripening period of your age; the formation of your general characters as Christians still more urgently requires the same spiritual assistance. And as the ancient mariners commenced their voyages with invocation for the prospering influences of Heaven, so should that assistance be especially invoked, now that your barks, having fallen down the narrow rivers of childhood, are as it were mustering in the estuary of youth, and preparing to set forth on their more arduous voyage across the wide and tempestuous ocean of mature life.

Plato<sup>1</sup> has a most striking picture of the fatal consequences of the presumptuous temper which would induce men to reject such a guidance. Ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλεγόμενος τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὑβρεως, ὡς οὐτ' ἄρχοντας οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος Θεοῦ· καταλειφθεὶς δὲ σκιρτᾷ ταραττων πάνθ' ἅμα. καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναι τις· μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχών

<sup>1</sup> De Legibus, lib. iv. (Edit. Stephani, tom. i. p. 416.)



τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτήν τῇ δίκῃ, ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησε.

“ But whosoever, being elate with presumptuous confidence and inflamed in his soul at once with youth, ignorance and arrogance, esteems himself to need neither ruler nor guide, but rather to be competent to guide others, such an one is *deserted and abandoned by God*: and thus deserted he bounds on confounding all things. And although he may gain an apparent importance in the eyes of many; yet after no long interval, overtaken by a sentence of which the justice cannot be called in question, he subverts alike himself, his house, and the state of which he is a member.”

But on this subject I cannot so fully express what I feel in any language of my own, as by borrowing the words of one himself distinguished equally as a scholar and a Christian, the learned and pious Heber, with a quotation from whom I shall now conclude.

“ The warfare which the Christian is enjoined to wage with himself, is as endless and universal as the Platonic strife of principles. It is not sufficient that we purchase by the surrender of a single vice a liberty for every other. It is not enough that we be occasionally abstinent, or that we refrain from overt actions, while the inward corruption remains unheeded and unknown.

“ The free-will offering of ourselves; the subjugation of our entire affections and propensities; the confinement of those thoughts whose wanderings are open to the eyes of Him who reads the soul; the government of those winged words over which, to borrow the remarkable expressions of Plato (so

nearly accordant in sense with the declaration of our blessed Lord), the avenging angel of Justice watches,—*διότι κούφων καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη ζημία, πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐτάχθη Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος*<sup>1</sup>; a devotion consistent and uniform; a faith which faileth not; a love which thinketh no evil; a courage which can support the contempt of man, and which can dare to forgive those injuries which to endure is agony;—these are the daily struggles to which the Christian soldier is liable, and this the steep and thorny path which alone leads to glory! And for these things who is of himself sufficient? What knowledge, what faith, what hope or fear shall stimulate our feeble powers to a task so far beyond their forces, if His powers do not sustain us, from whose mercy seat all power and wisdom flow; who gives us ‘grace’, if we believe his Scriptures, ‘to help in time of need’; and will not withhold, we learn from the same Divine authority, ‘His Holy Ghost from those who ask him faithfully’<sup>2</sup> ? ”

<sup>1</sup> Plato de Leg. lib. iv.

<sup>2</sup> Heber’s Bampton Lectures, p. 357.

## APPENDIX TO PART III.

*On the Doctrine of a Trinity as ascribed to Plato.*

I CANNOT conclude my observations on this subject, —especially as they are addressed to an Institution of which classical knowledge, and consequently the history of the ancient philosophical sects, forms one of the principal pursuits,—without adverting in a few words to the tenets sometimes ascribed to Plato, bearing a fancied analogy to the Christian mystery of the Trinity.

The allusions to the Jewish commentators on their own Scriptures, introduced at the close of our examination of the evidence of the Old Testament in our third Lecture, have, moreover, already led us to speak of Philo Judæus, an Alexandrian adherent of the Platonic school: so that we may hence, by an easy transition, pass to the opinions of its founder<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> An admirable Dissertation “on the Trinity of Plato,” &c., was published by the Rev. C. Morgan, London, 1795; but it is now so scarce, that although I earnestly sought for it for more than a year, (having seen it mentioned with deserved commendation,) I was unable to procure it till I had completed the above article, subsequently I found our views so closely agree, that I have preferred leaving what I had written unal-

To that founder some notion of the doctrine of a Divine Trinity has sometimes, but I am persuaded most erroneously, been attributed. An early father of the Church indeed, Justin Martyr, appears to have led the way in this unfounded and injudicious course; a natural but weak desire to recommend the Christian faith, which he had adopted to the Gentiles, by exhibiting an apparent resemblance between some of its tenets and the opinions of their own admired philosophers, appears to have strongly influenced him, and to have carried him far beyond the just bounds to which such a practice can justifiably be extended. We may, indeed, justly point out in many things the analogy between the conclusions of an enlightened natural reason, and the truths authoritatively enforced by Revelation. But then this must obviously be confined to such general truths as the natural arguments for the existence and perfection of the Deity, the conscious conviction of human weakness, and the acknowledgment of the necessity of Divine assistance. But Justin Martyr went far beyond this, and endeavoured forcibly to accommodate, by a strained construction, some of the most obscure passages of the Attic philosopher, to an imaginary resemblance to the peculiar mysteries of Christianity. The consequence has been, that he is accused of doing the direct reverse of what he really has done; his actual fallacy in the

tered, as an independent testimony on a disputed point, to incorporating any of his more able elucidations. It is greatly to be desired that this excellent work, without which any theological collection must be incomplete, should be reprinted by one of our Universities.

forcible accommodation of Platonism to Christianity has led to the suspicion that he had accommodated Christianity in this respect to Platonism. But some more recent writers have been seduced into still more unfounded and extravagant representations on this subject, misled by the authority of the later Platonicians, Plotinus, Iamblichus, &c.; who, as we shall presently see, were in the familiar habit of corrupting the doctrines of their Attic master by the interpolation of extraneous notions, the more mystical the better, which they borrowed more especially from the Christian sects then rising more and more into notice, and overthrowing in their progress the vain fabrics of Gentile Philosophy, whose last advocates imagined that they might most effectually defend their sinking cause, by borrowing weapons from the party whose opposition they found so prevailing.

In this spirit, by the most forced perversion of some of his most obscure and mysterious expressions, the last of those who called themselves by the name of Plato extracted a representation of three Divine hypostases exactly parallel to the Christian scheme.

In the enthusiasm which accompanied the revival of literature, some of its most ardent admirers pursued the cause with a degree of fanatical extravagance which, on such a subject, appears almost incredible. Ficinus especially seems to have regarded the restoration of what he *supposed* to be the Platonic Philosophy (for he was far from possessing sufficient extent or accuracy of knowledge or critical sagacity to distinguish the genuine system from these adsciti-

tious interpolations) as the æra of a new revelation, in his opinion apparently far superior to the Christian. In his chamber was placed an image of Plato, as his tutelary saint, with a lamp, in sign of religious homage, always burning before it; and even the less extravagant seemed firmly persuaded that in these noted writings all useful knowledge and truth were embodied. So long and widely did this spirit prevail that it seems to have tintured the minds of some scholars, even of a later age and better school, and who were perhaps almost unconscious of its influence. Hence many of the authors of a former century appear, most injudiciously, to have imagined that they were conferring a benefit on Christian Theology if they could illustrate it by pointing out the coincidence of its doctrines with the tenets of Gentile Philosophy; and such writers were especially fond of placing the fictitious Platonic Trinity in a prominent point of view. An effect followed which they apparently little foresaw, though it might seem sufficiently obvious to a judgment endowed with a slight degree of penetration. The opponents of the Trinitarian doctrine readily enough admitted their premises, *that such was the doctrine of the Platonic schools*: but from hence they drew the conclusion that it was a *corruption introduced* into the Christian system by those who, like Justin and Origen, had passed over from these schools to the faith, and whose superior acquirements of course increased their influence. Now had the real facts of the case been such as they were most inadvertently represented to be, I must candidly confess that this supposition would appear to offer the only probable explanation

of them; but I shall endeavour to show that the actual state of the case is far otherwise.

As to Plato and his predecessors, Timæus and Parmenides, a tertiary arrangement as a convenient division of many branches of human science was often resorted to, in the same manner as in the early fragments of the Cambro-British bards, we find them dividing every subject into triads; thus Laertius cites triads of τὸ ἀγαθόν, of Friendship, of Justice of Science, of Music, of Beauty, of the Soul, of Arts, of Government, &c. &c., which he ascribes to Plato. To their metaphysical cosmogony they undoubtedly often applied a similar division: thus, Timæus ascribes the origin of things to Ἰδέα, the archetypal conception in the Divine mind, and to Ὑλη, or matter; these are represented as being united, and producing as their offspring the sensible universe, thus completing a triad of principles. The metaphysical cosmogony of Plato (which is most fully, though still with sufficient obscurity, detailed in his dialogue inscribed with the name of the preceding philosopher, who is introduced as the main interlocutor,) is distinguished by a character very similar to the above though differing in its exact application. His view is, that the one great first principle of existence, Τὸ ὂν and Τὸ ἐν who seems *himself* to be represented as the δημιουργός, or creator, resolved to reduce into order and fashion matter which had previously itself existed in a chaotic state from eternity; (for this is the nearest approach of this school to the idea of creation, which never in their system involved the notion of calling matter itself into existence from nothing.) Thus resolved, *ille opifex rerum*,



*mundi melioris origo*, commenced his work by impressing on his intellectual conceptive power, λογισμὸς, the archetypal forms, ἰδέας, which were to serve as models for the material things to be fashioned: then determining that the best and highest state of the future universe would be to give it the nature of a ζῶον ἑμψυχον, ‘a living being animated by a soul,’ he infused into it such a living soul; this general view of the universe being nearly identical with that described in the lines of Pope:

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole,  
Whose body nature is, and God the soul.”

For this ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου, ‘soul of the universe,’ as emanating from the Deity, was of course partly Divine, although partly blended with another and material principle; and, indeed, to the human soul and the natural elements, as Divine emanations, a kind of derivative godhead was also attributed.

The production of this mundane soul does indeed present some verbal analogy to the doctrine of a trinal unity. The Deity, we are told, first took some of the Divine indivisible and unchangeable essence; then of the material and divisible; uniting with these a third middle substance, compounded of both; thus ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἓν, ‘forming one nature out of three.’ But here the analogy is obviously only verbal, for this triad is not a triad of the Divine nature, but a triad of universal nature, including matter. Plato adds the exact definite proportions of this strange chemical compound.

A strange mystical passage, in an epistle of Plato to Dionysius, is also sometimes cited: he himself

calls it ænigmatical; and I willingly confess myself not Œdipus sufficient to elicit any intelligible solution. The words run thus: "But I must communicate this to you in ænigmas, in order that if any mischance should happen to this letter by land or by water, no one that reads may be able to understand it. The case is thus: All things are around the universal king (*περὶ τῶν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ*), and all things are on account of him (*καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα*), and he is the cause of all that is lovely (*ἐκεῖνος αἰτία πάντων τῶν καλῶν*), and a second around secondary things (*δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα*), and a third around tertiary (*καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα*)."

I can only say that the philosopher has here effectually guarded against the misfortune he seems to apprehend so much—the possibility of being understood by any readers. Serranus, indeed, one of the ablest editors of Plato, has attempted an explanation, and supposes it to intend the universal diffusion of the Divine power pervading all things, and alone giving efficacy to all the secondary and ultimate causes of nature; interpreting it, that as the first cause, the Deity is connected with all primary effects; he is likewise, as the source of power to every second cause, connected with secondary effects; and in like manner with the tertiary or ultimate causes and effects.

A passage from the Philebus, inculcating the emanation of the human soul from the Divine mind in these terms: *Νοῦς ἐστὶ γενούσσης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου*, 'the mind is the offspring of the universal cause,' has been absurdly perverted as equivalent with the

Christian doctrine that the λόγος, or word, is the Son of God.

In like manner the discussion concerning the *summum bonum* in the sixth book of the Republic has been misapplied. Plato here considers this good in its highest sense to be synonymous with the Divine nature; and all secondary good things, such as virtue, justice, whatever is lovely and honourable, &c., to derive their excellence from their participation in qualities emanating from the supreme good; and in his usual figurative style he describes them as a secondary good, the offspring of the supreme good. Here, again, those who were determined to find Christian truth *inter sylvas Academi*, fancied they discovered the filiation of the second person. The whole system of Plato may be sufficiently collected from the Timæus, the Philebus, and Epinomis: of these the first is the most mystically metaphysical and obscure; and the last, which contains a beautiful statement of the natural evidences of Theology, is the most clear and interesting.

Now from the more mystical of the passages above cited, which I confess, if I dared, I would willingly call unintelligible jargon, the later Platonists thus contrived to coin their Trinity of ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις, which, (although the terms may be fairly considered as naturally denoting only primary substances, as Augustin translates the phrase, *tres principales substantiæ*,) I am rather persuaded were borrowed in imitation of the employment of the word hypostasis in the Christian Controversies. The first hypostasis of these late Platonicians was of course τὸ ὄΝ and τὸ ἔΝ, to which they assigned the Christian title

αὐτόθεος. The second hypostasis they made out of his intellectual conception, λογισμὸς, as embracing the archetypal ideas, which they personified and represented as an emanation from the first cause. To this emanation they even assigned the Christian idea of filiation : and they represented this λογισμὸς as instrumentally the δημιουργός. But in Plato himself we shall look in vain for any such personification of the λογισμὸς as implying anything beyond an attribute of the "ON, who himself is there undoubtedly represented as the great *demiurgic* principle. Out of the mundane soul they framed a third hypostasis, to which of course they assigned a parallel place, and often the very title of the *Divine Spirit* of the Christian scheme. Ammonius, Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius were the great promulgators of figments of this kind, which, however, at once betray their supposititious origin ; for while all these writers profess to record the Trinity of Plato, no two of them exactly agree in the hypostases which they introduce ; which, as Mosheim has well remarked, sufficiently proves *nihil certi habuisse hos homines quod sequerentur, sed id unum spectasse, ut non secus ac Christiani tria haberent principia, et trinum veluti Deum, quocunque demum modo.*

In order to account for this strange system of fiction and forgery prevailing among a sect calling itself philosophical, we must consider more fully the character and condition of the later Platonic school, or, as it also named itself, the Eclectic : the latter title was adopted from its habit of selecting and intermingling in its system the tenets of other philosophical sects, and even of many of the oriental super-

stitutions, which flocked together in the great emporium Alexandria, where it principally flourished. Many of its notions were thus borrowed from the oriental tenets of Zoroaster, &c. ; but it was principally blended with the doctrines ascribed to Pythagoras, whence it was also often called the Pythagorean Platonic school. Now the Modern restorers of the Pythagorean name, from the time of Augustus downwards, appear to have aimed at celebrity by the reputation of profound skill in the occult sciences, as much as from the researches of any true philosophy. It seems probable that the absurd fables concerning their master's miraculous powers, preserved at a later period in the marvellous legend of Iamblichus, such as the story of his appearing at the Olympic games with a golden thigh, of his suddenly vanishing and instantly reappearing many miles distant, &c., originated at this time. We know that Anaxilaus, one of the chiefs of the sect, was banished by Augustus from Rome and Italy for his pretension to magical acts.

But the most notorious of this class was Apollonius of Tyana, born towards the latter part of the first century. The genuine miracles of Christianity were already beginning to expand their fame through the Roman world, and to shake alike the fanes of Polytheism and the schools of Philosophy ; and it seems probable that the marvels attributed to this celebrated impostor were for the most part hashed up to provide for this encounter by the pretension to rival claims ; such at least we know was the purpose to which they were afterwards expressly applied ; and the nature of the fictions occasionally seems to betray

a palpable imitation ; thus we find a celestial messenger employed to announce to his mother, while pregnant, that she bore a Divine infant in her womb ; —and when he entered on his philosophical career, he announced himself to men as a superior dæmon. But it would be tedious to follow the tissue of ridiculous fables interwoven into his history by Philostratus, about a century and a half after his death. Now it was in the steps of these predecessors that the Sophists who in the middle of the third century revived the Platonic discipline, coupling it with that of these later Pythagoreans, professed to walk ; and their peculiar pretensions to the mysteries of Theurgy favoured their rival claims in the occult sciences. The mystical doctrines of Plato himself seem to have afforded a suitable opening to these fanciful pretensions, for we find him representing the general ideas of things, not as abstractions of the human intellect, but as conceptions in, and emanations from, the Divine mind. By an assiduous contemplation of these, therefore, he believed we could ascend to the intimate knowledge of the first cause ; for which, habits of complete abstraction from the objects of sense, and an entire devotion of the mind to the pure objects of intellect, were necessary, “ *Quod unum dogma,*” as Brucker well observes, “ *satis prodit quam fanaticam sit Platonis philosophia, et quod tota enthusiasmo faveat.*” His later disciples extended this tendency to its utmost point. By such mental abstractions, assisted by mysterious purgations and other rites, they maintained that it was possible to acquire an intimate intercourse with superior spiritual intelligences, and thus to obtain, through this intercourse,

a considerable degree of supernatural power;—such was Theurgy. The first distinguished leader of the revived Platonic sect, blended with the various mixtures to which I have before alluded, was Ammonius, who flourished about 240: he was bred in the Christian faith, from which however he appears to have apostatized, as it seems impossible to reconcile his conduct or opinions as a philosopher with his continuing even any outward profession of that faith. It was, however, obviously his object to reform the new Platonism into some resemblance with the purer doctrines which he had learnt among the Christians; and his endeavour throughout appears to have been to impart to the new philosophy, or rather, as Brucker justly terms it, new religion, which he constructed out of such various materials, such a character as might present a rivalry to Christianity. From such a source the later Platonic doctrines flowed. Plotinus was the disciple of Ammonius, and his immediate successor in the Platonic chair, a dignity sufficiently profitable to be defended by the arts of a kind of priestcraft rather than philosophy; for we read that great men and senators, becoming his followers, supported him with lavish gifts and expenditure. He claimed to be a great proficient in Theurgy, and professed to be often rapt in celestial vision of the Deity. I need not trace the long succession of the Platonic school through Amelius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, whom I have before quoted as the historian of Pythagoras, Proclus, Marinus, and Damascius, to most of whom the preceding observations will equally apply. Brucker has well described the general character of the sect, especially its imitation of Christ-



ianity, derived from its founder the apostate Ammonius. I have before shown how far this principle operated in the formation of a fictitious Platonic Trinity: thus, Iamblichus, professing to deliver the doctrines of the Egyptians concerning the principles of things, describes a secondary Deity, emanating from the first, and yet co-equal with him, *μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς, προούσιος, καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας*, ‘unity from the one, before all [created] existence, and [himself] the beginning of this existence,’ in such terms that one would rather fancy oneself to be reading a paragraph of Athanasius than the tenets of any Gentile school. And in Plotinus, Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Simplicius, we find the peculiar phrases of the Christian Scriptures, *Σωτὴρ, ἀνακαίνωσις, παλιγγενεσία, φωτισμὸς*, and very many others, previously unknown to philosophers, of perpetual occurrence. Although, Origen, indeed, and some other Alexandrian Christians, were connected with this sect,—and certainly, so far as this limited influence extended, Christianity could have derived no benefit from the unhallowed intercourse with Philosophy, and least of all with such a philosophy as this,—I trust I have sufficiently shown which party was likely to borrow its doctrines from the other. On this subject I would especially refer you to the account of the Eclectic sect in Brucker’s *Institutiones Historiæ Philosophiæ*, and to Mosheim’s very interesting Essay *de Studio Ethnicorum Christianos imitandi*, in vol. i. *Dissertationum ad Historiam Ecclesiasticam pertinentium*.

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
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